Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The eight plaintiffs in this action (collectively, “Sharp”) are former employees of apparel manufacturer S&S Activewear (“S&S”). Seven are women, and one is a man. Sharp alleges that S&S permitted its managers and employees to routinely play “sexually graphic, violently misogynistic” music throughout its 700,000-square-foot warehouse in Reno, Nevada. Sharp eventually filed suit, alleging that the music and related conduct created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district court granted S&S’s motion to dismiss and denied leave to amend the music claim, reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The court countenanced S&S’s argument that the fact that “both men and women were offended by the work environment” doomed Sharp’s Title VII claim.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal. The panel disagreed with the district court’s reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal, with prejudice and without leave to amend, of Plaintiffs’ music-based claim and instructed the district court to reconsider, on remand, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleadings in light of two key principles: First, harassment, whether aural or visual, need not be directly targeted at a particular plaintiff in order to pollute a workplace and give rise to a Title VII claim. Second, the challenged conduct’s offensiveness to multiple genders is not a certain bar to stating a Title VII claim. View "STEPHANIE SHARP, ET AL V. S&S ACTIVEWEAR, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff City of Portsmouth, New Hampshire Police Commission/Police Department (the City) appealed a superior court's denial of the City’s request to modify, correct, or vacate an arbitrator’s award of backpay to Aaron Goodwin, a police officer who was previously employed by the City and who was a member of defendant Portsmouth Ranking Officers Association, NEPBA, Local 220 (the Union). The arbitration arose from a grievance filed by the Union challenging Goodwin’s termination. The arbitrator found that the City wrongfully terminated Goodwin and awarded him approximately twenty-six months of backpay. The superior court confirmed the arbitrator’s termination decision and backpay award. On appeal, the City argued the arbitrator committed plain mistake because she failed to correctly apply the after-acquired-evidence doctrine in determining the amount of the backpay award. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the City that the arbitrator committed a plain mistake of law in reaching the backpay award, it reversed in part, vacated the superior court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s award, and remanded. View "City of Portsmouth Police Commission/Department v. Portsmouth Ranking Officers Association, NEPBA, Local 220" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) determining that Johnny Lee Sheldon's claim was compensable, that Contessa Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, was entitled to her attorney fees, and that a statutory penalty should be imposed against Accident Fund General Insurance Company, holding that the WCC did not err.Sheldon was rendered incapacitated and mentally incompetent after a workplace accident. Because Accident Fund General Insurance Company refused to accept liability for Sheldon's workers' compensation claim Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, petitioned the WCC for a hearing. The WCC ruled that Accident Fund was liable for Sheldon's injuries and that Bryer was entitled to attorney fees and a statutory penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err when it (1) ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled during the time that Sheldon had no appointed guardian; (2) found that substantial credible evidence supported the WCC's finding that Sheldon was working with argon when the pressure relief valve burst; and (3) awarded attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-611 and by imposing a penalty against Accident Fund under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-2907. View "Bryer v. Accident Fund General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

While an Illinois State Police (ISP) lieutenant, Dunn was assigned to the Illinois Gaming Board. According to ISP, federal agents informed the ISP that he was implicated in a federal criminal investigation into mortgage fraud. In 2014, the ISP placed him on restricted duty. ISP records reflected that Dunn was the “subject of a federal criminal felony investigation.” Dunn admits that he participated in a voluntary interview with federal investigators, but denies that he was under investigation. He claims that the ISP was never told that he was a “target.” According to ISP, it “could not obtain any additional documentation” before placing Dunn on restricted duty because of “limitations with federal grand jury regulations.” In 2016, Dunn filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against three individuals in their personal and official capacities, alleging that they had violated his right to due process without opportunity for a hearing by depriving him of a liberty interest in future occupational opportunities. He asserted that the defendants had notified third parties that ISP had stripped him of his law-enforcement authority. While the lawsuit was pending, Dunn retired while on restricted duty; he was categorized as “not in good standing” at retirement, which affected his eligibility to carry a concealed weapon.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Dunn lacked evidence that they publicly disclosed stigmatizing information about him. Public disclosure requires actual disclosure, but Dunn pointed to only the possibility of disclosure by FOIA requests or database searches. View "Dunn v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus and dismissing his complaint pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), holding that the superior court did not err.Plaintiff, a former employee of the City of East Providence, attempted to rescind an agreement he made with the City regarding, among other things, his retirement benefits and the issuance of a corrected W-2 to reflect his injured-on-duty status. The trial judge entered judgment for the City. Plaintiff then filed a complaint and petition for a writ of mandamus against his union asking the superior court to abrogate agreement regarding the period of his injured-on-duty status. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) several of Plaintiff's arguments were waived; and (2) this case was barred by res judicata. View "Jenkins v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zephryn Hammond appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant University of Vermont Medical Center on plaintiff’s claims of employment discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment in April 2019. In October 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant had discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff based on plaintiff’s race and disabilities in violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). The civil division concluded plaintiff had established a prima facie case that plaintiff’s termination was motivated by racial discrimination. However, it ruled that defendant had articulated a legitimate basis for the termination decision, namely, the performance issues identified in plaintiff’s evaluations and during the disciplinary process, and plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual. The court determined that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that plaintiff’s termination was the result of disability discrimination. Finally, the court concluded that the fact that plaintiff was terminated shortly after complaining of possible racial and disability discrimination created a prima facie case of retaliation, but that defendant offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination and plaintiff had failed to show that the stated reasons were false. It therefore granted summary judgment to defendant on each of plaintiff’s claims. Finding no reversible error in the civil division's judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hammond v. University of Vermont Medical Center" on Justia Law

Appellants are agricultural workers hired by strawberry growers (“the Growers”) to pick the fruit that was then turned over to the Appellees Red Blossom Sales, Inc. and Better Produce, Inc. (“the Marketers”) for distribution. Appellants sought to hold the Marketers liable for their wages as “client employers.” The Marketers cooled and sold the berries principally to large retail grocery chains. The Marketers conducted their cooling and distribution operations on premises that were close to but separate from the farms. The Growers stopped paying Appellants and later filed for bankruptcy. Appellants sued the Growers and the Marketers as joint employers under California and federal law. Appellants also sued the Marketers as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. The district court ruled for the Marketers on all theories. Appellants appeal only with respect to the Marketers’ liability under Section 2810.3.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Appellants were not performing labor within the Marketers’ “usual course of business” as defined by the statute. That term is defined as “the regular and customary work of a business, performed within or upon the premises or worksite of the client employer.” Given the particular facts of this case, the court concluded that Appellants’ work took place on the farms where the strawberries were grown, not on the premises or worksites of the Marketers. The Marketers are, therefore, not liable as client employers under California Labor Code Section 2810.3. View "LUIS MORALES-GARCIA, ET AL V. BETTER PRODUCE, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against The Gap, Inc. and its directors “derivatively on behalf of Gap.” Plaintiff’s action alleged that Gap violated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-9 by making false or misleading statements to shareholders about its commitment to diversity. Gap’s bylaws contain a forum-selection clause stating that the Delaware Court of Chancery “shall be the sole and exclusive forum for . . . any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation.” Lee nevertheless brought her putative derivative action in a California district court. The district court granted Gap’s motion to dismiss Lee’s complaint on forum nonconveniens ground.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The en banc court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that her right to bring a derivative Section 14(a) action is stymied by Gap’s forum-selection clause, which alone amounts to Gap “waiving compliance with a provision of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder.” The en banc court explained that the Supreme Court made clear in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), that Section 29(a) forbids only the waiver of substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act, not the waiver of a particular procedure for enforcing such duties. McMahon also disposes of Plaintiff’s argument that Gap’s forum-selection clause is void under Section 29(a) because it waives compliance with Section 27(a) of the Exchange Act, which gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over Section 14(a) claims. View "NOELLE LEE V. ROBERT FISHER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Glacier delivers concrete using trucks with rotating drums that prevent the concrete from hardening. After a collective-bargaining agreement between Glacier and the Union for its drivers expired, the Union called for a work stoppage on a morning it knew the company was mixing substantial amounts of concrete, loading batches into trucks, and making deliveries. The Union directed drivers to ignore Glacier’s instructions to finish deliveries in progress. Several drivers who had already left for deliveries returned with loaded trucks. By initiating emergency maneuvers to offload the concrete, Glacier prevented significant damage to its trucks. All the concrete mixed that day became useless.Glacier sued the Union, alleging common-law conversion and trespass to chattels. The Union argued that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 157, protected the drivers’ conduct. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that the NLRA preempted Glacier’s tort claims.The Supreme Court reversed. The NLRA protects the right to strike but that right is not absolute; it does not shield strikers who fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect their employer’s property from foreseeable, aggravated, and imminent danger due to the sudden cessation of work. The risk of harm to Glacier’s trucks and concrete was foreseeable and serious; the Union executed the strike in a manner designed to achieve those results. Given the lifespan of wet concrete, Glacier could not batch it until a truck was ready to take it. By reporting for duty and pretending that they would deliver the concrete, the drivers prompted the creation of the perishable product and waited to walk off the job until the concrete was in the trucks. View "Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“Department”). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave. Plaintiff also raised a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. The court wrote that Plaintiff has forfeited any arguments as to the district court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of these grounds in his opening brief. Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant consideration because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. View "Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law