Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Longmont United Hospital (Longmont) petitioned for a review of the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), concluding that Longmont violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the National Nurses Organizing Committee/National Nurses United, AFL-CIO (Union). Longmont does not dispute that it refused to bargain with the Union. Instead, it challenges the representation election whereby a group of registered nurses at Longmont elected the Union as its exclusive collective bargaining representative.   The DC Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. The court reasoned that Longmont has not shown a basis to disturb the Hearing Officer’s credibility findings. Further, the court held that the Board correctly declined to relitigate issues in the enforcement proceeding that had been decided in the representation proceeding. The Board did not adjudicate the General Counsel’s request for compensatory relief, and, as a result, any challenge to the fact or measure of compensatory damages is premature. View "Longmont United Hospital v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer for allegedly underpaying him for overtime hours. Plaintiff worked in Florida, but he sued Waste Pro USA, Inc., and its subsidiary, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc., as one of several named plaintiffs in a purported collective action in the District of South Carolina. That court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it denied as moot his motion to sever his claims and transfer them to a district court in Florida. Instead of appealing or seeking other relief in the South Carolina court, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida, alleging the same claims. The Florida district court granted summary judgment in favor of Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida because it determined that Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff had “alternate ways of preserving his cause of action short of invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling.” He could have filed a motion for reconsideration of or for relief from the dismissal order and argued that transfer was in the interest of justice. He also could have appealed the dismissal. “The right to appeal generally is regarded as an adequate legal remedy [that] forecloses equitable relief.” The court wrote that a diligent plaintiff would have filed a protective action or pursued a legal remedy in the South Carolina proceeding. Further, to the extent Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if equitable tolling does not apply in this case, that is the consequence of his own failure to pursue his remedies at law. Equity will not intervene in such circumstances. View "Anthony Wright v. Waste Pro USA Inc, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, in his capacity as the finance director/treasurer for the Town of Smithfield, in this action challenging the calculation of a former employee's retirement benefits, holding that the court erred in concluding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Armand Beaudry worked as a firefighter for the Town for several years before he was placed on disability retirement benefits. The retirement benefits were governed by a pension system that constituted "an amalgamation of various documents." The case arose from a dispute over the calculation of Beaudry's benefits. Beaudry filed a complaint challenging the amount. The trial court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the hearing justice erred by finding that a challenged amendment to the plan was enforceable at the time of Beaudry's retirement, thus creating an administrative remedy that Beaudry failed to exhaust. View "Beaudry v. Rossi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting Larry Hedlund's motion seeking retrospective application of the amendments to Iowa's whistleblower-protection law, Iowa Code section 70A.28, holding that section 70A.28(5)(a) did not apply retrospectively to Hedlund's claims.Hedlund brought a lawsuit against the State asserting a claim for wrongful discharge under section 70A.28. While the lawsuit was pending, the legislature amended the statute to allow aggrieved employees to pursue damages beyond those allowed by the prior version of the statute. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion asserting that the new amendments applied retroactively to him. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the legislature made to express provision for retrospective application the amendments to chapter 70A.8 did not apply in this case. View "Hedlund v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (collectively, the Officers) worked as police officers for the City of Hoover, Alabama. They also served as military reservists. Over a two-decade span, the Officers were summoned to active-duty service a combined thirteen times. While away, Hoover did not provide the Officers the same holiday pay and accrued benefits that it gave employees on paid administrative leave. This disparate treatment prompted the Officers to sue Hoover under USERRA. And it led the district court to grant summary judgment for the Officers. On appeal, Hoover argued that the Officers are not similar to employees placed on paid administrative leave. Second, Hoover asserted that military leave is not comparable to paid administrative leave.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Hoover violated Section 4316(b)(1)(B) by not providing the Officers the same benefits on military leave that it afforded similar employees on paid administrative leave. The court concluded that the DOL’s interpretation of Section 4316(b)(1)(B) deserves deference. Thus, to the extent Congress spoke to the meaning of “status” and “pay,” the legislative history suggests that it did so in a way that defeats Hoover’s interpretation. Further, the court reasoned that had the Officers been placed on paid administrative leave instead of military leave, they would have received holiday pay and accrued benefits for each period of service, including those shorter than sixteen months. So, the district court should have found the two forms of leave comparable in duration. However, the court affirmed because the district court reached the correct conclusion. View "Thaddaeus Myrick, et al v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

In November 2013, plaintiff Philip Pantano, a mechanic employed by Container Services of New Jersey (CSNJ), was injured at work while attempting to move a heavy piece of industrial equipment. Lawrence Giamella, who was also working on the site that day, tried to help plaintiff move the equipment with a forklift; plaintiff’s foot was crushed in the process. Plaintiff collected workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, CSNJ. He and his wife also brought a personal injury action against numerous defendants, including Marine Transport, Inc. (MT). MT and CSNJ were related companies owned by the same person. The core of the parties’ dispute concerned which entity or entities employed Giamella at the time of the accident: MT, CSNJ, or both. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CSNJ because of the statutory bar established by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. MT also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not Giamella’s employer and was therefore not vicariously liable for his negligence. Although Giamella was on MT’s payroll, MT raised the affirmative defense that he was a “borrowed servant” or “special employee” working for CSNJ at the time of the accident, applying the multi-factor test set forth in Galvao v. G.R. Robert Construction Co., 179 N.J. 462 (2004). The pretrial judge denied MT’s motion. At the close of plaintiff’s case, MT moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, founded on the same borrowed-employee theory it had raised earlier in its summary judgment motion. The trial judge did not rule on the motion, reserving judgment for after the jury verdict. The jury awarded plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium. Pursuant to an agreement reached by counsel, the jury was asked to presume that MT was vicariously liable and was not asked to resolve the borrowed-employee question. Instead, counsel assented to have the court resolve the borrowed-employee argument through the mechanism of MT’s yet-to-be-decided Rule 4:40-1 motion. The trial judge vacated the verdict and awarded judgment to MT, concluding that Giamella was a borrowed employee working for CSNJ when the accident occurred. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the directed verdict, and reinstated the jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pantano v. New York Shipping Association" on Justia Law

The DRBA, a bi-state agency created by an interstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, hired Minor as its Deputy Executive Director in 2009 and terminated him in 2017. Minor, believing he was fired for his support of then-incoming New Jersey Governor Murphy, sued the DRBA and its Commissioners for violating his First Amendment right to political affiliation. The court rejected the Commissioners’ request for qualified immunity, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Minor’s responsibilities were purely administrative by the time he was dismissed so that the Commissioners were barred potentially by the First Amendment from firing Minor on account of his politics.The Third Circuit vacated. The district court correctly held that the right of certain employees not to be fired based on political affiliation was clearly established. However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Minor held such a position. The question of immunity must await the determination of facts at trial. Third Circuit precedent requires the district court to “analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each [Commissioner]” to learn more about whether each Commissioner could know that his specific conduct violated clearly established rights. View "Minor v. Delaware River & Bay Authority" on Justia Law

Twelve current and former Philadelphia police officers posted highly offensive Facebook messages that glorified violence and denigrated minority groups. The posts became part of an expose by a national online news organization. The officers, who were disciplined or terminated, alleged First Amendment retaliation.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of their suit, noting that it did not condone the officers’ conduct and that the city has an interest in protecting the public’s perception of its officers. There were material factual gaps concerning when certain posts were written and by whom and which posts were the basis of the disciplinary actions. With respect to causation, there was unsubstantiated speculation about the impact of the posts, some of which had been public for years. View "Fenico v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court awarding attorneys' fees after a medical doctor sued and lost against a hospital following its revocation of the doctor's medical staff and surgical privileges, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.Doctor, a surgeon, sued Hospital after his termination stemming from allegations that Doctor provided care that fell short of standard surgical practice. After a remand, all of Doctor's claims were dismissed. Thereafter, the circuit court awarded Hospital attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion for attorneys' fees was timely filed; and (2) Doctor was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Williams v. Baptist Health" on Justia Law

Rodney Dickenson brought a whistleblower case against the Benewah County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”), Benewah County Board of Commissioners, and former Benewah County Sheriff, David Resser (collectively, the “County”). BCSO told Dickenson that his employment was being terminated for violating law enforcement policy and ethics. Dickenson alleged his termination violated Idaho’s Whistleblower Act because he was terminated for secretly recording meetings with Sheriff Resser and Undersheriff Anthony Eells to document malfeasance and the illegal activities of some deputies. After unsuccessful attempts at administrative appeals, Dickenson filed a complaint in district court alleging wrongful termination from his employment as a sergeant, in violation of Idaho Code sections 6-2101-2109, “because he communicated in good faith, with reasonable basis in fact, regarding a violation or suspected violation of the law.” The County moved for summary judgment on Dickenson’s complaint, which the district court granted, concluding Dickenson could not show he was fired for engaging in a protected activity. Dickenson appealed, arguing: (1) disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment; (2) the question of causation should have been a question for the jury; and (3) that the district court erred in its interpretation of the Whistleblower Act. The Idaho Supreme Court found that while these three issues were clear from Dickenson's opening brief, the brief included practically no citations to the record to support his claims. Neither the recordings themselves nor a transcript of either meeting was in the record, and the Court was left to divine from Dickenson’s generalized or conclusory statements in his affidavit what was said. "This dilemma alone is not just problematic, but fatal to Dickenson’s position on appeal." The district court concluded that Dickenson did not “provide[] evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that he was terminated because he engaged in an activity protected by Idaho’s Whistleblower Act, and summary judgment [is] granted to defendants.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Dickenson v. Benewah County" on Justia Law