Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the State of Connecticut and the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO. The plaintiff, the state, sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating a union member to his employment as the director of student conduct at a state university. The defendant union sought to confirm the award. The grievant’s employment had been terminated in connection with a domestic dispute involving his wife. The university conducted its own investigation and subsequently informed the grievant that his employment was being terminated as a result of his off-duty conduct. The union contested the grievant’s discharge, and an arbitration hearing was held. The arbitrator concluded that the university did not have just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment and ordered his reinstatement.The state contended that the award violated public policy. The trial court rendered judgment granting the state’s application to vacate the award and denying the union’s motion to confirm the award, from which the union appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the arbitration award reinstating the grievant to his position of director of student conduct violated public policy. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the union’s motion to confirm the award and to deny the state’s application to vacate the award. View "State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty" on Justia Law

Samantha Howard, a pharmacist with Type I diabetes and hypoglycemic unawareness, began working at Bothwell Regional Medical Center, operated by the City of Sedalia, Missouri. Howard requested to keep food and drink at her desk, which was granted. Later, she requested to bring a service dog into the pharmacy to help her manage her diabetes. Bothwell denied this request, citing potential risks of contamination. Unable to agree on an alternative accommodation, Howard resigned and filed a lawsuit alleging that Bothwell's failure to make a reasonable accommodation violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The jury ruled in favor of Howard, awarding her compensatory and emotional damages. Bothwell appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. The court found that the case was governed by its recent decision in Hopman v. Union Pac. R.R., which clarified the definition of "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA. The court concluded that Howard failed to identify any employer-sponsored benefit or program to which she lacked access due to the absence of her service dog. The court ruled that providing a service dog at work so that an employee with a disability has the same assistance the service dog provides away from work is not a cognizable benefit or privilege of employment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Bothwell. View "Howard v. City of Sedalia, Missouri" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Elizabeth Schacht, a staff anesthesiologist and critical care physician at a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital complex in Colorado. In 2018, she was fired due to consistent and serious problems with her patient care, professionalism, and communication. The hospital Director deemed her performance as a potential imminent threat to patient welfare. After her dismissal, Dr. Schacht appealed to a VA Disciplinary Appeals Board, which upheld her discharge following a four-day evidentiary hearing. Dr. Schacht then filed an action in federal district court, challenging the Board's decision.The district court initially granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions for summary judgment. It rejected most of Dr. Schacht's procedural claims except her contention that the Board's failure to explain why it had excluded her additional evidence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for the Board to provide either an explanation for its evidentiary ruling or a revised decision. Upon remand, the Board explained that it had rejected Dr. Schacht's submission due to its late submission and irrelevance to the case. The district court accepted the Board's reasoning and granted summary judgment to the agency.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. It found that the Board's decision to reject Dr. Schacht's late submission was reasonable and not arbitrary. The court also held that the Board's decision to uphold Dr. Schacht's firing was not arbitrary or capricious as it adequately explained why it believed no alternative penalty would redress Dr. Schacht's unprofessional conduct. View "Schacht v. Lieberman" on Justia Law

The case involves Roman Sharikov, an employee of Philips Medical Systems MR, Inc., who was terminated after refusing to comply with the company's COVID-19 health and safety policies, including a vaccination mandate. Sharikov alleged that Philips discriminated against him because it regarded him as having a disability or a record of a disability and retaliated against him after he objected to the measures.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Sharikov's claims, stating that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that Philips' company-wide COVID safety and vaccine policies did not infringe on Sharikov's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court also concluded that Sharikov failed to plead a plausible retaliation claim because the company-wide policies that he failed to comply with, resulting in the termination of his employment, were in place before he began his alleged protected activity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court agreed that Philips' company-wide COVID-19 health and safety measures did not discriminate against Sharikov under the ADA. The court also found that Sharikov failed to establish a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination, thus failing to state a plausible retaliation claim. View "Sharikov v. Philips Medical Systems MR, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Cynthia Allen and Kristine Webb, who filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, AT&T Mobility Services, LLC, alleging pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. The district court denied their motion for class certification, and the plaintiffs settled with AT&T and voluntarily dismissed their case. The following day, Amanda Curlee, who claimed she would have been a member of the proposed class, sought to intervene in the case to appeal the denial of class certification. The district court allowed her to intervene, and she immediately appealed.The district court had denied the original plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and the plaintiffs subsequently settled with AT&T and voluntarily dismissed their case. The court had not addressed the merits of any plaintiff's discrimination claims. Amanda Curlee, who claimed she would have been a member of the proposed class, sought to intervene in the case to appeal the denial of class certification. The district court allowed her to intervene.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Curlee's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that there was no final decision as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the district court had not resolved the merits of any plaintiff's discrimination claims. The court held that Curlee, as an intervenor, must litigate her claims on the merits before she can appeal the denial of class certification. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Curlee's appeal because there was no final judgment in the case. View "Curlee v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the International Association of Firefighters, Local 1319, AFL-CIO (Local 1319) and the City of Palo Alto (the city). In 2011, the city, facing a budget crisis, proposed an amendment to its city charter to alter a provision requiring certain labor disputes with its public safety unions to be submitted to binding interest arbitration. The city council adopted a resolution proposing the amendment, which was subsequently approved by city voters as "Measure D". However, the city did not consult with Local 1319 before proposing the amendment, which both the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and the appellate court later determined was a violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).The trial court in the quo warranto proceedings agreed that the city violated the MMBA by enacting the resolution and submitting Measure D to the voters without prior good faith consultation with Local 1319. However, the trial court did not declare Measure D invalid. Instead, it issued a multi-step order that suspended the operation of the charter’s current dispute resolution procedures, required good faith consultation between the city and the public safety unions, and retained jurisdiction with the possibility of a future finding of invalidity of Measure D.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by not invalidating Measure D after finding that the city's submission of Measure D to the voters violated the MMBA. The appellate court directed the trial court on remand to enter a new judgment ordering the city to restore the pre-amendment portion of the city charter's article V, invalidating Measure D, and providing any other appropriate relief consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "P. ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

The case involves Bristol SL Holdings, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Sure Haven, Inc., a defunct drug rehabilitation and mental health treatment center, and Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company and Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc. Bristol alleged that Sure Haven's calls to Cigna verifying out-of-network coverage and seeking authorization to provide health services created independent contractual obligations. Cigna, however, denied payment based on fee-forgiving, a practice prohibited by the health plans. Bristol brought state law claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel against Cigna.The district court initially dismissed Bristol’s claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that Bristol had derivative standing to sue for unpaid benefits as Sure Haven’s successor-in-interest. On remand, the district court granted Cigna’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted Bristol’s state law claims.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Bristol’s state law claims were preempted by ERISA because they had both a “reference to” and an “impermissible connection with” the ERISA plans that Cigna administered. The court reasoned that Bristol’s claims were not independent of an ERISA plan because they concerned the denial of reimbursement to patients who were covered under such plans. The court also held that allowing liability on Bristol’s state law claims would interfere with nationally uniform plan administration, a central matter of plan administration. View "Bristol SL Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Absolute Healthcare, operating as Curaleaf, a company that runs medical marijuana dispensaries across the United States. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Curaleaf committed four unfair labor practices, including unlawfully firing an employee, Anissa Keane, for attempting to unionize a Curaleaf store in Gilbert, Arizona. The NLRB also ordered Curaleaf to read aloud to its Gilbert-based employees a notice describing the Board’s findings and to grant the union access to Curaleaf’s Gilbert store.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge who found in favor of the NLRB on all four charges. The judge ordered Curaleaf to reinstate Keane with backpay, to read aloud a notice of the unfair labor practice findings to Curaleaf Gilbert employees, and to grant the union access to Curaleaf Gilbert’s facilities any time Curaleaf spoke to its employees about unionization. Curaleaf appealed to the NLRB, challenging only the unlawful-discharge finding and the notice-reading and union-access remedies. A divided three-member panel of the NLRB affirmed the administrative law judge's decision.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court held that the NLRB's finding that Curaleaf unlawfully fired Keane was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also held that the NLRB's notice-reading and union-access remedies could not be enforced. However, the court granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement as to the three uncontested unfair labor practices. View "Absolute Healthcare v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In January 2020, Tiffany McClure, a probation officer, responded to a call for assistance during riots at the state penitentiary at Parchman. She alleges that the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) failed to pay her the promised overtime wages. This case is part of a series of actions filed by probation and parole officers seeking unpaid wages for their overtime work with the MDOC. The main question is whether Mississippi courts have jurisdiction to hear state employees’ claims against their employers for breach of contract.The MDOC argued that the Hinds County County Court erred by not dismissing McClure’s claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They contended that employment-related grievances are exclusively reviewed by the Employee Appeals Board, and any non-grievable claims have no right to relief under state law. McClure agreed that her claims were non-grievable, but asserted that the Hinds County County Court was the only forum that could provide relief.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court’s ruling, stating that the Mississippi Constitution vests original jurisdiction with the circuit courts, and there are no adequate administrative remedies for McClure’s breach of contract and constitutional claims. However, the court noted that its holding was narrowly tailored to the specific facts of this case. The court also affirmed the Hinds County County Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the matter and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Department of Corrections v. McClure" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Rhita Bercy, filed a hostile work environment claim against her employer, the City of Phoenix, alleging a single course of conduct that continued over a period of nearly two years. She filed her bankruptcy petition within that two-year period. The claim was based on conduct that occurred both before and after she filed her bankruptcy petition. The parties agreed that a claim based on conduct before the petition, and any damages resulting from that conduct, belonged to the bankruptcy estate. The question was whether Bercy could recover damages on that claim for alleged harm arising from discriminatory conduct that occurred after she filed for bankruptcy.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the City's motion for summary judgment, holding that Bercy lacked standing to pursue her claim. The court reasoned that because Bercy could have brought her claim at the time of her bankruptcy petition, and any subsequent damages were sufficiently rooted in prebankruptcy incidents, the entire claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Bercy's hostile work environment claim was sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and thus belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, only the bankruptcy trustee had standing to sue on the claim. The court clarified that the Bankruptcy Code provides a “fresh start” to the debtor at discharge, but not “a continuing license to violate the law.” View "Bercy v. City of Phoenix" on Justia Law