Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A small business that imports and sells shea butter hired an individual in 2017 to provide communication, marketing, and sales support, particularly focusing on social media. The individual worked under a contract that labeled her as an independent contractor, but after the contract expired, she continued to perform a mix of social media, event, and administrative tasks. She stopped working regularly for the business in September 2018. A dispute arose over unpaid wages, with the individual claiming she was owed for work performed, and the business asserting that she was paid for all work under the terms of the contract.The Office of Wage-Hour (OWH) initially determined that the business owed the individual back wages, liquidated damages, and a statutory penalty. The business appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), arguing that the individual was an independent contractor. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the individual was an employee, not an independent contractor, and awarded damages. On the first petition for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the individual worked in both capacities—sometimes as an employee and sometimes as an independent contractor—and remanded for OAH to determine the hours worked in each capacity and adjust the damages accordingly. On remand, the ALJ used a percentage-based approach to allocate hours and payments between employee and independent contractor work, ultimately awarding the individual approximately $26,550 in unpaid wages and damages, plus a statutory penalty.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reviewing the case again, affirmed the OAH’s amended final order. The court held that under the current D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, employees may pursue claims for disputed wages even if the employer paid conceded wages. The court also held that, due to inadequate recordkeeping by the employer, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to disprove the employee’s evidence regarding hours worked and payments received. View "Shea Yeleen Health & Beauty, LLC v. Office of Wage-Hour" on Justia Law

A former sales representative for a pharmaceutical company alleged that the company engaged in an aggressive campaign to market one of its drugs, Vraylar, for uses not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), specifically for substance abuse and major depressive disorder (MDD). The representative, who was responsible for promoting the drug to medical providers, claimed that the company trained its sales force to encourage off-label prescriptions and incentivized providers to prescribe Vraylar for these unapproved uses. He further asserted that he faced adverse employment actions, such as loss of promotion and increased workload, after raising concerns internally about the legality and compliance of these marketing practices.After the representative filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the government declined to intervene. The plaintiff then amended his complaint, dropping his direct fraud claim and proceeding solely on a theory of retaliation under 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff’s internal complaints to the company focused on regulatory noncompliance rather than fraud against the government, and thus did not put the employer on notice of protected activity under the FCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, to state a claim for FCA retaliation, an employee must plausibly allege that the employer was on notice that the employee was attempting to prevent fraud against the government, not merely regulatory violations. Because the plaintiff’s communications only referenced regulatory and policy concerns, and did not suggest government fraud, the court found the notice requirement unmet. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Lewis v AbbVie Inc." on Justia Law

Reginald Brown, who was serving as interim police chief in Monroe, Louisiana, was dismissed from the Monroe Police Department following his handling of an excessive force complaint against officers. The incident involved a body camera recording showing an officer kicking a suspect, Timothy Williams, during an arrest. Brown was informed of the complaint and took immediate steps, including placing officers on administrative leave and notifying city officials. However, questions arose regarding the timing of Brown’s decision to request the Louisiana State Police to conduct the criminal investigation, particularly whether the delay was influenced by an upcoming mayoral election. Subsequent internal reviews included an interrogation and a polygraph examination, which Brown was found to have failed, leading to allegations of dishonesty and improper delay for personal benefit.Brown appealed his termination to the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, which, after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, found cause for discipline but determined that termination was excessive. The board reduced the penalty to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The City of Monroe appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court, which reinstated Brown’s termination, finding his conduct egregious and the board’s reduction arbitrary. Brown then appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, which reversed the district court and reinstated the board’s ninety-day suspension, holding that the district court lacked authority to modify the board’s disciplinary decision once it found the board acted in good faith for cause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. The court clarified that judicial review of the board’s disciplinary decisions is limited to determining whether the board acted in good faith for cause, and courts may not modify the board’s chosen discipline if that standard is met. The Supreme Court held that the board’s decision to reduce Brown’s discipline was reasonably supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "MONROE MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD VS. BROWN" on Justia Law

A professional musician employed by the Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra was placed on furlough in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In December 2020, she developed severe symptoms, including dizziness and tinnitus, after contracting COVID-19, which rendered her unable to perform. She was rehired by the orchestra in September 2021 but soon went on sick leave because her symptoms persisted. In February 2022, she applied for long-term disability benefits under her employer’s group policy, stating that her last day of work was in March 2020 and that her disability began in December 2020.The insurance company denied her claim, reasoning that she was not an “active, full-time employee” at the time her disability began, as required by the policy. The claimant appealed internally, submitting new information that she had returned to work in September 2021 but was again unable to perform due to her illness. The insurer treated this as a fundamentally different claim, maintaining its denial and advising her to file a new application based on the later date.She then filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that she was not eligible for benefits based on her initial application and that her new information constituted a separate claim for a different loss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the claimant was not eligible for benefits for a disability beginning in December 2020, and that her subsequent information regarding a September 2021 onset constituted a new claim, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review. View "Moratz v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Eight firefighters employed by a regional fire and rescue agency in Washington State requested religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued in August 2021 by the state’s governor, which required healthcare providers to be vaccinated. The fire agency, which provides emergency medical and fire services to a large population, including a state prison, allowed employees to seek religious accommodations. After reviewing the requests and consulting with union representatives, the agency determined it could not accommodate unvaccinated firefighters in their roles without imposing an undue hardship on its operations, citing health and safety concerns, operational burdens, and potential financial risks. The firefighters were offered the option to use accrued leave or take a leave of absence, with the possibility of returning if the mandate changed.The firefighters sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Washington Law Against Discrimination for failure to accommodate their religious beliefs. The district court assumed the firefighters had bona fide religious objections but found that accommodating their requests would impose an undue hardship on the agency, given the increased risk of COVID-19 transmission, the large number of exemption requests, and the inadequacy of proposed alternatives such as masking and testing. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the fire agency.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the standard clarified in Groff v. DeJoy, an employer demonstrates undue hardship when the burden of accommodation is substantial in the context of its business. The court found that the fire agency had shown substantial health, operational, and financial costs associated with accommodating the exemption requests, and that the proposed alternatives were insufficient. The summary judgment for the agency was affirmed. View "PETERSEN V. SNOHOMISH REGIONAL FIRE AND RESCUE" on Justia Law

A special education teacher with a long and distinguished career in an Illinois public school district was involuntarily transferred from one elementary school to another at age 52. After the transfer, she alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment at her new school. She claimed that she was assigned a disproportionate number of challenging students, unfairly criticized, denied adequate classroom support, and intimidated by an administrator. She believed these actions were motivated by her age, although she acknowledged that no one made any explicit age-related remarks.After she filed a complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the school district. The district court found that she had not produced evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the alleged harassment was either objectively hostile or based on her age.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court assumed, without definitively deciding, that hostile work environment claims are cognizable under the ADEA. However, it held that the teacher failed to present sufficient evidence that any of the conduct she experienced was motivated by age-based animus. The court found her assertions to be speculative and unsupported by direct or circumstantial evidence. As a result, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that there was no reasonable basis to infer age-based workplace harassment under the ADEA. View "Blumenshine v. Bloomington School District No. 87" on Justia Law

A black employee of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs alleged that his supervisors failed to provide adequate training, assigned him tasks outside his job description, denied him the ability to work from home during the early COVID-19 pandemic while allowing a white employee to do so, and pressured him to write a false report about another black employee. He also described incidents where he was charged as absent without leave, received a negative performance appraisal, was suspended for workplace conduct, and was assigned to less desirable work shifts. The employee claimed these actions were motivated by racial discrimination and retaliation for prior protected activity.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. The district court found that the employee failed to establish that he suffered an adverse employment action based on race, that the alleged comparators were similarly situated, or that the employer’s stated reasons for its actions were pretextual. The court also concluded that the evidence did not support a claim of a racially hostile work environment or unlawful retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the employee did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding disparate treatment, hostile work environment, or retaliation under Title VII. Specifically, the court found that the negative performance appraisal and other alleged actions did not constitute adverse employment actions affecting the terms or conditions of employment, that there was no evidence of similarly situated comparators, and that the employer’s explanations were not shown to be pretextual. The court also determined that the alleged conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to establish a hostile work environment, and that the timing and evidence did not support a claim of retaliation. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Woods v. Collins" on Justia Law

A train conductor and other women working at a Nebraska railyard alleged that they were subjected to frequent sex-based harassment by coworkers and supervisors. The allegations included unwelcome sexual advances, derogatory comments about women’s abilities, sexually explicit jokes, persistent sexual graffiti in work areas, unsanitary restroom conditions intentionally created to harass women, and the display of sexually explicit images. The employer’s supervisors allegedly failed to address complaints, sometimes responding dismissively or with humor. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated these claims, found reasonable cause to believe that Title VII had been violated, and, after unsuccessful conciliation, filed suit on behalf of the named conductor and a group of similarly aggrieved women.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed the EEOC’s claims on behalf of the group of women, holding that the EEOC failed to plead that the group suffered the same type of harassment as the named conductor and did not adequately specify the class size. The court later granted summary judgment to the employer on the individual claim, finding that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment under Title VII, and that conduct outside the statutory limitations period was not part of a continuing violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed both the dismissal and the summary judgment. The appellate court held that the district court erred by imposing heightened pleading requirements not supported by law, and that the EEOC’s complaint plausibly alleged a hostile work environment for the group. The Eighth Circuit also found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment and whether pre- and post-limitations conduct formed a continuing violation. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

The appellant, a former Senior Vice President of Corporate Development at a pharmaceutical company, had a longstanding history of back and hip problems, leading him to stop working in 2014. He received long-term disability benefits under an insurance plan administered by USAble Life for several years. In 2019, USAble terminated his benefits, citing evidence of significant improvements in his physical condition, including weight loss, increased exercise, travel, and other activities inconsistent with total disability. The termination was based on updated medical records, surveillance, and reviews by independent physicians, despite continued support for disability from some of the appellant’s treating doctors.After the termination, the appellant pursued multiple rounds of internal appeals with USAble, submitting additional medical and vocational evidence. USAble obtained further independent medical reviews, which consistently concluded that the appellant was no longer disabled under the plan’s definition. The appellant then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which granted summary judgment in favor of USAble, finding that the insurer’s decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo but applied a deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard to USAble’s benefits determination, as required under ERISA. The First Circuit held that USAble’s decision to terminate benefits was reasoned and supported by substantial evidence, that USAble properly applied the plan’s definition of disability, and that it adequately explained its disagreement with the appellant’s treating physicians. The court also found that any structural conflict of interest was sufficiently mitigated. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of USAble. View "Bernitz v. USAble Life" on Justia Law

A professor was hired by a university in 2014 as a tenure-track Assistant Professor with a starting salary at the lowest end of the pay scale for her department. Over the next several years, she was denied promotions, demoted to at-will status, and claims she was paid less than male colleagues. She alleges that these actions were motivated by sex discrimination and retaliation for her complaints, including derogatory statements allegedly made by a department chair about her gender and sexual orientation. She filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, after leaving the university, brought suit alleging violations of federal and state anti-discrimination laws.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the university and individual defendants on all claims. The court found that her Title VII claims regarding the 2019 and 2020 promotion denials were procedurally barred—one as untimely and the other for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court also found that the evidence did not support her claims of sex discrimination, wage discrimination, or retaliation, concluding that the university’s stated reasons for its actions were legitimate and not pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Title VII claims related to the 2019 and 2020 promotion denials were procedurally barred. However, it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the remaining claims, holding that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding sex discrimination in the 2016 promotion denial, retaliation, and wage discrimination. The court also held that the procedural bars of Title VII did not apply to the plaintiff’s claims under Title IX, Section 1983, or Maryland state law for the 2019 and 2020 promotion denials. The case was remanded for further proceedings on those claims. View "Hollis v. Morgan State University" on Justia Law