Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A landlord operated a business renting homes and had a tenant who performed repair, maintenance, and improvement work in exchange for reduced rent and payment. The tenant fell while working on the roof of one of the rental units and filed a workers' compensation claim. The landlord denied an employment relationship and disputed the work-related injury.The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations ruled in favor of the tenant, finding an employer-employee relationship. The landlord appealed, and the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) reversed the Director's decision, concluding there was no employment relationship under the control and relative nature of work tests. The tenant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which vacated parts of LIRAB's decision, instructing LIRAB to apply the substantial evidence standard instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case. The court held that the landlord did not present substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of an employment relationship under the relative nature of the work test. The tenant's work was integral to the landlord's rental business, and the tenant did not have a business of his own. Therefore, the court concluded that an employer-employee relationship existed, and the tenant's injury was covered under Hawai'i's workers' compensation laws. The court vacated LIRAB's decision and the ICA's judgment, remanding the case to LIRAB to compute compensation. The court also held that the landlord was not responsible for the tenant's attorney fees and costs. View "Borrson v. Weeks" on Justia Law

A former employee, Corbin Williams, worked as an insurance adjuster for Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, from 2014 until January 2022. Williams typically worked 84-hour weeks but was not paid overtime, violating the Labor Code. In March 2023, over a year after his employment ended, Williams notified the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency of his intent to pursue a PAGA action for these violations. He then filed a lawsuit seeking civil penalties on behalf of other current and former employees but not on his own behalf.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained a demurrer to Williams's complaint without leave to amend, finding the action time-barred. The court noted that Williams had not suffered any Labor Code violations within the one-year statute of limitations period before notifying the Agency, as his employment ended in January 2022. Consequently, the court did not address the defendant's alternative argument regarding Williams's standing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that to be a PAGA plaintiff, an individual must have a timely individual claim for at least one Labor Code violation. Since Williams's individual claims were time-barred, he could not satisfy this requirement. The court rejected Williams's arguments that other aggrieved employees' timely claims could substitute for his own untimely claims and that the continuous accrual doctrine applied. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, as Williams's proposed amendments would not cure the timeliness defect. View "Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Grp." on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) rule on when one entity is considered a joint employer of another entity’s employees. The NLRB determined that Google was a joint employer of Cognizant employees working on Google’s YouTube Music platform and ordered both companies to bargain with the employees’ union, the Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers of America, Local 9009 (AWU). Google and Cognizant refused to bargain, leading the NLRB to conclude that this refusal violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The employers petitioned for review, arguing they were not joint employers, but the contract under which the employees provided services to Google expired, rendering the petitions and the Board’s cross-applications for enforcement moot. The Union also petitioned for review, contending that the NLRB’s remedies were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the expiry of the Google-Cognizant contract meant there was no longer any relationship to support the joint-employer finding, making the case moot. The court dismissed Google’s and Cognizant’s petitions and the Board’s cross-applications as moot and vacated the order below. The court also dismissed as jurisdictionally barred the part of AWU’s petition seeking review of the NLRB’s decision to sever the issue of a make-whole remedy for employees and dismissed as moot those parts of AWU’s petition seeking prospective remedies.The court denied the remainder of AWU’s petition, concluding that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion by ordering only the customary remedies. The court emphasized that the Board’s choice of remedies is primarily within its province and subject to very limited judicial review. View "Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Vicar Operating, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Vicar failed to provide the required meal periods as mandated by California Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Orders Nos. 4-2001 and 5-2001. Vicar contended that the plaintiffs had signed valid written agreements prospectively waiving their meal periods for shifts between five and six hours, which could be revoked at any time. The plaintiffs argued that such prospective waivers allowed employers to circumvent statutory meal break requirements and denied employees a meaningful opportunity to exercise their right to meal breaks.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary adjudication in favor of Vicar, determining that the prospective waivers were valid under section 512 and the wage orders. The court found that the plain language of the statute and wage orders permitted such waivers and distinguished the case from Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, which did not address the timing of meal break waivers. The court also concluded that a DLSE opinion letter cited by the plaintiffs was not applicable as it interpreted different wage order regulations.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the revocable, prospective waivers signed by the plaintiffs were enforceable in the absence of any evidence that the waivers were unconscionable or unduly coercive. The court concluded that the prospective written waiver of a 30-minute meal period for shifts between five and six hours was consistent with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5. The court also determined that the legislative and administrative history confirmed that such waivers were consistent with the welfare of employees and that Brinker did not require a contrary result. View "Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

Dawn Simonson was employed by Douglas County as a histologist and suffered a lower back injury in 1996 while performing her job duties. The injury left her permanently and totally disabled, and she received workers' compensation benefits. When Simonson turned 67 in 2023, her employer stopped paying her permanent total disability (PTD) benefits based on a statutory retirement presumption. Simonson claimed she would have worked past age 67 and sought to rebut the presumption.A compensation judge initially found that Simonson had not rebutted the retirement presumption, applying factors from a previous case, Davidson v. Thermo King. The judge concluded that Simonson's intent to retire weighed in favor of the employer, while her financial need weighed in her favor, and other factors were neutral or irrelevant. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed this decision, concluding that the proper standard of proof to rebut the presumption was a preponderance of the evidence and that Simonson had met this burden based on her financial need.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the WCCA's determination that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employee seeks to rebut the retirement presumption. However, the Supreme Court found that the WCCA erred in emphasizing financial need as the primary factor. Instead, the court held that the relevant question is whether the employee would have retired anyway, even if not disabled, considering various factors such as the availability of work, retirement arrangements, age, work history, and willingness to forgo social security benefits. The case was remanded to the compensation judge for further findings consistent with this opinion. View "Simonson v. Douglas County" on Justia Law

Kassandra Memmer sued her former employer, United Wholesale Mortgage (UWM), alleging discrimination and sexual harassment during her employment. UWM moved to dismiss the lawsuit and compel arbitration based on the employment agreement. Memmer argued that the arbitration agreement was invalid and that she had the right to go to court under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted UWM's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, concluding that the parties had a valid arbitration agreement. The court did not address Memmer's argument regarding the applicability of EFAA. Memmer appealed the decision, asserting that EFAA should apply to her case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that EFAA applies to claims that accrue after its enactment date and to disputes that arise after that date. The court determined that the district court had not applied the correct interpretation of EFAA. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine when the dispute between Memmer and UWM arose and whether EFAA applies to her claims. View "Memmer v. United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Dr. Blake Vanderlan, a physician at a hospital operated by Jackson HMA, LLC, alleged that the hospital systematically violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). He reported these violations to the Department of Health and Human Services, prompting an investigation by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS confirmed the violations and referred the matter to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for potential civil monetary penalties. Vanderlan then filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Jackson HMA, alleging five FCA violations, including a retaliation claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi handled the case initially. The government investigated Vanderlan’s claims but declined to intervene. The case continued for six and a half years, during which the district court severed Vanderlan’s retaliation claims. The government eventually moved to dismiss the qui tam claims, arguing that the lawsuit interfered with administrative settlement negotiations and lacked merit. The district court granted the dismissal based on written filings and reaffirmed its decision after reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying Vanderlan an evidentiary hearing, as the FCA only requires a hearing on the briefs. The court also determined that the government’s motion to dismiss fell under Rule 41(a)(1), which allows for dismissal without a court order, and thus, the district court had no discretion to deny the dismissal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the government’s decision to dismiss the case was justified and that the district court applied the correct standard. View "Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA" on Justia Law

Samuel Shanks and Taylor Lambert, former employees of the International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, filed pro se lawsuits against the Union alleging discrimination. Shanks, who worked in accounting for over twenty years, claimed discrimination based on disability, race, color, and sexual orientation, as well as a hostile work environment and retaliation. Lambert, his niece, alleged wrongful termination, retaliation, and discrimination based on race, religion, and gender. Both claimed violations of various civil rights laws, including the D.C. Human Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Union removed the cases to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Shanks and Lambert appealed the dismissals. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals in part but appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in favor of claims that were not suited for summary dismissal.The D.C. Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and concluded that the allegations of racial discrimination related to the Union’s COVID-19 vaccination policy were plausible. The court found that the Union’s two-stage roll-out of the policy disproportionately affected Black employees, who were given less time and fewer resources to comply with the vaccination mandate. The court held that the disparate impact and discriminatory treatment claims based on race were sufficiently pled to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the dismissal of other claims, including those based on sexual orientation, gender, and religion, as well as Shanks’ hostile work environment claim. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the racial discrimination claims. View "Shanks v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law

Petitioners, representing a class of current and former Cornell University employees, participated in two defined-contribution retirement plans from 2010 to 2016. They sued Cornell and other plan fiduciaries in 2017, alleging that the plans engaged in prohibited transactions by paying excessive fees for recordkeeping services to Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund and Fidelity Investments Inc., in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §1106(a)(1)(C).The District Court dismissed the prohibited-transaction claim, requiring plaintiffs to allege self-dealing or disloyal conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds, holding that plaintiffs must plead that the transaction was unnecessary or involved unreasonable compensation, incorporating §1108(b)(2)(A) exemptions into §1106(a) claims.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and remanded the case. The Court held that to state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without addressing potential §1108 exemptions. The Court determined that §1108 sets out affirmative defenses, which must be pleaded and proved by defendants. The Court emphasized that the statutory text and structure do not impose additional pleading requirements for §1106(a)(1) claims and that the burden of proving exemptions rests on the defendants. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

In September 2015, Josh Brewer suffered a work-related injury while employed by Tectum Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Truxedo. Brewer filed a workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits, which was denied by his employer and their insurer, Berkshire Hathaway. Brewer's claim was initially denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ) and subsequently by the Department of Labor (Department), which found that Brewer did not prove his work-related injury was a major contributing cause of his current condition and ongoing need for treatment. Brewer appealed the Department's decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the Department's ruling. Brewer then appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the documentary evidence and expert testimonies. The court found that Brewer's treating physician, Dr. Rothrock, provided a more credible causation opinion than the employer's expert, Dr. Jensen. Dr. Rothrock opined that Brewer's work injury was a major contributing cause of his current condition and need for treatment, based on his personal treatment of Brewer and the results of various diagnostic tests. The court concluded that Brewer met his burden of proving causation and reversed the Department's determination on this issue.Regarding Brewer's claim for PTD benefits, the court reviewed the ALJ's findings for clear error. The court found that Brewer did not establish obvious unemployability due to his physical condition, age, training, and experience. Additionally, Brewer's job search efforts were deemed unreasonable, as he did not follow application instructions and highlighted his physical limitations on his résumé. The court also noted that the employer presented sufficient evidence of suitable employment opportunities available to Brewer within his limitations. Consequently, the court affirmed the Department's denial of PTD benefits.The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Brewer v. Tectum Holdings" on Justia Law