Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Lion Elastomers, a synthetic rubber manufacturer, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Lion Elastomers had been found guilty of unfair labor practices by the NLRB for threatening, disciplining, and discharging an employee, Joseph Colone, for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB applied the Atlantic Steel standard to assess whether Colone's behavior lost its protected status. However, before the appeal of the Board’s decision had been briefed, the NLRB issued a new interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in a case called General Motors, which overruled Atlantic Steel. The NLRB then sought a remand to apply this new interpretation to the Lion Elastomers case.The case was remanded to the NLRB by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, instead of applying the new interpretation from General Motors as expected, the NLRB used the remand proceeding to overrule General Motors and return to the Atlantic Steel standard. Lion Elastomers argued that the NLRB exceeded the scope of the remand and violated its due-process rights during the remand proceeding.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lion Elastomers. The court found that the NLRB had exceeded the scope of the remand by not applying the General Motors standard as expected. The court also found that the NLRB had violated Lion Elastomers's due-process rights by not giving the company an opportunity to be heard before deciding to overturn General Motors. The court vacated the NLRB's decision and remanded the case back to the NLRB, instructing it to apply the General Motors standard to this case. View "Lion Elastomers v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Kalitta Air, LLC implemented a vaccine mandate for all its employees. Employees who could not receive a vaccination due to a disability or a sincerely held religious belief could request an accommodation and would be placed on unpaid leave. If they remained unvaccinated after the leave period, they could either voluntarily resign or be terminated. Eleven employees, including five pilots, sued Kalitta under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that the mandate discriminated against them based on their religious beliefs and/or disabled status.The district court found that the Railway Labor Act precluded it from hearing certain claims by the pilots, who were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. These claims had to first go through arbitration as minor disputes. The pilots appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the pilots' claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and thus were minor disputes that had to be resolved through arbitration. The court also held that the pilots' claim of discrimination based on perceived disability would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and was therefore also precluded by the Railway Labor Act. View "Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC" on Justia Law

Dr. Anthony Tufaro, a former Chief of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery and Professor of Medicine at the University of Oklahoma (OU), filed a lawsuit against OU and three of its doctors after his contract was not renewed. Tufaro alleged that his contract was not renewed because he had exposed various discrepancies and misconduct within OU’s Medical and Dental Colleges. His claims included wrongful termination, First Amendment retaliation, Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of property and liberty, breach of contract, and violation of the Oklahoma Constitution.The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. In the federal court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed all the § 1983 claims against OU and the individual defendants in their official capacities, as they were not considered "persons" under § 1983. The court also dismissed the breach of contract claim against OU, as it found that OU had followed the procedures outlined in the Faculty Handbook. However, Tufaro's Burk tort claim against OU survived the motion to dismiss.After discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. The court ruled that Tufaro's complaints fell outside the scope of the First Amendment because they were made during his employment as part of his official duties. The court also held that Tufaro failed to demonstrate he was an "at-will" employee, an essential element of the Burk tort claim. Following the entry of summary judgment on all remaining claims, the district court entered final judgment, ending Tufaro’s case. Tufaro appealed several of the district court's rulings. View "Tufaro v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

The case involves Hospital de la Concepción, Inc. (HDLC), a hospital in Puerto Rico, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). HDLC reduced the work hours of its employees, represented by Unidad Laboral de Enfermeras(os) y Empleados de la Salud (Union), without bargaining with the Union. HDLC argued that it was privileged under the collective-bargaining agreements (CBAs) to unilaterally reduce employees’ work hours without bargaining and that it had no obligation to provide the Union with the information requested. The NLRB cross-applied for enforcement of its decision and order.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that HDLC violated the National Labor Relations Act by failing to bargain with the Union before reducing the employees’ work hours and by failing to provide the Union with requested information relevant to the decision to reduce work hours. The NLRB affirmed and adopted the ALJ's findings with modifications.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied HDLC’s petition and granted the NLRB’s cross-petition for enforcement. The court found that the CBAs did not authorize HDLC to unilaterally reduce its employees’ hours. The court also found that HDLC had a duty to respond to the Union’s information requests and failed to do so. The court rejected HDLC’s argument that the Board erred by failing to consider a defense not relevant to the theory under which it was charged. The court also found no error with the Board’s conclusion that HDLC failed to demonstrate that the economic exigencies exception privileged its unilateral reduction in employees’ scheduled work hours. Finally, the court could not consider HDLC’s argument that the Board should have excluded interim earnings from its remedy due to HDLC's failure to object before the Board. View "Hospital de la Concepcion v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Thomas Clobes, a Christian employee at a 3M manufacturing plant in Minnesota, who objected to 3M's COVID-19 vaccination policy on religious grounds. Clobes was told he would be terminated if he did not get vaccinated. He submitted a religious accommodation request to 3M, asking to continue with the same accommodations he had been following, such as wearing a mask and maintaining social distance. 3M did not immediately grant the request and asked Clobes follow-up questions about his religious beliefs and objections to the vaccine. Meanwhile, 3M continued to send daily email and loudspeaker announcements urging employees to get vaccinated. However, the vaccine requirement was eventually lifted due to the Federal Contractor Mandate being enjoined.In the District Court of Minnesota, Clobes sued 3M, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The district court granted 3M's motion to dismiss, ruling that Clobes failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment action or that similarly situated non-Christians were treated differently by 3M. The court also found that Clobes failed to allege any conduct on 3M's part that rose to the level of severe or pervasive harassment, and that there was no causal connection between Clobes's religion and 3M's conduct. The court denied Clobes leave to amend his complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile as Clobes failed to identify any additional facts that would establish a viable claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Clobes's complaint failed to plausibly support the elements of a hostile work environment claim, namely, that a causal nexus existed between 3M's allegedly harassing conduct and Clobes's status as a Christian, and that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. The court also upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint, as Clobes had not complied with the local rules requiring a copy of the proposed amended pleading to accompany any motion to amend. View "Clobes v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The case involves an employee, Marlene Mosher, who filed a petition against her employer, Whole Foods Market, Inc., claiming she suffered an injury from a fall during her employment. Mosher alleged that she sustained injury to her right lower extremity and right ankle and developed low-back pain. She claimed that she had suffered periods of temporary disability, required reasonable and necessary medical care, incurred mileage and expenses, and had not yet reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). Mosher also alleged that Whole Foods had failed or refused to provide those benefits, thus, she was entitled to waiting-time penalties and attorney fees.The Workers’ Compensation Court found that Mosher had not yet reached MMI and was unable to return to work without restrictions. The court awarded Mosher temporary total disability benefits, payment for medical bills, future medical care, a waiting-time penalty, and attorney fees. The court found that Whole Foods had no reasonable controversy that compensation was due, which justified a waiting-time penalty. The court also found no reasonable controversy as to medical expenses.Whole Foods appealed, arguing that there was a reasonable controversy as to whether Mosher had reached MMI and, thus, as to whether its obligations to pay temporary total disability ceased and its obligations to pay permanent disability began. Whole Foods also contested the amount of the attorney fees awarded.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court. The court held that when there is no reasonable controversy that the employee has been injured in a workplace accident and is entitled to some indemnity benefit, the employer is not excused from timely payments thereof. The court also held that the plain meaning of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” in § 48-125(4)(a) encompasses the work of a legal assistant for the attorney. View "Mosher v. Whole Foods Market" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the denial of a disability pension application by a former state trooper, James Donnelly-Taylor. The defendants are the State of Rhode Island, Division of the State Police, and the Colonel of the State Police and Governor in their official capacities. The trooper had been involved in an incident where he assaulted an individual he had arrested. Following this incident, he reported experiencing personal and work-related stress and was placed on injured-on-duty status. Later, he was indicted on one count of simple assault. He pleaded nolo contendere to the assault charge and was ordered to perform community service. The trooper remained out of work and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. He applied for a disability pension, which was denied by the superintendent of the state police.The superintendent's decision was appealed to the Superior Court, which found the denial to be arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case back to the superintendent for further consideration. The superintendent issued a supplemental decision, maintaining the denial of the disability pension. The Superior Court again found the superintendent's decision to be arbitrary and capricious and reversed the denial, instructing the superintendent to grant the trooper's request for a disability pension.The State of Rhode Island appealed the Superior Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision, finding that the superintendent's denial of the disability pension was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court held that the superintendent had reasonable grounds to conclude that the trooper's assault of the individual was not in the course of performance of his duties as a state police officer, and therefore his disabling injuries were not suffered in the course of performance of his duties. The case was remanded back to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rhode Island Troopers Association v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

Samantha Peifer, an employee of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, filed a lawsuit against her employer alleging pregnancy discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Peifer, who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and later became pregnant, requested accommodations from her employer due to her inability to perform certain tasks. Her requests were initially denied, but later granted after she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). However, she was not allowed to work from home as requested due to her high-risk pregnancy and exposure to COVID-19. Peifer eventually resigned, citing discriminatory treatment, and filed additional charges with the EEOC.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Board's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Peifer could not establish a prima facie case for any of her claims. Peifer appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's decision. The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court that Peifer's claims partly failed but concluded that the District Court was best situated to analyze the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis on whether Peifer makes out a prima facie case under an adverse employment action theory. The Court of Appeals also concluded that Peifer makes out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination based on the Board’s denials of her light-duty requests under a failure to accommodate theory. The case was remanded for further analysis on Peifer’s adverse employment theory and failure to accommodate theory, while the District Court’s decisions on Peifer’s constructive discharge allegation and retaliation claim were affirmed. View "Peifer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Thomas E. Hennig, Jr., who was discharged from his job at Money Metals Exchange, L.L.C. after making a controversial comment on the company's instant messaging system. Hennig referred to himself as his employer’s “good little Nazi” in a joke about enforcing the company’s time clock rules. After his termination, Hennig applied for unemployment benefits, but his application was denied by the Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) on the grounds that he was discharged for misconduct connected with his employment. Hennig appealed this decision to the Idaho Industrial Commission, which upheld the IDOL's decision.Hennig then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, arguing that the Commission’s decision was unsupported by competent and substantial evidence. He contended that his use of the term "Nazi" was not objectively unprofessional and that the company had tolerated racist remarks from another employee. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the Commission had failed to properly analyze whether the company's expectations of Hennig's behavior were objectively reasonable, given evidence that it had tolerated racist comments from another co-worker and then promoted him to a supervisory position. The court also found that the Commission had failed to consider Hennig's claim that the company had encouraged his unorthodox humor. View "Hennig v. Money Metals Exchange" on Justia Law

Domingo Musquiz, a former rail industry employee, petitioned for review of a decision by the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). The RRB had adopted a hearing officer's finding that Musquiz was at fault for an overpayment of his reduced-age annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) and denied his request for a waiver or reduction of repayment of the overpayment and penalty. Musquiz had failed to report his re-employment and additional income to the RRB, leading to the overpayment.The RRB's decision was based on the fact that Musquiz had received a booklet of regulations, including reporting requirements, when he applied for his annuity. The RRB concluded that Musquiz should have known about his reporting duties and was at fault when he did not report his change in employment and additional outside income.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the RRB that Musquiz was at fault for the overpayment that occurred from August 2012 to June 2, 2013. However, the court concluded that Musquiz was without fault for the RRB’s overpayment of his annuity from June 3, 2013, onward. The court reasoned that by then, the RRB had informed Musquiz that they had taken his outside earnings into account and adjusted his annuity payments.The court granted Musquiz's petition, vacated the RRB's decision, and remanded the case to the RRB for further proceedings. The court instructed the RRB to develop a factual record and determine whether recovery of the overpayment from June 3, 2013, onward would be contrary to the purpose of the RRA, against equity, or against good conscience. View "Musquiz V. United States Railroad Retirement Board" on Justia Law