Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A police officer with 25 years of service sought workers’ compensation benefits after being diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The officer had experienced numerous traumatic events during his career and began psychological treatment in 2021. He was diagnosed with PTSD by a licensed psychologist, who relied on the DSM-5 for the diagnosis. The City, disputing the claim, had its own psychologist conduct an independent psychological evaluation (IPE) using the same DSM edition, who concluded that the officer did not meet the criteria for PTSD but instead had alcohol abuse disorder. Subsequently, the officer’s psychologist conducted a follow-up evaluation using the updated DSM-5-TR, issuing a “lifetime” PTSD diagnosis.A compensation judge found the officer entitled to a statutory presumption that his PTSD was work-related but determined that the City had rebutted this presumption, relying on the City’s expert’s opinion despite it being based on the earlier DSM-5. The judge found the City’s expert more persuasive and denied the officer’s claim for benefits.The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) vacated the compensation judge’s order, holding that the City’s expert opinion could not be considered because it was not based on the most recently published DSM edition. The WCCA ruled that only an IPE using the most recent DSM edition could rebut the statutory presumption and made its own finding that the City failed to rebut the presumption.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the most recently published edition of the DSM includes text revisions, but an IPE is not the only way to rebut the statutory presumption. The Court also held that a compensation judge is not barred from considering an IPE based on an outdated DSM edition. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA’s decision and remanded for consideration of additional arguments not previously addressed. View "Rowe vs. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

A major industrial accident occurred at a petroleum refinery in Texas operated by a large energy company. During repairs, a pipe ruptured, leading to an explosion and fire that injured several workers and required an extensive emergency response. One employee, who played a critical role in the emergency efforts, later sought counseling and was diagnosed by multiple healthcare professionals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) attributed to the incident. The company, following its procedures and the relevant Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rule, reviewed these diagnoses to determine if they should be recorded as work-related mental illnesses under federal recordkeeping requirements.After receiving differing opinions from healthcare providers, the company ultimately concluded that the employee did not have a recordable work-related mental illness, relying on its designated medical evaluator’s assessment. The employee’s union reported the matter to OSHA, which investigated and cited the company for failing to record the PTSD diagnosis as required by OSHA’s rule. The company challenged the citation before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). The ALJ upheld the citation and imposed a monetary penalty. When the company sought further review, OSHRC declined, and the ALJ’s decision became the agency’s final order. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that OSHA lacked statutory authority under 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) to require employers to record work-related mental illnesses. The court determined that the term “illnesses” in the statute referred only to physical ailments. As a result, the Fifth Circuit vacated OSHA’s rule, the citation, and the penalty imposed on the company. View "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. OSHC" on Justia Law

A hospital in Puerto Rico underwent a change in ownership in 2017. The union that had previously represented the hospital’s employees claimed to remain the representative for five bargaining units. However, the union had not secured contracts for two units and the contracts for the other three units had expired several years earlier. After initially recognizing the union, the new hospital owner received evidence that most, and in one case all, employees in each unit no longer supported the union. The hospital then withdrew recognition and refused to bargain with the union.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged the hospital with unfair labor practices, alleging unlawful refusal to bargain and withdrawal of recognition. An administrative law judge ruled against the hospital, applying the NLRB’s “successor bar” doctrine, which requires a new employer to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union for up to one year following a change in ownership, regardless of current employee support. A divided panel of the NLRB affirmed this ruling, ordering the hospital to bargain with the union. The hospital petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the decision, challenging the legality of the successor bar.Initially, the Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s rule, granting deference to the NLRB’s policy judgment. However, after the Supreme Court decided *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, which eliminated judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and remanded for reconsideration. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the successor bar conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act’s guarantees of employee choice and majority rule. The court granted the hospital’s petition for review, denied the NLRB’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded the case, holding that the Board lacked statutory authority to impose the successor bar. View "Hospital Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A group of former employees of the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families challenged the agency’s implementation of a COVID-19 vaccine mandate issued by the Governor of Washington. After their requests for religious exemptions were granted, the agency denied their requests for reasonable accommodations that would allow them to remain unvaccinated and continue in their positions. The agency explained that, due to the nature of their roles, unvaccinated employees could not safely perform essential functions without posing a risk to others. The employees were ultimately separated from employment. They alleged constitutional violations and state law claims, asserting that the agency and certain officials discriminated against them based on religion and failed to provide required procedural protections.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed all claims. It found that the employees had not sufficiently alleged ongoing violations of federal law for injunctive relief, nor had they adequately alleged personal involvement by any official in the claimed constitutional violations. The court dismissed the federal claims and all state law claims, initially granting leave to amend. After the employees filed an amended complaint naming additional officials and asserting similar legal theories without new factual allegations, the district court dismissed the case without leave to amend and denied reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the employees failed to plausibly allege personal involvement by any official in constitutional violations, and that official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because there was no ongoing violation of federal law. It further concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in denying leave to amend, as amendment would have been futile. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend. View "SEAGRAVES V. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES" on Justia Law

A narcotics agent employed by the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General reported witnessing a coworker sexually and racially harass a female intern during a work assignment. Following his report, the Office investigated the incident, reprimanded the offending coworker for "unbecoming conduct," but otherwise continued to employ him in a supervisory role. The reporting agent subsequently applied for several promotions and career opportunities, including overtime assignments and specialized training courses, but was repeatedly denied. He alleged that these employment decisions were made in retaliation for his good faith report of harassment and that favoritism within a clique, referred to as a "boys’ club," influenced promotions within the Office.After filing a complaint under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, the agent presented evidence including deposition testimony from coworkers, performance evaluations, and records of denied promotions. The Commonwealth Court, applying the summary relief standard, found that he failed to establish a causal connection between his report and the adverse employment actions. The court concluded that the evidence showed he was passed over due to preferential treatment given to members of the "boys’ club," not because of his report, and dismissed his complaint.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the Commonwealth Court erred in granting summary relief. The Supreme Court held that the agent provided sufficient concrete evidence of a causal link between his report and the adverse employment actions, such as testimony that the report "played a role" in promotion decisions and evidence of post-report antagonism. The Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether all elements of a prima facie case under the Whistleblower Law are satisfied, including whether the report concerned a "wrongdoing." View "Adams v. AG" on Justia Law

A participant in two ERISA-qualified retirement plans at a university sought to change the beneficiary designation shortly before his death, naming trust accounts for his grandchildren as primary beneficiaries and removing his wife as a primary beneficiary. The plan documents required spousal consent for such changes. The participant’s wife, who was still living at the time, had previously executed a Wisconsin statutory power of attorney appointing her son-in-law as her agent. The agent signed the spousal consent form on her behalf, but the power of attorney did not expressly grant authority to waive her spousal survivor annuity rights. The plan recordkeeper rejected the beneficiary change form as deficient, and the participant died soon thereafter. The wife died about a year later. The plaintiffs, including family members and trustees, sought to enforce the beneficiary change, arguing that the power of attorney provided sufficient authority.After the recordkeeper’s rejection, the plaintiffs made a claim for benefits with the university as plan administrator. The university denied the claim, determining that Wisconsin law required a specific grant of authority in the power of attorney to waive spousal survivor benefits, which was absent in this case. The plaintiffs appealed the denial, but the university upheld its decision. Plaintiffs then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting claims under ERISA for benefits, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding the waiver was invalid and finding no merit in the other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that under Wisconsin law, specifically Wis. Stat. § 244.41(1)(f), a power of attorney must expressly grant authority to an agent to waive spousal rights to a joint and survivor annuity. Because the power of attorney did not contain such an express grant, the attempted waiver was invalid, and the plaintiffs’ ERISA claim failed. The court also affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary duty and negligence claims and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. View "Havlik v. University of Chicago" on Justia Law

Cheryl Hileman worked as a CAT scan technologist at Forbes Hospital, operated by West Penn Allegheny Health System. After about a year of employment, she was reprimanded for frequent absences and informed of the process to request a disability accommodation or medical leave. She did not make such a request. Several months later, a coworker reported concerns that Hileman was sleeping during her shift. When confronted, Hileman denied sleeping but mentioned, for the first time, that she had diabetes and was experiencing fatigue and dry eyes due to a medication change. She did not request an accommodation or leave. Shortly thereafter, Hileman was terminated for misconduct related to sleeping on the job.Hileman filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, including disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, wrongful termination, and interference with medical leave. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of West Penn, finding that Hileman was discharged for misconduct and had not requested an accommodation or leave prior to the investigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court rejected Hileman’s attempt to supplement the record on appeal and sanctioned her attorney for submitting a motion containing misquotations. On the merits, the court held that an employee must notify the employer of a disability and request an accommodation or leave before the employer is obligated to act. Because Hileman did not request an accommodation or leave, and there was no clear indication that she needed one, her claims failed. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "Hileman v. West Penn Allegheny Health System Inc" on Justia Law

Gertrude Crisp, an emergency medical technician, alleged that a co-worker, Joshua Gullett, sexually harassed her at their workplace, the Scioto Ambulance District. Crisp claimed that Gullett made inappropriate comments, touched her without consent, and engaged in other sexually charged behavior. After reporting one incident to a supervisor and showing him Gullett’s Fetlife profile, the employer separated Crisp and Gullett on future shifts but did not otherwise discipline Gullett. Years later, Crisp showed nude images, allegedly of Gullett and his wife, to several co-workers at work, purporting to warn them about Gullett’s behavior. Following an investigation, Scioto Ambulance District terminated Crisp for sharing the images while on duty.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Crisp sued Scioto, arguing that her termination was unlawful retaliation under federal and Ohio antidiscrimination laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that Crisp’s conduct in showing the images was not protected activity under the relevant statutes. Crisp appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that Title VII and the Ohio Civil Rights Act do not protect an employee who, in the course of opposing workplace discrimination, gratuitously shares nude or sexually explicit images of co-workers while on the job. The court reasoned that while some complaints of sexual harassment are protected, Crisp’s sharing of such images was not necessary to her complaint and extended beyond protected conduct. Therefore, Crisp’s firing did not constitute unlawful retaliation, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Crisp v. Scioto Ambulance Dist." on Justia Law

Several related companies, along with an individual, operated the Inn of Chicago. After purchasing the property, they assumed an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a labor union. When the City of Chicago approached them to use the Inn to house displaced migrants, the operation resumed, but the employers did not use union members for typical hotel functions. Instead, these tasks were handled by an outside staffing agency and later by another company managed by the same people. The labor union learned of this arrangement, filed grievances alleging violations of the CBA, and submitted the dispute to arbitration. The union also filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, which was consolidated with the arbitration.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reviewed the arbitration award. The arbitrator had found that the Inn was operating as a “hotel” within the meaning of the CBA while housing migrants, that the related companies and individual were a “single employer” under the CBA, and that they violated both the CBA and the National Labor Relations Act by failing to use union employees and failing to provide notice or bargain with the union. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, rejecting the employers’ arguments regarding arbitrability, notice, and authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. The court held that the employers were bound by the arbitration because they participated without reserving objections, and the arbitrator’s findings drew from the CBA and issues submitted by the parties. The court found no due process or public policy violation and affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award. View "Elmar Hotel Management, LLC v Unite Here Local 1" on Justia Law

Segerdahl Corporation, a direct-mail printing company wholly owned by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), was sold to a private equity firm in 2016. Bruce Rush, a senior manager and ESOP shareholder, alleged that the sale was improperly organized and approved for less than the company’s fair market value. He claimed that the Defendants—the ESOP trustee GreatBanc and several Segerdahl Board members—breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by favoring financial buyers, inadequately marketing the company, and failing to secure a higher sale price. The sale process involved negotiations led by JP Morgan, with only financial buyers considered, culminating in an agreement with ICV Partners for $265 million.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, certified a class of ESOP shareholders and denied summary judgment for most claims. After a three-week bench trial, the district court issued a comprehensive opinion finding in favor of Defendants on all counts. The court determined that the Defendants did not intentionally depress the sale price, had obtained the best possible price given Segerdahl’s declining performance, and had fulfilled their fiduciary obligations. The district court also found no prohibited transactions under ERISA and concluded that Rush failed to prove damages, rejecting expert testimony that relied on hypothetical buyers and unsupported valuations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that there was no clear error in the findings that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties, did not engage in prohibited transactions, and that the sale price reflected fair market value. The district court’s decision was affirmed in full. View "Rush v GreatBanc Trust Co." on Justia Law