Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A former correctional officer with the Michigan Department of Corrections was terminated after a coworker accused him of making harassing and inappropriate comments. The officer, after being served with a misconduct charge and attending a disciplinary conference with his union representative, was formally terminated in July 2019. He challenged his termination through arbitration, which concluded in December 2020 with a decision upholding his dismissal. Nearly three years later, he filed a federal lawsuit against two department officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, specifically focusing on procedural due process.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan initially dismissed the officer’s first complaint without prejudice for lack of prosecution after he failed to respond to a motion to dismiss. When he refiled a similar complaint, the district court dismissed it again, this time on the grounds that the claim was untimely under Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions and that, except for his procedural due process claim, he had forfeited his other constitutional arguments. The court also found that his procedural due process claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the officer’s procedural due process claim accrued, at the latest, on the date of his post-termination arbitration hearing in December 2020, making his June 2024 complaint untimely. The court further held that Michigan law does not permit equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this context and that the officer failed to plausibly allege inadequate process either before or after his termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Bozzo v. Nanasy" on Justia Law

Joseph Simone worked as a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. He disclosed a heart condition when hired, which did not generally affect his job performance. In 2014, TSA determined Simone was no longer medically qualified and placed him on administrative leave, eventually removing him from federal service in 2015. Simone filed an administrative complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, which was denied by an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative law judge and later on appeal. He then brought suit in federal district court against the Secretary of Homeland Security, asserting four claims under the Rehabilitation Act: disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and unlawful interference.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss. The court relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decision in Castro v. Secretary of Homeland Security, which held that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) exempted TSA from the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act regarding the hiring of security screeners. The district court concluded that ATSA precluded Simone’s claims and rejected his argument that the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), enacted in 2012, abrogated Castro and allowed Rehabilitation Act claims against TSA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the WPEA abrogated Castro and extended Rehabilitation Act protections to TSA security screeners. The court found that the WPEA’s statutory language superseded ATSA’s exemption and allowed TSOs to bring claims under the Rehabilitation Act. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Simone satisfied administrative requirements to bring his claims. View "Simone v. Secretary of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

A company that provides employee management services hired an employee in California in September 2021. At the start of her employment, she completed onboarding documents that did not mention arbitration. About five months later, she was asked to sign additional documents, including an arbitration agreement, a voluntary dispute resolution policy, and a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement (CND). The arbitration agreement required most employment-related disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration, with certain exceptions for claims related to confidential information. The CND allowed the company to bring certain claims in court and permitted the company to seek injunctive relief without posting a bond or proving actual damages. The employee later filed a lawsuit alleging various employment law violations.The Solano County Superior Court reviewed the company’s motion to compel arbitration. The company argued that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and, if any provision was found unenforceable, it should be severed. The employee opposed, arguing the agreement was unconscionable due to the manner in which it was presented and its one-sided terms. The trial court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, particularly because it forced the employee’s claims into arbitration while allowing the company’s likely claims to proceed in court, and because of a confidentiality provision that restricted informal discovery. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration and declined to sever the offending provisions, finding the agreement permeated by unconscionability.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the arbitration agreement and the CND, read together, were unconscionable due to lack of mutuality and an overly broad confidentiality provision. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to sever the unconscionable terms and concluded that any error in denying a statement of decision was harmless. View "Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

A restaurant and bar in Pennsylvania employed bartenders and servers who participated in a tip pool, which was allegedly distributed in part to a salaried manager, contrary to federal and state wage laws. An employee who worked there from September 2021 to December 2022 filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA). The claims centered on the manager’s alleged receipt of tip-pool funds intended for bartenders. The plaintiff sought damages and styled the case as a hybrid action: an FLSA collective action under § 216(b) and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the state law claim.The parties stipulated to conditional certification of an FLSA collective, and notice was sent to potential members, ten of whom opted in. After discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement, proposing a Rule 23(b)(3) class settlement that would release wage-and-hour claims, including unasserted FLSA claims, for all class members who did not opt out. The District Court held a hearing focused on whether class members who had not opted into the FLSA collective could be required to release FLSA claims through the class settlement. The District Court denied preliminary approval, reasoning that § 216(b) prohibited such releases, and denied reconsideration, certifying the legal question for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the certified question de novo. It held that § 216(b) of the FLSA establishes only the mechanism for litigating FLSA claims, not the conditions for waiving them, and does not prohibit the release of unasserted FLSA claims in a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class settlement. The Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded for a full fairness inquiry under Rule 23. View "Lundeen v. 10 West Ferry Street Operations LLC" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey, three licensed insurance adjusters were assigned by an outsourcing company to process claims for a Texas state-created insurer. The adjusters were required to complete additional certification and follow specific procedures set by the insurer. Their contracts labeled them as independent contractors, but the assignments lasted between one and a half to two years, during which they worked exclusively for the insurer. The company set their work schedules, required timesheets, and provided necessary equipment, though the adjusters were responsible for some personal and professional expenses. A shift to remote work introduced new monitoring policies, but the company maintained control over work hours and approval for overtime.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Applying a six-factor test to determine employment status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the court found that four factors favored independent contractor status and two favored employee status, with one of the latter given little weight. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding the adjusters were independent contractors and thus not entitled to FLSA overtime protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court found that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the adjusters, five of the six factors favored employee status. The court held that a reasonable jury could find the adjusters were employees under the FLSA, as they were economically dependent on the companies, had little control over their work, and their services were integral to the business. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Galarza v. One Call Claims, LLC" on Justia Law

A flight attendant employed by an airline and represented by a labor union was terminated after sending graphic anti-abortion images and messages to the union president and posting similar content on social media. The employee, a pro-life Christian and vocal opponent of the union, had previously resigned her union membership but remained subject to union fees. The union’s leadership had participated in the Women’s March, which the employee viewed as union-sponsored support for abortion, prompting her messages. The airline investigated and concluded that while some content was offensive, only certain images violated company policy. The employee was terminated for violating social media, bullying, and harassment policies.Following termination, the employee filed a grievance, which the union represented. The airline offered reinstatement contingent on a last-chance agreement, which the employee declined, leading to arbitration. The arbitrator found just cause for termination. The employee then sued both the airline and the union in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of Title VII and the Railway Labor Act (RLA), among other claims. The district court dismissed some claims, allowed others to proceed, and after a jury trial, found in favor of the employee on several Title VII and RLA claims. The court awarded reinstatement, backpay, and issued a broad permanent injunction against the airline and union, later holding the airline in contempt for its compliance with the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment for the employee on her belief-based Title VII and RLA retaliation claims against the airline, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for the airline on those claims. The court affirmed the judgment against the airline on practice-based Title VII claims and affirmed all claims against the union. The court vacated the permanent injunction and contempt sanction, remanding for further proceedings, and granted the employee’s motion to remand appellate attorney’s fees to the district court. View "Carter v. Transport Workers Union of America Local 556" on Justia Law

In this case, several former employees of a seafood company participated in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) that was funded by a $92 million loan used to purchase all outstanding company stock from four directors and officers. The plaintiffs alleged that these directors and officers manipulated sales projections and inventory figures to inflate the stock’s valuation, causing the ESOP to overpay by tens of millions of dollars. They further claimed that the plan’s trustee failed to conduct proper due diligence before agreeing to the purchase price. The plaintiffs sought restoration of plan losses, disgorgement of profits, and other equitable relief under ERISA, asserting breaches of fiduciary duty.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia without first exhausting the plan’s internal administrative remedies, despite acknowledging that the plan provided such procedures. They argued that exhaustion was not required for their claims and, alternatively, that they were excused from exhausting due to futility and inadequacy of the remedy. The defendants moved to dismiss on exhaustion grounds. The district court granted the motions, finding that Eleventh Circuit precedent required exhaustion for ERISA claims, and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments for excusal. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for a stay to allow exhaustion, but did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that ERISA plaintiffs must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, including for breach of fiduciary duty claims, and that no valid excuse relieved the plaintiffs of this obligation. The court also remanded the case for the district court to clarify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. View "Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corporation of America, Inc." on Justia Law

A correctional officer employed by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) for 18 years suffered from diabetes, hypertension, and chronic back pain. She took intermittent leave under TDCJ’s leave-without-pay (LWOP) policy, which allowed up to 180 days of leave in a rolling 12-month period. After returning from leave in 2017, she was reassigned to a less desirable shift without explanation, leading her to file internal grievances and an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint. Although her grievance was sustained and she was returned to her preferred shift, subsequent confusion over her LWOP balance resulted in her termination in 2018. She later reapplied for her job but was not rehired, despite recommendations in her favor and a shortage of correctional officers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas heard her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. After a jury trial, she prevailed on all counts, receiving $1.8 million in damages, which the district court reduced to $1 million after excluding emotional distress damages per Supreme Court precedent. The court denied the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, entering final judgment for the plaintiff and awarding attorney’s fees and costs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that monetary relief against the executive director under the ADA was barred by sovereign immunity and reversed that portion of the judgment. The court affirmed the jury’s findings on discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act against TDCJ, but found the $1 million damages award included amounts that should have been considered front pay, not back pay, and remanded for recalculation. The court also vacated the attorney’s fee award against the executive director and remanded for reconsideration of fees against TDCJ. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated, and remanded. View "Harmon v. Collier" on Justia Law

SuperValu, Inc. participated in a multiemployer pension plan, contributing on behalf of its employees for over a decade. In September 2018, SuperValu sold several stores to Schnuck’s Markets, Inc., with five of those stores employing workers covered by the pension plan. This sale qualified for a statutory “safe harbor,” meaning SuperValu did not incur withdrawal liability for the sold stores, as Schnuck’s agreed to continue contributions. Later, SuperValu closed its remaining stores and fully withdrew from the plan, triggering withdrawal liability. The pension fund calculated SuperValu’s total liability and the annual installment payments required, using statutory formulas. In calculating the payment schedule, the fund deducted the sold stores’ contribution base units for only the most recent five years, not the entire ten-year lookback period, which resulted in higher annual payments for SuperValu.SuperValu challenged the fund’s calculation, arguing that the contribution base units for the sold stores should have been excluded for all ten years, not just five. The dispute was submitted to arbitration under federal law, where the arbitrator ruled in favor of the fund. SuperValu then sought review in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The district court granted summary judgment to the fund, holding that the relevant statutory text did not require the deduction of the sold stores’ units for the entire ten-year period, and that SuperValu’s arguments based on legislative history and statutory purpose could not override the plain language.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the statute governing the payment schedule for withdrawal liability does not require a pension fund to deduct contribution base units for stores sold under the safe harbor provision for the entire ten-year lookback period. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "SuperValu, Inc. v. UFCW Unions and Employers Midwest Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Several pilots were terminated by United Airlines after the company implemented a COVID-19 vaccine mandate. These pilots, represented by their union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), believed that the union did not do enough to oppose United’s vaccination policies. The pilots had previously filed grievances challenging the mandate, arguing that United’s actions violated the status quo required under the Railway Labor Act because the collective bargaining agreement had expired. ALPA did not support these grievances or file its own, but did file a separate grievance arguing that termination for being unvaccinated was not justified. The pilots’ termination grievances remain pending at their request.After their terminations, the pilots sued ALPA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to adequately oppose United’s vaccine mandate. ALPA moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claim was unripe and failed to state a claim. The district court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness but granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court also denied the pilots’ request to file an amended complaint, finding that amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the case was ripe because the pilots’ alleged harm—termination—had already occurred. However, the court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the pilots failed to plausibly allege that ALPA’s actions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, as required to state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend, finding that the proposed amended complaint would not cure the deficiencies. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Wickstrom v Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law