Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Freedom Vans LLC, a company that converts and customizes vans into mobile houses, hired Jeremy David and Mark Springer. David, a self-taught carpenter, was hired in 2019 and later promoted to foundations manager. Springer, an automotive and maritime mechanic, was hired in 2020 as an electrician. Both employees earned less than twice the minimum wage and signed a noncompete agreement prohibiting them from engaging in any business that competed with Freedom Vans. They claimed they declined additional work offers due to fear of termination and legal action. They stopped working for Freedom Vans in 2021.David and Springer filed a class action lawsuit in 2022, alleging the noncompete agreement violated chapter 49.62 RCW, which regulates noncompete clauses in employment contracts. They sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The superior court granted summary judgment to Freedom Vans, reasoning that RCW 49.62 does not restrict an employer’s right to require employee loyalty and avoidance of conflicts of interest. The court denied Freedom Vans' request for attorney fees. Both parties appealed.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that noncompete agreements for employees earning less than twice the minimum wage must be reasonable and narrowly construed in light of the legislature’s intent to protect low wage workers and promote workforce mobility. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, concluding that prohibiting employees from providing any kind of assistance to competitors exceeds a narrow construction of the duty of loyalty. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the reasonableness of the noncompete agreement and assess damages and attorney fees. View "Springer v. Freedom Vans LLC" on Justia Law

Tara Osborn, a technical support specialist, was terminated by JAB Management Services, Inc., which provides prison healthcare. Osborn sued her former employer, alleging violations of state and federal employment law, including a claim that JAB Management failed to compensate her for overtime work as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). JAB Management moved for summary judgment on the overtime claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of JAB Management. The court found that Osborn failed to comply with local rules in her response to the summary judgment motion, leading to her amended response being struck. Consequently, the court deemed JAB Management's facts as admitted and found that Osborn did not provide sufficient evidence to show she worked overtime.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Osborn did not meet her initial burden of proving she worked uncompensated overtime. The court noted that Osborn's evidence was vague, conclusory, and lacked specificity regarding her work hours. Additionally, her claims were inconsistent with other evidence in the record. The court also found that even under the relaxed just and reasonable inference standard for proving damages, Osborn's evidence was insufficient to establish the amount and extent of her overtime work. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of JAB Management. View "Osborn v JAB Management Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Jennifer Jackiw, while working for Soft Pretzel Franchise, sustained an injury that led to the amputation of her right forearm. The employer acknowledged liability, and at the time of the injury, Jackiw's average weekly wage was $322.05. The parties agreed that the injury was a "specific loss" under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, entitling her to a healing period of up to 20 weeks followed by 370 weeks of compensation. However, they disagreed on how to calculate the weekly benefit amount for the 370 weeks.A workers' compensation judge (WCJ) concluded that Jackiw's benefit should be calculated according to the formula for total disability under Section 306(a) of the Act. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) affirmed this decision, despite acknowledging arguments that the specific-loss benefits should be calculated differently. The WCAB felt bound by the Commonwealth Court's decision in Walton v. Cooper Hosiery Co., which had interpreted the Act to harmonize benefits for specific loss and total disability.The Commonwealth Court, in a divided en banc panel, affirmed the WCAB's decision, applying the rule of stare decisis and agreeing with the interpretation in Walton. The dissenting judges argued that the statutory text provided more generous benefits for specific-loss injuries than for total disability without the loss of a body part.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine the correct statutory formula for calculating workers' compensation benefits for the loss of a body part. The court concluded that the plain text of the statute indicated that specific-loss benefits should be calculated under Section 306(c), not Section 306(a). The court vacated the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackiw v. Soft Pretzel Franchise" on Justia Law

William Herold worked for the University of Pittsburgh as a stationary engineer from 1976 to 2004, during which he was exposed to asbestos. He later became a foreman, a position without asbestos exposure, and retired in 2015. In 2019, Herold was diagnosed with mesothelioma, attributed to his asbestos exposure, and he died in 2022. His estate filed a common law negligence action against the University and other defendants in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.The trial court denied the University’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) provided the exclusive remedy for Herold’s claim. The court found that Herold’s mesothelioma, manifesting more than four years after his last exposure, was not compensable under the ODA. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the ODA’s exclusivity provision did not apply to Herold’s non-compensable claim, allowing the common law action to proceed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ODA’s exclusivity provision barred Herold’s common law action. The Court held that the ODA’s exclusivity provision extends only to claims asserting compensable disability or death, defined as occurring within four years of the last employment. Since Herold’s mesothelioma manifested beyond this period, the exclusivity provision did not apply, and the common law action was permissible. The Court also determined that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not require the claim to be adjudicated by the workers’ compensation authorities, as the issues were not complex or technical.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, allowing the common law negligence action to proceed in the trial court. View "In Re: Estate of W. Herold" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, train dispatchers for Bombardier Mass Transit Corporation, filed claims for unpaid wages, alleging they were entitled to overtime wages and wage statement penalties for on-call time. Initially, they sought relief through the labor commissioner’s Berman hearing process, which was denied. Subsequently, they requested a de novo hearing in the San Diego Superior Court, where they prevailed, receiving over $140,000 in back wages and penalties. They then moved for attorney fees and costs, which the trial court granted, awarding $200,000.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the plaintiffs' claims were initially denied by the labor commissioner. Upon seeking a de novo trial, the superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them unpaid wages and penalties. The court also granted their motion for attorney fees and costs, amounting to $200,000, rejecting Bombardier’s argument that section 98.2, subdivision (c) was the exclusive statute for awarding attorney fees and costs in such cases.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Bombardier contended that section 98.2, subdivision (c) should be the sole basis for awarding attorney fees and costs in a de novo trial following a Berman hearing. The appellate court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s decision. The court held that prevailing plaintiffs in superior court actions for unpaid wages are generally entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs under sections 218.5, 226, and 1194, and nothing in section 98.2 suggests otherwise. The court emphasized that the Berman process is designed to benefit employees and should not restrict their remedies. Thus, the order awarding $200,000 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs was affirmed. View "Villalva v. Bombardier Mass Transit Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, leading the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a "person aggrieved" by the NLRB's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB's conclusion that Macy’s failed to clearly inform the Union of the conditions necessary for reinstatement, making the lockout unjustified. The court also upheld the NLRB's decision to deny the Union's request for additional extraordinary remedies, finding that the traditional remedies were sufficient.The court enforced the NLRB's order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered by the employees due to the lockout. The court concluded that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in its remedial order and denied both the Union's and Macy’s petitions for review. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, which led the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout. Macy’s and the Union both petitioned for review of the NLRB’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a “person aggrieved” by the NLRB’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s conclusion that Macy’s lockout was unlawful because the Union was not clearly and fully informed of the conditions necessary for reinstatement. The court also upheld the NLRB’s remedial order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms, finding no clear abuse of discretion.The Ninth Circuit denied both the Union’s and Macy’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its final order. The court concluded that the NLRB’s actions were within its broad discretion to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. View "MACY'S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law

George Rodrique, II, a photographer for WCVB-TV, sued his employer, Hearst Stations, Inc. ("Hearst"), after it denied his request for a religious exemption from the company's COVID-19 vaccination requirement and subsequently terminated him for refusing to receive the vaccine. Rodrique claimed that Hearst's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits religious discrimination in employment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Hearst's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Rodrique's objections to the vaccine were not religious in nature. The court did not address whether accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on Hearst.Rodrique appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that his objections were indeed religious and that granting the exemption would not have caused undue hardship. He contended that Hearst provided insufficient evidence that the COVID-19 vaccine reduces virus transmission.The First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Rodrique's objections were religious. However, it affirmed the district court's summary judgment on different grounds, holding that Hearst reasonably relied on objective medical evidence, including public health guidance, to conclude that the vaccine reduces the likelihood of transmitting COVID-19. The court found that Hearst's reliance on such evidence was reasonable and that accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on the company. Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Hearst. View "Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Two workers' compensation claimants, represented by attorney David Graham, settled their claims with Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium (SEARHC) except for attorney's fees. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board awarded Graham significantly less than he requested. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed it, instructing the Commission to consider enhanced fees. On remand, the Commission did not change the fee award, leading to another appeal.The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission initially affirmed the Board's reduced fee award. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act allows for enhanced fees and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, the Commission again awarded $450 per hour, citing past awards and the factors in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), but did not enhance the fee despite acknowledging the complexity and novelty of the issues.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission abused its discretion by not adequately considering the factors that supported an enhanced fee. The Court emphasized the need for the Commission to apply the modified lodestar method, which involves calculating a baseline fee and then considering whether to adjust it based on various factors, including the complexity and novelty of the case and the contingent nature of the work. The Court vacated the Commission's fee award and remanded the case, directing the Commission to enhance the fees based on its findings. The Court also clarified that the Commission must consider all relevant factors and not rely solely on past awards. View "Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium" on Justia Law

Dr. Neena Biswas, a physician at the VA’s Dallas facility, alleged that the VA retaliated against her for whistleblowing by converting her appointment from permanent to temporary and subsequently terminating her employment. Dr. Biswas had made disclosures regarding the hiring process for the Chief of the Hospitalist Section, which she believed violated statutory requirements prioritizing U.S. citizens.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) found that Dr. Biswas’s disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act and contributed to the VA’s actions. However, the Board denied her request for corrective action, concluding that the VA would have taken the same actions regardless of her disclosures. The Board determined that the VA had strong evidence supporting its personnel actions, including Dr. Biswas’s unprofessional and disruptive conduct, and that other similarly situated employees were treated similarly.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the VA had clear and convincing evidence to support its actions. The court noted that Dr. Biswas’s conduct, including refusing patient assignments and sending inflammatory emails, justified the VA’s actions. The court also found that the Board’s error in considering Dr. Biswas’s emails to the VA Secretary as insubordination was harmless, as the decision was supported by other substantial evidence of her misconduct. The court concluded that the VA met its burden of proving it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. View "BISWAS v. DVA " on Justia Law