Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Michael Shields, a mechanic for the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (RTA), injured his left shoulder. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation approved his claim for left shoulder strain. In 2017, Shields sought benefits for a related right shoulder injury, which the bureau denied. Shields then sued in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and in May 2022, a jury found him entitled to benefits for the right shoulder injury. The RTA appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on April 27, 2023.Following the appellate court's decision, Shields filed a motion on May 8, 2023, seeking $26,221 in appellate attorney fees or a remand to the trial court to determine the fees. The RTA opposed, arguing the motion was untimely and that Shields had waived the issue by not seeking fees earlier. The appellate court ruled in favor of Shields, allowing him to recover appellate attorney fees and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court held that a worker who prevails at trial in a workers’ compensation action may request attorney fees after obtaining an appellate judgment on the merits. The court emphasized that the workers’ compensation statute should be liberally construed in favor of employees and found no statutory requirement for the timing of such a request. The court dismissed the RTA's arguments regarding the timing and jurisdiction of the fee request and did not address the issue of fee caps, as it was not ripe for review. View "Shields v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation" on Justia Law

In April 2020, a nursing home decided to pay its employees bonuses in recognition of their efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic. These bonuses were temporary salary increases, which were gradually reduced over the next few months until salaries returned to almost original levels. The company did not notify the union representing its employees or provide an opportunity to bargain before implementing and scaling back the bonuses. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that the bonuses were wages subject to mandatory bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially found that the bonuses were gifts rather than wages and thus not subject to mandatory bargaining. The ALJ also found that the management rights clause in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) authorized the company's actions. However, the ALJ found the company violated the Act by failing to respond to the union's information request.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB's determination that the bonuses were wages tied to employment-related factors and constituted hazard pay, making them subject to mandatory bargaining. The court also agreed with the NLRB that the management rights clause did not survive the CBA's expiration and thus did not authorize the company's unilateral actions. The court denied the company's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement, including the make-whole remedy for affected employees and compensation for adverse tax consequences. The court also enforced the order regarding the company's failure to respond to the information request. View "Alaris Health at Boulevard East v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In 2021, New Jersey enacted the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), which prohibits employers from refusing to hire job applicants based on cannabis use. In 2022, a retailer rescinded a job offer to an applicant, Erick Zanetich, after he tested positive for cannabis. Zanetich filed a lawsuit claiming the retailer's action violated CREAMMA and public policy. He sought redress individually and on behalf of a putative class.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed both counts of Zanetich's complaint. The court found that CREAMMA does not imply a private remedy for violations of its employment protections and that New Jersey's public policy exception to at-will employment does not apply to job applicants. Zanetich appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit held that CREAMMA does not imply a private remedy for job applicants who fail drug tests for cannabis. The court applied New Jersey's modified Cort test and found that CREAMMA does not confer a special benefit on job applicants, there was no legislative intent to provide a private remedy, and implying such a remedy would not advance CREAMMA's purposes. Additionally, the court held that New Jersey's public policy exception to at-will employment, as established in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., does not extend to job applicants. The court also declined to certify the state-law issues to the New Jersey Supreme Court, finding no significant uncertainty or importance warranting certification. View "Zanetich v. WalMart Stores East Inc" on Justia Law

Dr. Tara Gustilo, an Asian American obstetrician-gynecologist of Filipino descent, was demoted from her position as Chair of the OBGYN Department at Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc. (HHS) in April 2021. Following her demotion, she filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently sued HHS, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of HHS, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the race discrimination, retaliation, and First Amendment claims. The court concluded that Dr. Gustilo failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and that there was no evidence she opposed an unlawful employment practice. Additionally, the court found no material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board considered her Facebook posts in its decision to demote her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, finding that there was a material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board ratified the MEC's decision and the basis for it, which included consideration of Dr. Gustilo's Facebook posts. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the posts were protected speech and to apply the Pickering balancing test.The court declined to review the district court's summary judgment rulings on the Title VII and MHRA claims at this time, as they are now interlocutory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Gustilo v. Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc." on Justia Law

Paul Prinkey Jr. was injured while working for Emerine’s Towing, Inc. on January 19, 2015. His workers' compensation claim was allowed for myocardial infarction, substantial aggravation of pre-existing coronary artery disease, and major depressive disorder. Prinkey filed his first application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation on February 4, 2019, which was denied by the Industrial Commission of Ohio based on medical evaluations indicating he was capable of sedentary work. Prinkey filed a second application for PTD compensation on June 4, 2021, citing worsening symptoms.The Industrial Commission denied Prinkey’s second application, stating he failed to present evidence of new and changed circumstances as required by the amended R.C. 4123.58(G). The commission's staff hearing officer (SHO) found no jurisdiction to address the application due to the lack of new evidence. Prinkey sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which returned the matter to the commission for further proceedings, finding the SHO's order lacked adequate explanation and evidence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's decision. The court held that the SHO failed to comply with the requirements of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., which mandates that the commission must specifically state the evidence relied upon and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision. The court found that the SHO did not provide sufficient reasoning or cite specific evidence to support the conclusion that Prinkey failed to present new and changed circumstances. Consequently, the case was returned to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings. View "State ex rel. Prinkey v. Emerine's Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

Todd Halbur was terminated from his position as comptroller of the Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division (ABD). Halbur claimed he was fired in retaliation for reporting to his supervisor, Stephen Larson, that ABD was violating Iowa law by exceeding the 50% markup on liquor sales and for refusing to engage in illegal acts related to a service contract with Beverage Merchandising, Inc. (BMI). Halbur filed a lawsuit against Larson, asserting a statutory claim for wrongful discharge under Iowa Code section 70A.28 and a common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The district court submitted the statutory claim to a jury but dismissed the common law claim, ruling that the statutory claim was the exclusive remedy. The jury awarded Halbur $1 million, which was reduced due to a statutory cap on damages.The Iowa District Court for Polk County dismissed Halbur’s common law wrongful discharge claim, reasoning that the statutory claim under section 70A.28 provided a comprehensive remedy. The court also dismissed the statutory claims against the State of Iowa and ABD, allowing the claim to proceed only against Larson in his official capacity. Larson’s motion for summary judgment was initially granted in part but later reconsidered, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The jury found in favor of Halbur, awarding him damages.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case. Larson argued that Halbur’s internal complaints did not constitute protected disclosures under section 70A.28. However, the court found that Larson failed to preserve this issue for appeal by not raising it during trial through a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On cross-appeal, Halbur argued that his common law claim should not have been dismissed. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the statutory remedy under section 70A.28 was exclusive and comprehensive, precluding the need for a common law claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Halbur v. Larson" on Justia Law

A minor, Iyana Crenshaw, was injured while working at Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc. Her father, Derrick Crenshaw, filed a negligence lawsuit against Sonic, alleging that the injury was caused by Sonic's negligence. The complaint did not seek workers' compensation benefits but solely pursued a negligence claim.The Butler Circuit Court dismissed the negligence action, concluding that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act barred the claim. Crenshaw did not dispute that Iyana's injury was subject to the Act but argued that the Act itself was unconstitutional under Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022. The attorney general and Sonic defended the constitutionality of the Act, and the circuit court rejected Crenshaw's constitutional challenges, leading to the dismissal of the negligence action.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act does not violate Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution. The court applied both the vested-rights approach and the common-law-rights approach to determine the constitutionality of the Act. Under the vested-rights approach, the Act did not deprive Crenshaw of a vested right in a cause of action. Under the common-law-rights approach, the court concluded that the Act was a valid exercise of the legislature's police power, as it eradicated or ameliorated a perceived social evil. Therefore, the Act's exclusive-remedy provisions were upheld, and the dismissal of the negligence action was affirmed. View "Crenshaw v. Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc." on Justia Law

Newton Jones, the President of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, was removed from office and expelled from the Union by the Union’s Executive Council after it was determined that he had misused Union funds. Jones challenged the disciplinary proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, arguing that the proceedings violated the Union Constitution and his due-process rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). He also claimed that the district court erred by not allowing him sufficient time to respond to the motion for summary judgment and by not permitting discovery.The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Vice Presidents who had acted against Jones, affirming their decision to remove him from office. The court ruled that the Executive Council’s decision was binding and entitled to full effect. Jones then appealed the district court’s summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that the Executive Council did not violate the Union Constitution in removing Jones from office. The court deferred to the Union’s interpretation of its constitutional provisions, concluding that the Council’s interpretations were not unreasonable. The court also found that Jones had not shown any violation of the LMRDA or any error by the district court in conducting the summary-judgment proceedings.The Tenth Circuit concluded that Jones received a full and fair hearing under the LMRDA and that the district court did not err in setting an expedited briefing schedule or in not allowing additional time for discovery. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment. View "International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Jones" on Justia Law

The City and County of Butte-Silver Bow, Montana (BSB) hired Rhonda Staton as a police officer in 2001, promoting her to detective in 2008. Staton received two verbal reprimands in 2017 and 2018 for tardiness and refusal to investigate underage drinking, respectively. In 2019, Staton filed a hostile work environment complaint, which was not substantiated. In early 2020, Staton lost her department-issued taser, leading to a Fit for Duty Evaluation (FFDE) by Dr. George Watson, who found her unfit for duty. Staton was terminated in August 2020 based on this evaluation and her performance issues.The Butte Police Protective Association (BPPA) filed a grievance on Staton’s behalf, leading to arbitration. Arbitrator A. Ray McCoy found Watson’s FFDE unreliable and ruled that BSB had not established just cause for Staton’s termination. McCoy ordered Staton’s reinstatement, back pay, and an additional evaluation to determine rehabilitative strategies. BSB did not comply with the reinstatement or compensation but arranged for an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) by Dr. William Patenaude, which did not provide a diagnosis or rehabilitative recommendations.BSB petitioned to vacate the arbitration award, arguing it was a manifest disregard of Montana law. The Second Judicial District Court denied the motion to vacate but remanded the matter to the arbitrator to reconcile the award with Staton’s inability to return to service. BSB appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the arbitrator’s award did not violate Montana law or public policy. The court found that the District Court abused its discretion by remanding the matter, as it exceeded the permissible scope of review for arbitration awards. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded with instructions to confirm the original arbitration award. View "Butte v Butte Police" on Justia Law

Edgar Gonzalez worked for Nowhere Santa Monica, one of ten related LLCs operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles. As a condition of employment, Gonzalez signed an arbitration agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. He later filed a lawsuit against all ten LLCs, alleging various Labor Code violations and claiming they were joint employers. The non-Santa Monica entities moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica, but Gonzalez opposed, arguing they were not parties to the agreement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion to compel arbitration for Nowhere Santa Monica but denied it for the other entities, finding no evidence that Gonzalez's claims against the non-signatory defendants were intertwined with the arbitration agreement. Gonzalez then dismissed his complaint against Nowhere Santa Monica, and the other entities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Gonzalez was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with the non-Santa Monica entities because his claims against them were intimately founded in and intertwined with the employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. The court reasoned that Gonzalez's joint employment theory inherently linked his claims to the obligations under the employment agreement, which contained the arbitration clause. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration for the non-Santa Monica entities. View "Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC" on Justia Law