Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

James Jurgensen sustained a work injury on July 29, 2021, while employed by Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc. He hired attorney Joshua E. Borken, who agreed to a contingent fee of 20% of the first $130,000 of compensation and 20% of any excess amount, subject to approval. Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), caps attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases at $26,000. The parties settled for $150,000, and Borken sought $30,000 in fees, including $4,000 in excess fees. The compensation judge approved $26,000 but denied the excess fees after applying the Irwin factors.The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the compensation judge’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the excess fees. The WCCA also concluded that automatic approval of unobjected-to excess fees is inconsistent with section 176.081, which provides a presumptive cap on attorney fees. The WCCA did not address the constitutional issue due to a lack of jurisdiction.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the 2024 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 176.081, which increases the cap on attorney fees, does not apply retroactively. The court also held that the WCCA did not err by declining to automatically approve the requested excess fee. Additionally, the court found that Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), does not violate the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Finally, the court concluded that the WCCA did not err by affirming the compensation judge’s denial of excess attorney fees under the Irwin factors.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the WCCA, upholding the denial of the $4,000 in excess attorney fees. View "Jurgensen vs. Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves members of the Auburn University Board of Trustees and various Auburn University employees (defendants) who were sued by Patti Northcutt and her husband, Walter Northcutt (plaintiffs). Patti, a former employee and doctoral student at Auburn, alleged that the defendants retaliated against her for previous lawsuits and grievances she had filed, which were settled through agreements. She claimed that the defendants breached these settlement agreements and interfered with her ability to complete her doctoral program and obtain employment at Auburn.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Lee Circuit Court, which they amended multiple times. The third amended complaint included claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, and procedural due process violations, as well as state-law claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, asserting federal qualified immunity and State immunity under the Alabama Constitution.The Lee Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss the First Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims but denied the motion regarding the other claims. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the remaining claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition in part, directing the trial court to dismiss the claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983 for equal protection and procedural due process violations, based on federal qualified immunity. The Court also directed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to state-law claims for prospective injunctive relief, based on State immunity. However, the Court denied the petition regarding the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to federal-law claims for prospective injunctive relief and the state-law claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte B.T. Roberts" on Justia Law

The University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority (the Authority) was created by the legislature in 1995 and was initially required to engage in collective bargaining under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act (Peace Act). However, in 2011, Act 10 was signed into law, which removed the Authority from the Peace Act and eliminated its obligation to engage in collective bargaining.After Act 10, the Authority ceased collective bargaining with its employees. In recent years, employees requested the Authority to recognize the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as their collective bargaining agent, which the Authority declined. This led to a Memorandum of Understanding between SEIU and the Authority, and they petitioned the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to determine if the Authority was still required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. WERC concluded that the Authority was no longer required to engage in collective bargaining, citing Act 10's amendments. SEIU sought review in the circuit court, which affirmed WERC's decision. SEIU then appealed, and the Authority filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals, which was granted.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Authority is no longer required to engage in collective bargaining under the Peace Act. The court examined the statutory language and history, concluding that Act 10 ended the collective bargaining requirements for the Authority. The decision of WERC and the circuit court was affirmed. View "Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission" on Justia Law

A Hobby Lobby manager called law enforcement because Kristopher Birtcher appeared to be suffering from a mental health crisis at the store. Birtcher, who was unarmed and had committed no crime, tried to flee when sheriff’s deputies arrived. The deputies subdued him by double-cuffing his hands behind his back, securing his ankles, tying his ankles to a cord around his waist, and applying bodyweight pressure to his back while he was lying face down. Birtcher gasped that he couldn’t breathe and called for help. He stopped moving after several minutes, and the deputies kept him in a prone position for another 50 seconds before turning him on his side, then later returned him to a prone position. Birtcher died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest within 25 minutes of the deputies’ arrival.Birtcher’s minor daughter, A.B., brought state claims in state court after unsuccessfully litigating federal claims. She asserted claims for wrongful death, battery, negligence, and negligent training, and a survival action for violation of the Bane Act. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim and ruling that the restraint was “by the book.” The court also ruled that A.B. failed to identify a legal basis for her negligent training theory against Sheriff Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that there were triable issues of material fact on the excessive force claim, noting that the deputies’ use of forceful prone restraint with bodyweight compression could be seen as excessive. The court also found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as A.B. had identified a statutory basis for the claim, and Sheriff Gore failed to demonstrate the absence of triable issues of material fact. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The case involves the Citizen Action Defense Fund (Fund) requesting the initial offers for collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) from the Washington State Office of Financial Management (OFM) under the Public Records Act (PRA). The key issue is whether the deliberative process exemption under RCW 42.56.280 applies to these initial offers after the tentative CBAs have been signed by the parties and submitted to the OFM director but before they are signed by the governor or funded by the legislature.The Thurston County Superior Court found that OFM violated the PRA by withholding the records, ruling that the deliberative process exemption did not apply once the CBAs were signed by the state’s negotiation representative and the union. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the records were still exempt because the CBAs had not been presented to the governor for approval or funded by the legislature, and thus were not yet final.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the deliberative process exemption continues to apply until the legislature has funded the CBAs. The court reasoned that the collective bargaining process is not complete until the final step in the statutorily required implementation process, which is the approval of funding by the legislature. Therefore, the deliberative process exemption protects the documents related to collective bargaining until the CBAs are funded by the legislature. View "Citizen Action Def. Fund v. Off. of Fin. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Travis Bearden, a firefighter and paramedic for the City of Ocean Shores, joined the U.S. Army Reserves in 2013. He took periodic absences for military service, receiving paid military leave from the city. The dispute centers on military leave Bearden took between 2019 and 2021. During his first and second leaves from October 2019 to August 2020, Bearden was kept on the schedule and provided paid military leave for his scheduled workdays until his paid leave was exhausted in February 2020. The city then placed him on leave without pay status. For his third leave from August 2020 to May 2021, the city did not provide Bearden any paid military leave for the October 2020-September 2021 military fiscal year, arguing he had no scheduled workdays.Bearden filed a complaint in federal court in January 2021, asserting the city violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by denying him accrued leave, including paid military leave under RCW 38.40.060. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding Bearden was not entitled to paid military leave during his third leave because he was not scheduled to work on any day during the October 2020-September 2021 military fiscal year. Bearden appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Washington’s paid military leave statute.The Washington Supreme Court held that public employees are entitled to 21 days of paid military leave for required military service during each military fiscal year, regardless of whether they are scheduled to work by the employer due to the length of their military service absence. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language and purpose support this entitlement, and the scheduling of workdays does not limit the annual entitlement to paid military leave. View "Bearden v. City of Ocean Shores" on Justia Law

In the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab required employees to be vaccinated against the disease. Sally Tarquinio, who suffers from “Lyme-induced immune dysregulation,” requested a medical exemption, fearing adverse effects from the vaccine. The lab found her condition unclear and requested to speak with her doctors, but Tarquinio refused. Consequently, the lab denied her exemption request and terminated her employment for non-compliance. Tarquinio sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the lab.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed the case and found that Tarquinio had not provided sufficient evidence to support her need for an exemption. The court noted that the lab had made good faith efforts to understand her condition and accommodate her, but Tarquinio’s refusal to allow communication with her doctors prevented the lab from obtaining necessary information. The court concluded that without this information, the lab could not be held liable for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Tarquinio’s failure to engage in the interactive process by not providing adequate medical documentation or allowing the lab to speak with her doctors meant that the lab was not on proper notice of her need for accommodation. The court emphasized that the interactive process is essential for determining reasonable accommodations and that an employer cannot be held liable if the employee obstructs this process. Thus, the lab’s actions were deemed appropriate, and the summary judgment in favor of the lab was affirmed. View "Tarquinio v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab" on Justia Law

Dayana Garcia worked as a server at Gloria’s Restaurant for several months. After her employment ended, she filed a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) suit against the restaurant's management entities and co-founder, alleging failure to pay minimum wage. The defendants initially participated in litigation, including answering the lawsuit, engaging in discovery, and mediating. They also filed a joint status report stating they had no intent to arbitrate. Five months after the lawsuit was filed, the defendants moved to compel arbitration.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the defendants had waived their right to arbitrate by substantially invoking the judicial process. The defendants appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the defendants had engaged in several litigative actions, including filing an answer without mentioning arbitration, participating in discovery, and mediating the dispute. The court also highlighted the defendants' explicit statement in the joint status report that they were not considering arbitration. The court concluded that these actions constituted a substantial invocation of the judicial process, thereby waiving the right to arbitrate. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Garcia v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Joanne Allison, a former registered nurse, filed a class action lawsuit against her former employer, Dignity Health, alleging unpaid work, meal period, and rest break violations. She sought class certification for registered nurses at three Dignity hospitals since June 1, 2014. Allison's expert claimed that time records showed over 70% of shifts had noncompliant meal periods. She also argued that work-issued communication devices interrupted rest breaks, violating labor laws.The trial court initially granted partial class certification, finding common questions suitable for class treatment, including the legality of Dignity's premium request requirement and the impact of communication devices on breaks. However, Dignity later moved to decertify the class, citing post-certification discovery that revealed significant variations in nurses' experiences and practices, undermining the manageability of class-wide adjudication.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering new evidence from post-certification depositions, which showed varied reasons for noncompliant meal periods, such as personal preferences and mistakes. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to disregard the Steiner survey due to methodological flaws and potential biases, which rendered it unreliable for proving class-wide liability.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decertification order, agreeing that individualized inquiries predominated over common questions, making class treatment unmanageable. The court also noted that the evidence did not support a uniform practice of requiring nurses to carry work phones during breaks, further complicating the rest break claims. Thus, the order decertifying the class was affirmed. View "Allison v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Santoasha Harris endured five years of sexual harassment at her job with the City of Milwaukee. When she reported the harassment in 2017, the City separated her from the harasser, conducted an investigation, compelled the harasser’s resignation, and restored Harris to her position within a month. Harris sued the City, alleging it knew about the harassment for years, failed to act, and retaliated against her for reporting it. Due to Harris’s bankruptcy filing, her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that Harris’s Estate had not shown the City unreasonably failed to prevent the harassment or that she suffered a tangible employment action as a consequence of reporting it. The court found no evidence supporting the Title VII and Section 1983 claims against the City.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the evidence did not support the claims of quid pro quo harassment, hostile work environment, or retaliation under Title VII. The court found that Harris did not suffer a tangible employment action and that the City acted promptly and reasonably once the harassment was reported. Additionally, the court found no basis for employer liability under Section 1983, as there was no evidence of intentional discrimination by the City. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find for the Estate on its claims against the City. View "Bankruptcy Estate of Harris v City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law