Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Anna Palova, a flight attendant for United Airlines since 1992, was terminated in February 2020 for allegedly engaging in "parking," a prohibited scheduling tactic. United Airlines claimed that Palova manipulated flight assignments, violating the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Palova, however, argued that her termination was due to age discrimination, as she and two other older flight attendants were fired while younger attendants who committed similar infractions were not.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of United Airlines. The court concluded that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) precluded Palova's Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim and preempted her Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) claim. The court reasoned that resolving Palova's claims would require interpreting the CBA, which falls outside the court's jurisdiction under the RLA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the RLA does not preclude or preempt Palova's age discrimination claims. The court found that Palova's claims of age discrimination were independent of the CBA and did not require its interpretation. The court noted that while the CBA might be referenced, it was not dispositive of the discrimination claims. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Palova v. United Airlines" on Justia Law

In 1996, Katherine Stovall, while employed at New England Telephone Company, experienced pain in her hands and wrists due to a work-related injury. By 1998, the pain had spread, leading her to take a leave of absence. She returned to work in 1999 but ultimately stopped working in June 2001 due to increased pain. Stovall notified her employer of a new injury/aggravation in August 2001. In 2004, she filed petitions for benefits for both the 1996 and 2001 injuries. In 2006, a hearing officer awarded her benefits for the 2001 injury but not for the 1996 injury, which she had withdrawn.The Workers’ Compensation Board hearing officer found that the 2001 injury was a significant aggravation of the 1996 injury. In 2011, New England Telephone filed a petition to review the benefits, asserting that the 520-week limit on compensation payments had been reached. The hearing officer granted the petition, finding that Stovall had achieved maximum medical improvement and had no permanent impairment from the 2001 injury.Stovall filed a petition for restoration of benefits for the 1996 injury in 2017, nearly eleven years after payments for the 1996 injury had ceased. An ALJ denied the petition as time-barred, concluding that Stovall had not shown that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The Appellate Division vacated this decision, ruling that the payments for the 2001 injury tolled the statute of limitations for the 1996 injury.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Appellate Division's decision, holding that Stovall failed to prove that New England Telephone was on notice that its payments for the 2001 injury were related to the 1996 injury. The case was remanded for the Appellate Division to affirm the denial of Stovall’s petition as time-barred. View "Stovall v. New England Telephone Company" on Justia Law

In August 2022, a bin full of phosphate rock collapsed at the Lee Creek Mine in Beaufort, North Carolina, injuring three miners. Industrial TurnAround Corporation (ITAC), the independent contractor responsible for checking the structural integrity of the bin's support columns, was cited by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for failing to take defective equipment out of service. MSHA sent a notice of proposed penalty to ITAC's outdated address of record, and ITAC did not contest the penalty, which became final 30 days later. ITAC subsequently filed a motion to reopen the penalty, claiming it had inadvertently failed to update its address of record.The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission granted ITAC's motion to reopen the penalty, citing excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Commission noted that ITAC had not occupied the address since 2009 and had only discovered the MSHA notice when an employee checked for missing packages. The Secretary of Labor, representing MSHA, opposed the motion, arguing that ITAC's failure to update its address could not be excused under FRCP 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission’s order to reopen the penalty was not an appealable collateral order and dismissed the Secretary’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the order did not impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix a legal relationship, and that the interest in immediate review did not meet the high threshold required under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission’s decision to reopen the penalty did not involve a substantial public interest or a particular value of a high order that justified immediate appeal. View "Secretary of Labor v. Industrial TurnAround Corporation" on Justia Law

Garten Trucking LC, a company specializing in the transportation of paper products, faced a union organizing campaign by the Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers (AWPPW) in mid-2021. After losing a union representation election, AWPPW filed multiple unfair labor practice charges against Garten Trucking, alleging various violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Garten Trucking guilty of several violations, including unlawful interrogation and threats, and ordered a new election. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) affirmed the ALJ's findings and mandated bargaining with AWPPW.While the initial case was pending, AWPPW continued its organizing efforts, distributing a flyer claiming that Garten Trucking was required to bargain with the union and that the union's presence led to employee raises. In response, Garten Trucking's owner, Robert Garten, posted a message on the company's internal board, refuting the union's claims and suggesting that employees would have already received raises if not for the union's actions. The union filed another unfair labor practice charge, and the ALJ ruled that Garten's message violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by implying that union activities negatively impacted wage increases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether Garten's message constituted a coercive threat. The court upheld the NLRB's decision, finding substantial evidence that Garten's statement linking wage increases to union activities was coercive and violated the NLRA. The court emphasized that while employers are entitled to express their opinions on union activities, they cannot make statements that imply threats or promises of benefits based on union support. The court denied Garten Trucking's petition and granted the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Garten Trucking LC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

An employee, Delbert P. Costa, Jr., suffered a workplace injury on May 9, 2012, while employed by the County of Hawai'i, Department of Water Supply. Costa reported the injury, and the County filed an industrial injury claim, contesting compensability pending investigation. The County did not contest that temporary total disability (TTD) benefits would be due if the injury was compensable. The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations found the injury compensable on June 24, 2013, but the County did not appeal this decision or pay TTD benefits.Costa applied for a hearing to address the nonpayment of TTD benefits, and the Director issued a supplemental decision on April 25, 2014, awarding TTD benefits and imposing a 20% penalty for late payment. The County appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB), which reversed the Director’s supplemental decision, finding no statutory basis for the penalty as the TTD benefits were not due before the Director’s decision on compensability.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the LIRAB’s decision, although it noted errors in the LIRAB’s application of the evidentiary standard and its characterization of HRS § 386-92 as punitive. The ICA agreed with the LIRAB that the Director’s decision did not order TTD benefits and thus did not support the imposition of a penalty.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that a penalty under HRS § 386-92 is appropriate where an employer fails to make timely TTD benefit payments after a final decision on compensability. The Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the LIRAB’s decision, remanding the case to the LIRAB to assess the penalty and determine attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Costa v. County of Hawai'i" on Justia Law

Alexander Smith, a Christian firefighter in Atlantic City, was prohibited from growing a beard due to the city's grooming policy, which he claimed violated his religious beliefs. Smith sued the city, alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VII’s accommodation and anti-retaliation provisions. The District Court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment for the city on all claims.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied Smith's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that his claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all four claims, leading Smith to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the District Court’s judgment regarding Smith’s Title VII accommodation claim and his free exercise claim, finding that the city's grooming policy was not generally applicable and failed strict scrutiny. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the equal protection claim and the Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that Smith did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Additionally, the court reversed the denial of Smith’s motion for a preliminary injunction, recognizing a likelihood of success on the merits and the irreparable harm caused by the loss of First Amendment freedoms. View "Smith v. City of Atlantic City" on Justia Law

Brett Jens resigned from his position at Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC, and subsequently joined a competitor, J.R. Simplot Company. Wilbur-Ellis filed a lawsuit against Jens and Simplot, seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce restrictive covenants in Jens’s employment agreement and to prevent Simplot’s alleged tortious interference with the agreement. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the restrictive covenants were no longer enforceable.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that Wilbur-Ellis was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim against Jens. The court found that the restrictive covenants in Jens’s employment agreement did not survive past the agreement’s expiration date of February 28, 2010. Wilbur-Ellis appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing that the restrictive covenants were intended to begin when Jens’s employment ended. Simplot cross-appealed, contending that Wilbur-Ellis could not enforce the restrictive covenants because the employer in the agreement was Wilbur-Ellis Air, LLC, not Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction, agreeing that the restrictive covenants did not survive the expiration of the employment agreement. The court emphasized that the agreement did not contain a survival clause or any language indicating that the restrictive covenants were intended to extend beyond the termination of the agreement. Consequently, the court concluded that Wilbur-Ellis was unlikely to succeed on the merits, which is the most significant factor in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction. View "Wilbur-Ellis Company LLC v. Jens" on Justia Law

Kristina Steets was severely injured in 2017 while working for Celebration Fireworks, Inc. The employer accepted liability for her total disability under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) in 2018. In 2019, Steets filed petitions to amend the description of her injuries and sought specific loss benefits. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) granted her petitions, and the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. However, Steets died from her injuries while the Commonwealth Court's decision was pending.Steets' estate filed petitions seeking payment of the specific loss benefits awarded to her, which were still under appellate review at the time of her death. The WCJ denied the Estate's claims beyond funeral expenses, and the WCAB affirmed. The Commonwealth Court, in a split decision, also affirmed, ruling that specific loss benefits did not survive Steets' work-related death based on the precedent set by Estate of Harris v. WCAB (Sunoco, Inc.).The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and overruled Estate of Harris and Burns International Security Services, Inc. v. WCAB (Crist), which had held that Section 306(g) of the WCA was the exclusive means by which specific loss benefits survive the death of a worker. The Court held that Section 410 of the WCA applies, which states that if a claimant dies before the final adjudication of their claim, the compensation due to the claimant up to the date of death shall be paid to the dependents or, if there are no dependents, to the estate. Since Steets died before the final adjudication of her specific loss benefits claim, the employer was required to pay those benefits to her estate. The case was remanded to the WCJ to determine the amount of specific loss benefits due to the Estate. View "Steets v. Celebration Fireworks" on Justia Law

In 2023, Kenneth Bresler, a former Appeals Court staff attorney, filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court against three Appeals Court employees, Lynn Muster, Mary Bowe, and Gina DeRossi, alleging intentional interference with advantageous relations. Bresler claimed that the defendants engaged in a campaign that led to his termination. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Bresler failed to establish the "actual malice" required for such a claim and that they were entitled to common-law immunity as public officials.The Superior Court judge granted the motion to dismiss for Bowe and DeRossi but denied it for Muster. Bresler appealed the dismissal of Bowe and DeRossi, while Muster cross-appealed the partial denial of her motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Bresler's application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the allegations in the complaint, when taken as true, plausibly suggested that Muster and Bowe acted with "actual malice," which is necessary to state an intentional interference claim. The court found that Muster's actions, motivated by jealousy and hostility, and Bowe's subsequent negative evaluations and actions against Bresler, supported the inference of actual malice. However, the court held that the complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to establish actual malice or defeat common-law immunity for DeRossi.As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court's order as to Muster and DeRossi and reversed it as to Bowe, allowing the claims against Muster and Bowe to proceed while dismissing the claims against DeRossi. View "Bresler v. Muster" on Justia Law

A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law