Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor filed a lawsuit against Levering Regional Health Care Center and Reliant Care Management Company for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The suit alleged that Levering deducted 30 minutes of pay for employees' meal breaks, despite knowing that employees routinely worked through these breaks. An investigation revealed that many employees did not receive lunch breaks or had them interrupted, and some were unaware of the policy to report missed breaks for compensation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Levering's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Levering did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the unpaid overtime work due to the employees' failure to use the established reporting policy. Additionally, the court found that the Secretary did not adequately establish the amount of overtime owed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that Levering may have failed to effectively communicate its policy to employees, as evidenced by the lack of time sheets submitted during the audit period compared to a later period. The court also found that the Secretary provided enough evidence to estimate the amount of unpaid overtime work, meeting the burden of showing the extent of the work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Micone v. Levering Regional HCC, L.LC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an at-will employee, was terminated by her employer, a private organization, after she sent emails to members of the Tennessee General Assembly expressing grievances about the employer's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The employer claimed the emails violated its policies. The plaintiff sued for retaliatory discharge, asserting her termination violated her right to petition under Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Hamilton County dismissed the complaint, holding that the right to petition did not apply to private employers. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the right to petition could serve as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, thus allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution is enforceable only against governmental entities, not private parties. The court emphasized that the historical context of the right to petition, dating back to early England, was intended to protect against government oppression, not to constrain private parties. The court noted that no state has held that the right to petition limits the ability of private employers to terminate at-will employees. Consequently, the court concluded that private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, holding that at-will employees cannot base claims of retaliatory discharge against private employers on the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution. View "Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee" on Justia Law

AFSCME Council 93 filed a petition to certify a bargaining unit consisting of thirteen employees from the Town of Barnstead’s police and fire departments. The Town objected, arguing that the employees' duties were too dissimilar to share a community of interest. The case was submitted to the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) for a decision on the written record.A PELRB hearing officer approved the proposed bargaining unit, concluding that the employees shared a sufficient community of interest to negotiate jointly. The officer noted that all employees worked in public safety, were subject to the Town’s employment terms, and interacted with each other at work. The Town requested a review, challenging the community of interest determination. The PELRB denied the request and certified AFSCME as the bargaining unit’s exclusive representative. The Town then appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the PELRB’s decision, focusing on whether the police and fire department employees shared a community of interest under RSA 273-A:8, I. The Court found that the PELRB’s decision was primarily based on the fact that all employees followed the Town’s personnel policies, which was insufficient to establish a community of interest. The Court noted differences in work schedules, duties, responsibilities, and organizational structures between the police and fire departments. The Court concluded that the record did not support the PELRB’s finding of a community of interest and reversed the PELRB’s decision approving the proposed bargaining unit. View "Appeal of Town of Barnstead" on Justia Law

Nicholas Guthneck was hired by Qlarant Integrity Solutions, LLC, a Maryland company working on federally funded contracts, as a health fraud investigator in September 2020. He worked remotely from Montana. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, President Biden issued Executive Order 14042 in September 2021, mandating that federal contractors ensure their employees were vaccinated against COVID-19. Qlarant implemented a vaccination policy in October 2021, requiring employees to submit proof of vaccination by November 24, 2021. Guthneck refused to disclose his vaccination status, citing Montana law (House Bill 702, codified as § 49-2-312, MCA), which prohibits employment discrimination based on vaccination status. Consequently, Qlarant terminated his employment on November 4, 2021.Guthneck filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB), which found reasonable cause to support his claim. The case was set for a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Qlarant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law. The OAH hearing officer agreed and dismissed the complaint. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Human Rights Commission (HRC), which vacated the dismissal, stating that the hearing officer lacked authority to determine preemption.Qlarant sought judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. The District Court reversed the HRC's decision, ruling that the hearing officer had the authority to determine preemption and correctly found that Executive Order 14042 preempted § 49-2-312, MCA. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the OAH hearing officer had the authority to determine whether Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law, as it involved statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional question. The Court also held that Executive Order 14042 expressly preempted § 49-2-312, MCA, for federal contractors like Qlarant during the relevant period. Thus, Qlarant was required to comply with the federal mandate, and Guthneck's termination for refusing to disclose his vaccination status was lawful. View "Qlarant v Guthneck" on Justia Law

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC transitioned a petroleum refinery into a renewable diesel production facility in 2021. During this transition, HollyFrontier reassigned work from hourly workers to salaried employees with higher education and technical expertise. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union Local 11-574 filed a grievance, alleging that this reassignment violated their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator ruled in favor of HollyFrontier on the reassignment issue but also decided that salaried employees should be included in the bargaining unit, an issue not submitted for arbitration.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and granted HollyFrontier's petition to vacate the arbitrator's decision regarding the inclusion of salaried employees in the bargaining unit. The court reasoned that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding an issue that was not submitted for arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur of the arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by addressing an issue not submitted for arbitration. The parties had only submitted the issue of whether HollyFrontier's reassignment of work violated the CBA, and the arbitrator's decision to include salaried employees in the bargaining unit was beyond the scope of the submitted issue. The court emphasized that arbitration is limited to the issues the parties agree to submit, and the arbitrator must stay within those bounds. View "HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. United Steel Paper" on Justia Law

Angel Tudor, a teacher with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), worked for Whitehall Central School District for approximately 20 years. Tudor had an accommodation allowing her to leave campus for 15-minute breaks during her prep periods to manage her PTSD symptoms. In 2016, Whitehall prohibited teachers from leaving school grounds during prep periods, leading Tudor to take medical leave. Upon her return, Whitehall provided inconsistent accommodations, which Tudor claimed were insufficient. For the 2019-20 school year, Tudor's schedule included a study hall period during which she was not guaranteed her requested break, leading her to take unauthorized breaks.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Whitehall, holding that Tudor's ability to perform her job without accommodation was fatal to her failure-to-accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court assumed Tudor had a qualifying disability but found that she could not establish the third element of her claim because she could perform her job's essential functions without accommodation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred. The appellate court held that an employee may qualify for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA even if they can perform the essential functions of their job without it. The court emphasized that the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, not just necessary ones. The judgment of the district court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District" on Justia Law

Members of a local union sued their national parent organization for imposing an illegal trusteeship. The plaintiffs, members of NABET-CWA Local 41, claimed that the national union imposed the trusteeship in bad faith following a local officer election. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a temporary restraining order, later converting it into a preliminary injunction. The parties eventually settled, resulting in a consent judgment that dissolved the trusteeship and required the national union to pay Local 41 approximately $26,000 in trusteeship costs. The only unresolved issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. The court acknowledged its broad discretion and the American Rule, which presumes against fee shifting. It considered two exceptions: bad faith and common benefit. The court found that while the national union acted in bad faith in imposing the trusteeship, both parties litigated the dispute in good faith, thus not justifying fee shifting. Additionally, the court recognized that the plaintiffs conferred common benefits on Local 41 and the national union but concluded that these benefits were not substantial enough to merit an award of attorneys' fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, finding that the lower court had appropriately applied the American Rule and its exceptions. The district court's decision to deny attorneys' fees was deemed reasonable and within its broad discretion, as it provided a sound explanation for its conclusions. The appellate court emphasized the highly deferential standard of review for such decisions and upheld the district court's judgment. View "Siddiqui v National Association of Broadcast Employees & Tec" on Justia Law

Mr. Dourdounas, a high school math teacher, was assigned to the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) in 2012. The ATR is a pool of teachers whose positions were eliminated but who were not terminated. In 2017, the DOE and UFT created a voluntary severance package for ATR teachers. Mr. Dourdounas, believing he was still in the ATR pool, applied for the severance package but was denied because the DOE claimed he had been permanently hired at Bronx International High School.Mr. Dourdounas followed the grievance process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the DOE and UFT. After exhausting the grievance process, including an internal appeal within the UFT, he commenced an article 78 proceeding against the City, alleging breach of contract for denying him the retirement incentive. The DOE moved to dismiss the petition on several grounds, including timeliness and failure to state a cause of action.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the statute of limitations began when Mr. Dourdounas was informed of the denial in July 2017. The Appellate Division held that pursuing the grievance process did not toll the statute of limitations.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds. The court held that under the precedent set in Ambach, an employee cannot seek judicial review of a claim arising under a CBA without alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Since Mr. Dourdounas did not allege such a breach, his claim was dismissed. The court also clarified that claims arising solely from a CBA must be brought as a breach of contract action, not through an article 78 proceeding. View "Matter of Dourdounas v City of New York" on Justia Law

Haylee Hinton was injured in a car accident caused by another motorist running a red light. She initially sought compensation from her employer’s workers’ compensation insurer and later settled with the motorist’s insurance carrier. Hinton then filed a claim for underinsured motorist benefits with Midwest Family Mutual Insurance, her underinsured motorist coverage provider, and submitted the claim to arbitration as permitted by Utah law.Midwest sought a declaratory judgment from the district court to limit the categories of damages Hinton could recover in arbitration, citing Utah Code section 31A-22-305.3(4)(c)(i), which excludes benefits paid or payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act from underinsured motorist coverage. The district court interpreted the statute to mean that past and future medical expenses and two-thirds of lost wages were payable under workers’ compensation and ruled that Hinton could not recover these categories of damages from Midwest.Hinton petitioned for interlocutory review, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction and misinterpreted the statute. The Utah Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction but misinterpreted the statute. The court concluded that “payable” means benefits that can or may be paid to a specific claimant in a particular case, not just categories of damages generally available under workers’ compensation. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings to determine what benefits remain payable to Hinton under the Workers’ Compensation Act. View "Hinton v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance" on Justia Law

Mark R. Schmidt, a workers' compensation attorney, sustained a work-related injury while loading files into a trial bag. His treatment included pain management with medications like OxyContin and Oxycodone. To avoid increasing his medication dosage, his physician, Dr. Murphy, prescribed CBD oil. Schmidt purchased CBD oil and lotion over the counter and used them as directed. He sought reimbursement from his employer, Schmidt, Kirifides and Rassias, PC, for the CBD oil costs, which the employer refused, arguing that CBD oil is not a pharmaceutical drug.A Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) granted Schmidt's penalty petition, ordering the employer to reimburse him for the CBD oil costs. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) reversed this decision, stating that Schmidt did not follow the necessary rules for reimbursement and that CBD oil is not a "supply" under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) due to the lack of FDA approval. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board's decision, concluding that CBD oil is a "medicine" or "supply" under the WCA and that Schmidt, not being a provider, was not required to submit standard billing forms for reimbursement.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that any item prescribed by a health care provider as part of a treatment plan for a work-related injury falls within the meaning of "medicines and supplies" under Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) of the WCA. The court also held that the cost containment provisions of the WCA and related regulations do not apply to claimants who are not providers. Therefore, Schmidt was entitled to reimbursement for the CBD oil costs, and the Commonwealth Court's order was affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias" on Justia Law