Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Loretta Marshall applied for a nursing job with Tidelands Health using their online application process. After failing a mandatory physical agility test, she was denied employment. Marshall then sued Tidelands, alleging that the physical agility test constituted prohibited discrimination. Tidelands moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Marshall had agreed to arbitration through the online application process. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Tidelands had not shown the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the case. Initially, Tidelands argued that Marshall's 2016 arbitration agreement covered her 2020 application. The magistrate judge found that the 2016 agreement did not apply to future applications. Tidelands then argued that Marshall agreed to arbitration in 2020, but the magistrate judge found that Marshall was not required to scroll through the arbitration agreement in 2020 and was not on reasonable notice of the agreement. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge and denied Tidelands' motion to compel arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Tidelands failed to show that Marshall had reasonable notice of an offer to arbitrate in 2020. The court noted that Marshall was not required to scroll through the arbitration agreement and that the arbitration notice at the top of the webpage did not provide the actual terms of an agreement. Additionally, the court found that Marshall did not manifest her assent to the arbitration agreement by clicking the "submit" button, as it did not clearly indicate agreement to arbitration. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that no arbitration agreement was formed in 2020. View "Marshall v. Georgetown Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joseph Pessin, representing himself and others similarly situated, sued JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPMC), the JPMorgan Chase Retirement Plan, and its fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Pessin alleged that the Defendants failed to provide adequate disclosures to pension plan participants after converting the retirement plan from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan. Specifically, Pessin claimed that the Defendants did not properly inform participants about the "wear-away" effect, which could freeze their benefits until the cash balance exceeded the previously accrued benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Pessin’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that the Defendants had provided sufficient disclosures explaining the retirement plan's workings and did not mislead participants about the conversion's impact on their accrued benefits. The court concluded that the summary plan descriptions (SPDs) and benefit statements were adequate and that the Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties under ERISA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the Defendants sufficiently disclosed the wear-away effect and that the SPDs clearly explained how benefits would be calculated. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's finding that the Defendants complied with ERISA § 105(a) regarding annual pension benefit statements. The court held that the benefit statements did not properly indicate the total benefits accrued, as they only included the cash balance amount and not the higher minimum benefit from the prior plan. Consequently, the court found that Pessin adequately alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the JPMC Board for failing to monitor the JPMC Benefits Executive's performance regarding the benefit statements.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Pessin v. JPMorgan Chase" on Justia Law

Robert Anthony Zaragoza, a former brakeman and train conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company, was terminated in 2015 after testing positive for cocaine but was later reinstated. In 2016, he failed a color vision test and subsequent retests, leading to his removal from service and denial of recertification as a conductor. Zaragoza contested these results, submitting medical reports attesting to his adequate color vision, but was not reinstated.Zaragoza argued that his claims were tolled from 2016 to 2020 due to his inclusion in a class action against Union Pacific, Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. The district court for the Western District of Texas dismissed his claims as untimely, finding that the tolling ended with the class certification order in February 2019, and the statute of limitations expired before Zaragoza filed his EEOC charge in March 2020.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Zaragoza was included in both the putative and certified class definitions in the Harris class action. The court held that the statute of limitations for Zaragoza's claims was tolled during the pendency of the Harris class action, from the time his claims accrued until the Eighth Circuit decertified the class in March 2020. Consequently, Zaragoza's claims were timely when he filed his EEOC charge.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Zaragoza's disability discrimination claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, declining to address Union Pacific's alternate grounds for summary judgment. View "Zaragoza v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

Noncitizen laborers were brought into the United States to work for construction subcontractor defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fraudulently applied for B-1 employment visas, which cost less than the petition-based visas they should have applied for, thereby violating the False Claims Act (FCA). Additionally, one plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the Trafficking Victims Prevention Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) by threatening prosecution and suing him to coerce other workers to continue working.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The court held that the defendants did not have an "established duty" to pay for the more expensive visas because they never applied for them, thus no legal obligation existed under the FCA. The court also dismissed the TVPRA claim, finding that the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants' actions coerced him to provide any labor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the defendants had no "established duty" to pay for the more expensive visas since they did not apply for them, and thus did not violate the FCA. The court also upheld the dismissal of the TVPRA claim, concluding that the plaintiff did not state a claim because the defendants' actions did not coerce him to provide any labor. The court's main holding was that potential liability for applying for the wrong visas does not constitute an "established duty" to pay under the FCA, and that the TVPRA claim failed because the plaintiff was not coerced into providing labor. The decision was affirmed. View "LESNIK V. ISM VUZEM D.O.O." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Patricia Olivieri, alleged that her employer, Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated, and her manager, Neil Isler, subjected her to sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. Olivieri claimed that Isler sexually assaulted and harassed her, and that after she reported his behavior, she faced retaliation and continued harassment from Stifel and other defendants. Olivieri's allegations included inappropriate comments, physical contact, and retaliatory actions such as changes in her job responsibilities and work environment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially granted the defendants' motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement in Olivieri's employment contract. However, after the enactment of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), Olivieri moved for reconsideration. The district court vacated its earlier decision, concluding that Olivieri's claims accrued after the EFAA's effective date, making her arbitration agreement voidable under the new law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the lower court, applying the continuing violation doctrine to determine that Olivieri's hostile work environment claims accrued after the EFAA's effective date of March 3, 2022. The court held that the EFAA applied to Olivieri's claims, rendering her arbitration agreement invalid and unenforceable. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Curtis Rookaird, represented by Paul Parker, was terminated by BNSF Railway Company after performing an air-brake test, which he argued was a protected activity under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). Rookaird claimed his termination was retaliatory. Initially, a jury found in Rookaird’s favor, but the Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider whether the air-brake test contributed to BNSF’s decision to terminate him. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of BNSF, concluding that while the air-brake test contributed to the termination, it did so "very little."The district court found that BNSF had conceded the air-brake test contributed to Rookaird’s termination but ruled that BNSF was entitled to an affirmative defense by showing the test contributed minimally. The court also upheld BNSF’s evidentiary rulings, excluding certain testimony and admitting comparator evidence. Rookaird appealed, arguing the district court misapplied the FRSA and erred in its evidentiary rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it vacated the district court’s judgment on the affirmative defense issue. The Ninth Circuit held that under the FRSA, an employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated the employee absent the protected activity, not merely that the protected activity contributed "very little" to the decision. The case was remanded for the district court to determine if BNSF met this burden, given that the air-brake test could not contribute even in part to the termination decision. View "Parker v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

A member of the United Mine Workers of America arbitrated a dispute against Consol Energy, Inc. and won. The Union then sued to confirm the arbitration award, while Consol and its subsidiaries counterclaimed to vacate the award. The Union argued that the subsidiaries could not unilaterally reduce health benefits promised to miners for life, even if they no longer mined coal. Consol, which served as the health-plan administrator, had sent a letter indicating potential changes to benefits after the agreement expired, prompting the arbitration.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Union’s claim for lack of standing, reasoning that the Union was not injured as Consol had not actually modified the benefits. The court also declined to vacate the arbitration award on the merits of the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Union’s claim did not fall under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which only authorizes suits for actual violations of contracts, not anticipated future violations. Consequently, the Union’s claim was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Regarding the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim, the court determined that the Subsidiaries lacked standing as they were not named in the arbitration award and had not shown a concrete and imminent injury. The court vacated the district court’s orders on the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.Thus, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Union’s claim and vacated and remanded the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim for dismissal due to lack of standing. View "International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Consol Energy Inc." on Justia Law

Ghulam Ali, an economist at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), suffers from severe allergies. For years, the EPA accommodated his condition by providing a suitable workspace. However, in 2011, the EPA placed a heavily perfumed colleague next to Ali, exacerbating his allergies. Ali requested a private office or a small conference room as an accommodation. Instead, the EPA offered him 100% telework, which Ali rejected, citing concerns about his home setup and the need for in-person collaboration. Ali then filed a lawsuit under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming the EPA failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA. The court concluded that Ali caused a breakdown in the interactive process by rejecting the telework offer without providing sufficient explanation. The court held that Ali bore sole responsibility for the failure to settle on an appropriate accommodation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Ali had provided all requested information and had proposed alternative accommodations, which the EPA either ignored or rejected. The court determined that whether the EPA's offer of 100% telework was a reasonable accommodation involved disputed material facts that should be resolved by a jury. The court emphasized that the reasonableness of an accommodation is often a fact-intensive question and that Ali's concerns about telework, including the need for in-person interaction and the unsuitability of his home for permanent work, were valid issues for a jury to consider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ali v. Regan" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former employees of Alpine Site Services, Inc., filed a lawsuit alleging that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them the required overtime wages. Alpine contended that the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) exemption applied, which would exempt them from paying overtime. The plaintiffs argued that they were not properly classified under the MCA exemption.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with Alpine, finding that the plaintiffs were classified as "loaders" under the MCA exemption. The court found that the plaintiffs' job duties included loading vehicles, which directly affected the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce. The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs fell under the MCA exemption and were not entitled to overtime pay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not err in classifying the plaintiffs as "loaders" under the MCA exemption. The court noted that the plaintiffs' duties included loading vehicles, which required the exercise of judgment and discretion, and that this work directly affected the safety of operation of motor vehicles. The court also found that the plaintiffs regularly engaged in loading activities, which constituted a substantial part of their job responsibilities. The appellate court concluded that the MCA exemption applied to the plaintiffs in all workweeks, even those in which they performed only non-safety-affecting duties. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion to amend the court's factual findings, as the plaintiffs failed to provide meaningful analysis or supporting authority for this argument. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Kelley v. Alpine Site Services" on Justia Law

Four former Tesla employees, Sharonda Taylor, Shaka Green, Tatianna Smith, and Zenobia Milligan, requested personnel records from Tesla through their counsel, Bryan Schwarz Law (BSL), under the California Labor Code. These individuals are also part of a class action lawsuit, Vaughn v. Tesla, which alleges racial discrimination and harassment at Tesla's Fremont factory. During the Vaughn litigation, BSL sent Tesla privacy waivers and statutory personnel records requests on behalf of numerous employees, including the plaintiffs. Tesla did not respond to these requests, citing a stay in the Vaughn proceedings due to an appeal.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, denied Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike the plaintiffs' PAGA complaint. The court found that Tesla failed to show that the plaintiffs' claims arose from protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court ruled that the plaintiffs were exercising their statutory rights to inspect and copy personnel records, independent of the Vaughn litigation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Tesla's refusal to provide the requested personnel records did not constitute protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court distinguished this case from Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn., noting that the plaintiffs' claims did not involve any "written or oral statement or writing" by Tesla. The court also found that Tesla's conduct did not further any public issue or contribute to public debate, as required under the anti-SLAPP statute's catchall provision. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the denial of Tesla's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Taylor v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law