Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Three licensed substance use disorder professionals, referred to as the Counselors, were employed by NCG Acquisition, LLC and NCG CARE, Inc. They allege that they were wrongfully terminated after attempting to ensure a client received appropriate care. The Counselors had recommended that a client in severe distress be moved to inpatient treatment, but their supervisor, Jessica Tewell, altered their recommendation, preventing the client from receiving the necessary care. The client subsequently died of a drug overdose. The Counselors reported their concerns internally and were terminated shortly thereafter.The Counselors filed a lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina, claiming wrongful termination in violation of public policy under the North Carolina Substance Use Disorder Professional Practice Act (SUDPPA) and its regulations. The district court dismissed their complaint, concluding that while SUDPPA constitutes an expression of public policy, the Counselors failed to allege a plausible claim that their termination contravened specific SUDPPA regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that SUDPPA and its regulations indeed represent the public policy of North Carolina. The Counselors plausibly alleged that their termination was in retaliation for actions taken in compliance with their professional obligations under SUDPPA, such as protecting client welfare and maintaining accurate records. The court concluded that the Counselors' actions were consistent with their professional duties and that their termination violated the public policy of North Carolina. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Shook v. NCG Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

Samuel Hickman was electrocuted while working on a construction site when a boom crane contacted overhead power lines. Hickman and his wife filed a personal injury lawsuit against Boomers, LLC, its owner Michael Landon, and employee Colter James Johnson, alleging negligence and recklessness. Boomers moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. Hickman argued that the accident fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The district court granted summary judgment for Boomers and denied Hickman’s motion for reconsideration.The district court applied the 2020 amended version of Idaho Code section 72-209(3), which clarified the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception, and concluded that Boomers did not intend to harm Hickman or have actual knowledge that injury was substantially likely. Hickman appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied the pre-amendment version of the statute and the standard from Gomez v. Crookham Co., which interpreted the exception to include conscious disregard of knowledge that an injury would result.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the pre-amendment version of section 72-209(3) and the Gomez standard should apply. The court found that the additional evidence submitted by Hickman in his motion for reconsideration created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Johnson consciously disregarded the known risk of injury from the power lines. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hickman v. Boomers, LLC" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, employees Terry J. Leal and Dustin Kopp sought workers' compensation benefits for injuries they claimed were work-related. Ms. Leal's claim involved a right shoulder injury, while Mr. Kopp's claim involved an abdominal hernia. Both claims were initially denied by the Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Compensation Division, which concluded that the injuries were not caused by their work activities. The employees contested these decisions, leading to hearings before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).In both cases, the OAH appointed attorneys to represent the employees. These attorneys hired medical experts to testify on the causation of the injuries. Ms. Leal's attorney hired Dr. Gregory Reichhardt, and Mr. Kopp's attorney hired Dr. Douglas Adler. The OAH found in favor of the employees, awarding them workers' compensation benefits. However, when the attorneys sought reimbursement for the medical expert fees, the OAH denied these requests, citing a lack of statutory authority under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act to order such reimbursements.The employees appealed to the District Court of Laramie County, which certified the cases to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed whether the OAH had the authority to order reimbursement of medical expert fees. The Court concluded that the OAH does have such authority. It reasoned that the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act, when read as a whole, provides for the payment of costs, including expert witness fees, to ensure the quick and efficient delivery of benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers. The Court found that the OAH's decision to deny reimbursement was not in accordance with the law and reversed the OAH's decision. View "Leal v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

Amanda J. Bazinet, an executive office manager at Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital in Milton, Massachusetts, was terminated after the Hospital implemented a mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policy. Bazinet sought a religious exemption, citing her Christian beliefs and opposition to vaccines developed using fetal cell lines from aborted fetuses. The Hospital denied her request without engaging in an interactive process and subsequently terminated her employment.Bazinet filed a civil action alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Massachusetts anti-discrimination law. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed her religious discrimination claims sua sponte, ruling that Bazinet failed to allege a sincerely held religious belief and that accommodating her would cause the Hospital undue hardship.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Bazinet had sufficiently alleged a religious belief conflicting with the vaccine requirement, as her accommodation request and supporting letter detailed her religious objections. The court also determined that the sincerity of Bazinet's beliefs and the undue hardship defense required further factual development and could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.The First Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of Bazinet's religious discrimination claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the claims to proceed past the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. View "Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Nancy Vargas, a bus driver for the Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit District, injured her foot at work in March 2018. She settled her workers' compensation claim with the district in December 2020, agreeing that the injury caused a 26 percent permanent disability. Vargas also applied for subsequent injury benefits from the Subsequent Injuries Benefits Trust Fund (Fund), listing pre-existing disabilities and disclosing that she was receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments.The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) joined the Fund as a defendant in Vargas’s case. The Fund acknowledged Vargas’s eligibility for benefits but sought a credit for a portion of her SSDI payments, arguing that these payments were for her pre-existing disabilities. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) found that the Fund had not proven its entitlement to the credit. The Board upheld this decision, stating that the Fund failed to show that the SSDI payments were awarded for Vargas’s pre-existing disabilities.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the Fund bears the burden of proving its entitlement to a credit for SSDI payments under Labor Code section 4753. The court found that the Fund did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that Vargas’s SSDI payments were for her pre-existing disabilities. The court emphasized that the Fund must prove the extent to which SSDI payments are attributable to pre-existing disabilities to reduce subsequent injury benefits. The court also noted that the Fund had ample opportunity to gather evidence but failed to do so. The Board’s order denying the Fund’s petition for reconsideration was affirmed. View "Subsequent Injuries Benefits Trust Fund v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Loretta Marshall applied for a nursing job with Tidelands Health using their online application process. After failing a mandatory physical agility test, she was denied employment. Marshall then sued Tidelands, alleging that the physical agility test constituted prohibited discrimination. Tidelands moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Marshall had agreed to arbitration through the online application process. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Tidelands had not shown the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the case. Initially, Tidelands argued that Marshall's 2016 arbitration agreement covered her 2020 application. The magistrate judge found that the 2016 agreement did not apply to future applications. Tidelands then argued that Marshall agreed to arbitration in 2020, but the magistrate judge found that Marshall was not required to scroll through the arbitration agreement in 2020 and was not on reasonable notice of the agreement. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge and denied Tidelands' motion to compel arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Tidelands failed to show that Marshall had reasonable notice of an offer to arbitrate in 2020. The court noted that Marshall was not required to scroll through the arbitration agreement and that the arbitration notice at the top of the webpage did not provide the actual terms of an agreement. Additionally, the court found that Marshall did not manifest her assent to the arbitration agreement by clicking the "submit" button, as it did not clearly indicate agreement to arbitration. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that no arbitration agreement was formed in 2020. View "Marshall v. Georgetown Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joseph Pessin, representing himself and others similarly situated, sued JPMorgan Chase & Company (JPMC), the JPMorgan Chase Retirement Plan, and its fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Pessin alleged that the Defendants failed to provide adequate disclosures to pension plan participants after converting the retirement plan from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan. Specifically, Pessin claimed that the Defendants did not properly inform participants about the "wear-away" effect, which could freeze their benefits until the cash balance exceeded the previously accrued benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Pessin’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that the Defendants had provided sufficient disclosures explaining the retirement plan's workings and did not mislead participants about the conversion's impact on their accrued benefits. The court concluded that the summary plan descriptions (SPDs) and benefit statements were adequate and that the Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties under ERISA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the Defendants sufficiently disclosed the wear-away effect and that the SPDs clearly explained how benefits would be calculated. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's finding that the Defendants complied with ERISA § 105(a) regarding annual pension benefit statements. The court held that the benefit statements did not properly indicate the total benefits accrued, as they only included the cash balance amount and not the higher minimum benefit from the prior plan. Consequently, the court found that Pessin adequately alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the JPMC Board for failing to monitor the JPMC Benefits Executive's performance regarding the benefit statements.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Pessin v. JPMorgan Chase" on Justia Law

Robert Anthony Zaragoza, a former brakeman and train conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company, was terminated in 2015 after testing positive for cocaine but was later reinstated. In 2016, he failed a color vision test and subsequent retests, leading to his removal from service and denial of recertification as a conductor. Zaragoza contested these results, submitting medical reports attesting to his adequate color vision, but was not reinstated.Zaragoza argued that his claims were tolled from 2016 to 2020 due to his inclusion in a class action against Union Pacific, Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. The district court for the Western District of Texas dismissed his claims as untimely, finding that the tolling ended with the class certification order in February 2019, and the statute of limitations expired before Zaragoza filed his EEOC charge in March 2020.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Zaragoza was included in both the putative and certified class definitions in the Harris class action. The court held that the statute of limitations for Zaragoza's claims was tolled during the pendency of the Harris class action, from the time his claims accrued until the Eighth Circuit decertified the class in March 2020. Consequently, Zaragoza's claims were timely when he filed his EEOC charge.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Zaragoza's disability discrimination claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, declining to address Union Pacific's alternate grounds for summary judgment. View "Zaragoza v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law

Noncitizen laborers were brought into the United States to work for construction subcontractor defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fraudulently applied for B-1 employment visas, which cost less than the petition-based visas they should have applied for, thereby violating the False Claims Act (FCA). Additionally, one plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the Trafficking Victims Prevention Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) by threatening prosecution and suing him to coerce other workers to continue working.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The court held that the defendants did not have an "established duty" to pay for the more expensive visas because they never applied for them, thus no legal obligation existed under the FCA. The court also dismissed the TVPRA claim, finding that the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants' actions coerced him to provide any labor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the defendants had no "established duty" to pay for the more expensive visas since they did not apply for them, and thus did not violate the FCA. The court also upheld the dismissal of the TVPRA claim, concluding that the plaintiff did not state a claim because the defendants' actions did not coerce him to provide any labor. The court's main holding was that potential liability for applying for the wrong visas does not constitute an "established duty" to pay under the FCA, and that the TVPRA claim failed because the plaintiff was not coerced into providing labor. The decision was affirmed. View "LESNIK V. ISM VUZEM D.O.O." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Patricia Olivieri, alleged that her employer, Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated, and her manager, Neil Isler, subjected her to sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. Olivieri claimed that Isler sexually assaulted and harassed her, and that after she reported his behavior, she faced retaliation and continued harassment from Stifel and other defendants. Olivieri's allegations included inappropriate comments, physical contact, and retaliatory actions such as changes in her job responsibilities and work environment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially granted the defendants' motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement in Olivieri's employment contract. However, after the enactment of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), Olivieri moved for reconsideration. The district court vacated its earlier decision, concluding that Olivieri's claims accrued after the EFAA's effective date, making her arbitration agreement voidable under the new law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the lower court, applying the continuing violation doctrine to determine that Olivieri's hostile work environment claims accrued after the EFAA's effective date of March 3, 2022. The court held that the EFAA applied to Olivieri's claims, rendering her arbitration agreement invalid and unenforceable. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc." on Justia Law