Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

A worker alleged that he suffered a back injury while employed at a meat processing company. The employer’s workers’ compensation insurer investigated the claim and issued a written denial, stating that the injury was not work-related. The worker requested a hearing to challenge the denial. After this request, the insurer required the worker to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) by a physician of its choosing. The IME report supported the insurer’s denial, concluding that the worker’s preexisting condition, not a work injury, was the major cause of his disability. The worker’s own physician disagreed with the IME’s findings. The worker then requested authorization for a worker requested medical examination (WRME), citing the conflict between the IME and his physician’s opinion.The Workers’ Compensation Division’s Medical Resolution Team denied the WRME request, reasoning that the IME had been conducted after the insurer’s initial written denial. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld both the denial of compensability and the denial of the WRME request, relying on the IME report as persuasive evidence. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s decisions. The worker’s estate, after his death, pursued judicial review in the Oregon Court of Appeals, which reversed the Board’s denial of the WRME request and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the insurer’s denial was “based on” the IME report.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the statutory interpretation of ORS 656.325(1)(e). The court held that whether a denial of compensability “is based on” an IME report should be determined at the time the WRME request is decided, not at the time of the initial hearing request. Because the insurer relied on the IME report to defend its ongoing denial, the worker was entitled to a WRME. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the Workers’ Compensation Board, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Teitelman v. SAIF" on Justia Law

Brandon King worked as a driver for United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) and believed he was hired for a Monday-to-Friday schedule. However, UPS assigned him to a Tuesday-through-Saturday schedule, which included weekend work he sought to avoid through various means, such as maximizing weekday hours, trading shifts, and calling in sick. UPS disciplined him for these actions, including written warnings and supervisor ride-alongs, and fired him multiple times, though the union secured his reinstatement. King alleged that UPS discriminated against him based on race and age, created a hostile work environment, and retaliated against him, claiming that younger, white employees were allowed to avoid Saturday shifts and were disciplined less harshly for similar conduct.King filed suit in Iowa state court under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. UPS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, arguing that the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) completely preempted King’s state law claims because resolving them would require interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The district court denied King’s motion to remand the case to state court and granted UPS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that King’s claims were preempted and that he failed to state a claim under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed both the refusal to remand and the judgment on the pleadings de novo. The court held that King’s discrimination and hostile work environment claims were substantially dependent on analysis of the collective-bargaining agreement and thus completely preempted by the LMRA, requiring dismissal. The retaliation claim failed because King did not plausibly allege a causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "King v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

An educator employed by the New York City Department of Education (DOE) was appointed Executive Director of the “AP for All” program, where she supervised a diverse team and was credited with expanding access to Advanced Placement courses. Early in her tenure, she experienced racial tensions with subordinates, including accusations of “microaggressions” and being labeled as exhibiting “white fragility.” These tensions escalated after a new Chancellor implemented an “equity agenda” that included mandatory implicit bias trainings. The plaintiff, who is Caucasian, alleged that these trainings and subsequent workplace interactions fostered a racially hostile environment, with repeated negative generalizations about white employees and a lack of intervention by supervisors when she complained.The plaintiff initially filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York, later amending her complaint to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, where the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a municipal policy or custom that caused her demotion, the alleged hostile work environment, or her constructive discharge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the demotion and constructive discharge claims, holding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence that these actions were motivated by racial discrimination or that the employer intentionally created intolerable working conditions. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim, finding that genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether the DOE’s actions and inaction amounted to a municipal policy or custom that created a racially hostile environment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Chislett v. New York City Department of Education" on Justia Law

An athletic trainer employed by a rehabilitation services provider was assigned to work at a local high school under a contract between her employer and the school. Over several years, she reported concerns about the conduct and performance of other athletic trainers at the school, which led to personnel changes. In 2020, after a new head football coach was hired, the trainer was briefly given additional responsibilities but was soon told to return to her original role. Shortly thereafter, the school’s principal requested her removal, citing workplace issues unrelated to her sex. The trainer was then removed from her assignment at the school and offered several alternative positions by her employer, some with reduced pay or less desirable conditions. She ultimately accepted a new assignment but later resigned, alleging that her removal and reassignment were due to sex discrimination and retaliation for her complaints.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that although there was a factual dispute about the employer’s control over the removal, the trainer failed to show that the employer discriminated or retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. The court concluded there was insufficient evidence that the employer knew or should have known the school’s removal request was based on sex, or that the reassignment options were offered for discriminatory reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trainer’s discrimination claim failed because there was no evidence the employer knew or should have known the school’s request was sex-based, and no evidence that the reassignment was motivated by sex. The retaliation claim also failed, as there was no evidence the employer removed or reassigned her because she engaged in protected activity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer. View "Vincent v. ATI Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

A hospital employee in Oregon, who identified as a practicing Christian, requested a religious exemption from her employer’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, citing her belief that her body is a temple of the Holy Spirit and that she must avoid substances that could harm her body. The employer granted her exemption from vaccination but required her to wear personal protective equipment and undergo weekly antigen testing using a nasal swab treated with ethylene oxide. The employee objected to the testing, claiming her research showed the swab was carcinogenic and that using it would violate her religious duty to protect her body. She requested alternative accommodations, such as saliva testing or full-time remote work, but the employer denied these requests and ultimately terminated her employment when she refused to comply.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that her objection to the testing was based on secular, medical concerns rather than a bona fide religious belief. The court concluded that while her general belief in protecting her body as a temple was religious, her specific objection to the nasal swab was rooted in her personal interpretation of medical research.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that to state a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII and Oregon law, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the specific accommodation request is rooted in a bona fide religious belief, not merely a secular or personal preference. The court found that the employee’s complaint did not sufficiently connect her religious beliefs to her objection to antigen testing, as her concerns were based on her own medical judgment rather than religious doctrine. The court declined to adopt a more lenient pleading standard and affirmed the dismissal with prejudice. View "DETWILER V. MID-COLUMBIA MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

An employee of an airline company in Puerto Rico suffered a work-related injury when an airplane door struck his head. After the incident, he sought medical treatment and eventually reported to Puerto Rico’s State Insurance Fund (the Fund) for workers’ compensation. The employer did not initially provide the necessary incident report for the Fund, nor did it file a Work Accident Report with the Fund until nearly two years later. The employee was placed on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and continued to receive treatment, including surgery and physical therapy. While still under medical care and unable to return to work, he was terminated by the employer, who cited his failure to keep them informed of his status.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, alleging several claims under federal and Puerto Rico law, including a retaliation claim under Puerto Rico’s Whistle-Blower Act (Law 115). The district court dismissed some claims at the motion to dismiss stage and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, including the Law 115 retaliation claim. The district court found that the five-month gap between the employee’s report to the Fund and his termination was too long to establish causation, and also concluded that the employer’s stated reasons for termination were not pretextual.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo. The court held that the district court erred by treating close temporal proximity as a necessary condition for causation and by failing to consider the employer’s shifting explanations for the termination as evidence of pretext. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the Law 115 claim and remanded for further proceedings, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding causation and pretext. View "Mercado v. Hyannis Air Service, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee brought a civil action against his former employer, alleging wrongful termination and retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act. The employee claimed he was fired for discussing his compensation with his supervisor and requesting a higher annual bonus, which he argued was protected conduct under state law. The employer denied retaliatory intent, asserting instead that the employee either resigned voluntarily or was terminated for performance reasons. The employer did not plead any statutory exceptions as affirmative defenses in its answer.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court for Douglas County. After both sides presented their evidence, the employer moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the employee’s discussion about compensation occurred during working hours and thus fell within a statutory exception that prohibits such discussions during working hours. The court took the motion under advisement and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the employee, awarding substantial damages. However, the court did not enter judgment on the verdict. Instead, it later granted the employer’s motion for directed verdict, reasoning that the employee failed to disprove the applicability of the statutory exception, and dismissed the action.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the statutory exception regarding discussions of compensation during working hours constitutes an affirmative defense. The Court clarified that the employer bears the burden to plead and prove this defense, and failure to do so results in waiver. Because the employer did not plead the exception as an affirmative defense, the district court erred in granting a directed verdict on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to enter judgment in conformity with the jury’s verdict. View "Khaitov v. Greater Omaha Packing Co." on Justia Law

Two police officers employed by a city were injured in separate incidents while on duty. After their injuries, both received payments from the city under section 1(b) of the Illinois Public Employee Disability Act, which provides that eligible employees unable to work due to a duty-related injury must continue to be paid “on the same basis” as before the injury, without deductions from sick leave, compensatory time, or vacation. The city continued to pay their salaries as before, including withholding federal and state income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare taxes. The officers filed suit, alleging that the city violated the Disability Act by withholding employment taxes and, for one officer, by deducting accrued leave time.The Circuit Court of Tazewell County granted summary judgment for the officers, finding that section 1(b) prohibited the withholding of employment taxes and required payment of “gross pay.” The court also found the city had improperly deducted leave time and held that the ten-year statute of limitations for breach of contract applied, awarding damages and fees to the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, reversed, holding that section 1(b) does not prohibit withholding employment taxes, and that the five-year statute of limitations applied. The appellate court also found a genuine issue of fact regarding whether leave time was improperly deducted and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that section 1(b) of the Disability Act does not prohibit a public employer from withholding employment taxes from payments made to an injured employee under that provision. The court reasoned that the statute’s language requires payment “on the same basis” as before the injury, which includes continued tax withholding, and expressly prohibits only certain deductions, not taxes. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the leave time deduction claim. View "Bitner v. City of Pekin" on Justia Law

Judy Howell suffered a work-related back injury in 1993 while employed by the Floyd County Board of Education and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, including future medical expenses. For nearly thirty years, she was prescribed Hydrocodone for pain management. In 2022, the employer sought to reopen the claim, contesting the compensability of Hydrocodone based on Kentucky’s adoption of the Official Disability Guidelines (ODG), which do not recommend long-term opioid use. Medical experts for the employer opined that Hydrocodone was not medically reasonable or necessary under the ODG, while Howell’s treating physician supported continued use.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Hydrocodone prescription non-compensable, citing the ODG and the lack of evidence showing significant benefit from continued use. The ALJ allowed for a reasonable weaning period. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, finding substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also affirmed, but reasoned that applying the ODG’s presumption of non-compensability to Howell’s longstanding award was a substantive change that could not retroactively reduce her vested rights. However, the appellate court still upheld the denial of Hydrocodone because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, but clarified that the adoption of the ODG and its rebuttable presumption regarding certain treatments is a remedial, not substantive, change. The Court held that the ODG’s application does not violate due process or equal protection, nor does it retroactively impair vested rights. The main holding is that the ODG creates a rebuttable presumption regarding medical necessity, and substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Hydrocodone was not compensable for Howell’s work injury. View "HOWELL V. FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by a city in Kentucky worked a rotating schedule of 36 and 44 hours per week, but was paid for 40 hours each week without overtime for hours worked beyond 40 in a given week. After a state audit revealed the city’s payroll practices violated overtime requirements, the city issued back pay to affected employees and revised its procedures. The officer, believing the back pay was insufficient and that certain categories of compensation were miscalculated, rejected the payment and filed suit for unpaid overtime, vacation, and sick leave, as well as liquidated damages and attorney’s fees. The relevant period for the claim was limited by statute to the officer’s last three years of employment.The Bullitt Circuit Court, after a bench trial, found the city liable for unpaid overtime and vacation pay, but denied liquidated damages and retirement hazardous duty pay, and initially awarded sick leave. Upon the city’s motion to amend, the trial court corrected calculation errors, eliminated the sick leave award based on a city ordinance, and reduced the overtime award. The court also awarded only $2,500 in attorney’s fees, far less than the amount requested and supported by detailed billing records. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of liquidated damages, sick leave, and retirement hazardous duty pay, but reversed and remanded for reconsideration of statutory interest and attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals in full. It held that the trial court properly amended its judgment to correct errors based on evidence presented at trial, that liquidated damages under the wage statute are discretionary when the employer acts in good faith, that statutory interest applies from the date of judgment, and that the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily reducing attorney’s fees without explanation. The case was remanded for proper calculation of interest and attorney’s fees. View "WHEELER V. CITY OF PIONEER VILLAGE, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law