Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Capitol Street Surgery Center, an outpatient surgical clinic, hired Marty Lauster, a licensed interventional radiology technologist (IR tech), in 2019. In November 2020, during a staff meeting, Lauster objected to a nurse moving an imaging device called a C-arm, stating that nurses are not permitted to operate it. Two weeks later, Lauster was fired by Brandon Ehret, the clinic’s top administrator. Lauster filed a charge of unfair labor practices with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), claiming he was terminated due to his objection at the meeting.An administrative law judge (ALJ) heard the case and found that Capitol fired Lauster because of his protected labor activity, issuing a make-whole award. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Capitol petitioned for review, arguing that Lauster was fired due to performance issues, not because of his comment about the C-arm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that to prove a prima facie section 8(a)(1) violation, the NLRB must establish that the employee engaged in protected activity, the employer’s decisionmaker was aware of this activity, and the decisionmaker took adverse action because of animus toward the protected activity. The court found that the ALJ’s determination that Ehret knew about Lauster’s comment was not supported by substantial evidence. Ehret testified that he was unaware of the comment when he decided to fire Lauster, and this was corroborated by other witnesses.The Seventh Circuit granted Capitol’s petition for review, vacated the NLRB’s decision and order, and denied the petition for enforcement, concluding that the NLRB failed to prove that Ehret knew of Lauster’s protected activity when he made the termination decision. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Capitol Street Surgery Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Jorge Baez sued BayMark Detoxification Services, Inc., alleging disability discrimination under Massachusetts law, claiming BayMark Detox was his former employer. Baez was repeatedly informed that he had sued the wrong party but did not amend his complaint in time. BayMark Detox moved for summary judgment, asserting it was never Baez's employer. Baez then requested to amend his complaint to name the correct employer, but the district court granted summary judgment to BayMark Detox, denied Baez's Rule 60(b) motion for relief, and ordered Baez to pay costs.Baez initially worked for Community Health Care, Inc. (CHC), which was acquired by BayMark Health Services, Inc. (BHS). During the COVID-19 pandemic, Baez worked from home but was later terminated after an audit revealed billing errors. Baez filed a discrimination complaint against BayMark Detox, which was removed to federal court. BayMark Detox, a separate entity from CHC, stated it never employed Baez. The district court set a deadline for amending pleadings, which Baez missed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to BayMark Detox, finding no evidence that BayMark Detox was Baez's employer. The court denied Baez's request to amend his complaint, citing his failure to show good cause for the delay. The court also denied Baez's Rule 60(b) motion, rejecting the argument that Massachusetts procedural rules should apply. The court awarded costs to BayMark Detox.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, agreeing that Baez failed to name the correct employer and did not demonstrate good cause for amending his complaint late. The court also upheld the award of costs to BayMark Detox. View "Baez v. BayMark Detoxification Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Derek Hall, a Senior Account Executive at UiPath Incorporated, alleged retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after being placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) and subsequently terminated. Hall, who was 62 years old, filed an internal complaint against his supervisor for age discrimination on the same day he was placed on the PIP. UiPath and Hall later entered into a Separation and Release of Claims agreement, terminating Hall's employment. Hall then joined Accelirate, Inc., but was terminated shortly after his former supervisor at UiPath informed Accelirate of complaints about Hall.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of UiPath. The court found that Hall failed to establish a causal link between his protected activity (the age discrimination complaint) and the adverse employment action (his termination). Additionally, Hall did not successfully rebut UiPath’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action, which was based on Hall's performance issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, noting that Hall did not challenge the district court’s determination that UiPath had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Hall's failure to address this aspect of the district court’s analysis in his appeal effectively forfeited his argument. Consequently, the appellate court did not need to address the issue of causation and upheld the summary judgment in favor of UiPath. View "Hall v. UiPath" on Justia Law

Angel Matta was hired by Dakota Provisions in February 2020 as a production worker. Matta had attendance issues documented by his employer and was injured at work on March 23, 2020, leading to several weeks of missed work. He filed a workers' compensation claim and was terminated by Dakota Provisions one month later. Matta then filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful termination and violation of public policy. Dakota Provisions moved for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. Matta appealed the decision.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Beadle County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Dakota Provisions, concluding that Matta was an at-will employee and could be terminated for any lawful reason. The court also found that Matta failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his disability discrimination claim and did not recognize a common law tort for retaliatory discharge based on a disability.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision in part, agreeing that Matta was an at-will employee and that his termination did not violate public policy based on disability discrimination. However, the court reversed the summary judgment regarding Matta's claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Matta's termination was pretextual and retaliatory, given the proximity of his termination to his workers' compensation claim and the inconsistent reasons provided by Dakota Provisions for his termination. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "Matta v. Dakota Provisions" on Justia Law

Stephnie Trujillo filed a complaint against her former employer, J-M Manufacturing Company (JMM), and four former coworkers, alleging unlawful sexual/gender discrimination, harassment, failure to prevent such actions, retaliation, and seeking injunctive relief. The parties negotiated and entered into a post-dispute stipulation for arbitration, which was approved by the trial court. Arbitration commenced, and JMM paid the arbitrator’s invoices for over a year. However, JMM failed to pay an invoice by the due date of September 12, 2022, but paid it immediately upon being reminded on October 18, 2022. Trujillo then sought to withdraw from arbitration under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which the trial court granted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration, finding that JMM’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98, which does not allow exceptions for inadvertent delays or lack of prejudice. The court lifted the stay on trial court proceedings, allowing the case to proceed in court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98 did not apply because the parties entered into a post-dispute stipulation to arbitrate, not a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Additionally, JMM was not considered the “drafting party” as defined by section 1280, subdivision (e), which refers to the company that included a pre-dispute arbitration provision in a contract. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions to deny Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and to reinstate the stay of trial court proceedings pending completion of arbitration. View "Trujillo v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Edgar Gonzalez worked for Nowhere Santa Monica, one of ten related LLCs operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles. As a condition of his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. Gonzalez later filed a class action lawsuit against all ten Nowhere entities, alleging various Labor Code violations. He claimed that all entities were his joint employers, sharing control over his employment conditions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion to compel arbitration for Nowhere Santa Monica but denied it for the other entities, finding no evidence that Gonzalez's claims against the non-signatory entities were intertwined with his claims against Nowhere Santa Monica. Gonzalez then dismissed his complaint against Nowhere Santa Monica, and the other entities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Gonzalez was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with the non-Santa Monica entities because his claims against them were intimately founded in and intertwined with his employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. The court reasoned that Gonzalez's joint employer theory inherently linked his claims to the obligations under the employment agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. Therefore, it would be unfair for Gonzalez to claim joint employment for liability purposes while denying the arbitration agreement's applicability.The appellate court reversed the lower court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration for the non-Santa Monica entities, concluding that all of Gonzalez's claims should be arbitrated. View "Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC" on Justia Law

Ashley Howell, a temporary pre-licensed psychiatric technician, was employed by the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) from January 2, 2020, to January 24, 2020. Howell was terminated after DSH discovered she was on medical leave from her previous job due to a 2017 sexual assault, which she did not disclose during her pre-employment health screening. Howell filed a lawsuit against DSH, claiming mental and physical disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Napa County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of DSH on Howell’s claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process. Howell dismissed her claim for failure to prevent discrimination. The jury found in favor of Howell on her mental disability discrimination claim, awarding her $36,751.25 in lost earnings and health insurance benefits but nothing for pain and suffering. The court denied Howell’s motion for a new trial on non-economic damages and granted DSH’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, striking the award for lost health insurance benefits. Howell was awarded $135,102 in attorney fees and costs but did not receive a ruling on her request for prejudgment interest.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decisions to deny Howell’s motion for a new trial and to grant DSH’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The appellate court found that Howell did not provide evidence of out-of-pocket expenses for lost health insurance benefits. The court also upheld the trial court’s award of $135,102 in attorney fees and costs, finding Howell’s request for $1.75 million to be unreasonable. However, the appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to address Howell’s request for prejudgment interest. View "Howell v. State Dept. of State Hospitals" on Justia Law

Stephen Lowery, a heavy equipment operator in the logging industry, filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer, Galen Kuykendall Logging, and its surety, Associated Loggers Exchange. Lowery claimed that his work caused a new occupational disease at the L3-4 level of his spine, distinct from his previous L5-S1 injury. Kuykendall Logging argued that Lowery's L3-4 condition was a continuation of his prior degenerative disease, which began in 1992.The Idaho Industrial Commission initially found that Lowery failed to prove his L3-4 injury resulted from an accident but concluded it was a compensable occupational disease. The Commission determined that Lowery's L3-4 condition arose independently from his previous L5-S1 issues and was aggravated by his work as a shovel logger. The Commission awarded Lowery medical and time loss benefits but denied permanent partial impairment or disability benefits. Kuykendall Logging filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Lowery's occupational disease manifested while he was employed by another company, Evergreen Timber.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the Commission's findings were supported by substantial evidence, including expert opinions that Lowery's L3-4 condition was a new occupational disease caused by his work. The Court also agreed that Lowery's occupational disease manifested on or after June 19, 2019, while he was employed by Kuykendall Logging. The Court found that Lowery complied with the notice and limitation requirements and that the Nelson doctrine did not preclude his recovery. Finally, the Court held that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by retaining jurisdiction and holding a second hearing to determine Lowery's last injurious exposure. View "Lowery v. Kuykendall" on Justia Law

The City of Great Falls unilaterally revised its drug and alcohol policy in 2019, expanding the scope of employees subject to random testing and imposing stricter penalties without negotiating with the affected labor unions. The unions filed unfair labor practice complaints, alleging that the City's actions violated the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act (MPECBA). The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals (MBPA) consolidated the complaints and referred them to a hearing examiner, who ruled in favor of the unions, concluding that the City's unilateral policy changes constituted unfair labor practices.The City did not file exceptions to the hearing examiner's proposed decision, which became the final agency decision by default. Instead, the City petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the hearing examiner's decision involved purely legal questions that should be reviewed by the court. The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, dismissed the petition, citing the City's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not seeking final agency review.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the City's failure to exhaust the final agency review remedy provided by MPECBA and the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) precluded judicial review. The Court clarified that there is no jurisprudential exception to the exhaustion requirement for purely legal or constitutional questions in the context of MAPA contested case proceedings. The City's petition for judicial review was thus correctly denied and dismissed. View "Great Falls v. Assoc. of Firefighters" on Justia Law

The case involves Sunder Energy, LLC (Sunder), a solar sales dealer, and its former employee, Tyler Jackson, along with several other defendants. Sunder sought to enforce restrictive covenants against Jackson, who had joined a competitor, Solar Pros LLC, and allegedly recruited Sunder employees to the new company. The restrictive covenants were part of Sunder's operating agreement, which Jackson signed without negotiation or full understanding of its terms.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware denied Sunder's motion for a preliminary injunction to enforce the restrictive covenants. The court found the covenants unenforceable for two reasons: they originated from an egregious breach of fiduciary duty by Sunder's principals, and they were facially unreasonable. The court also declined to "blue pencil" the covenants to make them reasonable, citing the overbroad and oppressive nature of the restrictions. Additionally, the court ruled that Utah law governed Sunder's tortious interference claim against Jackson's new employers, which effectively dismissed that claim under Utah law.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision in part and reversed it in part. The Supreme Court agreed that the Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in refusing to blue pencil the restrictive covenants, given the lack of negotiation, minimal consideration, and the overbroad nature of the covenants. The Supreme Court also upheld the application of Utah law to the tortious interference claim. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's ruling that the operating agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law, stating that such a determination exceeded the scope of the preliminary injunction stage and should await a complete factual record. View "Sunder Energy, LLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law