Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Harold Winston, an African-American male with over 30 years of service, sued his employer, the County of Los Angeles, alleging race-based discrimination, retaliation, and failure to maintain a discrimination-free environment under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. While the case was pending, section 1102.5 was amended to allow courts to award reasonable attorney fees to prevailing whistleblower plaintiffs. After the jury found in Winston’s favor on his retaliation claim under section 1102.5, he filed a motion for attorney fees based on the new provision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Winston’s motion for attorney fees, ruling that the fee provision did not apply retroactively to his case, which was filed in 2019 before the amendment took effect. The court found no legislative intent supporting retroactive application and noted that Winston did not prevail on his FEHA claims, which could have provided a basis for attorney fees.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that a new statute authorizing an award of attorney fees applies to actions pending on the statute’s effective date. The court cited case precedent establishing that newly enacted attorney fee provisions are procedural and apply to pending litigation. The court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case with directions for the trial court to determine the appropriateness and reasonableness of Winston’s fee request. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Winston v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Celestia Chapman, a finance manager at Brentlinger Enterprises, requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her terminally ill sister. Her employer denied the request, stating that the FMLA did not cover leave to care for an adult sibling. When Chapman did not show up for work on a scheduled day, she was terminated. Subsequently, Brentlinger Enterprises falsely informed workers' compensation authorities that Chapman had quit and threatened her with Rule 11 sanctions if she pursued an FMLA lawsuit. Chapman sued, alleging violations of the FMLA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and other statutes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to Brentlinger Enterprises on all claims except for the COBRA violation, for which it imposed a statutory penalty. Both parties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Chapman's FMLA interference claim, finding that an in loco parentis relationship could form between adults, including siblings, under the FMLA. The court also reversed the summary judgment on Chapman's FMLA retaliation claims related to her termination and the false statements made to the unemployment agency, as well as her ADA and Ohio law associational disability discrimination claims. The court affirmed the summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim related to the Rule 11 sanctions letter and upheld the district court's award of $85 per day in statutory penalties for the COBRA violation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Chapman v. Brentlinger Enterprises" on Justia Law

Martin B. Sturdivant, an employee of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, sustained a back injury while working as a corrections officer. The injury led to chronic back pain, and Sturdivant received temporary total disability payments through the workers' compensation system. As he approached the 500-week limit for these payments, he applied for extended compensation, claiming a total loss of wage-earning capacity.The North Carolina Industrial Commission denied Sturdivant's claim, concluding that he had not sustained a total loss of wage-earning capacity. The Commission interpreted this phrase to mean a total loss of the ability to earn wages in any employment. Sturdivant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which rejected the Commission's interpretation. The Court of Appeals held that "total loss of wage-earning capacity" was synonymous with "total disability," incorporating a broader legal test.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the phrase "total loss of wage-earning capacity" means the complete elimination of the capacity to earn any wages. The Court clarified that this phrase does not share the same legal meaning as "total disability." The Court found that the Industrial Commission's interpretation was correct and that the Commission's findings were supported by competent evidence. The Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals' opinion to reject its statutory interpretation but otherwise affirmed the decision. View "Sturdivant v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Acumen Capital Partners, LLC, a commercial property management company, discharged engineer Gregory Zapata, allegedly due to his failure to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination mandate. Zapata had been involved in union activities, including signing union authorization cards and discussing unionization with colleagues. Acumen's chief engineer, Salvatore Coppola, who was aware of Zapata's union activities, had informed Zapata that the company's owner, Jeffrey Rosenblum, did not want a union in the building.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Acumen discharged Zapata because of his protected union activities, violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) credited the testimonies of Zapata and another engineer, Gabriel Garcia, while discrediting Rosenblum's testimony. The ALJ concluded that Acumen's stated reason for discharging Zapata—non-compliance with the vaccination mandate—was pretextual, as the company had not enforced the mandate consistently and had not excluded other unvaccinated employees from the workplace.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB's findings that Acumen had knowledge of Zapata's union activities and that anti-union animus was a motivating factor in his discharge. The court noted the timing of the discharge, the pretextual nature of Acumen's explanation, and the disproportionate response to Zapata's unvaccinated status. The court denied Acumen's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its decision and order, which included reinstating Zapata with backpay. View "Acumen Capital Partners, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A police officer in Buffalo, Texas, was terminated by the City Council after engaging in a high-speed chase with a civilian in his patrol vehicle, resulting in an accident. The officer, Gregory Moliere, received a written reprimand from the Chief of Police, which he accepted. Subsequently, the City Council voted to terminate his employment. Moliere sued, claiming the City Council lacked the authority to fire him and that his due process rights were violated.The trial court dismissed Moliere's suit, finding that the City Council had the authority to terminate him. Moliere appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was a fact issue regarding the City Council's authority to terminate Moliere. The appellate court noted ambiguities in the City's employee manual and the police department's policy-and-procedure manual and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing Moliere's due process claim.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the City Council had the authority to terminate Moliere under Texas Local Government Code Section 341.001, which allows the governing body of a Type A general-law municipality to establish and regulate a municipal police force. The court held that the City Council's authority to regulate the police force included the power to terminate officers for cause. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing Moliere's claims based on the alleged lack of authority to fire him.However, the Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address Moliere's due process claim, which had not been considered previously. View "City of Buffalo v. Moliere" on Justia Law

Regena Strable, a marketing director at Altoona Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, injured her left ankle at work, leading to permanent partial disability. This injury caused further physical injuries to her hip and lower back, as well as mental injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. Strable had previously suffered carpal tunnel injuries to both wrists a decade earlier. After settling with her employer for the ankle injury and the sequela injuries, Strable sought benefits from the Second Injury Fund of Iowa based on her prior carpal tunnel injuries.The deputy commissioner denied Strable’s request for benefits from the Fund, concluding that Iowa Code section 85.64 imposes liability on the Fund only when the second injury is limited to a scheduled injury. The Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner disagreed and granted benefits. On judicial review, the Iowa District Court for Polk County reversed the Commissioner’s decision, agreeing with the deputy commissioner that awarding benefits from the Fund would result in double recovery for Strable.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s order. The court held that the Fund is liable under Iowa Code section 85.64 if the first and second qualifying injuries caused a compensable injury to an enumerated member, regardless of whether the injuries caused other non-enumerated or unscheduled injuries. The court found that the Commissioner erred in calculating the Fund’s liability by not including the employer’s liability for the sequela injuries. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for a determination of the amount and timing of the Fund’s liability, consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Strable" on Justia Law

An employee, Ashley Koester, worked as a mobile crisis counselor for Eyerly-Ball Community Health Services. She believed she was entitled to overtime compensation for her on-call hours and filled out timesheets accordingly, which were approved by her supervisor. Later, her employer objected to the overtime payments and terminated her employment. Koester sued her employer under Iowa Code chapter 91A and for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, claiming she was terminated for asserting her right to overtime pay.The Iowa District Court for Polk County dismissed Koester's claims, ruling that she did not have a claim under chapter 91A because she had been paid in full, including for the overtime hours she claimed. The court also found her statutory claim time-barred. Koester appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of her public policy claim but affirmed the dismissal of her statutory claim.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Koester did not state a claim for relief under chapter 91A or the common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court held that chapter 91A is a wage collection law, not a generalized fair practices law, and since Koester did not have a claim for unpaid wages, she was not entitled to relief. The court also determined that Koester's public policy claim failed because she was not engaged in protected activity under the statute, as she did not file a complaint or claim unpaid wages before her termination. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the District Court's judgment dismissing Koester's claims. View "Koester v. Eyerly-Ball Community Mental Health Services" on Justia Law

Courtney Galloway, a used car sales manager at Husker Auto Group, LLC, was terminated from her position in January 2019. Galloway claimed her termination was in retaliation for investigating and reporting a fraudulent sales scheme involving a fellow employee, Ryan Mathis. She alleged that the scheme involved selling vehicles to straw purchasers to evade state sales tax and Mercedes-Benz export policies, and that upper management was aware of and benefited from the scheme.Galloway filed a claim with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (NEOC), alleging whistleblower retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA). The NEOC dismissed her claim, concluding that she had not engaged in protected activity because she reported a coworker’s actions, not those of her employer. The NEOC also found no evidence that the individual who terminated her employment was aware of her protected activity.Galloway then filed a lawsuit in the district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, asserting claims of retaliation under the NFEPA and wrongful discharge under Nebraska’s public policy exception to the at-will employment rule. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Husker Auto, agreeing with the NEOC’s findings.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Husker Auto was involved in or knew of the fraudulent scheme and whether the company knew of Galloway’s role in investigating the scheme. The court noted conflicting testimony and evidence about Husker Auto’s knowledge and involvement, as well as Galloway’s performance and the reasons for her termination. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Galloway v. Husker Auto Group" on Justia Law

Hemphill Construction Company, Inc. (Hemphill) entered into a contract with the City of Jackson and subsequently subcontracted Interstate Carbonic Enterprises (ICE) for a project. Gay Lynn Harris, Jr., an owner and officer of ICE, was severely injured while working on the project in September 2020. Harris sought workers’ compensation benefits from Hemphill, but an Administrative Judge (AJ) ruled that Harris was not entitled to these benefits because he had voluntarily opted out of ICE’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Neither party appealed the AJ’s decision.In March 2022, Harris filed a negligence complaint against Hemphill in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. Hemphill moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming tort immunity under the exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA). The trial court agreed and granted Hemphill’s motion to dismiss. Harris appealed, arguing that tort immunity did not apply and that judicial estoppel should apply. Hemphill contended that Harris had not exhausted his administrative remedies.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Harris was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his negligence suit. The court held that Hemphill was entitled to tort immunity because it had contractually required ICE to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for its employees, thus satisfying the statutory requirement to secure payment under the MWCA. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss Harris’s negligence claim against Hemphill. View "Harris v. Hemphill Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) conducted an investigation into the University of Mississippi's football program, which included allegations against Barney Farrar, an assistant athletics director. The NCAA found Farrar guilty of multiple recruiting violations and issued a five-year show-cause order, restricting his employment in recruiting roles at NCAA member institutions. Farrar appealed the decision, but the NCAA's Infractions Appeals Committee upheld the findings and penalties.Farrar then filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, alleging negligence, denial of a fair hearing, malicious interference with employment, denial of due process under the Mississippi Constitution, and usurpation of judicial function. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the NCAA on all claims except for malicious interference with employment and denial of due process. The NCAA petitioned for an interlocutory appeal on these two issues.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and applied a de novo standard of review. The court held that the NCAA is not a state actor and thus not subject to due process requirements under the Mississippi Constitution. The court also found that Farrar failed to provide evidence of malice necessary to support his claim of malicious interference with employment. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the NCAA. View "National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Farrar" on Justia Law