Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves 11 public charter schools (the Schools) seeking to overturn a decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB found that the Schools violated section 3550 of the Prohibition on Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union Membership by sending e-mails that tended to influence employees' decisions regarding union representation by United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA). The Schools argued that PERB's interpretation of section 3550 was erroneous and that the statute was unconstitutional as it violated free speech protections.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially dismissed the allegations, finding that the e-mails did not contain threats or promises and thus did not violate the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). However, PERB, applying its new interpretation from Regents I and Regents II decisions, found that the e-mails violated section 3550 because they tended to influence employee choice regarding union membership. PERB rejected the Schools' defenses, including claims of business necessity and constitutional free speech rights.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court upheld PERB's interpretation of section 3550, finding it not clearly erroneous. The court also rejected the Schools' constitutional claims, determining that section 3550 regulates only government speech, which is not protected by the First Amendment or the California Constitution. The court found that the Schools, as public employers, and their administrators and Alliance CMO, as agents, were engaged in government speech when communicating about union matters.The court concluded that substantial evidence supported PERB's findings that the Schools could be held responsible for the e-mails sent by Alliance CMO and the School administrators under theories of actual and apparent authority. The court affirmed PERB's decision and order. View "Alliance Marce & Eva Stern Math & Sci. High Sch. v. PERB" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, sustained a compensable injury to his lumbar spine in 1994 while working. He continued to work until his voluntary retirement in 2003, after which his condition worsened, leading to further medical treatment and surgery in 2013. In 2015, the plaintiff sought total incapacity benefits retroactive to his retirement. The workers’ compensation commissioner awarded him benefits starting from December 30, 2017, and for a three-month period following his 2013 surgery, but not from his retirement date in 2003.The defendant appealed to the Compensation Review Board, arguing that the commissioner misapplied the law by awarding benefits after unauthorized medical treatment and to a voluntarily retired claimant. The board affirmed the commissioner’s decision, finding the award of benefits appropriate under the statute.The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the board’s decision. The Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff was not eligible for total incapacity benefits because his incapacity occurred after his voluntary retirement and he had no intention of returning to the workforce.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that under the plain language of General Statutes § 31-307 (a), a claimant who sustains a compensable workplace injury is eligible for total incapacity benefits regardless of whether the incapacity occurs before or after voluntary retirement. The court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the defendant’s alternative claim regarding the necessity and availability of the plaintiff’s 2013 surgery. View "Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Joe David Hudson was injured while working for Joplin Regional Stockyards, Inc. (JRS) in 2002. In 2005, Hudson, JRS, and JRS' insurer, Star Insurance Company, entered into a settlement agreement where Hudson received an $80,000 lump sum. The settlement left future medical expenses for Hudson's left ankle open. In 2011, Hudson had a below-the-knee amputation, which Star refused to cover. Hudson filed the settlement in circuit court in 2013, and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the settlement. Hudson later filed an equitable garnishment action, leading Star to pay $92,000 for his medical bills. In 2015, Star agreed to reimburse Hudson up to $610,311.75 for future medical expenses. In 2016, Hudson and JRS entered into a subordination agreement, acknowledging all payments due under the judgment had been received.In 2022, Hudson filed a motion to revive the judgment, which JRS opposed, arguing the judgment had been satisfied and the Division of Workers' Compensation had not determined the future medical care provision. JRS also filed a motion for relief from the judgment, claiming it was void due to lack of due process. The Circuit Court of Jasper County sustained Hudson's motion to revive the judgment and overruled JRS' motion for relief.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and determined that JRS had standing to appeal. The court found that the circuit court erred in reviving the judgment because JRS had satisfied the judgment by paying the $80,000 lump sum. The court reversed the circuit court's order sustaining Hudson's motion to revive the judgment and overruled Hudson's motion to revive the judgment. Hudson's motion for damages for a frivolous appeal was also overruled. View "Hudson v. Joplin Regional Stockyards, Inc." on Justia Law

A dental hygienist brought claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, and negligence against her former employer and supervisors. She alleged that her supervisor made repeated sexual advances and harassed her throughout her employment. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the retaliation claims and allowed the other claims to proceed to trial. A jury awarded the plaintiff $575,000 in emotional distress damages and $2 million in punitive damages. However, the district court granted a motion for a new trial, finding the damages excessive and indicative of unfair prejudice. In the second trial, the court precluded certain evidence, and the jury awarded the plaintiff only $1 in nominal damages.The plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, the order granting a new trial, and the evidentiary rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the retaliation claims, agreeing that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity as required for such claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to grant a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that the jury’s damages award was excessive and indicative of prejudice. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the plaintiff’s psychiatric records, portions of a coworker’s deposition testimony, and an anonymous fax.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in any of its challenged rulings and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Qorrolli v. Metropolitan Dental Associates" on Justia Law

Broadgate, Inc. employed an H-1B visa holder who filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division in February 2018, alleging that Broadgate had not paid him the full wages required by the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Division’s investigation substantiated the claim and found additional violations, including failure to post required workplace notices. Consequently, the Division issued a determination letter in December 2018, finding Broadgate had willfully violated the Act, barring it from the H-1B program for two years, requiring payment of back wages, and assessing a civil penalty.Broadgate sought review before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), challenging only the determination regarding the workplace notices. The ALJ agreed with Broadgate, vacating the determination. However, the Department’s Administrative Review Board reversed this decision. On remand, Broadgate argued that the Division exceeded its authority by investigating violations not alleged in the original complaint. The ALJ rejected this argument, and the Review Board and the district court affirmed the Director’s imposition of fines and penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Broadgate argued that the District Director lacked authority to issue the determination letter and that the Wage and Hour Division exceeded its authority by investigating the notice violations. The court held that the presumption of regularity applied, meaning the Director’s issuance of the letter was presumptive proof of her authority. The court also found that the Division was entitled to investigate the notice violations discovered during the investigation of the wage complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Broadgate’s arguments. View "Broadgate, Inc v. Su" on Justia Law

Employee Paul Westcott was terminated by his employer, Mack Molding Co., Inc., for lying about secretly recording conversations at work. Westcott sued the employer, claiming that his recording activities were protected under Vermont’s Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and Worker’s Compensation Act (WCA), and also alleged breach of contract and promissory estoppel.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the employer. The court concluded that Westcott’s recording activities were not protected under FEPA or WCA. It also found that Westcott could not sustain his breach-of-contract claim because the employee handbook clearly stated that employment was at-will and could be terminated for any reason. Additionally, the court held that Westcott’s promissory estoppel claim failed because his termination was not connected to any promise made by the employer regarding his return to work after short-term disability leave.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that Westcott’s covert recording of workplace conversations did not constitute protected activity under FEPA or WCA. The court also agreed that the employee handbook did not create a binding contract that altered Westcott’s at-will employment status. Furthermore, the court found no basis for the promissory estoppel claim, as there was no specific promise breached by the employer related to Westcott’s termination.In summary, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer, concluding that Westcott’s recording activities were not protected, his employment was at-will, and there was no breach of a specific promise that could support a promissory estoppel claim. View "Westcott v. Mack Molding, Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Annalycia Jenkins, a former employee of Dermatology Management, LLC, filed a class action lawsuit against her employer after resigning. She alleged unfair competition, and the employer sought to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jenkins signed on her first day of work. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable due to its lack of mutuality, shortened statute of limitations, unreasonable discovery restrictions, and requirement for the parties to equally share the arbitrator’s fees and costs. Procedurally, the court noted the agreement was a contract of adhesion, pre-signed by the employer months before Jenkins was hired, and presented to her on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without the presence of the Chief People Officer.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable due to the inequality of bargaining power and the pre-signed nature of the agreement. It also upheld the finding of substantive unconscionability, noting the lack of mutuality, the unreasonable one-year statute of limitations, the unfair cost-sharing provision, and the restrictive discovery terms. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the unconscionable provisions, as doing so would condone an illegal scheme and incentivize employers to draft one-sided agreements. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Las Vegas Police Managers and Supervisors Association and the Las Vegas Peace Officers Association negotiated additional holidays with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the City of Las Vegas. These holidays included Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth. The Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) refused to collect increased retirement contributions on the holiday pay for these additional holidays, arguing that they were not included in Nevada's statutory list of holidays.The Associations filed a declaratory relief action in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, seeking to compel PERS to collect the appropriate contributions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Associations, directing PERS to collect the contributions for the additional holiday pay.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that PERS is required to collect additional retirement contributions for the increased wages earned on the negotiated holidays. The court concluded that the plain text of NRS 288.150(2)(d) supports the Associations' authority to negotiate holidays and that PERS must comply with these agreements. The court also determined that Juneteenth became a legal holiday in Nevada in 2021 following a presidential declaration and that PERS must collect contributions for this holiday retroactively to 2022. Additionally, the court found that the Associations have the statutory power to negotiate holiday pay for Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve, and PERS is obligated to collect contributions for these holidays as well.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, requiring PERS to collect the appropriate employer contributions for the additional holiday pay as negotiated by the Associations. View "PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS. OF NEV. VS. LAS VEGAS MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASS'N" on Justia Law

East Penn Manufacturing Company, Inc. (East Penn) did not fully compensate its workers for the time spent changing into uniforms and showering after shifts, which was required due to the hazardous nature of their work involving lead-acid batteries. The company provided a grace period for these activities but did not record the actual time spent. The U.S. Department of Labor sued East Penn under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for failing to pay employees for all time spent on these activities.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the government, determining that changing and showering were integral and indispensable to the workers' principal activities. The jury subsequently awarded $22.25 million in back pay to 11,780 hourly uniformed workers. The District Court, however, declined to award liquidated damages. East Penn appealed the decision, and the government cross-appealed the denial of liquidated damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's rulings. The Third Circuit held that employers bear the burden of proving that any unpaid time is de minimis (trivial). The court also held that employers must pay for the actual time employees spend on work-related activities, not just a reasonable amount of time. The court found that the District Court's jury instructions and the admission of the government's expert testimony were proper. Additionally, the Third Circuit upheld the District Court's decision to deny liquidated damages, concluding that East Penn had acted in good faith based on legal advice, even though that advice was ultimately incorrect.In summary, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, requiring East Penn to compensate employees for the actual time spent on changing and showering, and placing the burden of proving de minimis time on the employer. View "Secretary United States Department of Labor v. East Penn Manufacturing Inc" on Justia Law

Krista Dittus sued her former employer, Black Hills Care and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, and the company that took over its operations, RC North SD Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC d/b/a Avantara North, alleging wrongful termination in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Avantara denied the allegations, asserting it had no employment relationship with Dittus at the time of her termination. Black Hills Care did not respond or appear in the case.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of Avantara after striking Dittus's untimely response to the motion for summary judgment. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and ruled that Avantara was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Written orders were entered, and Avantara's counsel served notice of entry of the orders on Dittus's counsel via the court's electronic filing system on September 15, 2023. Dittus's counsel filed a notice of appeal and a civil case docketing statement through the same system on October 13, 2023, but only the docketing statement was served on Avantara's counsel.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and determined that it lacked appellate jurisdiction due to Dittus's failure to serve the notice of appeal on Avantara's counsel as required by SDCL 15-26A-4. The court emphasized that both timely filing and service of the notice of appeal are mandatory jurisdictional requirements. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "Dittus v. Black Hills Care & Rehab and Avantara" on Justia Law