Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. implemented a reduction-in-force (RIF) that resulted in the termination of 271 employees. Several of these former employees filed a collective action lawsuit against Spirit, alleging age discrimination. To succeed, they needed to demonstrate a pattern or practice of age discrimination. They presented documentary evidence and testimony to support their claims, while Spirit contended that the RIF aimed to eliminate underperformers regardless of age.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of Spirit, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a pattern or practice of age discrimination. The court found that the evidence did not support the claim that Spirit's actions were motivated by ageism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined the evidence, including lay testimony, documentary evidence, and expert opinions. The court found that the evidence, individually or collectively, did not support an inference of a standard operating procedure to eliminate older employees. The court noted that some evidence might suggest individual instances of age discrimination but did not establish a company-wide policy or practice.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding an unlawful pattern or practice of age discrimination. The court also addressed the exclusion of expert declarations and found no error in the district court's decisions. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that Spirit's RIF or refusal to rehire older workers was motivated by age discrimination. View "Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings" on Justia Law

Kristen M. Barnett, a former registered nurse at INOVA Health Care Services, refused to receive the COVID-19 vaccine due to her religious beliefs. INOVA had a policy requiring vaccination unless an exemption was granted. Barnett initially received a medical exemption but later requested a religious exemption, which was denied. She was subsequently placed on administrative leave and then discharged for noncompliance. Barnett filed a lawsuit against INOVA, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII and the Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted INOVA's motion to dismiss Barnett's complaint in its entirety. The court found that Barnett failed to state a claim for reasonable accommodation under Title VII because her objection did not raise issues related to abortion or fetal cells. The court also dismissed her disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the VHRA, finding them duplicative and lacking a comparator.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Barnett had sufficiently alleged religious discrimination for all three claims at the motion to dismiss stage. The court found that Barnett's allegations demonstrated her sincere religious beliefs and that her refusal to receive the vaccine was religious in nature. The court also found that Barnett's allegations supported a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent by INOVA.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Barnett's claims to proceed. View "Barnett v. INOVA Health Care Services" on Justia Law

Mr. Anthony W. Knox, a former Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and a member of the United States Air Force Reserves, brought reemployment and discrimination claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). He sought to retroactively correct the effective dates of a within-grade pay increase and a promotion. Knox was deployed on active duty from November 2002 to November 2003. During his deployment, his DEA supervisor indicated that his next within-grade increase should be effective February 23, 2003, but it was incorrectly set as April 20, 2003. Knox returned to the DEA in November 2003 and was eventually promoted to GS-13 in April 2016.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) granted Knox’s within-grade increase reemployment claim but denied his promotion claims and his within-grade increase discrimination claim. The Board found that the delay in Knox’s within-grade increase was an administrative error unrelated to his military service and that his promotion was discretionary, not automatic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s denial of Knox’s discrimination claims, finding substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the delay in his within-grade increase was not due to his military service. However, the court vacated and remanded the Board’s decision on Knox’s promotion reemployment claim, stating that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard by requiring Knox to prove he was entitled to an automatic promotion. The correct standard is whether Knox may have been entitled to the promotion, considering factors such as whether the promotion was generally granted to all employees and whether it was reasonably certain that the benefit would have accrued but for his military service. View "KNOX v. DOJ " on Justia Law

Gwendolyn Cunningham, a Black woman, alleged that the Department of Defense discriminated against her by not promoting her to a newly created GS-13 supervisor position. Cunningham, who had been with the Department since 1988 and held a GS-12 supervisor position, applied for the GS-13 role along with Emmanuel Griffin and two other employees. Griffin, a Black man with extensive experience and higher education credentials, was ultimately selected for the position by Andrew Hartz, the newly hired GS-14 Benefits Division Chief. Hartz cited Griffin's strategic vision and leadership skills as reasons for his selection, despite Cunningham's strong subject matter expertise.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Defense. The court found that the Department had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting Griffin over Cunningham and that Cunningham failed to offer evidence that these reasons were pretextual. Cunningham's belief that she was discriminated against based on her sex and race was deemed insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Department's rationale for promoting Griffin was legitimate and nondiscriminatory, as it was based on Hartz's genuine belief in Griffin's superior qualifications and strategic vision. The court also found that Cunningham did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the Department's reasons were pretextual. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Cunningham's heartfelt belief in discrimination was not enough to defeat the motion for summary judgment. View "Cunningham v. Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, CompassCare, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA), and First Bible Baptist Church, challenged the constitutionality of New York Labor Law Section 203-e, which prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s or a dependent’s reproductive health decision making. They argued that the law infringed on their First Amendment rights of expressive association, speech, and religion, and that the Notice Provision, which required employers issuing employee handbooks to include information about employees' rights under the Act, compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Plaintiffs' claims related to expressive association, speech, free exercise, religious autonomy, and vagueness. However, it permanently enjoined the enforcement of the Act’s Notice Provision. The case was then influenced by the Second Circuit's decision in Slattery v. Hochul, which held that an employer might have an associational-rights claim if the Act forces the employer to employ individuals acting against the organization’s mission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It vacated the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claim, the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs regarding the Notice Provision, and the permanent injunction. The Court remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether any Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an associational-rights claim under the precedent set by Slattery. The Court held that the Act’s Notice Provision is subject to rational basis review and is reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of employees regarding their statutory rights. It also affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ free speech and free exercise claims. View "CompassCare v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of the State of California providing dental care to inmates, sued the state seeking compensation for time spent on pre- and post-shift safety and security activities. These activities included going through security and handling alarm devices. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that these activities were not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their wage claims were viable and that the trial court improperly decided a disputed question of fact.The trial court, Solano County Superior Court, sustained the demurrer on the grounds that the activities in question were not compensable under the FLSA. The court did not address other grounds raised by the defendants, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) precluding the claims, the inapplicability of the statutes to government employers, failure to exhaust contractual remedies, and the statute of limitations.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in not accepting as true the plaintiffs' allegation that providing security is among their principal activities. The appellate court found that the MOU precludes plaintiffs from seeking additional wages under general state wage laws, thus affirming the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action. However, the court held that plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of contract and that the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies could not be resolved on demurrer. The court also determined that the plaintiffs' contract claim was not time-barred.The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, allowing the breach of contract claim to proceed while dismissing the other claims. View "Bath v. State" on Justia Law

Blake Wentworth, a former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California for various claims, including failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. Wentworth alleged that the Regents did not accommodate his bipolar II disorder and disclosed confidential information about him.The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on Wentworth's claims for failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. The court found that the Regents had engaged in the interactive process and offered reasonable accommodations, such as stopping Wentworth's tenure clock. The court also ruled that the invasion of privacy claim failed because Wentworth did not demonstrate that the Regents disclosed any confidential information.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on the interactive process and reasonable accommodations claims, finding that the Regents had acted appropriately. However, the appellate court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy claim, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents disclosed Wentworth's personal information in violation of the Information Practices Act (IPA).The appellate court also reversed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for attorney's fees and costs, remanding the case for further proceedings to determine whether Wentworth was entitled to fees under the catalyst theory or based on his success in obtaining his personnel file during the litigation. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wentworth's motion for a retrial on the personnel file cause of action, finding that Wentworth had forfeited his challenge by failing to object to the verdict form before the jury was discharged. View "Wentworth v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Terrence Richard, a brakeman for Union Pacific Railroad Company, fell from a train and broke his leg while working. He sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). Richard claimed that the locomotive engineer’s mishandling of the train caused a surge that led to his fall. Union Pacific argued that Richard fell because he was improperly positioned on the train. The trial court excluded the testimony of Richard’s expert, Richard Hess, a retired Union Pacific engineer, who would have testified that the engineer’s actions caused the surge.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Union Pacific’s motion in limine to exclude Hess’s testimony, finding that Hess lacked the necessary qualifications. The jury returned a special verdict for Union Pacific, finding the company was not negligent. Richard appealed, arguing that the exclusion of Hess’s testimony was erroneous and prejudicial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Hess’s testimony. Hess had extensive experience relevant to the subject matter and his testimony would have been helpful to the jury. The exclusion of Hess’s testimony was prejudicial because it left Richard without a witness to testify about the locomotive engineer’s actions and their potential danger.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment for Union Pacific and remanded the matter for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Hess’s expert testimony and that the error was prejudicial to Richard’s case. View "Richard v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Eva Osborne, the plaintiff, sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct by Slap during her four years as his executive assistant. The claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation, and wage and hour violations. Slap later filed a cross-complaint against Osborne, alleging libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that her statements were protected activity and rejecting Slap’s arguments that they were extortionate and illegal. The court held that Slap could not establish minimal merit in his claims because Osborne’s statements were both absolutely and conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, and Slap failed to show malice to overcome the conditional privilege. Slap appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court rejected Slap’s attempt to invoke an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute for activity that is illegal as a matter of law. The court concluded that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims, preventing him from meeting his burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show his claims had minimal merit. The court did not address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding the conditional privilege, malice, or the prima facie showing on Slap’s claims. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeannine Bedard, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer, refused to comply with the City of Los Angeles’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate and did not sign a “Notice of Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy Requirements.” Consequently, the Chief of Police sought to terminate her employment. The LAPD Board of Rights reviewed the proposed discipline, found Bedard guilty of failing to comply with conditions of employment, and upheld her discharge. The Board also found that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not providing sufficient time to respond to the charges, awarding her back pay, which the City did not pay.Bedard filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, arguing that the disciplinary action was procedurally and legally invalid and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The trial court found the termination justified but agreed that the City violated Bedard’s due process rights by not giving her enough time to respond. The court awarded her back pay but upheld her termination.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bedard’s termination was justified due to her refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate, which was a condition of her employment. The court found substantial evidence supporting that Bedard’s refusal to vaccinate, not just her refusal to sign the Notice, was the basis for her termination. The court also held that the penalty of termination was not an abuse of discretion given the public health implications of her refusal to vaccinate. Additionally, the court agreed that the Skelly violation entitled Bedard to back pay but did not warrant reinstatement. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bedard v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law