Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

by
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (SAC) against the school district and six of its employees, alleging a pattern of harassment, discrimination and retaliation against her because she engaged in protected activities. The court held that the demurrer to the cause of action entitled, "Retaliation in Violation of Government Code Section 12940(h)" was properly sustained; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to add or amend the cause of action alleged for the first time in the SAC; failure to comply with the Government Claims Act bars the cause of action alleging violations of Labor Code section 1102.5; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied leave to amend despite plaintiff's PTSD. View "Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

by
Appellants, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 2875 (Union), and Robert Green (Green), sought certiorari relief from the Court of Civil Appeals' (COCA) opinion affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Norman and reversing an arbitration award in favor of Green and Union. Green, a member of his local union, was discharged from his job with the City of Norman, Oklahoma (City). Green appealed the decision and the matter was ultimately presented to an arbitrator for a determination. The arbitrator determined there was no "just cause" for discipline and he ordered reinstatement of Green's employment. The union filed a petition in district court to enforce the arbitration award. City filed a cross petition asking the district court to vacate the arbitration award. Both parties sought summary relief from the district court. The district court denied relief to Green and granted summary judgment in favor of City. The district court held the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the collective bargaining agreement and vacated the arbitrator's opinion and award. Green and the union filed a Petition in Error; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to City but remanded the matter for the arbitrator to resolve the issue of progressive discipline. Green and the union sought certiorari relief from the Oklahoma Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court held the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority under the terms of the CBA when determining whether the City had "just cause" to discipline Green. It vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, reversed the district court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. City of Norman" on Justia Law

by
Sparre began working as a Norfolk locomotive engineer in 1999. In 2010, he reported a safety violation to the Federal Railroad Administration, which resulted in the assessment of an $8,000 civil penalty against Norfolk. In 2014, Norfolk terminated Sparre for excessively exceeding the speed limit while operating a locomotive. Sparre complained to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, alleging Norfolk fired him in retaliation for reporting the safety concern in 2010, which would violate the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109. OSHA dismissed Sparre’s complaint as without merit. Sparre requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. The parties engaged in years‐long, extensive discovery. In November 2017, the ALJ found there were no genuine issues of fact and granted Norfolk a summary decision. The decision, with instructions to petition for review, including the 14‐day timeline, was mailed to Sparre and his attorneys that same day. Thirty days later, Sparre appealed to the Board and filed a petition for judicial review. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the Board, which found that Sparre’s petition was untimely and he was not entitled to equitable tolling. Sparre filed a second appeal. The Seventh Circuit rejected the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Sparre failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing. View "Sparre v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

by
At the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employer must proffer admissible evidence showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, clear, and reasonably specific explanation for its actions. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that one aspect of the Department's promotion process had a disparate impact on Hispanic and Latino candidates who applied for the position he sought, and that the Secretary in 2008 denied him a promotion because of his Hispanic ethnicity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.The DC Circuit affirmed in part and held that plaintiff's disparate impact claim lacked merit where there were no genuine issues of material fact and plaintiff failed to establish causation as a matter of law. However, the court held that the district court misapplied the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework as to the disparate treatment claim by accepting the Department's vague reason for the denial of the promotion. In this case, none of the presented evidence sheds light on how the selection boards applied the core precepts to defendant's case. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated the denial of plaintiff's cross-motion in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Figueroa v. Pompeo" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court answered a certified question of Iowa law by holding that, under Iowa law, a common law cause of action for bad faith failure to pay workers' compensation benefits is not available against a third-party claims administrator of a worker's compensation insurance carrier.Plaintiff, who suffered a work-related injury, filed a claim for benefits with the workers compensation commissioner. Plaintiff was denied benefits. Plaintiff later filed a bad faith action against his employer's workers' compensation carrier and its third-party administrator. The action was removed to the federal district court, and the court certified the following question to the Supreme Court: “In what circumstances, if any, can an injured employee hold a third-party claims administrator liable for the tort of bad faith for failure to pay workers’ compensation benefits?” The Supreme Court held that a third-party administrator cannot be sued for bad faith as if it were an insurer. View "De Dios v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner Steven Silva appealed a New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB) decision that upheld decisions of respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), to suspend and subsequently terminate the petitioner’s employment. Petitioner began working at the New Hampshire Hospital in 1999. He was terminated from employment in 2015 for violating the hospital’s sexual harassment policy. In 2016, the PAB found that the petitioner’s 2015 termination did not comply with New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Per 1002.08(d) because DHHS did not provide the petitioner, prior to termination, with all of the evidence it relied upon to justify his termination, and, consequently, he was not given an opportunity to refute the evidence that led to his dismissal. For that reason, the PAB ordered DHHS to reinstate the petitioner retroactively to the date of his termination and award him back pay and benefits. Following the PAB’s order, DHHS resumed paying the petitioner but simultaneously placed him on suspension so that it could conduct a new investigation into the same sexual harassment allegations that formed the basis for the 2015 termination. In 2017, after completing its investigation, DHHS terminated the petitioner again. The petitioner appealed his suspension as well as his 2017 termination to the PAB, arguing that the PAB’s decision overturning his prior termination prevents DHHS from terminating or suspending him for the same conduct. After a hearing on the merits, the PAB upheld the suspension and subsequent termination. On appeal, petitioner argued the statutory reinstatement requirement in the Administrative Rules precluded DHHS from terminating him a second time for the same conduct which gave rise to his 2015 termination. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that because the PAB’s decision overturning the 2015 termination was based upon DHHS’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Per 1002.08(d) prior to termination, it was not a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. Therefore Silva's argument failed and the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB's decision. View "Appeal of Steven Silva" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission adopting the finding of an administrative law judge (ALJ) that Appellant's additional benefits claim was barred by the statute of limitations, holding that the Commission did not err in finding that Appellant's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.After a hearing, the ALJ found that Appellant's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's findings. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the statute of limitations had tolled. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the Commission's finding, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Farris v. Express Services, Inc." on Justia Law

by
In this case concerning whether retail salespeople who are paid entirely in commissions or draws are entitled to additional overtime or Sunday pay, the Supreme Judicial Court held that such employees are entitled to overtime or Sunday pay with separate and additional payments of one and one-half times the minimum wage for every hour the employees worked over forty hours or on Sunday.At issue before the Court was whether the defendant employers in this case satisfied their obligations under the overtime statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A, and the Sunday pay statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 136, 6, when they paid draws or commissions that equaled or exceeded the minimum wage for the plaintiff employees' first forty hours of work and one and one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked over forty hours or on Sunday. The Supreme Judicial Court held that draws and commissions cannot be allocated retroactively as hourly and overtime wages and Sunday pay even where the draws and commissions equal or exceed the minimum wage for the employees' first forty hours of work and one and one-half times the minimum wage for all hours worked over forty hours or on Sunday. View "Sullivan v. Sleepy's LLC" on Justia Law

by
In this case concerning the proper recipient of heart and hypertension benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c for permanent disability if such benefits vested and were payable during the claimant's lifetime but were not paid to the claimant before his death the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board concluding that the executrix of the decedent's estate was improperly was substituted as party claimant, holding that heart and hypertension benefits under § 7-433c may be paid to a claimant’s estate if such unpaid benefits matured before the claimant’s death.The Workers' Compensation Commissioner granted the motion to substitute the executrix as a party claimant. The Board concluded that the executrix was improperly substituted as party claimant because a claimant's estate cannot receive the claimant's vested but unpaid section 7-433c benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) neither Morgan v. East Haven, 546 A.2d 243 (Conn. 1988), nor any other legal authority barred the substitution to the extent that the executrix sought payment of matured benefits; but (2) because the record did not support the determination that the decedent's section 7-433c disability benefits matured before his death, this case must be remanded for further proceedings to decide the proper beneficiary of any benefits due. View "Brennan v. Waterbury" on Justia Law

by
Levitin, a Jewish surgeon of Russian descent, owns and operates a private medical practice. From 2000-2013, most of her revenue came from her work at Northwest Community Hospital, where she maintained practice privileges. In 2008 Levitin complained to Northwest that Dr. Conway, another surgeon, was harassing her, repeatedly criticizing her medical decisions, undermining her in front of her patients, and interrupting her in surgery. Northwest reprimanded Conway. Direct harassment stopped. Several doctors subsequently filed complaints concerning Levitin’s professional judgment. One refused to work with her. The chair of Northwest’s surgery department informed Levitin that he would begin proactively reviewing the surgeries she scheduled for potential issues and reviewed Levitin’s prior surgeries. He referred 31 cases to the Medical Executive Committee, which found that Levitin deviated from the appropriate standard of care in four cases and initially concluded that Levitin should receive quarterly reviews. The Committee reconvened following an incident in which Levitin operated on a patient without proper sedation and voted to terminate her practice privileges. Northwest’s Board of Directors terminated Levitin’s practice privileges. She filed suit, alleging antitrust claims, state-law claims, and a claim for employment discrimination based on sex, religion, and ethnicity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of her claims, finding that Levitin was not an employee. View "Levitin v. Northwest Community Hospital" on Justia Law