Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Maria Miller, a correctional officer with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), was injured in 2016 while on a temporary assignment. After her worker’s compensation benefits were exhausted in 2018, CDCR placed her on unpaid leave. CDCR later offered her a medical demotion to an alternative position, which she did not accept, citing a newly disclosed mental disability. Miller has remained on unpaid leave since then. In 2020, she sued CDCR under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted summary judgment in favor of CDCR, concluding that CDCR was entitled to summary adjudication on each cause of action. The court found that Miller could not perform the essential functions of her job as a correctional officer due to her disabilities and that CDCR had offered reasonable accommodations, which she either accepted or refused.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that CDCR had met its burden by showing that Miller could not perform the essential duties of her job and that reasonable accommodations were offered. The court also found that Miller failed to produce evidence of a material dispute of fact regarding her ability to perform her job or the reasonableness of the accommodations offered. The court concluded that CDCR was not liable for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination, or retaliation. The judgment was affirmed. View "Miller v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

A police officer with over thirty-three years of experience, including seventeen years with the Blue Ash Police Department, was terminated at age sixty-one. The officer alleged that his performance record was nearly perfect until a new police chief took over, after which he faced increased scrutiny and discipline. The officer was assigned a traffic study, typically not given to patrol officers, and disciplined multiple times for minor infractions, including failing to turn on his microphone during traffic stops and not responding promptly to a noise complaint. The final incident leading to his termination involved a delayed response to a medical emergency, which led to an investigation uncovering multiple policy violations, including untruthfulness.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court concluded that the officer failed to provide sufficient evidence that his termination was due to age discrimination. The court also found that the officer abandoned his other claims by not addressing them in his brief opposing summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the age discrimination claim, holding that the officer could not show that age was the "but-for" reason for his termination. However, the court reversed the district court's decision on the hostile work environment claim. The appellate court found that the officer presented enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on age. The court noted that the officer's allegations of increased scrutiny, disproportionate discipline, and demeaning assignments could support a hostile work environment claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim against the City of Blue Ash. View "McNeal v. City of Blue Ash" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when struck by a car driven by Ralph Wilson, who had been driving for Uber earlier that evening. Wilson had turned his Uber driver app to "offline" about four minutes before the accident and more than a mile away from the accident site. Wilson testified that he had finished driving for Uber for the night and was on his way home from McDonald's when the accident occurred. The plaintiff argued that inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony and Uber's records created a triable issue of fact regarding whether Wilson was still operating as an Uber driver at the time of the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of Uber Technologies, Inc. and related companies, finding that Wilson was acting in his personal capacity and not as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court deemed the plaintiff's arguments speculative and irrelevant to establishing whether Wilson was acting within the scope of his employment with Uber at the time of the incident.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the undisputed material facts demonstrated that Wilson was not acting as an Uber driver at the time of the accident. The court found no evidence to support the plaintiff's claim that Wilson intended to switch back to "available" status or that he was driving towards a surge area. The court concluded that the inconsistencies in Wilson's testimony were immaterial to the issue of his status at the time of the accident. Therefore, the judgment in favor of the Uber parties was affirmed. View "Kim v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Ramon Vasquez, Jr., sustained injuries while working in a restaurant and subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim, which was accepted by AmTrust North America, Inc. AmTrust paid $177,335.59 in benefits. Vasquez then initiated third-party litigation against several defendants, resulting in a $400,000 settlement. AmTrust, having intervened as subrogee, sought to recover its lien from the settlement proceeds. Vasquez argued that AmTrust was not entitled to any of the settlement proceeds based on prior case law.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County held that AmTrust did not meaningfully participate in the third-party litigation and thus had to bear a portion of the litigation costs and fees under the Breen formula. The court also ruled that AmTrust could not recover from the portion of the settlement allocated to noneconomic damages, as per Poremba. Consequently, the district court adjudicated AmTrust’s lien at $0 and dismissed its complaint.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the Breen formula, which required insurers to bear a portion of litigation costs, conflicted with NRS 616C.215(5). The court held that there is no requirement for an insurer to intervene or participate in the third-party claim to recover on its lien. The court also overruled the Breen formula and Poremba to the extent they conflicted with the statute, stating that an insurer's lien applies to the total proceeds of any recovery, including noneconomic damages. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Amtrust North America, Inc. v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, Julia McCreight and Rebecca Wester, were long-term employees of AuburnBank, each with over twenty years of service. McCreight, a mortgage loan originator, and Wester, a loan closer, were both terminated by Michael King, the mortgage department manager. McCreight was fired for sending an unauthorized loan approval letter to a borrower who did not qualify, while Wester was terminated for failing to verify a borrower’s employment status before closing a loan. Both women, over sixty years old at the time of their termination, claimed they were fired due to age and sex discrimination and in retaliation for their complaints about King’s behavior.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of AuburnBank and King on all counts. The court found that neither McCreight nor Wester provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of age and sex discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that McCreight and Wester failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that their terminations were due to illegal discrimination. The court clarified that mixed-motive theories of liability do not need to be explicitly pleaded in the complaint but must be raised by summary judgment. The court found that McCreight did not raise a mixed-motive theory at the district court level and failed to provide sufficient evidence for her single-motive theory. Similarly, Wester’s evidence was insufficient to support her claims. The court also held that both plaintiffs failed to show causation for their retaliation claims, as there was no evidence that the decision-makers knew about their discrimination complaints. View "McCreight v. AuburnBank" on Justia Law

Kelly Dwyer sought to recover mental health benefits for his minor daughter, E.D., under his employee group benefit health plan issued by United Healthcare Insurance Company. E.D. suffered from severe anorexia nervosa, leading her parents to admit her to a residential treatment facility, Avalon Hills. Initially, United approved full hospitalization benefits, but later reduced the coverage to partial hospitalization and eventually denied further hospitalization benefits, suggesting outpatient treatment instead. Despite E.D.'s doctors' objections and evidence of her ongoing severe symptoms, United maintained its decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of United, finding that the insurer had not improperly withheld benefits. The court's decision was based on the administrative record and the arguments presented during the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court found that United's denial of benefits was both substantively and procedurally deficient. Substantively, the court held that United's decision was not supported by concrete evidence and contradicted the medical records. Procedurally, United failed to provide a meaningful dialogue or adequate explanation for its denial, violating ERISA requirements. Additionally, the court found that United improperly failed to process claims at the MultiPlan rate, as it did not respond to Mr. Dwyer's administrative appeal regarding this issue.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for the calculation of damages, statutory penalties, attorneys' fees, and other relief for Mr. Dwyer. View "Dwyer v. United Healthcare" on Justia Law

Three black officers, Cedric Green, Darrell Clark, and Reginald Cooper, alleged a history of racial discrimination within the Alexandria Police Department (APD). They claimed that over their decades-long careers, they faced systemic racism, including derogatory comments and unfair treatment. Clark and Cooper were eventually terminated, and Green was demoted. They argued that these actions were retaliatory, following their complaints to HR and the FBI about racial harassment and misconduct within the department.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Alexandria and other defendants. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to present competent evidence to support their claims. Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiffs' reliance on their complaint and unsubstantiated assertions did not meet the evidentiary standards required to survive summary judgment. The court also found that the city provided legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse employment actions taken against the plaintiffs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a hostile work environment, as the incidents cited were either not racially motivated or not severe and pervasive enough. The court also found no causal connection between the plaintiffs' protected activities (complaints to HR and the FBI) and the adverse employment actions. Additionally, the court held that the city had legitimate reasons for the terminations and demotion, which the plaintiffs failed to show were pretextual. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under Louisiana's whistleblower statute and their Monell claims against the city, citing a lack of evidence of a discriminatory policy or custom. View "Clark v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Joseph Mayor, a petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to direct the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) to rescind its order granting Ross Valley Sanitation District’s (Ross Valley) petition for reconsideration of an award of permanent disability. Mayor had been awarded total permanent disability by a workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) due to an industrial injury. Ross Valley filed a petition for reconsideration, but the Board acted on it more than 60 days after it was filed, which Mayor argued exceeded the Board’s jurisdiction under former section 5909 of the Labor Code.The WCJ issued the award on March 2, 2023, and Ross Valley filed for reconsideration on March 23, 2023. The Board did not act within the 60-day period mandated by former section 5909, which stated that a petition is deemed denied if not acted upon within 60 days. On August 14, 2023, the Board granted the petition for reconsideration, citing administrative irregularities and delays in receiving the petition. Mayor then filed for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Board lost jurisdiction after the 60-day period lapsed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Mayor, referencing the recent decision in Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., which held that the Board’s action after 60 days exceeded its jurisdiction. The court noted that the Legislature had amended section 5909 to start the 60-day deadline from when the Board receives the case file, not when the petition is filed, but this amendment did not apply retroactively. The court granted Mayor’s petition, directing the Board to rescind its orders and confirming that the WCJ’s award of permanent disability was final. View "Mayor v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Sarah Anoke and other employees initiated arbitration proceedings against their employer, X (comprising Twitter, Inc., X Holdings I, Inc., X Holdings Corp., X Corp., and Elon Musk), for employment-related disputes. The arbitration provider issued an invoice for $27,200, which Anoke’s counsel mistakenly paid. The arbitration provider marked the invoice as paid and closed, then refunded the payment and issued a new invoice to X, which X paid within 30 days.Anoke petitioned the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco to compel X to pay her arbitration-related attorney fees and costs, arguing that X’s payment was untimely because it was not made within 30 days of the first invoice. The superior court denied the petition, reasoning that since the first invoice was nullified after Anoke’s attorney mistakenly paid it and X timely paid the second invoice, X met the statutory deadline.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for payment was tied to the due date set by the arbitration provider’s invoice. Since the first invoice was paid (albeit mistakenly) and the second invoice was paid within 30 days, there was no default. The court affirmed the superior court’s order, concluding that the arbitrator acted within its authority by issuing a second invoice and that the statute did not require the arbitrator to reinstate the first invoice after it had been paid and closed. The court also noted that the reasons for a timely payment are irrelevant under the statute. View "Anoke v. Twitter" on Justia Law

In July 1, 2021, the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America sought to represent employees of Hudson Institute of Process Research Incorporated, a legal outsourcing and staffing company. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was tasked with determining the appropriate bargaining unit, excluding supervisors. Hudson and the union disagreed on whether certain personnel, including team leads and revision specialists, were supervisors. Hudson also objected to an employer-wide bargaining unit. The NLRB held a hearing in September 2021, where Hudson argued that these personnel had supervisory authority.The NLRB regional director found that Hudson failed to prove that the disputed personnel were supervisors and approved an employer-wide bargaining unit. Hudson appealed to the NLRB, which denied the request for review. An election was conducted, and the union was certified. Hudson refused to bargain, leading the NLRB to find it had committed an unfair labor practice. Hudson then petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the NLRB lacked substantial evidence to support its findings that certain personnel were not supervisors. Specifically, the court determined that I-140 team leads, team lead assistants, floating team lead assistants, RFE team leads, and I-485 team leads possessed supervisory authority, including assigning work and recommending rewards, using independent judgment. The court also upheld the NLRB’s certification of an employer-wide bargaining unit but found that the unit improperly included supervisors.The Fifth Circuit granted Hudson’s petition for review, reversed the NLRB’s bargaining order, and denied enforcement, concluding that Hudson did not violate the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the union. View "Hudson Institute of Process Research Incorporated v. NLRB" on Justia Law