Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

Several current and former employees of the City of Chicago, including police officers and an emergency management officer, challenged the City’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The policy, issued in October 2021, required city employees to either be vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo regular testing and report their status through an employee portal. Religious exemptions from vaccination were available and granted to these plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs objected to having to submit their vaccination status and test results in the portal, arguing that this reporting requirement violated their constitutional and statutory rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, raising claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court dismissed the Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. It found the Title VII claims factually implausible and concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a religious practice conflicting with the reporting requirements. The court also held that, since the plaintiffs were granted their requested exemptions from vaccination, they could not succeed on claims based on their refusal to comply with reporting requirements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the policy’s reporting requirements were neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational-basis review, which the policy satisfied. The court determined that the reporting and disciplinary provisions were rationally related to the City’s legitimate interest in public health and workplace safety. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all constitutional, statutory, and state-law claims, finding the plaintiffs’ arguments insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Kondilis v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

An individual received health insurance through his employer, with the plan administered by a third-party insurer. After being injured in a car accident, he recovered damages from the other driver’s employer and, based on communications from his insurer and its agent, paid $25,000 in reimbursement to the plan. He later learned that the full plan document did not contain a reimbursement obligation, contrary to what was represented in the summary plan description. A similar situation occurred when his wife was injured in a separate accident; litigation in state court ultimately resulted in a declaratory judgment that the plan did not provide for reimbursement, and this was affirmed on appeal.The individual then sued the insurer, its agent, and his employer in federal court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), alleging he was defrauded into paying reimbursement. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed most claims, but allowed one ERISA claim under § 1132(a)(3) to proceed. While his federal appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed state law claims in state court, which were removed to federal court. The district court held that these state law claims were completely preempted by ERISA and dismissed the action, reasoning that the claims were duplicative of the pending federal lawsuit and arose from the same events.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff’s state law claims were completely preempted by ERISA under the standard articulated in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, because the claims sought relief for benefits allegedly due under the terms of an ERISA-governed plan and did not rely on a legal duty independent of ERISA or the plan. The court further concluded that dismissal, rather than remand or amendment, was appropriate due to the duplicative nature of the proceedings. View "Patterson v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff was an employee who brought claims for wrongful termination, Labor Code violations, and breach of contract against two defendants: the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and the Public Transportation Services Corporation (PTSC). MTA had created PTSC, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, to provide retirement and employment benefits to certain workers and to manage employees who support MTA’s transportation functions. The plaintiff did not file a prelitigation claim under the Government Claims Act (GCA) before suing these entities.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of both defendants, finding that the plaintiff had not alleged compliance with the GCA’s claim presentation requirements. The plaintiff was given leave to amend but continued to argue that PTSC was not a public entity subject to the GCA, and that even if it was, the claims presentation requirement should not apply because PTSC had not registered as required by statute. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, finding both defendants to be public entities and that PTSC was not required to register separately from MTA. The court entered judgment for both defendants.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, the plaintiff did not challenge the judgment in favor of MTA but contested the ruling as to PTSC. The appellate court held that PTSC qualifies as a public entity for purposes of the GCA’s claims presentation requirement, given its creation and control by MTA. However, the court found that if PTSC failed to register properly on the Registry of Public Agencies—including with county clerks where it maintains offices—this would excuse the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the GCA. The judgment for MTA was affirmed, but the judgment for PTSC was reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint. View "Black v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

An employee of a company specializing in training security officers raised concerns to management about unsafe working conditions, including the handling of weapons and a hazardous firing range where bullet ricochets had resulted in injuries. The employee, along with other instructors, formally complained to supervisors about these dangers, especially during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when he also questioned restrictions on personal protective equipment. After voicing these safety concerns, the employee was suspended and later terminated, allegedly for insubordination.The employee filed a charge with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), asserting that his termination was unlawful retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). After investigation, an NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing and determined that the employee was not a managerial employee and was therefore protected by the NLRA. The ALJ found that the primary reason for the suspension and termination was the employee’s repeated advocacy regarding workplace safety, not insubordination. The ALJ concluded that the employer had committed unfair labor practices. The employer appealed, and the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision with minor modifications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying the substantial evidence standard, the court held that the Board’s conclusion—that the employee was not a managerial employee—was supported by the record. The court found that the employee lacked authority to formulate or implement management policy and did not possess the discretion characteristic of managerial status. Therefore, the employee was entitled to the NLRA’s protections. The court granted the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order and denied the employer’s cross-petition for review. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Constellis, LLC" on Justia Law

A director and former officer of a closely held Delaware corporation engaged in egregious acts of sexual harassment and racist behavior toward two employees. These actions led to the employees’ resignations and prompted successful charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The employees then filed lawsuits in the New York state courts, resulting in judgments totaling over $1.8 million against both the director and the corporation, jointly and individually.After these outcomes, the corporation’s other stockholder and director, who also serves as its president, filed a derivative suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery. He alleged that the director’s acts were not only violations of employment law but also constituted a breach of fiduciary duty—specifically, the duty of loyalty. He sought to hold the director liable to the company for the monetary judgments and other losses, arguing that the director’s unlawful, self-interested conduct was per se disloyalty under Delaware law.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware first determined that it had personal jurisdiction over the director under Delaware’s director consent statute. The court then addressed demand futility and found that, given the board’s composition and the nature of the alleged conduct, the plaintiff’s ability to proceed depended on whether the complaint stated a viable claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The court concluded that, under Delaware law, interpersonal workplace misconduct—even when unlawful and reprehensible—does not by itself amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty unless it involves the misuse of corporate power as part of the company’s internal affairs. The court reasoned that employment law, not corporate doctrine, provides the remedy for such conduct. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. View "Brola v. Lundgren" on Justia Law

An agricultural company opposed a unionization effort initiated by the United Farm Workers of America, who sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's employees under a new statutory procedure. The union filed a Majority Support Petition with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, presenting evidence that a majority of employees supported union representation. The company responded by submitting objections and employee declarations alleging misconduct by the union during the signature collection process. The Board's regional director investigated and determined that the union had met the statutory criteria for certification, leading the Board to certify the union as the employees' representative.Following the certification, the company filed additional objections with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, including constitutional challenges to the underlying statute. The Board dismissed most objections and set others for a hearing, but stated it could not rule on constitutional questions. While administrative proceedings were ongoing, the company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Kern County seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding and to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Board and the union argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory limits on judicial review, but the superior court nonetheless issued a preliminary injunction halting the Board's proceedings. Appeals and writ petitions followed, consolidating the matter before the reviewing court.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge at this stage. The court reaffirmed that under California law, employers may not directly challenge union certification decisions in court except in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here. The proper procedure is for employers to wait until an unfair labor practice proceeding or mandatory mediation is completed and a final order is issued before seeking judicial review. The court reversed the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of the company’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wonderful Nurseries v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Several former employees brought a class action lawsuit against their previous employer, a fast-food chain, challenging three company policies: excessive wage deductions for the Oregon Workers’ Benefit Fund (WBF), failure to pay for interrupted meal breaks longer than 20 minutes, and deductions for non-slip shoes required for work. The WBF overdeductions occurred when the employer failed to adjust employee contribution rates as the state rate decreased, causing employees to pay more than their share. The company also required employees to purchase specific non-slip shoes, from which it received vendor rebates, and allowed the cost to be deducted from wages.In the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, the plaintiffs prevailed on the WBF claims, with the court finding at summary judgment that the WBF overdeductions were willful, and that shoe deductions were for the plaintiffs’ benefit, leaving for trial whether the shoes were authorized in writing. The jury awarded substantial penalty wages for the WBF overdeductions, but the district court later reduced the jury’s award relating to shoe deductions, holding that written authorization was a defense. The court also denied class certification for the unpaid break claims, finding individual inquiry necessary, and refused to exclude class members who did not receive mailed notice or to reduce prejudgment interest for alleged plaintiff delay.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on willfulness regarding the WBF overdeductions and on whether the shoe deductions were for the employees’ benefit, requiring both issues be retried by a jury. The appellate court also clarified that written authorization was not a defense to minimum wage and overtime violations relating to shoe deductions. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the unpaid break claims and on notice and prejudgment interest issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "GESSELE V. JACK IN THE BOX INC." on Justia Law

A senior account manager at a telecommunications company was terminated after several major accounts she managed decided to discontinue the company’s services. In the months leading up to her termination, she took eight and a half days of paid leave to care for her ill daughter and mother. Her supervisor had expressed concerns about her performance, particularly with her newer accounts, but consistently granted all her leave requests without referencing the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Despite meeting some of her performance objectives, the loss of major accounts and her supervisor’s ongoing performance criticisms culminated in her dismissal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the employer on the employee’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. The district court found that the employee had not shown she was denied any FMLA benefits or that her termination was in retaliation for taking leave. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her related claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), dismissing it without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the employee did not establish an FMLA interference claim because her supervisor’s criticisms were unrelated to her leave requests, which were fully granted, and she was not prejudiced by the employer’s failure to provide FMLA notice. The court also held that the employee failed to show retaliation, as her termination was based on documented performance issues rather than the exercise of FMLA rights. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the NYCHRL claim without prejudice. View "Haran v. Orange Business Services, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee at a nuclear power plant operated by a subsidiary corporation left active work due to a medical condition but remained employed while on short-term disability. After the employee transitioned to long-term disability, the employer terminated his employment. The union, representing the plant’s workers, filed a grievance on the employee’s behalf, arguing that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) required continued employment and benefits. The union initiated arbitration against the employer but mistakenly named the employer’s parent company as the respondent. Despite the error, counsel for the correct employer participated in the arbitration, and all parties consistently identified the subsidiary as the actual employer during the proceedings.After the arbitrator issued an award in favor of the union—ordering reinstatement and benefits for the employee—the employer did not comply. Instead, the parent and subsidiary together filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, seeking to vacate the award due to the mistaken caption. The union counterclaimed for confirmation of the award. The district court ruled for the union, finding extensive evidence that the subsidiary had engaged in and intended to be bound by the arbitration, and that the erroneous caption was merely a procedural defect to which the employer had waived any objection by participating fully and not raising a timely challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that when an arbitration demand and award misname the party against whom the award is meant to be entered, but there is no ambiguity about the real party, a federal court may enforce the award. The court further held that any objection to the misnomer was waived by the employer’s participation and failure to object, and that the error was a curable misnomer not warranting vacatur or modification of the award. View "Holtec International Corp. v. Michigan State Utility Workers Council" on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization operates several Zen Buddhist temples in California, providing residential training programs where participants, known as Work Practice Apprentices (WPAs), live and work at the temples. Participants perform various tasks, including cleaning, cooking, and guest services, as part of their Zen training. Upon completing the WPA program, individuals may become staff members, continuing similar duties while residing at the temple. The plaintiff participated as a WPA and later as a staff member, performing duties such as guest services, food preparation, and facility maintenance. She received modest monthly stipends and room and board, but ultimately challenged the compensation as inadequate under California wage-and-hour laws.After her affiliation with the organization ended, the plaintiff filed a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner, seeking unpaid regular and overtime wages, meal period premium wages, and liquidated damages. The Labor Commissioner ruled in her favor against the organization and two individual leaders, holding the individuals personally liable as employers under Labor Code section 558.1, and awarded her $149,177.15. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court of San Francisco, posting an undertaking only on behalf of the organization, not the individual defendants. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeals by the individuals for lack of undertakings and granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding the ministerial exception under the First Amendment barred the wage-and-hour claims.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed. It held that the ministerial exception does not bar wage-and-hour claims by ministers unless such claims would require judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical matters or religious doctrine. Because there was no evidence that adjudicating the plaintiff’s wage claims would entangle the court in religious concerns, the exception did not apply. The court also held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ appeals due to their failure to post the required undertakings. View "Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center" on Justia Law