Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Colorado Custom Maid (CCM) places house cleaners with clients who need their homes cleaned. In doing so, it has tried to avoid becoming the house cleaners’ employer, hoping instead to maintain the relationship as one between a referral service and a group of independent contractors so that it could avoid paying unemployment taxes on the money it paid to those cleaners. In 2014, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment Division of Employment and Training (Division) concluded that, despite CCM’s efforts to characterize them as independent contractors, CCM’s cleaners were in fact employees for whom the company should be paying unemployment taxes. After evaluating the dynamics of the relationship between CCM and its cleaners, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed. The Court affirmed the conclusion of an Industrial Claim Appeals Office Panel that the realities of CCM’s relationship with its cleaners established an employment relationship. View "Colo. Custom Maid v. ICAO & Div. of Unemp. Ins." on Justia Law

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In 2010, the Colorado General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 10-191 (SB 191), which significantly amended Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA) provisions concerning teacher contracts and the transfer process. SB191 eliminated the earlier practice of transferring teachers to schools without the consent of the principal of the recipient school. Under SB 191, nonprobationary teachers who were deemed effective during the prior school year and who have not secured a mutual consent placement become members of a “priority hiring pool” for available positions. However, nonprobationary teachers who were unable to secure such a position after the longer of twelve months or two hiring cycles are placed on unpaid leave until they are able to secure an assignment. Defendant-Petitioner School District No. 1 in the City and County of Denver (DPS) sought review of the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss Plaintiff-Respondent Rebecca Reeves-Toney’s constitutional challenge to the “mutual consent” provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) of the TECDA. Reeves-Toney alleged these provisions violated the local control clause of article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution by delegating local school boards’ hiring decisions to principals and other administrators. DPS moved to dismiss Reeves-Toney’s complaint, arguing, among other things, that she lacked standing to bring her claim. The trial court agreed that Reeves-Toney lacked individual standing, but nevertheless concluded that she sufficiently alleged taxpayer standing to challenge section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) and plausibly alleged that the statute was facially unconstitutional. The court thus denied the motion to dismiss. The Colorado Supreme Court determined Reeves-Toney did not allege an injury based on an unlawful expenditure of taxpayer money, thus failing to demonstrate a clear nexus between her status as a taxpayer and the challenged government action. Reeves-Toney therefore lacked taxpayer standing to bring her constitutional challenge to section 22-63-202(2)(c.5). Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to dismiss Reeves-Toney's complaint. View "In re Reeves-Toney v. School Dist. No. 1 in the City & County of Denver" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose out of a retaliation action under the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (the “Whistleblower Act”) and a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against the Idaho State Police. Plaintiff Brandon Eller alleged the Idaho State Police (ISP) retaliated against him in two ways: (1) after he testified against another officer in a preliminary hearing; and (2) when he voiced objections to a new ISP policy requiring members of the Crash Reconstruction Unit to destroy draft and peer review reports. A jury awarded Eller $30,528.97 in economic damages under the Whistleblower Act and $1.5 million in non-economic damages for his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The district court then entered a memorandum decision and order reducing the award for Eller’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim to $1,000,000 because Idaho Code section 6-926 capped the State’s liability for actions brought under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) at $500,000 per occurrence. Both Eller and ISP timely appealed on several grounds, and their appeals were consolidated. After its review, the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court incorrectly applied the ITCA to Eller’s claim because the Whistleblower Act supplanted it. The district court’s rulings that the Whistleblower Act bars non-economic damage awards and that the ITCA caps Eller’s damages were vacated, and the matter remanded for a partial new trial regarding non-economic damages solely under the Whistleblower Act. View "Eller v. Idaho State Police" on Justia Law

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Kenco employed Madison as a quality engineer from May 13 until August 9, 2013. Kenco provided warehousing services to Mars, a global manufacturer of food products. Madison alleges that her discharge followed adverse employment actions Kenco took in retaliation for food safety concerns she had raised with her superiors. Following her discharge, Madison filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), seeking whistleblower protection. OSHA dismissed her complaint. In a de novo proceeding conducted at Madison’s request, an ALJ entered a summary decision against her. The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board dismissed her appeal as untimely. The Seventh Circuit denied her petition for review. Regardless of whether the agency’s mistake in directing the initial mailing of the ALJ’s decision to counsel’s former address amounts to an extraordinary circumstance which stood in the path of Madison’s pursuit of her rights, Madison cannot show that the Board abused its discretion in refusing to equitably toll the statutory appeals period long enough to deem her appeal timely. Subsequent events removed any obstacle that may have prevented her from filing a timely appeal. After a second mailing and email correspondence, Madison’s counsel could be expected in the exercise of due diligence to take action more quickly than he did. View "Madison v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

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This appeal presented an issue regarding the effect of Labor Code section 218.5 on a prevailing party employer’s right to recover contract-based attorney fees from an employee. In this case, Dane-Elec Corporation USA (Dane Corp.) prevailed against Nessim Bodokh, its former chief executive officer, on a complaint to recover on a promissory note and defeated Bodokh’s cross-complaint to recover allegedly unpaid wages. The trial court granted Dane Corp.’s motion to recover attorney fees based on an attorney fees provision in the promissory note. The court found that Bodokh had not brought the wage claim in bad faith and declined to award Dane Corp. attorney fees incurred solely in connection with the wage claim. But the court awarded Dane Corp. attorney fees incurred in defending Bodokh’s wage claim that were inextricably intertwined with the contract claim. Bodokh appealed from the judgment and the order granting Dane Corp.’s motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting Dane Corp.’s motion for attorney fees and remanded. Based on its holding, the Court concluded that under section 218.5(a) Dane Corp. could not recover attorney fees to the extent the wage claim and the breach of contract claim were inextricably intertwined. The matter was remanded for the trial court to recalculate the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Dane Corp. View "Dane-Elec Corp. v. Bodokh" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court holding that a copy of a petition for judicial review sent by email to opposing counsel failed to comply with Iowa Code 17A.19(2), which imposes a jurisdictional requirement for the petitioner in an action for judicial review to timely mail a copy of the petition to attorneys for all the parties in the case, holding that emailing between attorneys in Iowa satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of the statute.Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review after the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner issued a decision in a contested case proceeding against Loyd Ruling Construction. Loyd Roling filed a motion to dismiss the petition for judicial review, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Petitioner's attorney did not mail the copy of the petition through the postal system until more than ten days after the petition was filed, as required by section 17A.19(2). The district court agreed and dismissed the petition, concluding that electronic mailing did not constitute substantial compliance with the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the service requirement under the statute is satisfied when a lawyer emails a copy of the petition to opposing counsel. View "Ortiz v. Loyd Roling Construction" on Justia Law

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Claimant Catherine Sheldon injured her shoulder after falling in the lobby of the office building where she worked. Claimant contended she suffered a compensable injury that arose out of employment because her fall was unexplained and occurred at work. Employer, US Bank, contended the injury was not unexplained because claimant failed to eliminate idiopathic factors related to her personal medical conditions that might have caused her fall. The Workers’ Compensation Board (the board) concluded claimant failed to establish that her fall was unexplained. The Court of Appeals held that the board applied the wrong standard, vacated the board’s decision, and remanded the case to the board to apply the standard in the manner directed by that court. Although the Oregon Supreme Court disagreed with the standard expressed by the Court of Appeals, it nevertheless reached the same result, therefore affirming the Court of Appeals, vacating the board’s decision, and remanding the case to the board. View "Sheldon v. US Bank" on Justia Law

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Roberts sued City Colleges of Chicago following his termination as director of medical programs at Malcolm X College, alleging retaliatory discharge, violation of section 20 of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/20), and wrongful termination. City Colleges gave no reason for his termination, which followed his complaints about the use of unqualified instructors. The circuit court dismissed the retaliatory discharge and Whistleblower Act counts with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s Whistleblower Act claim but reversed the dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the Whistleblower Act claim but reinstated the dismissal of the retaliatory discharge claim. Roberts did not establish that his termination violated a clearly mandated public policy; he failed to allege sufficient facts to conclude that the use of the instructors put federal funding at risk. Section 20 of the Whistleblower Act requires that an employee refuse to participate “in an activity that would result in a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” The complaint lacked sufficient facts to conclude that appointment of the instructors violated the standards of a recognized accrediting agency or misrepresented the nature of its educational program or employability of its students. View "Roberts v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, Jane and her parents, sued two individuals and several entities including and affiliated with the United Church of Christ (UCC) after Jane was sexually assaulted by a youth pastor. Plaintiffs alleged that the First Congregational Church of Dundee (FCCD) and its pastor, James, negligently and willfully and wantonly hired, supervised, and retained FCCD’s director of youth ministries, Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice. All counts of the second amended complaint were dismissed as against FCCD and James. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the striking of portions of the plaintiffs’ complaint but reinstated all counts of the complaint. The stricken statements concerned FCCD’s and James’s post-assault actions, which do not support plaintiffs’ claims of an ongoing conscious disregard for Jane’s welfare or a pattern of conduct prior to the assault nor do they make it more likely or less likely that they acted negligently before the assault. The negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention counts were reinstated, as were the willful and wanton counts inasmuch as they overlap with the negligent supervision counts but not to the extent they overlap with the negligent retention counts. View "Doe v. Coe" on Justia Law

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Once a jury has evaluated witness credibility, weighed evidence, and reached a verdict, a litigant seeking to overturn that verdict faces a steep hurdle. Plaintiff filed suit against TWC, alleging that the company fired her based on illegal age discrimination. The jury found in favor of plaintiff and the district court denied TWC's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and the district court managed the proceedings fairly. View "Westmoreland v. TWC Administration LLC" on Justia Law