Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee v. City of Cranston
In this appeal concerned two City of Cranston ordinances that promulgated a ten-year suspension of the cost-of-living adjustment benefit for retirees of the Cranston Police Department and Cranston Fire Department who were enrolled in the City's pension plan the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court finding in favor of Defendants, holding that the superior court did not err in its judgment.The Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee (Plaintiff) brought this action against the City, Mayor Allan Fung, and members of the Cranston City Council (collectively, Defendants) alleging claims ranging from constitutional violations to statutory infringements. A superior court justice found in favor of Defendants on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court justice did not err by (1) finding that the ordinances did not violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions; (2) applying the burden of proof in the Contract Clause analysis; (3) applying expert testimony; (4) granting summary judgment for the City as to Takings Clause, res judicata, and Rhode Island Open Meetings Act claims; and (5) ruling on an assortment of motions and in her findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee v. City of Cranston" on Justia Law
Colo. Dept. of Labor & Emp. Div. of Workers’ Comp. v. Dami Hosp.
Dami Hospitality, LLC (“Dami”) was the owner-operator of a Denver motel that employed between four and ten people at any given time. As an employer of three or more persons, Dami was required by statute to maintain workers’ compensation insurance. Dami allowed its workers’ compensation coverage to lapse on in 2005. Upon receiving notification of the lapse from the Division of Workers’ Compensation (“DWC”), Dami conceded the violation and paid a corresponding settlement in June 2006. Dami again allowed its workers’ compensation coverage to lapse in 2006. From June 2007 to September 2010, Dami carried the proper insurance, but the company’s workers’ compensation coverage again lapsed on September 12, 2010 and went without insurance until July 9, 2014. On February 19, 2014, the DWC discovered that Dami had allowed its workers’ compensation insurance to lapse for these periods of time and issued a notice to Dami regarding this. Dami faxed a copy of workers' compensation insurance for the July 10, 2014 - July 10, 2015 period; Dami offered no such evidence for any other period, nor any explanation for the lapses. Fines accrued for noncompliance, totaling $841,200. The DWC ultimately issued an order upholding the fines. Dami appealed to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (“ICAO”). The ICAO rejected all but Dami’s excessive fines argument. The ICAO remanded the matter to the DWC, directing it to review the constitutionality of the aggregated per diem fines assessed in accordance with the test established by the court of appeals in Associated Business Products v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 126 P.3d 323 (Colo. App. 2005). The ICAO would ultimately affirm the resulting fines, and Dami appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court set aside the fines, assuming, without deciding, the Excessive Fines Clause could be applied to challenge regulatory fees imposed on a corporation. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the proper test to assess the constitutionality of government fines under the Eighth Amendment required an assessment of whether the fine was grossly disproportional to the offense for which it was imposed. The Supreme Court thus reversed the court of appeals’ ruling and remanded to that court for return to the Division of Workers’ Compensation with instructions to, as appropriate and necessary, develop an evidentiary record sufficient to determine whether the $250–$500 fine that a business was required to pay for each day that it was out of compliance with Colorado’s workers’ compensation law is proportional to the harm or risk of harm caused by each day of noncompliance. View "Colo. Dept. of Labor & Emp. Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Dami Hosp." on Justia Law
Garcia-Solis v. Farmers Ins. Co.
Claimant Elvia Garcia-Solis was injured in a work-related accident. Farmers Insurance Company and Yeaun Corporation (collectively, “Insurer”) accepted a workers’ compensation claim and certain specified medical conditions associated with the accident. Because claimant also showed psychological symptoms, her doctor recommended a psychological referral to diagnose her for possible post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Insurer argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the cost of the psychological referral was not covered by workers’ compensation because claimant had failed to prove that it was related to any of the medical conditions that insurer had accepted. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed both the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board: “’injury’ means work accident is context-specific to exactly two uses in the first and second sentences of ORS 656.245(1)(a). It does not apply to the second use in the first sentence of ORS 656.245(1)(a). We do not decide or suggest that it applies to any other statute in the workers’ compensation system.” View "Garcia-Solis v. Farmers Ins. Co." on Justia Law
NLRB v. Anderson Excavating
The Board sought enforcement of it its order finding that Anderson violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), by failing to make contractually mandated contributions to the CLT&E Funds and the union. The Eighth Circuit granted the Board's application for enforcement of its order and denied Anderson's petition for review. The court held that the union's 2015 unfair labor practice charge was timely.The court also held that the record did not support Anderson's argument that the deposition testimony at issue served as the basis for the charge. Rather, the Board found that even without relying on the depositions, the record established that Anderson violated section 8(a)(5) by withdrawing recognition from the union and by repudiating the terms of the 2014-2018 Heavy Highway Agreement. Finally, the court rejected Anderson's argument that the Board erred in failing to find that the union induced its failure to pay in May 2015. View "NLRB v. Anderson Excavating" on Justia Law
Kendzierski v. Macomb County.
This case was a class action brought on behalf of approximately 1600 unionized Macomb County, Michigan employee retirees who worked for defendant Macomb County under various CBAs dating back to 1989. Plaintiffs claimed that in 2009 and 2010, defendant breached these agreements by reducing and altering their healthcare benefits. Plaintiffs sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief. It was undisputed that each CBA contained an express three-year durational provision and that none of the CBAs contained a provision expressly granting a vested right to lifetime and unalterable retirement healthcare benefits. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that while plaintiffs were entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits under the agreements, defendant was permitted to make reasonable modifications to those benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that while plaintiffs were entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits, those benefits could not be modified absent plaintiffs’ consent. The Michigan Supreme Court determined after review of the CBAs at issue the agreements did not grant plaintiffs a vested right to lifetime and unalterable benefits. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded to the circuit court for entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant. View "Kendzierski v. Macomb County." on Justia Law
Milligan v. Singer
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss a claim brought under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act (AWBA) and dismissed the complaint, holding that the complaint was barred by the State's sovereign immunity.Plaintiff, who had worked in the office of the Arkansas Treasurer of State before he was terminated, filed a complaint against Defendant, the treasurer, in his official capacity, alleging a violation of the AWBA. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint was barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to the Court's decision in Arkansas Community Correction v. Barnes, 542 S.W.3d 841 (Ark. 2018), the purported legislative waiver of the State's sovereign immunity in the AWBA is unconstitutional; and (2) the complaint in this case was barred by sovereign immunity. View "Milligan v. Singer" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Arkansas Supreme Court, Labor & Employment Law
Weil v. Metal Technologies, Inc.
Metal Technologies (MT), a Bloomfield, Indiana manufacturer of automobile parts, employs around 500 workers. Plaintiffs filed class and collective actions against MT, alleging violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Indiana wage laws. They argued that MT unlawfully paid employees only for the hours that they were scheduled to work even when employees’ timestamps showed that they were clocked in for longer than that. The district court conditionally certified—but later decertified—those claims. After decertification, the plaintiffs proceeded in their individual capacities and secured a very modest award. They also contended that MT withheld wages from employees’ paychecks for uniform rentals; Indiana law authorized withholding only for uniform purchases. The district court entered judgment for the class on those claims. While appeal was pending, Indiana amended its law to authorize withholding for uniform rentals and made that amendment retroactive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decertification order but vacated and remanded for reconsideration of the wage-deduction claim in light of the new law, which will likely also require recalculation of attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that employees were actually working without compensation, not simply that they were clocked in for over 40 hours, and lacked proof of any injury. View "Weil v. Metal Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law
Bennett v. Rancho Cal. Water Dist.
Plaintiff Shawn Bennett sued defendant Rancho California Water District (the District) for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5(b). The matter was tried in front of a jury, and the trial court excluded evidence showing Bennett’s relationship with the District was anything other than an employment relationship. Citing an administrative law judge’s prior finding Bennett had been the District’s employee for purposes of retirement benefits eligibility through the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the trial court concluded the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied and established Bennett had been the District’s employee. To this, the Court of Appeal reversed for a new trial. The Court held a party was not collaterally estopped from litigating an issue when, in a prior proceeding, a dispositive finding had been made, but only by imposing a lesser burden of proof on the party invoking collateral estoppel than that which would have been applied in the subsequent proceeding. The Court found in the prior CalPERS proceeding, the administrative law judge expressly assigned to the District the burden of proving Bennett had been its independent contractor and thereby entirely relieved Bennett of the burden of proof on that issue. The trial court therefore erred by finding the doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable and precluding litigation of Bennett’s employment status. At the retrial, the common law definition of employee will apply to Bennett’s section 1102.5(b) claim. View "Bennett v. Rancho Cal. Water Dist." on Justia Law
Oseland v. Crow Wing County
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirming in part and reversing in part the workers' compensation judge's determination that the heirs of relator Richard Island were entitled to interest from Auto-Owners Insurance Group on underpaid disability benefits but that neither penalties nor expenses were warranted, holding that the compensation judge's determinations were supported by substantial evidence.On appeal, the WCCA affirmed the compensation judge's denial of penalties and expenses but reversed the award of interest from the date of each underpayment of disability benefits, concluding that the heirs were not entitled to interest. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the underpaid benefits must bear interest from the date of each underpayment, and the interest owed under Minn. Stat. 176.221, subd. 7 accrued at the statutory rate in effect at the time the payment was due; and (2) the compensation judge's determinations regarding penalties and expenses were supported by substantial evidence. View "Oseland v. Crow Wing County" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law, Minnesota Supreme Court
Nunez v. Nevell Group, Inc.
Nevell Group, Inc. (Nevell) filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claims filed against it by former employee Xavier Nunez. Nevell and the union to which Nunez belonged were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that provided for arbitration of alleged violations of the relevant wage order. The trial court denied the motion based on Nevell’s waiver of its right to compel arbitration, Nevell’s delay in filing its motion, and the prejudice Nunez would suffer if the motion were to be granted. The Court of Appeal agreed: Nevell explicitly waived any right to compel arbitration by advising the trial court in writing that it would not file a motion to compel. Nevell also impliedly waived arbitration by permitting two court-ordered deadlines, by which it was to have filed a motion to compel, to pass, and by engaging in significant discovery and other litigation activities inconsistent with the right to arbitration. The Court determined Nunez would suffer prejudice if Nevell’s motion to compel arbitration were granted at this point because Nevell’s delay in seeking to compel arbitration unnecessarily extended the time the case was pending and caused Nunez to expend resources on litigation activities inconsistent with arbitration, such as class-based discovery, the preparation of a demand package based on a class action, and preparing and serving notice to the putative class members. View "Nunez v. Nevell Group, Inc." on Justia Law