Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of an unemployment law judge upholding the determination of the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development that the wages Appellant paid to workers who hold H-2A and J-1 visas are subject to unemployment insurance taxation, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Appellant owed the taxes.Appellant, a corporation that grows and sells fruits and vegetables, began hiring H-2A and J-1 nonimmigrant visa holders in 2010. In 2016, the Department of Employment and Economic Development determined that Appellant owed $154,726 in unpaid unemployment insurance taxes, mostly on the wages of the H-2A and J-1 visa workers. An unemployment judge upheld the determination, concluding that the visa workers' wages were subject to unemployment insurance taxation under Minnesota law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant must pay unemployment insurance taxes on these workers' wages. View "Svihel Vegetable Farm, Inc. v. Department of Employment & Economic Development" on Justia Law

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The Department sought interlocutory review of the district court's decision that the state waived Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims under Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA). The Fourth Circuit exercised its jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and held that the state has not waived the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. In this case, the state did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to plaintiff's FEPA claims through a statutory consent to suit provision in Md. Code. Servs. 20-903. In the absence of the state's express consent to suit in federal court, the Department was entitled to the protection of the Eleventh Amendment with respect to the FEPA claims. View "Pense v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services" on Justia Law

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Christopher Ross appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the County of Riverside on Ross's claims for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 and for violation of the provisions in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA) prohibiting disability discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to prevent disability discrimination. Ross worked for the County as a deputy district attorney. He sought an accommodation with his work schedule based on a concussion syndrome he was experiencing from previous work in the Military. Supervisors there did not oblige, and Ross sued for violations of the Labor Code section 1102.5, but it was determined he could not establish his claim for disability discrimination because he could not prove he could perform the essential functions of his job. He could not establish his claim for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for the same reasons as well as because he could not prove he had any functional limitations requiring accommodation and his requested accommodation was not reasonable. He could not establish his claim for failure to engage in the interactive process because he did not interact in good faith. And, he could not establish his claim for failure to prevent disability discrimination because he could establish his claims for disability discrimination. Because the Court of Appeal concluded there were triable issues of material fact of the questions of whether Ross engaged in protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5 and whether Ross had a physical disability under the FEHA, it reversed the judgment as to these claims and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Ross v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

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In this work injury discrimination case the Supreme Court held that in order for business necessity to constitute a valid defense to a claim of work injury discrimination, an employer must demonstrate that the employee's absence caused a business impairment that could not be reasonably alleviated by means that would not result in discrimination.The Supreme Court vacated the judgment the intermediate court of appeals' judgment on appeal and the judgment of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Director of the Hawai'i Department of Labor and Industrial Relations that the work injury discrimination in this case was contravened by Hawaii law, holding that the decision of the hearing officer that the employer in this case discriminated against the employee solely because of her work injury should have been affirmed. View "BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, Inc. v. Murakami" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against Canada for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that Canada was immune from the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq., holding that the FSIA did not prohibit Plaintiff's suit.Plaintiff, who was injured in the course of her employment at the Canadian consulate in Boston, Massachusetts, sued Canada for damages in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pursuant to the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Act, Mass. Gen. Laws chapter 152. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was not barred by FSIA. View "Merlini v. Canada" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, former Safeway employees, appealed the trial court's judgment against them on two causes of action under the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The Court of Appeal affirmed and held that the trial court properly granted Safeway summary adjudication on the UCL claim because plaintiffs failed to submit evidence raising a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Safeway's no-premium-wages policy harmed the class members in a manner entitling them to the only UCL remedy plaintiff's sought, viz., restitution. Furthermore, even assuming plaintiffs raised a triable issue regarding whether Safeway took from the class members the value of the statutory guarantee, they failed to raise a triable issue regarding their ability to measure that value. The court also held that the trial court properly struck the PAGA claim because it was untimely. View "Esparza v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by airline pilots, seeking damages under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). Plaintiffs alleged that their employer colluded with a union in the union's breach of its duty of fair representation.The panel held that, under the RLA, employees can hold their union liable for breaching its duty of fair representation during collective bargaining. The panel held, however, that the RLA does not support the imposition of liability on an employer solely for its "collusion" in the union's breach of duty. In this case, plaintiffs did not claim that their employer breached its own obligations under a collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the only identifiable breach in this case was USAPA's breach of its duty of fair representation. View "Beckington v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

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Newton worked on drilling platforms off the California coast. Newton was paid for his time on duty but not for his time on standby, during which he could not leave the platform. Newton filed a class action, alleging that California laws required compensation for standby time. The platforms were subject to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which provides that all law on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is federal law; denies states any interest in or jurisdiction over the OCS; and deems the adjacent state’s laws to be federal law only “[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” federal law, 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2)(A). A unanimous Supreme Court vacated a Ninth Circuit decision in favor of Newton. Where federal law addresses the relevant issue, state law is not adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS. The Court rejected Newton's proposed pre-emption analysis; federal law is the only law on the OCS and there is no overlapping state and federal jurisdiction, so the reference to “not inconsistent” state laws presents only the question whether federal law has already addressed the issue. If so, state law on the issue is inapplicable. Some of Newton’s claims are premised on California law requiring payment for all standby time but federal law already addresses that issue. To the extent his OCS-based claims rely on California’s minimum wage, the Fair Labor Standards Act already provides for a minimum wage. View "Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton" on Justia Law

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Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 276 and its president, Alan Wagner (collectively, the Union) brought this mandamus petition against the San Joaquin Regional Transit District (the District), alleging the Union had the right to fill by appointment a vacancy on the District’s retirement board, to ensure labor-management parity, as the Union claimed was required by Public Utilities Code section 99159 (or the San Joaquin Regional Transit District Act). The District proposed to conduct an election by all employees (not only union members) to fill the vacancy, claiming that process was required by an earlier statute, section 50150. The trial court denied the petition and the Union timely appealed. After hearing oral argument, the Court of Appeal vacated submission and ordered supplemental briefing, reserving the option to order further argument if we deemed it necessary. After considering all the briefing and argument, the Court found the Union’s position more persuasive, harmonizing the two statutes, avoiding any constitutional question, and was in accord with the use of the term “representative” in federal labor law and the long-standing practice of the parties--the only parties affected by the two statutes. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Amalgamated Transit Union v. San Joaquin Reg. Transit Dist." on Justia Law

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After Booth started working at a Tennessee Nissan factory, he injured his neck and sought medical treatment. Booth’s physician recommended several work restrictions, including that he not reach above his head or flex his neck too much. Booth. continued to work on the assembly line for about a decade without incident. In 2015, Booth requested a transfer to another position in the factory, which Nissan denied because that position’s duties conflicted with Booth’s work restrictions. Booth claimed that Nissan’s denial was disability discrimination that violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. Nissan then announced plans to restructure the assembly line. Booth alleged that two additional jobs Nissan assigned to him as part of the restructuring would have violated his work restrictions, When he informed Nissan about this conflict, Nissan told him to see a physician. Booth’s physician modified the restrictions, clearing him to work the new jobs. Although Booth remains a Nissan employee, he claimed that Nissan failed to accommodate him—a separate ADA violation—by pressuring him to remove his work restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Nissan. To sue under the ADA, the plaintiff must be disabled; just because a plaintiff has work restrictions does not mean that he is disabled. Booth has not advanced evidence that he is disabled. View "Booth v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law