Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Horner v. American Airlines, Inc.
This action arose from a dispute over the integration of former TWA pilots into American Airlines' pilot seniority lists. Former TWA pilots filed suit against American and its union under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), seeking to vacate an arbitration award and enjoin its implementation.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that former TWA pilots lacked standing to challenge the arbitration award. The court held that Mitchell v. Continental Airlines was controlling in this case and that an individual grievant generally lacks standing to challenge the results of a binding arbitration process where a union has the sole authority to compel arbitration under a CBA formed pursuant to the RLA. The court also held that, to the extent the union permitted modifications to the CBA's grievance and arbitration proceedings, this was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or evidence of bad faith. View "Horner v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law
Mollet v. City of Greenfield
Firefighter Mollet became a battalion chief in 2009. His relationships with chief Cohn and assistant chief Weber were strained. One night, firefighter Hernandez forgot to stow his gear. Other firefighters displayed the items and posted a paper sign with a Mexican flag and the words “Border Patrol.” Hernandez did not file a complaint but another firefighter reported it. Mollet emailed Cohn and Weber, who agreed “that this crosses the line of firehouse hazing” and asked Mollet to investigate. Four individuals were eventually disciplined. In the following months, Cohn and Weber were critical of Mollet’s performance on multiple occasions and stated that he might be demoted or reassigned. Mollet received an offer of employment from another department. Cohn and Weber indicated that he would be demoted if he did not take that position. Mollet told Weber he was going to accept the offer, which was contingent upon his passing a physical and psychological exam. Cohn sent a letter accepting Mollet’s resignation; Mollet responded he would not resign until the contingencies were met. Cohn responded that Mollet’s employment had terminated. Mollet was placed on paid leave until he submitted his resignation and began his new employment. Mollet filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging he was retaliated against for opposing workplace discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the claim; no reasonable trier of fact could find that reporting the Hernandez incident was the but-for cause of Mollet’s constructive discharge. View "Mollet v. City of Greenfield" on Justia Law
Charleston v. McCarthy
Plaintiff filed suit against the sheriff and several other county employees, alleging various claims related to the treatment plaintiff asserted he suffered as a result of his political beliefs and associations. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the sheriff on the First Amendment discrimination and retaliation claims. The court held that both claims suffered from the same fatal flaw because they lacked an adverse employment action. In this case, none of the complained-of actions, either together or separately, constitute an adverse employment action. View "Charleston v. McCarthy" on Justia Law
National Education Ass’n Rhode Island v. Town of Middletown
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the grounds that the case was moot, holding that there was no justiciable controversy before the Court and that Plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that the issues raised in their complaint were of extreme public importance and were capable of repetition yet will evade review.After the National Education Association Rhode Island and the Middletown Teachers' Association/NEA (collectively, the Union) and the Middletown School Committee (school committee) reached a tentative successor agreement to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was due to expire the Town of Middletown refused to ratify the agreement. The Union filed suit challenging the denial. Thereafter, the parties agreed to a new three-year CBA, and the Town voted to ratify the agreement. The trial justice granted summary judgment for Defendants, the Town, the school committee, and the Middletown School Department. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in granting summary judgment on the basis of mootness and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine existed. View "National Education Ass'n Rhode Island v. Town of Middletown" on Justia Law
Jordan v. New York City Housing Authority
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court holding that the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) violated section 71 of the Civil Service Law by refusing to reinstate Petitioner to her labor class caretaker position after terminating her, holding that Petitioner did not fall with the ambit of N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 71, a provision governing reinstatement of public sector employees injured on the job.Petitioner's petition fell within the "labor class" - one of four classifications under New York's Civil Service Law - which includes "all unskilled laborers" in the State's service. NYCHA terminated Petitioner after she missed more than one year of work due to a disability. Petitioner requested reinstatement, but NYCHA refused. Petitioner then filed this action. Supreme Court granted the petition as against NYCHA, concluding that the plain language of section 71 did not exclude labor class employees. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that NYCHA did not violate section 71 when it refused to reinstate Petitioner. View "Jordan v. New York City Housing Authority" on Justia Law
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Labor & Employment Law, New York Court of Appeals
Teco/Perry County Coal v. Feltner
The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the opinion of the court of appeals holding that the section of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.7305 treating hearing loss workers' compensation claimants differently from other types of traumatic injury claimants violated constitutional equal protection guarantees, holding that a rational basis existed for the unequal treatment.Under section 342.7305, workers' compensation claimants suffering hearing loss may not receive income benefits unless their whole person impairment rating is at least eight percent, but other types of non-hearing loss traumatic injury claimants need not meet this threshold impairment rating to qualify for income benefits. The court of appeals held that section 342.7305(2) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the ALJ's determinations that the claimants in this case did not qualify for income benefits based on their impairment ratings, holding that a rational basis existed for the eight percent impairment threshold for income benefits. View "Teco/Perry County Coal v. Feltner" on Justia Law
Letcher County Board of Education v. Hall
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board reversing the determination of an administrative law judge (ALJ) denying Roger Hall's claim for benefits pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. chapter 342, holding that the ALJ erred by finding that Hall's claim was barred under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316(4)(a).Hall developed mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos over the course of his employment. Hall brought a claim for benefits. The ALJ denied the claim, concluding that Hall's mesothelioma was caused by his exposure to asbestos during the course of employment but that his claim was untimely filed pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.316(4)(a). The Board reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence compelled reversal of the ALJ's order. View "Letcher County Board of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law
Marshall v. Montaplast of North America, Inc.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in favor of Employer on Employee's complaint alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint.Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for informing other workers that one of their supervisors was a registered sex offender or, at the least, that this was a substantial motivating factor in her termination. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act establishes a public policy that the sex offender registry should be open and accessible to the public at large. The circuit court granted Employer's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even if a right to disseminate information from the sex offender registry existed to prevent termination for that dissemination, the dissemination would need to be effectuated in a manner consistent with appropriate workplace behavior and decorum. View "Marshall v. Montaplast of North America, Inc." on Justia Law
Richardson v. Chicago Transit Authority
Richardson began working for CTA in 1993. Richardson weighed 350 pounds in January 2005 and weighed 566 pounds in May 2009. Richardson suffers from hypertension and sleep apnea. In 2010, Richardson was absent from work because he had the flu. CTA’s medical provider documented that could not return to work until he controlled his blood pressure. CTA transferred Richardson to Temporary Medical Disability. When Richardson was physically fit to work, he had to be cleared for safety because CTA bus seats are not designed for drivers weighing over 400 pounds. Assessment instructors noted that: Richardson had his foot on the gas and brake at the same time; Richardson was unable to make hand-over-hand turns; Richardson’s leg rested close to the door handle; Richardson could not see the floor from his seat; part of Richardson’s body hung off his seat and the seat deflated when Richardson sat. Richardson was “sweating heavily,” needed to lean onto the bus for balance, and had a “hygiene problem.” CTA proposed to return Richardson to disability to work with doctors to lose weight; Richardson would release his ability to bring various claims. Richardson refused. In 2012, CTA terminated his employment. The district court rejected Richardson’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; extreme obesity only qualifies as a disability under the ADA if it is caused by an underlying physiological disorder or condition. Richardson offered no such evidence. View "Richardson v. Chicago Transit Authority" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Gallagher Bassett Services v. Honorable Carrie Webster
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss and remanded this case to the circuit court for the entry of an order dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, holding that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendant.Plaintiff was injured while working for Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. and was subsequently terminated. Defendant, Old Dominion's third-party claims administrator, denied Plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits on behalf of Old Dominion. Plaintiff sued Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims, but the circuit court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion for a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers when it refused to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendant. View "State ex rel. Gallagher Bassett Services v. Honorable Carrie Webster" on Justia Law