Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Union Pacific in an action brought by plaintiff against the employer, alleging disparate treatment and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff suffered from chronic back pain and wanted to take time off as necessary and to receive 24 hours of rest per shift (between shifts).The court held that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, because job attendance is an essential function of a Union Pacific Locomotive Engineer and plaintiff could not perform this essential function with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Higgins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, a food services and facilities company, in three individual cases brought by employees of the company, holding that Plaintiffs' individual claims alleging violations of the Massachusetts Tips Act failed.Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendant for alleged violations of the Massachusetts Tips Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A, and then moved for class certification. The district court denied the motion for lack of sufficient commonality and typicality. Three individual plaintiffs' cases proceeded to summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant's actions were protected under the safe harbor provision of the Tips Act. The First Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment without reaching the merits of the class certification issue, holding that Plaintiffs' claims did not warrant relief. View "Lazo v. Sodexo, Inc." on Justia Law

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In December 2014, Arctic hired Graham as its maintenance supervisor. Arctic soon received customer complaints about his attitude and noticed his insubordination and difficulty completing tasks on time. In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did not work until May and received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to work with medical restrictions requiring that he work sitting down. Arctic assigned Graham to skate sharpening. Graham maintains that the task requires standing but did not inform Arctic of his belief that skate sharpening did not meet his restrictions. When Graham transitioned back to full-time work. Arctic assigned him to work evenings because of seasonal need. Graham characterized this as a “demotion.” In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arctic claimed that Graham created a hazard to its customers and fired Graham, citing his poor attitude about his position; poor attitude toward customers; lack of timeliness; insubordination; and the Zamboni accident, which caused Arctic to lose revenue. Graham sued, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, by failure to reasonably accommodate his disability and by his termination based on disability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Arctic. If an employee does not provide sufficient information to determine the necessary accommodations, the employer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the disabled employee. Graham did not provide enough evidence to support an inference of bad faith in his termination. View "Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Ford on plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Plaintiff, born without a left forearm and hand, applied for an entry-level assembler position at Ford's assembly plant.The court held that the district court did not err by using the broad-range-of-jobs standard because this case only involved the major life activity of working or employment; the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiff had not satisfied the broad-range-of jobs standard because Ford considered him permanently restricted from a single, particular job he applied for; plaintiff waived his argument regarding direct evidence of discrimination; and therefore plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the MHRA failed, because plaintiff failed to show that Ford regarded him as having a disability. Finally, the court declined to consider the retaliation claim on appeal. View "Heuton v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion when it found that Alfredo Pacheco was medically able to perform light-duty work offered by his employer, Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) but reversed the conclusion that Alcoa did not make the light-duty job offer in good faith, holding that the court of appeals should not have determined whether the job was offered in good faith.Pacheco sustained an injury while working for Alcoa and received temporary total disability (TTD) compensation for approximately one year. Thereafter, Alcoa offered Pacheco light-duty employment. Pacheco accepted the offer and worked in the light-duty position for three weeks. Pacheco then submitted a renewed request for TTD compensation, which Alcoa denied. The Commission denied the request for TTD compensation based on a finding that the light-duty job was within Pacheco's medical restrictions. The court of appeals concluded that the evidence supported the Commission's finding but also concluded that the job offered by Alcoa was not offered in good faith. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that where the Commission did not address the question of whether the light-duty job offer was made in good faith, the court of appeals should not have made that determination. View "State ex rel. Pacheco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, on summary judgment, of plaintiff's claims of interference and retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court held that SCS had a good-faith reason for plaintiff's termination. In this case, SCS adhered to company policy in firing plaintiff after he had refused to conduct himself professionally and had delayed reporting a safety concern. View "Tatum v. Southern Company Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit denied Wood Group's petition for review of the Board's conclusion that Wood Group's employee satisfied the situs and status requirements for coverage under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. In this case, the employee was injured while unloading a vessel on a platform customarily used for that task.The court held that the Board correctly applied the plain language of the Act and affirmed its conclusion that the employee met the situs requirement. Furthermore, because the employee's injury occurred when he was loading/unloading a vessel, and because he regularly loaded/unloaded vessels, the status requirement was satisfied. View "Wood Group Production Services v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 425.16, cannot be used to judicially screen claims alleging discriminatory or retaliatory employment actions, holding that the statute contains no exception for discrimination or retaliation claims.Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, his employer, ultimately fired him for unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory reasons. Defendant, a news organization, filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiff had not shown any of his claims had minimal merit. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that discrimination and retaliation do not qualify as protected activity, and therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) in cases alleging discrimination or retaliation claims in the employment context, the plaintiff's allegations about the defendant's invidious motives will not shield the claim from the same preliminary screening for minimal merit that would apply to any other claim arising from protected activity; and (2) Defendant showed that Plaintiff's claims arose in limited part from protected activity, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to a determination of whether those limited portions of Plaintiff's claims had sufficient potential merit to proceed. View "Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc." on Justia Law

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Smith worked at the General Services Administration for nearly 30 years before GSA removed him. For most of his career, he received positive evaluations and faced no discipline. When Smith began to complain about GSA’s ineffective collection and management practices, his supervisor warned him to communicate his concerns only to his supervisor. He was eventually suspended for failure to follow that instruction and his relationship with his supervisor deteriorated. Smith was also disciplined for disrespect toward his supervisor and failing to remove his computer access card from his laptop, although Smith, a quadriplegic, was physically unable to remove the card. The Merit Systems Protection Board agreed that GSA retaliated against him for his repeated disclosure of gross mismanagement; Smith was a whistleblower, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8), and his protected disclosures contributed to the decision to remove him. The Board nevertheless upheld the removal. Without addressing evidence relevant to GSA’s motive to retaliate or its treatment of other similarly situated non-whistleblowers, the Board ruled that because GSA had strong evidence of misconduct, removal was justified. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board conflated two distinct inquiries: whether the penalty was reasonable and whether the agency would have imposed that same penalty absent Smith’s protected whistleblowing. Given Smith’s disability and his supervisors’ knowledge that he could not remove his computer access card, the GSA policy did not apply to him. View "Smith v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

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The DC Circuit denied a petition for review of the Board's findings, including the finding that Ingredion violated the National Labor Relations Act by dealing directly with employees and denigrating a union in the eyes of employees. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's factual finding that Ingredion engaged in direct dealing with employees; Ingredion misrepresented the union's position in a way that tended to cause employees to lose faith in the union; although the format of the new contract was a major issue, it did not create an overall impasse; Ingredion's delay in providing requested information was unreasonable; and Ingredion violated the Act when one of its managers made threats of job loss to employees. The court also held that Ingredion's contentions that the Board violated its due process rights and improperly imposed a notice-reading remedy lacked merit. In regard to the Board's remedial order, the court held that Ingredion was on notice and was therefore not denied due process. Furthermore, the Board had broad discretion in fashioning remedies for violations of the Act. View "NLRB v. Ingredion Inc." on Justia Law