Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Heisler v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Nationwide in an action brought by plaintiff, an employee of Nationwide, alleging discrimination against her on the basis of her sex and her age. The court held that plaintiff failed to show Nationwide's legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not selecting her for vacant positions and promotions were pretexts for age or gender bias. In this case, Nationwide's treatment of a younger male employee similarly to plaintiff was the clearest example of a record reflecting a displeased manager rather than discrimination based on age or gender. View "Heisler v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Cruz v. McAleenan
Plaintiff filed suit alleging that DHS engaged in discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment for DHS and denied plaintiff's motion to stay proceedings to allow for discovery.The DC Circuit held that the district court erroneously concluded that the evidence sought by plaintiff could not create a dispute of material fact as to whether DHS's proffered reasons for taking adverse action were pretextual. The court also held that summary judgment was inappropriate with respect to plaintiff's claim that her reassignment to the Resource Management Branch was retaliatory. However, summary judgment was appropriate with respect to DHS's initial decision to extend her detail, because plaintiff did not create a genuine dispute of material fact. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cruz v. McAleenan" on Justia Law
Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Hunt worked the overnight shift at a Wal-Mart store. Watson was her supervisor. After Watson made several unprofessional remarks toward Hunt over a four-month period, Watson wrote a disciplinary report on Hunt, who then filed a complaint with human resources. Watson had previously been twice accused of sexual harassment and received written “coaching.” A manager concluded Hunt’s claims could not be substantiated without corroborating witnesses but required Watson to retake the ethics training course. Hunt reported no incidents of harassment following the discipline. Wal-Mart investigated the claims but was unable to substantiate them. Hunt filed suit, alleging Watson sexually harassed her by creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At summary judgment, the district court held that Wal-Mart established the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense to liability because it reasonably prevented and corrected sexual harassment, and Hunt unreasonably delayed in reporting the harassment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The alleged conduct, while unacceptable, did not amount to constructive discharge. Wal-Mart acted as a reasonable employer. It promulgated a comprehensive sexual harassment policy, trained its employees, maintained an effective reporting system, expeditiously investigated Hunt’s complaint, communicated its zero-tolerance policy, and retrained Watson even though the investigation failed to substantiate the allegations against him. View "Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law
Stepp v. Covance Central Laboratory Services, Inc.
Stepp sued his former employer, Covance, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3, by refusing to hire him permanently in retaliation for his earlier complaints about discrimination. Stepp received positive performance reviews in his first nine months. Two of Stepp’s temporary coworkers were made permanent around their nine-month anniversary. While a temporary worker, Stepp, an African-American male, complained that Casteel, his team leader, treated female and white employees better than male and African-American employees and confronted Casteel directly. A manager investigated Stepp’s complaints but found them baseless. Stepp filed formal charges with the EEOC Casteel complained to Ball, a supervisor, that Stepp often stared at him, shook his head, smirked, and said “uh oh.” Shortly thereafter, with Stepp still in temporary status, Covance froze new hires in his department. Stepp asked Ball if Covance did not give him permanent status before the freeze because Casteel had complained about him; she responded “yes.” Stepp’s one-year term as a temporary worker ended soon after. Grubb, a human resources partner, planned to give a 90-day extension to temporary workers whose terms ended near the December holidays but Covance advised him that a 90-day extension was too long, so he shortened the extensions. The Seventh Circuit vacated a judgment in favor of Covance. A reasonable jury could conclude that Covance refused to promote Stepp to permanent status because of his complaints. View "Stepp v. Covance Central Laboratory Services, Inc." on Justia Law
McPherson v. City of Scottsbluff
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the City of Scottsbluff, Nebraska and dismissing Plaintiff's claim of discrimination and retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), holding that the City was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff, a former police officer for the City, was terminated when he refused to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination (FFDE). Plaintiff brought this action alleging discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the City could lawfully require Plaintiff to undergo an FFDE under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1107.02(1)(j); and (2) because Plaintiff alleged that the City retaliated against him for expressing disapproval of his fellow employees' actions, as to his employer's actions, there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff engaged in protected activity pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(3). View "McPherson v. City of Scottsbluff" on Justia Law
Lovelace v. Washington University School of Medicine
Plaintiff filed suit against her employees, alleging that they unlawfully terminated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Plaintiff's husband filed suit for loss of consortium.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not err in granting defendants summary judgment on the FMLA claim, because plaintiff's use of FMLA leave some half-year prior to her termination was insufficient to show her termination was an act of discrimination. The court also held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on the MHRA claim, because plaintiff could not have had a reasonable good faith belief that the conduct she opposed had constituted disability discrimination in violation of the MHRA. For purposes of the MHRA, accusing an employee of racism does not constitute racial discrimination. Furthermore, evidence of general temporary work restrictions, without more, was insufficient to constitute a disability. Finally, the loss of consortium claim was properly dismissed. View "Lovelace v. Washington University School of Medicine" on Justia Law
Severson & Werson v. Sephery-Fard
The law firm filed a Petition for Workplace Violence Restraining Orders, identifying 14 lawsuits in which its employees had been involved with Sepehry-Fard, and citing several incidents involving false allegations and threats. The firm alleged that Sepehry-Fard is a member of the “sovereign citizen movement,” whose members believe they don’t answer to governmental authority; they have been known to commit murder and physical assault. The court granted specific temporary protective orders pending the hearing, without notice to Sepehry-Fard, and set the hearing for September 5. On the Notice of Court Hearing, the court indicated the firm had to have the petition and associated documents personally served on Sepehry-Fard at least five days before the hearing. While the form permitted the firm to ask for less than five days’ notice, the firm left that section blank. The proof of service indicated personal service to Sepehry-Fard on September 1, four days before the hearing date. Sepehry-Fard did not appear. The court conducted a hearing and entered a three-year restraining order with terms nearly identical to those in the temporary order. The court filed the Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing on September 6. A deputy had that order personally served on Sepehry-Fard on September 8. The court of appeal reversed, finding the Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8 requirement of five days’ notice jurisdictional. rendering the order void in the absence of the party who did not receive that notice. View "Severson & Werson v. Sephery-Fard" on Justia Law
Hollingsworth v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
The Supreme Court has made clear that when a civil action and a workers' compensation proceeding are concurrently pending, "the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction" should determine exclusive jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate, holding that the superior court exercised jurisdiction first and thus it had jurisdiction to decide which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, the superior court erred by staying the civil case to allow the WCAB to decide the issue, and the WCAB erred by proceeding without deference to the superior court. View "Hollingsworth v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law
McAdams v. The Jefferson County 911 Emergency Communications District, Inc.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that defendant demoted plaintiff because of his multiple sclerosis in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court weighed the balancing factors to determine whether an entity acts as an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity, and held that, when defendant demoted plaintiff, it did not act as an arm of the state and was thus not entitled to sovereign immunity. In this case, the Alabama Supreme Court previously held that a communications district was not an arm of the state; there was no evidence that the State of Alabama exerts any control over the particular function at issue here; where the entity derives its funds, did not support granting sovereign immunity; and Alabama would not be financially responsible for a judgment against defendant. View "McAdams v. The Jefferson County 911 Emergency Communications District, Inc." on Justia Law
Edmiston v. LA Small Business Development Center
The Louisiana Small Business Development Center is not a juridical entity capable of being sued under federal law for alleged age discrimination. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff against the Center, alleging that she was fired because of age discrimination. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim and that the proper party to name as a defendant would have been the Board of Supervisors. However, the Board of Supervisors is an arm of the state entitled to state sovereign immunity against claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. View "Edmiston v. LA Small Business Development Center" on Justia Law