Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court granted the City of Mesquite's petition and issued a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its order denying the City's motion to dismiss a local government employee's complaint alleging both that the employer breached a collective bargaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair representation, holding that there was not basis to allow the employee to proceed on the fair-representation claim in the district court.In denying the City's motion to dismiss the district court applied the six-year statute of limitations for contract claims. The City appealed, arguing that the claims were subject to a six-month limitations period under Nevada's Local Government Employee-Management Relations Act (EMRA) and federal labor law. The Supreme Court granted the City's petition for a writ of mandamus without reaching the statute of limitations questions, holding that there is no private cause of action to enforce a claim against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation in the first instance, but rather, the EMRA affords a local government employee an administrative process to bring such a claim. View "City of Mesquite v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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L’Chaim, which operates residential care homes for seniors, was cited for wage and hour violations by the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE). A hearing officer affirmed the citations, which included a total of approximately $89,000 in premium-pay and penalty assessments under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 558 for failure to provide 30-minute meal periods to employees. L’Chaim sought mandamus relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which the trial court denied. L’Chaim claimed that under Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Wage Order 5, it may require its employees to work “on-duty” meal periods that, unlike periods when employees are “relieved of all duty,” do not need to be at least 30 minutes long (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 11050). The court of appeal affirmed, holding that L’Chaim must provide meal periods of at least 30 minutes, regardless of whether they are on-duty or off-duty, under Wage Order No. 5. Although L’Chaim was authorized to provide on-duty, as opposed to off-duty, meal periods to its employees, those meal periods still had to be at least 30 minutes long. View "L'Chaim House, Inc. v. Divison of Labor Standards Enforcement" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirming a compensation judge's judgment finding that Alapati Noga, a former defensive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings, who now suffers from dementia, was entitled to permanent and total disability benefits, holding that Noga did not satisfy the statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. 176.151.Noga played as a defensive lineman for the Vikings from 1988 until 1992. While playing for the Vikings, Noga experienced head injuries and headaches. In 2015, Noga filed a claim petition for workers' compensation benefits. A compensation judge found that Noga sustained a Gillette injury of "head trauma, brain injury, and/or dementia" that culminated on or about December 1, 1992 and that the injury was a substantial contributing factor to Noga's permanent and total disability.The WCCA vacated certain findings and remanded several issues. On remand, the compensation judge resolved those issues in Noga's favor, determining, among other things, that the statute of limitations was satisfied under Minn. Stat. 176.151 because the Vikings provided Noga with medical care that constituted a "proceeding." The WCCA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Vikings' provision of care for Noga's head injuries did not constitute a proceeding that prospectively satisfied the statute of limitations. View "Noga v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action challenging the decision of the Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) not to hire plaintiff. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court held that plaintiff failed to show that PBA's reasons for hiring other candidates were pretextual. In this case, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the decision to hire other candidates was motivated by race, where such a conclusion would require speculation because plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination. View "Farver v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Iowa Civil Rights Act for retaliation, discrimination, and hostile work environment.The court held that summary judgment on the retaliation claim was proper under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Even assuming plaintiff established a prima facie showing of retaliation, substantial evidence in the record supported the employer's proffered reason for its termination of plaintiff: she repeatedly micromanaged and interfered with other employees. Therefore, plaintiff failed to show that the employer's reason for her termination was pretextual. The court also held that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on sex, because her actions demonstrated that she did not personally experience offensive or unwelcome harassment. Furthermore, plaintiff's claim for hostile work environment based on a protected activity failed, because she failed to show that she experienced harassment so severe or pervasive as to constitute a materially adverse action. Finally, plaintiff waived her discrimination claims. View "Mahler v. First Dakota Title Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying the motion to compel arbitration filed by Edwards Jones & Company, Jeremy Kientz, and Nick Ferranto (collectively, Edwards Jones) of post-termination claims asserted against them by former Edward Jones employee Adam Bucy, holding that Bucy's claims were mandatorily arbitrable and within the scope of the arbitration agreements.Bucy, who worked for Edward Jones for approximately nineteen years primarily as a financial advisor, was terminated after an internal review. Bucy filed a complaint against Edward Jones asserting claims for statutory blacklisting, statutory defamation, and common law tortious interference with a prospective business relationship. Edward Jones moved to dismiss and compel arbitration of Bucy's claims on the basis that they were subject to arbitration under Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) regulations and two arbitration agreements between the parties. The district court denied arbitration of post-employment claims, concluding that the claims were not arbitrable within the scope of the arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration agreements were valid and enforceable, that Bucy's claims were mandatorily arbitrable, and that the claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreements. View "Bucy v. Edward Jones & Co." on Justia Law

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Cash Depot underpaid employees for their overtime work. Fast filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 203 (FLSA), on behalf of himself and other Depot employees. Depot hired an accountant to investigate. The accountant tallied Depot’s cumulative underpayments at less than $22,000. Depot issued checks to all underpaid current and former employees covered by the suit and issued checks to Fast for his underpaid wages, for liquidated damages under the FLSA, and for Fast’s disclosed attorney fees to that point. Fast and his attorney never cashed their checks. The district court denied a motion to dismiss because Fast contested whether Depot correctly calculated the amount it owed but granted partial summary judgment for Depot, “to the extent that [it] correctly calculated” what it owed Fast. Eventually, Fast conceded that Depot correctly paid the missing wages and urged that only a dispute over additional attorney fees remained. After Fast’s demand for additional attorney fees went unanswered, he filed a motion for attorney fees. The court determined that because Fast was not a prevailing party for the purposes of the FLSA, he was not entitled to attorney fees, and granted Depot summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fast never received a favorable judgment. View "Fast v. Cash Depot, Ltd." on Justia Law

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Jack Robinson appeals from a district court judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) order finding Robinson personally liable for any unpaid workers’ compensation premiums, penalties, interest, and costs owed by Dalton Logistics, Inc. (“Dalton”). Robinson argues WSI failed to properly serve him with the administrative order resulting in a lack of personal jurisdiction and that his due process rights were violated. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the ALJ failed to make any findings of fact to support its conclusion that Robinson’s motion to dismiss be denied as a matter of law. It therefore reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. View "Robinson v. WSI" on Justia Law

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Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) appealed a judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision that John Sandberg sustained a compensable injury because his repetitive work activities substantially worsened the severity of his preexisting degenerative disc condition. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the ALJ’s findings were not sufficient to understand the basis for the decision. The decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "WSI v. Sandberg, et al." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Norac in an action brought by plaintiff, a Norac employee, alleging claims of employment discrimination following her termination. The court held that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of presenting evidence that created a fact question as to whether Norac's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual, and thus summary judgment was appropriate. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to strike an email and its admission did not prejudice plaintiff. View "Lacey v. Norac, Inc." on Justia Law