Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff filed suit against the City, the police chief, and the city administrator, alleging that plaintiff was terminated without due process and in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment free speech rights. The district court denied defendants' motion for qualified immunity.The Eighth Circuit held that, even if plaintiff were terminated in retaliation for his speech, defendants did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Furthermore, the disputed facts did not preclude summary judgment because the dispute did not affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. In this case, defendants could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was speaking solely as an aggrieved police officer and without constitutional protection. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to establish a deprivation of a liberty interest, because he did not show that he was stigmatized by the stated reasons for his discharge and that the statements were made public. Therefore, plaintiff failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation, and the police chief and administrator were entitled to summary judgment. Finally, because plaintiff failed to demonstrate a deprivation of a property or liberty interest, his claims against the City also failed. However, this ruling did not necessarily resolve the city's liability in the retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Mogard v. City of Milbank" on Justia Law

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The dispute in this workers’ compensation case arises out of a question relating to overlapping statutory provisions that control the determination of permanent partial disability. ORS 656.214 obligated employers to provide compensation for a worker’s permanent impairment, meaning “loss of use or function” that is “due to the compensable industrial injury.” But ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) limited the employer’s liability when the compensable injury combines with a qualifying “preexisting condition” to “cause or prolong” the injured worker’s’ disability or need for medical treatment, unless the compensable injury is the “major contributing cause” of the “combined condition.” The question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether the legislature intended an employer would obtain the same limited liability when the employer did not follow the process that the legislature created for estimating a reduced amount of permanent impairment following the denial of a “combined condition.” The Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended that injured workers would be fully compensated for new impairment if it was due in material part to the compensable injury, except where an employer has made use of the statutory process for reducing liability after issuing a combined condition denial. View "Caren v. Providence Health System Oregon" on Justia Law

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Lavite, a combat veteran, works in the Administration Building of Madison County, Illinois, as superintendent for the County’s Veterans Assistance Commission. In 2015, Madison County officials banned Lavite from the Administration Building indefinitely after learning that Lavite had experienced a PTSD episode during which he threatened a police officer and then kicked out the windows of a squad car. The ban lasted for nearly 20 months. Lavite kept his job but had to work remotely. Lavite had previously resisted efforts to use funds from the Commission’s budget for other county needs. Before the ban was lifted, Lavite filed suit. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lavite’s right to assemble on government property was not violated because the ban on his presence in the building was viewpoint-neutral and reasonably motivated by legitimate safety concerns. None of the evidence supports a reasonable inference of causation between the ban imposed on Lavite in 2015 and his 2013 objections to the proposals to divert some of his Commission’s budget to other purposes. Lavite, having no alleged liberty or property interest, did not establish any due process violation. View "Lavite v. Dunstan" on Justia Law

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Where a collective bargaining agreement contains unambiguous language vesting welfare benefits, the agreement's general durational clause does not prevent those benefits from vesting. The Second Circuit held that the effects bargaining agreement (EBA) unambiguously vested medical coverage for retirees who retired prior to the expiration of the EBA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of union retirees who retired prior to the expiration of the EBA and their surviving spouses, and its order permanently enjoining Honeywell from terminating medical coverage for those union retirees and their surviving spouses.The court held that the EBA was ambiguous as to whether medical coverage for union retirees who retired after the EBA expired and their surviving spouses vested. Nonetheless, the court held that the Post‐Expiration Plaintiffs have presented a sufficiently serious question as to the merits and satisfied the remaining requirements for a preliminary injunction to issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining Honeywell from terminating the Post‐Expiration Plaintiffs' medical benefits and remanded for further proceedings View "Kelly v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendant, the newly elected district attorney, fired them because they supported his political opponent. The district court denied defendant qualified immunity on the individual and official capacity claims.The Fifth Circuit held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to four of the plaintiffs and reversed based on defendant's qualified immunity. However, in regard to the individual capacity claims, the court held that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Cazares, Palmira Munoz, and Maldonado were policymakers or confidential employees. Accordingly, the court dismissed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maldonado v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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Texas filed suit against the EEOC and the Attorney General, challenging the EEOC's guidance on employers' use of criminal records in hiring. On remand, the district court dismissed Texas's claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), but enjoined defendants from enforcing EEOC's guidance against Texas until EEOC complied with the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Fifth Circuit held that the Guidance was a reviewable final agency action that the court had jurisdiction to review. Furthermore, Texas had standing to sue EEOC and the Attorney General to challenge the legality of the Guidance. On the merits, the court held that the Guidance was a substantive rule subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirement and that EEOC overstepped its statutory authority in issuing the Guidance. Because the Guidance is a substantive rule, and the text of Title VII and precedent confirmed that EEOC lacked authority to promulgate substantive rules implementing Title VII, the court modified the injunction by striking the clause "until the EEOC has complied with the notice and comment requirements under the APA for promulgating an enforceable substantive rule." The court also modified the injunction to clarify that EEOC and the Attorney General may not treat the Guidance as binding in any respect. Therefore, the court affirmed the injunction as modified and declined to consider the DJA claim. View "Texas v. EEOC" on Justia Law

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California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) manages contributions made by employees and member school districts to the State Teachers’ Retirement Fund. (Ed. Code 22000.) In 2014, the Baxter petitioners, formerly employed by the Salinas Unified High School District sought to prevent CalSTRS from continuing to reduce their monthly retirement benefit payments and to restore prior monies they claimed CalSTRS had wrongfully withheld to recoup overpayments made as a result of a years-long miscalculation by the District. The trial court held that a three-year limitations period barred CalSTRS from recouping the prior overpayments. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the continuous accrual theory applied. A second suit challenged the reductions. Before the court of appeal addressed Baxter, the trial court granted relief in the second suit, finding CalSTRS’s claims time-barred. The court of appeal followed Baxter, holding that the continuous accrual theory applies. CalSTRS was time-barred from pursuing any claim against teachers as to pension benefit overpayments made more than three years before CalSTRS commenced an action but is not time-barred from pursuing any claim concerning periodic overpayments to teachers and adjustments to teachers’ future monthly benefits, where the payment accrued not more than three years prior to commencement of an action. The reduction in benefits made by CalSTRS did not constitute the commencement of an “action.” CalSTRS constructively commenced an “action” when these teachers filed their verified petition and complaint in the superior court on February 1, 2016. View "Blaser v. State Teachers' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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Until 2013, Wozniak had tenure on the University of Illinois faculty. He waged an extended campaign against students who did not give him a teaching award. As he had done before when the University enforced school policies, Wozniak filed suit. Disagreeing with the University’s Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the Board of Trustees terminated Wozniak. After the Committee had issued its report, Wozniak posted the entire document and evidence on his website, revealing the identities of the students involved. Wozniak also filed a state court civil suit seeking damages from the students, planning to get a judicial order requiring the students to sit for depositions. Wozniak sued the University alleging violations of the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wozniak was fired for intentionally causing hurt to students, and refusing to follow the Dean’s instructions, not simply for publicizing the effects of his actions. Wozniak acted in his capacity as a teacher and used his position to inflict the injuries that precipitated his discharge. The First Amendment does not govern how employers respond to speech that is part of a public employee’s job. How faculty members relate to students is part of their jobs. Speech that concerns personal job-related matters is outside the scope of the First Amendment, even if that speech is not among the job’s duties. View "Wozniak v. Adesida" on Justia Law

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Jaludi began working for Citigroup in 1985 and rose steadily through the ranks. Jaludi was laid off and terminated in 2013 after reporting certain improprieties in Citigroup’s internal complaint monitoring system. Jaludi, believing Citigroup had fired him in retaliation for his reporting, sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962 (RICO), and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1514A. Citigroup moved to compel arbitration, relying on two Employee Handbooks. The 2009 Employee Handbook, contained an arbitration agreement requiring arbitration of all claims arising out of employment—including Sarbanes–Oxley claims. In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which amended Sarbanes–Oxley to prohibit pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate whistleblower claims, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)). In 2011, Citigroup and Jaludi agreed to the 2011 Employee Handbook; the arbitration agreement appended to that Handbook excluded “disputes which by statute are not arbitrable” and deleted Sarbanes–Oxley from the list of arbitrable claims. Nonetheless, the district court held that arbitration was required for all of Jaludi’s claims. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Although Jaludi’s RICO claim falls within the scope of either Handbook’s arbitration provision, the operative 2011 arbitration agreement supersedes the 2009 arbitration agreement and prohibits the arbitration of Sarbanes–Oxley claims. View "Jaludi v. Citigroup" on Justia Law

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Bergamatto began working as a longshoreman in 2000 and stopped working in 2010. In 2013, he applied for retirement benefits under his pension plan, which is covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001. The 2010 plan said that “[t]he provisions … in effect during the Participant’s last year of credited service shall be applied to determine the Participant’s right to benefits and the amount thereof.” The 2010 plan originally precluded longshoremen hired between October 1996 and September 2004 from accruing benefits for work performed before October 2004. A 2013 amendment to the 2010 plan provided that, “[e]ffective October 1, 2012, Participants hired on or after October 1, 1996 shall receive pension benefit accruals for years of credited service earned from 1996 through 2004[.]” A 2015 plan eliminated the language preventing employees hired between October 1996 and September 2004 from accruing benefits for work prior to October 2004. Bergamatto’s application for pension benefits was approved based on only the years of credited service starting in October 2004 on the basis that the 2010 plan required that benefit determinations be made based on the plan provisions in force during the participant’s last year of credited service. The fund’s Board of Trustees agreed. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the Board of Trustees’ interpretation of the 2015 and 2010 plans “reasonably consistent” with the plans’ unambiguous language. View "Bergamatto v. Board of Trustees of NYSA-ILA Pension Fund" on Justia Law