Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer in an action brought by plaintiff, a former employee, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The court held that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the employer's reason for firing him. Although the parties agreed that plaintiff made a prima face case of employment discrimination, the court held that the employer provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing plaintiff: a broad reduction in force. The court also held that plaintiff failed to show that the employer's reason for firing him was pretextual. In this case, no evidence showed that age was a factor in any of the employer's firing decisions. View "McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." on Justia Law

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The EEOC was authorized to obtain evidence by issuing a subpoena and seeking a court order enforcing it. The EEOC exercised those powers when it sought information from Centura Health ("Centura"), a multi-facility healthcare organization operating primarily in Colorado. Between February 2011 and October 2014, eleven current or former Centura employees, working across eight Colorado locations, filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC. They alleged Centura violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by terminating their employment or refusing to allow them to return to work after medical leave. These employment decisions were allegedly made because of their disabilities or their requests for accommodations. Centura petitioned the EEOC to revoke or modify the subpoena. The EEOC denied the petition and directed Centura to provide the requested information. Centura refused, so the EEOC filed a subpoena-enforcement action in the district court. Centura challenged only parts of the subpoena, including items 9 and 18(e), arguing that compliance would be unduly burdensome and that the information sought was not relevant to the eleven individual charges within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(a). It alleged the information would only be relevant to a pattern-or-practice investigation, but the EEOC had not filed a pattern-or-practice charge. While the Tenth Circuit determined Centura’s representations of the disparate factual nature of the eleven charges was largely accurate, and agreed with the distinctions it drew regarding the EEOC’s cases, the Court concluded Centura failed to persuade the Court that eleven charges of disability discrimination, most alleging a failure to accommodate across a handful of an employer’s facilities, were insufficient to warrant finding information regarding an employer’s pattern-or-practice relevant. The Court affirmed the district court's enforcement of the EEOC's subpoena. View "EEOC v. Centura Health" on Justia Law

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Defendants Merchants Building Maintenance, LLC and Merchants Building Maintenance Company (the MBM defendants) appeal from an order of the trial court denying their joint motion to compel arbitration. The MBM defendants moved to compel arbitration of a portion of plaintiff Loren Mejia's cause of action brought against them for various violations of the Labor Code under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The MDM defendants moved to compel arbitration of that portion of Mejia's PAGA claim in which she seeks "an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages." The Court of Appeal reduced the issue presented as whether a court could split a single PAGA claim so as to require a representative employee to arbitrate that aspect of the claim in which the plaintiff sought to recover the portion of the penalty that represented the amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages, where the representative employee has agreed to arbitrate her individual wage claims, while at the same time have a court review that aspect of the employee's claim in which the plaintiff sought to recover the additional $50 or $100 penalties provided for in section 558 of the Labor Code for each violation of the wage requirements. The Court of Appeal concluded that a single PAGA claim seeking to recover section 558 civil penalties could not be "split" between that portion of the claim seeking an "amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages" and that portion of the claim seeking the $50 or $100 per-violation, per-pay-period assessment imposed for each wage violation. The Court affirmed the trial court's order denying the MDM defendants' motion to compel arbitration in this case. View "Mejia v. Merchants Building Maintenance" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff, a Division 1 college football player, alleging that he was an employee of the NCAA and the PAC-12 Conference within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and California labor law.The panel held that the district court properly concluded that Division I FBS Football Players are not employees of the NCAA or PAC-12 as a matter of federal law. In this case, the economic reality of the relationship between the NCAA/PAC-12 and student-athletes does not reflect an employment relationship. The panel held that, within the analytical framework established by the Supreme Court, the NCAA and PAC-12 are regulatory bodies, not employers of student-athletes under the FLSA. The panel also held that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's California law claims for failure to state a claim. Under California law, student-athletes are generally deemed not to be employees of their schools. Furthermore, there was no authority that supported an inference that, even though the student-athletes are not considered to be employees of their schools under California law, the NCAA and PAC-12 can nevertheless be held to be "joint employers" with the students' schools. View "Dawson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association" on Justia Law

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Defendants, athletics officials at Binghampton, appealed the district court's denial in part of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Second Circuit held that the district court erroneously conflated the distinct Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983 standards for both vicarious liability and causation. The court clarified the differences between discrimination claims brought under Title VII and those brought under section 1983.The court held that section 1983 claims for discrimination in public employment require plaintiffs to establish that the defendant's discriminatory intent was a "but‐for" cause of the adverse employment action; section 1983 claims for discrimination in public employment cannot be based on a respondeat superior or "cat's paw" theory to establish a defendant's liability; and defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, even when interpreted in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record cannot support the conclusion that they violated her "clearly established" constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order in regard to the section 1983 claims against defendants, entered judgment for defendants, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Naumovski v. Norris" on Justia Law

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Hudson, a 39-year employee of Consolidated Communications, was discharged due to strike-related misconduct. Hudson had blocked a company vehicle while moving in traffic during the strike. Following an appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court, the National Labor Relations Board issued a supplemental decision concluding that Consolidated did not violate the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). The Board found that Hudson’s actions were calculated to intimidate the non-striking employees and were inherently dangerous. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the union’s argument that Hudson’s conduct was not intended to intimidate or endanger the Consolidated employees and that she only intended to follow them to set up an ambulatory picket. That suggestion is belied by the fact that she was following them from the front and purposely impeded their progress. These acts illustrate a thorough plan to do more than follow the work vehicle and are not “animal exuberance” which the Board can and does excuse. View "Local 702, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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Jeff Graham was employed as a firefighter/EMT by the Anchorage Fire Department (AFD). He worked for AFD since 1995 and has held his then-current position since 2003. After taking AFD’s engineer promotional exam in 2010, Graham wrote a letter to the AFD fire chief criticizing the subjective nature of the test. In 2012 Graham failed the interview portion of the engineer exam. He subsequently filed a complaint with the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, alleging discrimination on the basis of his race (Korean) and age (48). He also petitioned his union, the International Association of Firefighters Local 1264 (the Union), to file a grievance against the Municipality of Anchorage on his behalf, under the Union’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the Municipality. Graham later prevailed in a civil suit against the Municipality of Anchorage for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. He was awarded partial attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(1). Graham argued he should have instead been awarded full fees and costs under his union’s collective bargaining agreement with the Municipality. Because the fee recovery provision in the agreement was not applicable to Graham’s case, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order denying Graham’s motion for full attorney’s fees and costs. View "Graham v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Warren Unilube's motion for summary judgment in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging a race-based claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Under the McDonnell Douglass framework, the court held that plaintiff made a prima facie case of discrimination because he was a member of a protected group and was terminated. Furthermore, he was qualified for his position.However, the court held that the employer articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's discharge based on plaintiff's performance related deficiencies. Finally, the court held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Warren's reasons for his termination were pretextual. View "Beasley v. Warren Unilube, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Parish hired Sterlinski in 1992 as Director of Music. In 2014 the Parish’s priest demoted Sterlinski to the job of organist and in 2015 fired him outright. Sterlinski contends that the Parish held his Polish heritage against him. Until his demotion he could have been fired for any reason, because as Director of Music he held substantial authority over the conduct of religious services and would have been treated as a “minister.” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to ministers. Sterlinski claims that as an organist, he was just “robotically playing the music that he was given” and could not be treated as a minister. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the Bishop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Organ playing serves a religious function in the life of the Parish. The court stated: “If the Roman Catholic Church believes that organ music is vital to its religious services, and that to advance its faith it needs the ability to select organists, who are we judges to disagree?” View "Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago" on Justia Law

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Dyer, a Ventra employee, has migraine headaches that often prevent him from working. Ventra’s collective bargaining agreement's attendance policy does not require the employee to justify an absence; points are assessed for absences, depending on whether the employee calls in to report the absence and whether the employee is absent for his entire shift or only part of it. Once an employee accumulates 11 or more points, he is terminated. Certain absences, including leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), are expressly excluded from the point-accumulation system. Employees who have perfect attendance for 30 days will have their total points reduced by one point. Taking leave for vacations, bereavement, jury duty, military duty, union leave and holidays keeps the 30-day clock running. The point reduction schedule did not count FMLA and other unpaid leave (such as disability) as days “worked” toward 30-day perfect attendance. Beginning in 2013, Dyer used intermittent FMLA leave. Dyer did not have any points for using his FMLA leave. Ventra terminated Dyer in 2016, for accumulating 12 points. The district court granted Ventra summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Resetting Dyer’s perfect-attendance clock every time he took FMLA leave effectively denied him the flexibility of the no-fault attendance policy that employees not taking FMLA leave enjoyed. Dyer's ability to remain employed hinged on his not taking FMLA leave. FMLA leave is treated less favorably than other equivalent leave statuses. View "Dyer v. Ventra Sandusky, LLC" on Justia Law