Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Murray v. Mayo Clinic
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the Mayo Clinic in an action alleging employment discrimination under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.In light of Supreme Court precedent, the panel held that its decision in Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005), holding ADA discrimination claims are evaluated under a motivating factor causation standard, is no longer good law. The panel held that Head was irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's decisions in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), and Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The panel agreed with its sister circuits and held that an ADA discrimination plaintiff bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. 2112 must show that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for the disability. Therefore, the district court correctly instructed the jury to apply a but for causation standard, rather than a motivating factor standard. View "Murray v. Mayo Clinic" on Justia Law
Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Medtronic in an employment discrimination action brought by plaintiff under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated based on his morbid obesity, but the district court held that morbid obesity was not a physical impairment under the relevant EEOC regulations and interpretive guidance.The panel held that it need not determine whether morbid obesity itself is an impairment under the ADA, and affirmed the district court's judgment for Medtronic on alternative grounds. The panel held that, even assuming that morbid obesity were an impairment, or plaintiff suffered from a disabling knee condition that the district court could have considered, he would have to show some causal relationship between these impairments and his termination. In this case, there was no basis for concluding that he was terminated for any reason other than Medtronic's stated ground that he falsified records to show he had completed work assignments. View "Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc." on Justia Law
Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Bristol Excavating, Inc.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207, employers must pay employees one-and-a-half times their “regular rate” of pay for all hours worked above a 40-hour work week. “[R]egular rate” includes “all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee,” subject to eight enumerated exemptions but “remuneration for employment” is not defined in the overtime provisions or elsewhere in the Act. The Department of Labor asserted that employers are bound to include bonuses from third parties in the regular rate of pay when calculating overtime pay, regardless of what the employer and employee may have agreed. The district court, agreeing with the Department, concluded that the incentive bonuses at issue must be included in the regular rate of pay because they are remuneration for employment and do not qualify for any of the statutory exemptions. The Third Circuit vacated in part. Incentive bonuses provided by third parties are not necessarily “remuneration for employment” under the Act, depending on the understanding of the employer and employee. In this case, the factual record did not support a finding that all of the incentive bonuses were necessarily remuneration for employment. View "Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Bristol Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law
Stone v. Troy Construction LLC
Stone sued Troy Construction, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleging a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). She claims that Troy paid local employees per diem compensation that should have been classified as wages and included in the regular rate of pay, which would have affected the calculation of overtime pay. The district court granted Troy summary judgment, holding that there had been no willful violation of the FLSA. Whether a violation is willful determines the length of the applicable statute of limitations; the court applied a two-year statute of limitations and concluded that Stone’s claims were time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated. The district court required a showing of conduct worse than recklessness while recognizing that Troy “appear[ed] to agree that excluding per diem[s] when calculating overtime rates for [out-of-state] employees is acceptable under the statute.” Troy therefore knew that per diems for non-local employees were implicated and permissible under the FLSA, but Troy’s professed ignorance about the implications of the same per diems paid to local employees did not meet the court’s standard. That analysis did not give Stone the benefit of a fair inference that Troy did recognize the implication of the per diems paid to local employees. View "Stone v. Troy Construction LLC" on Justia Law
Miracle v. Ohio Department of Veterans Services
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint alleging that his former employer wrongfully terminated him during his probationary period, holding that the civil-service statutes invoked by Plaintiff do not express a clear public policy providing the basis for a wrongful-discharge claim by a probationary employee.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging that the Ohio Department of Veterans Services, at the direction of the governor's office, wrongfully terminated him during his probationary period. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 124. 27(B) and 124.56 do not express a clear public policy that provides the basis for a wrongful-discharge claim for civil service employees terminated during their probationary period, and therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint. View "Miracle v. Ohio Department of Veterans Services" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law, Supreme Court of Ohio
Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC
Gupta joined Morgan Stanley and signed an employment agreement containing an arbitration clause; an employee dispute resolution program (CARE) applied to all U.S. employees. The CARE program did not then require employees to arbitrate employment discrimination claims but stated that the program “may change.” In 2015, Morgan Stanley amended its CARE program to compel arbitration for all employment-related disputes, including discrimination claims, and sent an email to each U.S. employee, with links to the new arbitration agreement and a revised CARE guidebook. The email attached a link to the arbitration agreement opt-out form and set an opt-out deadline, stating that, if the employee did not opt-out, continued employment would reflect that the employee agreed to the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook and that opting out would not adversely affect employment status. Gupta did not submit an opt-out form or respond to the email. He continued to work at Morgan Stanley for two years until, he alleges, the company forced him to resign because of military leave. Gupta sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301–35. The court agreed with that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence as acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so; based on pretrial evidence, Gupta could not dispute he received the email. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, finding the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of that agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate. View "Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC" on Justia Law
Conille v. AFSCME, Council 93
The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court finding that Local 402 never requested to appeal its deactivation to the International Executive Board (IEB) and that it failed to prove that it was deactivated in retaliation for having exercised its free-speech rights, holding that Local 402 did request an appeal to the IEB.Local 402, which was an affiliate of Council 93, which was created by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) represented Massachusetts Department of Developmental Services (DDS) employees in Waltham, Massachusetts. In 2017, Local 402 was deactivated. Local 402 later filed suit against Council 93 and AFSCME alleging three claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Local 402 for one count but ruled in favor of Council 93 as to the remaining counts. Local 402 filed a notice of appeal, but the district court held that Local 402 did not preserve its appeal rights. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Local 402 exercised its right to appeal to the IEB. View "Conille v. AFSCME, Council 93" on Justia Law
Bentley v. AutoZoners, LLC
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's state law claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The court held that summary judgment was correctly entered in favor of AutoZone on plaintiff's Connecticut claims of discriminatory discharge based on sex, retaliatory discharge for reporting sexual harassment, and a sex hostile work environment because plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could resolve any of these claims in her favor; the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's own deposition testimony could not raise a genuine issue of fact as to AutoZone's having notice of plaintiff's sexual harassment by a co‐worker before August 2014 because that testimony was unequivocally contradicted by her own earlier sworn and written statements, and she failed plausibly to explain the numerous contradictions; and the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to the harassing co‐worker being a supervisor, which was required for AutoZone to be strictly vicariously liable for any ensuing hostile work environment. View "Bentley v. AutoZoners, LLC" on Justia Law
Passaro v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Plaintiff, a former special agent with the Virginia State Police, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against the Commonwealth, seeking relief that includes compensatory damages, reinstatement, and back pay.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ADA claim, because the Commonwealth has not waived its sovereign immunity from that claim. However, the court reversed the district court's decision that claim preclusion barred the Title VII claims, because the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in this litigation. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Passaro v. Commonwealth of Virginia" on Justia Law
Harville v. City of Houston
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's race discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. In this case, plaintiff was terminated from her position as deputy clerk with the City of Houston, Mississippi as part of a group of layoffs designed to offset the City's budget shortfall. The court held that plaintiff failed to present a genuine issue of material fact that her race was a motivating factor in her termination or that there was a causal connection between her EEOC complaint and that termination. View "Harville v. City of Houston" on Justia Law