Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Holcim v. Swinford
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of permanent partial disability benefits based on Employee's treating doctor's impairment rating, holding (1) Employee met his burden of proving the extent of the injury attributable to his work injury; but (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4) was not retroactive.Specifically, the Court held (1) the ALJ relied upon substantial evidence in finding Employee's work injury to be the combination of the exacerbation of a dormant pre-existing condition and a new injury; and (2) while the court of appeals was correct in addressing the retroactivity of section 342.703(4), the court erred in holding that the statute was not retroactive. The Court remanded this matter to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Holcim v. Swinford" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Kentucky Supreme Court, Labor & Employment Law
Hampton v. Intech Contracting, LLC
In this workers' compensation enforcement action the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals dismissing in part and reversing in part the circuit court's order granting Appellant's third, fourth, and fifth motions for partial summary judgment, holding that the court of appeals erred in not dismissing Appellees' appeal from the portion of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Appellant on his third and fifth motions for partial summary judgment.Appellees, Appellant's employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, appealed the circuit court's order granting Appellant's third, fourth, and fifth motions for partial summary judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal from the portion of the order granting Appellant's fourth motion for partial summary judgment as an appeal from an interlocutory order, but it refused to dismiss the remainder of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals should have dismissed the appeal from the portions of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Appellant on his third and fifth motions for partial summary judgment, along with his fourth partial summary judgment motion, as being an appeal from a nonfinal order. View "Hampton v. Intech Contracting, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Kentucky Supreme Court, Labor & Employment Law
Lucas v. Honorable Judith E. McDonald-Burkman
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals granting in part and denying in part Appellant's petition for a writ to prohibit the trial court from compelling her husband's deposition testimony, thereby denying Appellant's writ petition in whole, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the deposition to move forward.Appellant filed suit against Baptist Healthcare, Inc., her former employer, alleging, inter alia, gender discrimination. Baptist sought to depose Dr. Gregory Collins - Appellant's husband, treating physician, and employer - but Appellant objected to the deposition based on the husband-wife privilege. Baptist then filed a motion to compel Collins's testimony. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion, ordering that Baptist could depose Collins on three specified topics. The court of appeals granted Appellant's writ of prohibition as it related to Collins's testimony of Lucas's public manifestations of emotional health but denied the writ as it related to the other two topics. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order appropriately limited Collins's deposition testimony and properly allowed the deposition to take place subject to additional objections or assertions of privilege. View "Lucas v. Honorable Judith E. McDonald-Burkman" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Kentucky Supreme Court, Labor & Employment Law
University of Louisville v. Honorable Audra Eckerle
In a whistleblower action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part the order of the court of appeals denying the petition for a writ of prohibition/mandamus sought by the University of Louisville and Ruby Fenton, holding that remand was necessary in this case.Plaintiff filed this whistleblower action against the University after the University did not renew his faculty appointment. During discovery, Plaintiff served a subpoena upon Fenton seeking all written communications and notes reflecting communications between Fenton and any person associated with the University relating to faculty grievance proceedings initiated by Plaintiff. Fenton represented Plaintiff's supervisors during the grievance proceedings. The University and Fenton asserted that the communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. The trial court permitted the discovery. Fenton and the University then filed this writ of prohibition/mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court held (1) the lower courts did not err in determining the the attorney-client privilege was not applicable under these circumstances; but (2) the court of appeals did not rule upon the University and Fenton's request for protection of the subject communications based upon the work-product privilege. View "University of Louisville v. Honorable Audra Eckerle" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Kentucky Supreme Court, Labor & Employment Law
Wetherby v. Amazon.com
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) award of six percent permanent partial disability benefits to Appellant because of a work-related injury, holding that substantial medical evidence supported the six percent permanent partial disability found by the ALJ.On appeal, Appellant argued that the ALJ erred by making insufficient findings to exclude a pre-existing condition in assessing his impairment rating. The Workers' Compensation Board concluded that remand was necessary for the ALJ to address Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d 261 (Ky. App. 2007). The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the ALJ did not need to apply Finley and that the ALJ based her opinion on substantial medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in limiting her discussion of Finley and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings. View "Wetherby v. Amazon.com" on Justia Law
Kentucky Employees Retirement System v. Seven Counties Services, Inc.
The Supreme Court accepted certificate of a question of law from a federal district court and answered that Seven Counties Services, Inc.'s participation in and its contributions to the Kentucky Employees Retirement System (KERS) are based on a statutory obligation, rather than a contractual obligation.In 1979, the then-Governor designated Seven Counties, a non-profit provider of mental health services, a "department" for purposes of participating in KERS, a public pension system. Thereafter, Seven Counties paid into KERS to secure retirement benefits for its employees. In 2013, Seven Counties initiated bankruptcy proceedings primarily to reject its relationship with KERS as an executory contract. KERS countered that Seven Counties should be required to comply with its statutory obligations to contribute to KERS. The bankruptcy court determined that Seven Counties' relationship with KERS was contractual and, therefore, that Seven Counties could reject the contract in bankruptcy and leave the retirement system. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the relationship between KERS and Seven Counties was statutory. View "Kentucky Employees Retirement System v. Seven Counties Services, Inc." on Justia Law
Singh v. Cordle
Beginning in 2009, Plaintiff Rajesh Singh worked as an untenured professor in the School of Library and Information Management (SLIM) at Emporia State University (ESU). He was informed in February 2014 that his annual contract would not be renewed. He sued ESU and various administrators in their individual capacities, asserting several retaliation and discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Kansas Act Against Discrimination (KAAD); and the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on every claim except one: a First Amendment retaliation claim under section 1983 against Provost David Cordle. Provost Cordle appealed the denial of summary judgment on the ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court then certified as final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) its order granting summary judgment on all other claims, and Plaintiff filed a cross-appeal, challenging the grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims: (1) ESU and the individual Defendants discriminated against him by not renewing his contract; and (2) ESU and the individual Defendants retaliated against him for filing discrimination complaints with ESU’s human resources department and the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC). The Tenth Circuit found the claims against ESU were brought under Title VII and the KAAD, and the claims against the individual Defendants were brought under section 1983. The Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment for Provost Cordle and affirmed grants of summary judgment on the remaining claims. Cordle was entitled to qualified immunity because he could have reasonably believed that the speech for which he allegedly punished Plaintiff was not on a matter of public concern. As for the discrimination claims, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Plaintiff did not establish a genuine issue of fact that ESU’s given reason for his nonrenewal, that he was noncollegial, was pretextual. “Although Plaintiff contends that these discrimination claims survive under the cat’s-paw theory of liability, he does not provide adequate evidence that the allegedly biased supervisor - his school’s dean - proximately caused the ultimate nonrenewal decision.” The Court affirmed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims because he failed to present adequate evidence that the ESU employees who allegedly retaliated against him knew that he had filed formal discrimination complaints. View "Singh v. Cordle" on Justia Law
Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co.
The named plaintiffs are Hispanic or Latino individuals who applied for employment as line workers at Ford’s Chicago assembly plant but were not hired. Millender is a black Ford employee and the Chairman of the United Auto Workers union for the plant. The plaintiffs allege a conspiracy between Millender, the Harvey unemployment office, and unknown Ford employees, to ensure that the plant predominantly hired black employees to the exclusion of Hispanic and Latino applicants. Millender allegedly believed black employees would be more likely to support him as a union leader. This resulted in a dearth of Hispanic and Latino workers, despite a sizable minority of Hispanic and Latino people in the surrounding area. The complaint alleges line workers at the plant are hired exclusively through the Harvey unemployment office. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding the claims were not “like or reasonably related to” claims asserted in their EEOC charges. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Count II; those claims were properly exhausted before the EEOC. Count II describes conduct that is consistent with the conduct described in the charges, alleging a disparate impact upon Hispanic and Latino applicants caused by the skills test, and implicates the same individuals. Count I’s new claims of pre-test discrimination are not included in the EEOC charges and are incongruent with the allegations in the charges. View "Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law
Brock Services, LLC v. Rogillio
Brock filed suit against a former employee for violating his employment agreement's non-compete provision and requested a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the injunction, holding that the agreement was not geographically overbroad. In this case, when defendant signed the agreement, he knew that he could be prohibited from working in the identified parishes, and that the restriction was the only one the district court enforced following reformation.The court also held that the district court did not err in admitting parol evidence and in determining that the parties' intent as to the meaning of subsection 7.1(a) of the agreement regarding where defendant needed to be working for Apache in order to violate the provision; the district court's reliance on evidence of customer solicitation was unnecessary to the finding of breach; and thus the district court did not err in finding a likelihood of success on the merits. In this case, defendant has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in finding the balance of harm and public interest weigh in Brock's favor; the burden to plaintiff was minimal; and the injunction did not disserve the public. View "Brock Services, LLC v. Rogillio" on Justia Law
Rodriguez v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
Rodriguez, a Gulf War veteran, served as a Santa Cruz police officer. 1995-2007. He applied for industrial disability retirement in 2011 with the California Public Employee’s Retirement System based on his PTSD diagnosis that was caused in part by his work for the city. After litigation, the city granted Rodriguez disability retirement but denied his claim of industrial causation. He began receiving benefits in December 2016. Rodriguez requested a finding that his disability was industrial from the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board in April 2017. The Board concluded that Rodriguez’s disability was industrial, but that he was barred from receiving industrial disability retirement benefits because his claim for a finding of industrial causation was untimely under the five-year time limitation in Government Code section 21171. The court of appeal reversed. Section 21171 applies only to rescind, alter or amend an earlier industrial determination. Section 21174 applies to initial determinations and states that a retiree claiming an industrial disability that is disputed will not receive the additional benefits “unless the application for that determination is filed with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board... within two years after the effective date of the member’s retirement.” If a claimant applies for a determination of industrial causation within two years of retirement but more than five years after the injury, the Board cannot modify its determination that an injury is industrial or not; nothing precludes the Board from making the initial determination of industrial causation. View "Rodriguez v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law