Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Liday v. Sim
Plaintiff filed suit against her former employers for unpaid wages as a live-in caretaker for her employers' children. In 2014, the Legislature passed the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights (DWBR) to provide personal attendants with overtime protection beginning January 1, 2014.The Court of Appeal held that, because personal attendants were exempt from overtime requirements before 2014, California law in effect at the time did not limit the number of hours a personal attendant's salary could cover, except to require that it pay at least the minimum wage of $8 per hour for each hour worked. In this case, the parties did not dispute the trial court's finding that they did not agree to an hourly rate, and nothing in the record demonstrates they agreed plaintiff would work a set number of hours per week. Therefore, the court held that the trial court erred when it presumed plaintiff's monthly salary compensated her for only 45 hours of work per week. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for recalculation of the unpaid wages plaintiff was owed for work she performed from April 2010 through December 2013 applying an $8 per hour rate of pay for each hour she worked. View "Liday v. Sim" on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Labor & Employment Law
Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino
Logan worked as a cook for MGM. As part of her job application, she agreed to a six-month limitation period to bring any lawsuit against her employer. After leaving the job, she sued MGM under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging employment discrimination. Her former employer asserted a statute of limitations defense. Although Logan arguably brought her claim within the Title VII statutory period, she waited longer than the limitation period provided in her employment application. The district court granted MGM summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contractual limitation period cannot supersede the statutory limitation period for bringing suit under Title VII. The Title VII limitation period is part of an elaborate pre-suit process that must be followed before any litigation may commence. Contractual alteration of this process abrogates substantive rights and contravenes Congress’s uniform nationwide legal regime for Title VII lawsuits. View "Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino" on Justia Law
Charter Communications, Inc v. National Labor Relations Board
French created pro-union flyers and asked a union organizer to distribute them at his workplace, Charter Communications. Three months later, Charter fired French and two of his colleagues. In the intervening period, all three employees were temporarily reassigned to more isolated regions, and Charter supervisors watched French closely, warned him that the company was aware of his undisclosed pro-union activities, and threatened him with discharge. The National Labor Relations Board concluded that Charter repeatedly violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 157, during that three-month period; that French was discriminatorily discharged because of his union activity; and that his colleagues were discriminatorily discharged because of their perceived union activity. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for enforcement, first rejecting a claim that most of the claims were barred because they were not raised in French’s initial charge filed with the NLRB, which listed only French’s termination and a particular conversation. The events added to the charge establish Charter’s anti-union animus in the period leading up to French’s discharge and would have been at issue under French’s initial charge. A reasonable employee might be dissuaded by Charter’s conduct from engaging in protected activity. French established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge; the Board’s finding of pretext is reasonable. View "Charter Communications, Inc v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles
After the City filed suit against plaintiffs from their jobs as hearing examiners at the Department of Transportation, they filed suit alleging violations of the Bane Act and a claim for whistleblower retaliation. The jury found for plaintiffs and the trial court assessed a penalty under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), awarding them attorney fees.The court held that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of retaliation; assumed that the City established legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for firing plaintiffs; and held that there was evidence to support the jury's finding that the City's proffered reasons for firing plaintiffs were pretextual. In this case, there was evidence plaintiffs were not fired because of how they conducted hearings or for behavioral problems. Rather, a jury could have reasonably inferred that the City was punishing plaintiffs for their prior complaints. The court rejected the City's contention that the penalty award must be reversed based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with prefiling notice requirements, and held that attorney fees were appropriately awarded under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Finally, the court held that it need not reach the Bane Act issues. View "Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
Williams v. Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC
Plaintiff Wilfert Williams sued defendant Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC in a common law tort action for failing to hire him due to his race. His complaint also alleged discrimination under the Unruh and Ralph Civil Rights Acts and that defendant engaged in unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200. From April 2014 through July 2015, plaintiff catered meals to the visiting and home team players at Raley Field, home of defendant’s minor league baseball team. He was hired by the visitor clubhouse manager, Wayne Brown, and the home clubhouse manager to do so. He also helped Brown with meal preparation during that time. While assisting Brown, the job of assistant visitor clubhouse manager became available and plaintiff applied for the job. Brown recommended plaintiff to both defendant’s human resources director and to the baseball operations and public relations coordinator, Daniel Emmons. Plaintiff was never interviewed for the position even though he was already performing some of the tasks of assistant clubhouse manager and had experience running his own catering business. Instead, defendant hired a Caucasian teenager who was still in high school and did not meet any of the qualifications for the job. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint after sustaining defendant’s demurrer. Plaintiff stipulated the dismissal be entered without leave to amend. Defendant contended as a threshold matter, that plaintiff lacked standing in this appeal given his stipulation in the trial court was tantamount to a nonappealable consent judgment and in any event, his causes of action failed on the merits. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiff lacked standing to appeal but agreed the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s causes of action for discrimination under the Unruh and Ralph Civil Rights Acts and for unfair business practices. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court addressed plaintiff’s common law failure to hire claim. Central to that claim is the applicability of Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 (1980). While the Court agreed that failing to hire a prospective employee based on race violated public policy, specifically the Government Code as well as our state Constitution, that prospective employee’s remedies were grounded in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the Act). Tameny on the other hand required “the prior existence of an employment relationship” between the parties upon which to predicate a tort duty of care. Because defendant did not owe plaintiff any duty, plaintiff could not bring a failure to hire claim against defendant in a common law tort action and must instead proceed under the Act. View "Williams v. Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC" on Justia Law
Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board
OHL, a third-party logistics company that provides transportation, warehousing, and supply-chain management services for other companies, operates warehouses throughout the country, including five in Memphis. OHL and the National Labor Relations Board have “a long and acrimonious history,” during which OHL has engaged in multiple unfair labor practices and anti-union activity. In this dispute, the Board found that OHL violated the National Labor Relations Act when it unilaterally changed its employee attendance policy two separate times without giving the union that represents its employees notice and the opportunity to bargain, and then discharged an employee pursuant to the new policy. OHL challenged the finding with respect to the second violation on due process grounds, arguing that it was neither specifically alleged in the administrative complaint nor tried at the hearing before an administrative law judge. OHL argued that the change to the attendance policy did not cause the employee’s discharge. The Sixth Circuit granted enforcement of the Board’s order. The Board did not deprive OHL of due process. While the second violation was not specifically alleged in the charge or the complaint, the record is replete with evidence that the Board provided ample notice to OHL; the parties thoroughly litigated the issue. View "Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
Kelleher v. Fred A. Cook, Inc.
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, alleging associational discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court held that plaintiff has stated a claim for association discrimination under the ADA, because the complaint supports an inference that plaintiff was qualified for his position and that he was fired because his supervisor assumed he would be distracted by his daughter's disability. In this case, plaintiff's allegations provide all that was needed to raise a minimal inference that plaintiff's employer thought plaintiff's daughter was a distraction, and concern over distraction was a determining factor in plaintiff's termination. View "Kelleher v. Fred A. Cook, Inc." on Justia Law
Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC
Tile Shop, a specialty retailer, pays its commissioned sales staff a semimonthly “draw” of $1,000 ($24,000 annually) even if a sales associate earns less than that amount in commissions during the pay period. Tile reconciles and recovers any shortfall between earned commissions and the $1,000 draw in subsequent pay periods, but only from commissions in excess of $1,000. For 10 months Osorio sold products for Tile. When business was slow and his commissions totaled less than $1,000 in a pay period, Tile paid him the guaranteed $1,000 and reconciled the difference in later pay periods when his commissions exceeded $1,000. He quit and filed a class action alleging that Tile’s “recoverable draw” system violates the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, which prohibits employers from deducting more than 15% from an employee’s wages per paycheck as repayment for previous cash advances. The district judge rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Act prohibits “deductions by employers from wages or final compensation” unless specified conditions are met. 820 ILCS 115/9. Tile’s draw reconciliations are not “deductions” from wages or final compensation. The reconciliations determine the employee’s gross wages before tax withholding and other deductions are made. Considered in context, the term “deductions” as used in the Act refers to withholdings from an employee’s gross wages, not the formula used to calculate gross wages. View "Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC" on Justia Law
Southern Cal. Pizza Co., LLC v. Certain Underwriters, etc.
In the context of a demurrer by defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Subscribing To Policy Number 11EPL-20208, the trial court interpreted the term “wage and hour or overtime law(s)” to encompass all provisions of the Labor Code. Plaintiff owned and operated over 250 Pizza Hut and Wing Street restaurants. Defendant provided to plaintiff Southern California Pizza Company, LLC, an employment practices liability insurance policy, which covered certain losses arising from specified employment-related claims brought against plaintiff. The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer, concluding all causes of action in the underlying employment lawsuit against plaintiff fell within the scope of the Policy exclusion. Using well-established insurance policy interpretation principles, the Court of Appeal found the wage and hour law language of the exclusion was more narrow in scope than stated by the trial court: it concerned laws regarding duration worked and/or remuneration received in exchange for work. Applying that interpretation, and taking into account the Policy’s general coverage, the Court concluded many of the disputed underlying lawsuit claims were potentially subject to coverage. Thus, the trial court erred in sustaining defendant’s demurrer. View "Southern Cal. Pizza Co., LLC v. Certain Underwriters, etc." on Justia Law
Kenney v. Helix TCS
Plaintiff Robert Kenney was a former employee of Defendant Helix TCS, Inc. (“Helix”), which provided security services for businesses in Colorado’s state-sanctioned marijuana industry. Kenney filed this lawsuit against Helix under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that Helix misclassified him and similarly situated workers as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime obligations. Helix moved to dismiss Kenney’s claim based on the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”), arguing that Kenney’s employment activities were in violation of the CSA and are thus not entitled to FLSA protections. The Tenth Circuit concluded Helix wanted it to interpret the CSA in a manner implicitly repealing the FLSA’s overtime mandate for employers in the marijuana industry. The Tenth Circuit determined the “case law is clear that employers are not excused from complying with federal laws” because of their other federal violations. “Moreover, the purposes of the FLSA do not conflict with the CSA quite as directly as Helix implies. Helix cherry-picks among the enumerated purposes of the FLSA, citing only those most favorable to its arguments.” The Tenth Circuit did not draw conclusions about the merits of Kenney’s FLSA claims. Rather, the Court held only that Kenney and similarly situated individuals were not categorically excluded from FLSA protections. It therefore affirmed the denial of Helix’s motion to dismiss. View "Kenney v. Helix TCS" on Justia Law