Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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An employer can sue for declaratory relief to enforce a superior court judgment unfavorable to the Labor Commissioner without violating the anti-SLAPP statute where, as here, the lawsuit does not arise out of activity protected by the statute. In this case, Supershuttle filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the the Labor defendants, seeking a declaration that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the Labor Commissioner from considering wage claims filed by drivers of Supershuttle vans because the Sacramento Superior Court previously found the drivers were independent contractors, not employees.The court found that the gravamen of Supershuttle's complaint was the harm it will suffer from the intended decision of the Labor defendants to deny collateral estoppel effect to a final decision of the Sacramento Superior Court, not from the Labor defendants' writing or statements preceding or communicating that decision; the Labor defendants have not identified speech or writings made in connection with a public issue or issue of public importance from which the causes of action arise; and the trial court did not conclude that the Labor defendants acted illegally as a matter of law within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP law. The court held that, most importantly, the trial court did not rely on any illegality to deny the Labor defendants' motion to strike, and the court did not rely on any illegality to affirm the trial court's order. View "Supershuttle International, Inc. v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint seeking to invalidate a Maine statute that governs collective bargaining between the state's university system and its faculty on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment, holding that the statute is not unconstitutional.Plaintiff, an economics professor at the University of Maine at Machias, brought this action challenging the University of Maine System Labor Relations Act, Me. Stat. tit. 26. 1021-1037. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) section 1025(2)(E) is not properly read to designate the Associated Faculties of the Universities of Maine as Plaintiff's personal representative, as he argued; and (2) the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), which the Court cited favorably in response to a similar challenge in D'Agostino v. Baker, 812 F.3d 240, disposes of Plaintiff's contention that the distinction between having a union represent a bargaining unit as an entity in collective bargaining and having it represent the employees within the unit individually is immaterial. View "Reisman v. Associated Faculties of the University of Maine" on Justia Law

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After the county petitioned the superior court for a writ vacating the Commission's decision and upholding LA County Sheriff's Deputy Mark Montez's discharge, the trial court found that the Commission's decision was unsupported by its own findings and issued a writ ordering the Commission to set aside its decision and reconsider the matters.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order and held that Montez's misconduct was an inexcusable neglect of duty that harmed the Sheriff's Department by compromising the public's ability to trust it, and the Commission abused its discretion by reducing Montez's punishment. The court held that reasonable minds could not differ with regard to the appropriate disciplinary action in Montez's case, and the Commission's conclusion that the misconduct was unlikely to recur was unwarranted. View "County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Huey Brock appealed judgments dismissing his negligence action against Richard Price and KS Industries, LLC (“LLC”) and awarding Price and LLC costs and disbursements in the amount of $181,467. Price and LLC cross-appealed the judgment awarding costs and disbursements. In 2011, Brock was severely injured in a traffic accident while traveling in a company-owned vehicle with Price and another LLC employee, resulting in Brock becoming quadriplegic. Days later WSI accepted his claim for benefits. In June 2012, Brock, WSI, and LLC entered into a stipulation that Brock would continue to receive WSI benefits while seeking workers’ compensation benefits in California from KS Industries, LP (“LP”). The stipulation further provided that WSI would cease paying benefits if his claim against LP’s insurance carrier were accepted and his attorney would act in trust for WSI in pursuing reimbursement of funds paid in connection with Brock’s claim. Brock then filed an application for California workers’ compensation benefits claiming he was employed by LP at the time of the accident. Based on a California administrative decision, LP’s workers’ compensation carrier commenced paying benefits to Brock and reimbursed WSI all funds expended on Brock. In 2014, WSI issued a notice of decision reversing its prior decision accepting Brock’s claim. In February 2015, Brock brought this negligence action against Price and LLC. Brock moved for summary judgment arguing collateral estoppel based on the California administrative proceedings precluded Price and LLC from arguing LLC was Brock’s employer rather than LP, and therefore his action was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of North Dakota law. In November 2018, Price and LLC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing collateral estoppel did not apply and the exclusive remedy provisions applied to bar Brock’s action against LLC and his co-worker, Price. The district court agreed and dismissed the action. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the negligence action because it was indeed barred by the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act’s exclusive remedy provisions. The Court reversed the award of costs and disbursements and remanded for the court to hold a hearing on Brock’s objections required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(e)(2). View "Brock v. Price, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Dollar General after the company denied her request for a leave of absence due to a medical condition, alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and state law.The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's ADA claim and held that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dollar General was aware of her disability; that she requested an accommodation; and that Dollar General, had it engaged in the interactive process, could have reasonably accommodated her. However, plaintiff's remaining claims failed because she could not show defendants' actions amounted to retaliation and she failed to follow the steps Dollar General had established for requesting FMLA leave. View "Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal annulled the decision of the appeals board and remanded with directions to find that the special employer had a valid endorsement in its workers' compensation insurance policy excluding coverage for special employees. The court held that while the appeals board was correct that the limiting endorsement had not been signed by the special employer, the written affirmation required by the regulation then in effect is not limited to a signature. Taking into account the circumstances of the entire transaction and its history, the court held that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of a written affirmation. Therefore, the court held that CIGNA was liable for the claim as a covered claim within the meaning of Insurance Code section 1063.1. View "Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

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Montelongo was a West Point student cadet, 1973-1977, then served in the Army 1977-1996, from which he retired. From June 21, 2001, to March 28, 2005, Montelongo served as a civilian presidential appointee in the Air Force. An Air Force human resources officer advised Montelongo that his time as a cadet could be “bought back” and credited toward an eventual civil service annuity under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), 5 U.S.C. 8401–8479. Montelongo made the small payment to “buy back” his four years at West Point and, in 2017, applied for a FERS annuity. The Office of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board concluded, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that only his time as a presidential appointee (just under four years) counted as creditable civilian service. Montelongo did not satisfy the five-year threshold requirement for a FERS annuity. Montelongo’s cadet time was “military service” that was creditable service under 5 U.S.C. 8411(c)(1) but was not “civilian service” for which section 8410 sets a five-year minimum for annuity qualification. View "Montelongo v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

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The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Scott Ledford’s petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the outcome of a Workers’ Compensation Commission hearing. Ledford was a former lance corporal with the South Carolina Highway Patrol. While employed as a highway patrolman, Ledford was injured in two separate work-related accidents: in July 2010, Ledford sustained injuries to his spine after being tasered during a training exercise; and in March 2012, Ledford was involved in a motorcycle accident while attempting to pursue a motorist. Ledford settled the 2010 claim with Respondents. Following the second accident, Ledford filed two separate claims for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Commission Appellate Panel declined to find Ledford suffered a change of condition; however, she found Ledford was entitled to medical benefits for injuries to his right leg and aggravated pre-existing conditions in his neck and lower back due to the motorcycle accident. Neither party appealed the Commission’s order. Months later, Ledford reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). Commissioner Susan Barden held a hearing on Ledford’s Form 21 in August 2014. Following the hearing, but prior to the issuance of a final order, Ledford filed a motion to recuse Commissioner Barden. According to Ledford's motion, Commissioner Barden requested a phone conference with the parties a month after the hearing during which she allegedly threatened criminal proceedings against Ledford if the case was not settled; indicated that she engaged in her own investigation and made findings based on undisclosed materials outside the record; suggested Ledford used "creative accounting" in his tax returns; and questioned Ledford's credibility regarding his claims of neck pain. Ledford contended any one of these grounds was sufficient to warrant recusal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission, finding: (1) Commissioner Barden was not required to recuse herself; (2) substantial evidence supported the Appellate Panel's decision to reverse Commissioner Barden's permanency determination; and (3) substantial evidence supported the Appellate Panel's findings that Ledford was not credible and his landscaping business remained lucrative following the injury. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in finding Commissioner Barden was not required to recuse herself. The Court was “deeply concerned” by the Commissioner’s conduct in this matter. “Ledford's counsel provided an opportunity for Commissioner Barden to right her wrong by moving for recusal. Instead of stepping aside, Commissioner Barden became more abusive and strident in both her ruling on the recusal motion and her final order.” The Commission’s orders were vacated and the matter remanded for a new hearing before a different commissioner. View "Ledford v. DPS" on Justia Law

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In order to prevail on a claim under Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (c), the plaintiff must identify both the specific activity and the specific statute, rule, or regulation at issue; the court must then determine the legal question whether the identified activity would result in a violation or noncompliance with the identified statute, rule, or regulation, and, if so, the jury must determine the factual issue whether the plaintiff was retaliated against for refusing to participate in the identified activity. The County appealed a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in an action alleging retaliation in violation of section 1102.5, subdivision (c), and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).The Court of Appeal reversed the district court's jdugment and held that the County was entitled to judgment on the section 1102.4(c) retaliation claim, because the trial court declined to make the initial legal determination and plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to establish that any acts he was asked to perform would result in a violation of or noncompliance with any identified state, federal, or local statute, rule, or regulation. In regard to the FEHA retaliation claim, the court held that the jury instruction erroneously allowed the jury to find in favor of plaintiff even if no violation of FEHA was committed. Rather, the court found in favor of the County because plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any adverse employment action he suffered was motivated by retaliation for complaints he made regarding discrimination or other activity protected by FEHA. View "Nejadian v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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McDonald's employees filed a class action alleging that they were denied overtime premiums, meal and rest breaks, and other benefits in violation of the California Labor Code. Plaintiff class members worked at franchises in the Bay Area operated by the Haynes Family Limited Partnership.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to McDonald's, holding that there was no evidence that McDonald's, as the franchisor, was a joint employer. The panel held that the district court properly determined that McDonald's was not an employer under the "control" definition, which requires control over the wages, hours, or working conditions. The panel also held that the district court correctly concluded that McDonald's did not meet the "suffer or permit" definition of employer. Finally, the panel held that the district court correctly concluded that McDonald's was not an employer under the common law definition of "employer." Furthermore, the panel held that McDonald's could not be held liable under an ostensible-agency theory; plaintiffs met neither the damages nor the duty elements to prove negligence; and the panel declined to address the merits of the remaining claims. View "Salazar v. McDonald's Corp." on Justia Law