Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Harnishfeger v. United States
Harnishfeger published a book under a pseudonym, Conversations with Monsters: Chilling, Depraved and Deviant Phone Sex Conversations, concerning her time as a phone‐sex operator. A month later, Harnishfeger began a one‐year stint with the Indiana Army National Guard as a member of the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program, a federal anti-poverty program administered by the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS). When Harnishfeger’s National Guard supervisor discovered Conversations and identified Harnishfeger as its author, she demanded that CNCS remove Harnishfeger. CNCS complied and ultimately cut her from the program. Harnishfeger filed suit alleging First Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act violations. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The book is protected speech; it was written and published before Harnishfeger began her VISTA service. Its content is unrelated to CNCS, VISTA, and the Guard. It was written for a general audience, concerning personal experiences and is a matter of public concern. A jury could find that Harnishfeger’s National Guard supervisor infringed her free-speech rights by removing her from her placement because of it. The supervisor’s actions were under color of state law, so 42 U.S.C. 1983 offers a remedy, and she was not entitled to qualified immunity. There is no basis, however, for holding CNCS or its employees liable. Harnishfeger failed to show a triable issue on any federal defendant’s personal participation in a constitutional violation. View "Harnishfeger v. United States" on Justia Law
Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co.
Morrissey, a licensed practical nurse, worked for Coldwater, a skilled nursing and rehabilitation center, from 2001 until she quit in 2016. Morrisey alleges that she was under a 12-hour work restriction due to a disability from 2012 onward, and Coldwater forced her to work beyond that restriction, compelling her to quit. She sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A), for discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. Morrissey provided evidence that: she was disabled; Coldwater had a blanket policy of denying all requests for accommodation if the injury was not work-related; Coldwater forced Morrissey to work beyond her medical restrictions; and Coldwater targeted Morrissey after she complained. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Coldwater, holding that Morrissey established that she has a disability and had requested an accommodation. Numerous material factual issues remain in dispute: whether Morrissey’s restriction remained in effect, whether it was Coldwater’s policy to honor only those work restrictions that were based on work-related injuries, and whether an accommodation would have caused Coldwater undue hardship. View "Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co." on Justia Law
Greer v. City of Wichita, Kansas
Anjela Greer, an employee for the City of Wichita who worked at the Wichita Art Museum, contended her employer denied her a promotion because of her military service in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. She applied for a promotion but didn’t get an interview. Greer simultaneously served in the Navy Reserves and worked as a security guard at the Wichita Art Museum. After about five years as a security guard Greer learned of a vacancy for the museum’s “Operations Supervisor.” She and one other person applied. A city employee screened the applications and decided not to advance Greer to the next stage, where she would have been interviewed. The Museum attributed the denial of an interview to Greer’s lack of qualifications: the new job required at least one year of prior supervisory work in particular fields. The application called for Greer to state how many people she supervised. She answered “2,” but identified her job title only as “Security” and didn’t list any supervisory duties. Based on the job title and the absence of any listed supervisory duties, the Museum maintained Greer’s application had shown a lack of supervisory experience. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on two grounds: (1) any reasonable factfinder would determine that the defendants had declined to advance Greer to the interview stage because her application showed a lack of supervisory experience; and (2) the defendants had proven that they wouldn’t have advanced Greer to an interview regardless of her military status. The Tenth Circuit rejected both grounds. The first was invalid because a factfinder could reasonably infer that Greer’s military status was a motivating factor in defendants’ denial of an interview. The second ground was also invalid because a factfinder could have reasonably found Greer would have obtained an interview if she had not been serving in the military. The Court thus reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants. View "Greer v. City of Wichita, Kansas" on Justia Law
Von Kaenel v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP
Plaintiff, an equity partner at the firm, filed suit alleging that the firm's mandatory requirement policy was in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The provision at issue in the law firm's partnership agreement required mandatory retirement at age 70.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the law firm, holding that plaintiff was not an employee of the firm and was therefore not covered by the ADEA. The court found that the undisputed record established that as an equity partner, plaintiff's compensation scheme -- which included sharing in the firm's profits and losses, his ability to vote on changes to the firm's policies or admission of new partners, the lack of supervision over his substantive work, the influence he had when requesting to lower his hourly rate for a client, and the limited ways in which he could be expelled from the firm -- simply did not bear a close relationship to that of an employee. View "Von Kaenel v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP" on Justia Law
National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
After the Union proposed that, in appraising employee work performance, the Agency not use any "performance appraisal rating levels above the Successful rating level for purposes of the annual appraisal process," Agency representatives declined to negotiate over the matter. The Union then filed a negotiability petition with the Authority, but the Authority denied the petition and held that the number rating levels for both individual elements of the job and overall performance were essential aspects of an agency's rights to direct employees and assign work.The DC Circuit denied the Union's petition for review, holding that the Authority's position rests on a permissible and reasonable construction of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and it was consistent with well-established precedent. The court explained that, because proposals restricting the number of performance ratings interfere with an agency's ability to measure and evaluate its employees, they interfere with an agency's nonnegotiable rights to assign work and direct employees. View "National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law
Capron v. Massachusetts Attorney General
The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting the Attorney General's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that the "Au Pair Program" at issue in this case impliedly preempts Massachusetts from requiring host families to comply with its wage and hour laws and ordering Plaintiff's case dismissed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.The United States Department of State (DOS) administers the Au Pair Program, through which foreign nationals may obtain a special visa then provide in-home childcare services to host families in the United States while the foreign nationals pursue post-secondary school studies. Plaintiffs, a DOS-approved private placement agency based on Massachusetts, and two individuals, brought this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that state law measures are preempted insofar as they protect au pair participants by imposing obligations on their host families as their employer that may be enforced against the host families. The district court found that there was no preemption. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish field or conflict preemption. View "Capron v. Massachusetts Attorney General" on Justia Law
Suzuki v. Abiomed, Inc.
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's claims that Defendant terminated his employment to deprive him of a significant equity incentive, holding that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that when Defendant fired Plaintiff it deprived Plaintiff of compensation that he had already earned by virtue of his past services.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to show that, at the time of his discharge, Plaintiff was deprived of compensation that he had fairly earned and legitimately expected by virtue of his past work. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Suzuki v. Abiomed, Inc." on Justia Law
Fish v. Ramler Trucking, Inc.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that, by the plain words of Minn. Stat. 604.02, a tortfeasor's liability to an injured employee is not reduced by the employer's fault.At issue was whether the 2003 amendment to Minn. Stat. 604.02, subd. 1 overturned the line of decisions holding that an employer liable to an injured employee under the Workers' Compensation Act and a third party liable in tort to that same employee do not have either joint or several liability. In this case, an employee was injured in the workplace. The employee and his employer settled the workers' compensation claim. The employee brought a negligence against the tortfeasor, which brought a third-party contribution claim against the employer. The jury found that the injury was caused by the employee, the employer, and the tortfeasor. The district court applied section 604.02 to reduce the net damage award to the employee by an amount proportionate to the employer's fault. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the lower court erred in applying section 604.02 under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tortfeasor's liability to the employee was not reduced by the fault of the employer. View "Fish v. Ramler Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law
Block v. Exterior Remodelers, Inc.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) ruling that Minn. Stat. 176.179 did not apply to Appellant's vacated workers' compensation award, holding that no mistaken compensation was paid, and thus, section 176.179 did not apply.Appellant injured his low back during the course of his employment and entered into a settlement agreement with his employer. The WCCA approved the settlement by an award. Appellant later petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that there was a mutual mistake of fact when the settlement was entered into and a substantial change in his medical condition that could not have been anticipated at the time of the award. The WCCA vacated the award based on the substantial change in Appellant's medical condition. When Appellant then filed a claim petition for additional benefits the parties disagreed as to whether Employer was entitled to a credit for the $40,000 already paid under the vacated award. The compensation judge ruled that section 176.179 did not apply and that Employer was entitled to full credit against Appellant's claim for benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding because no mistake of fact or law occurred, no mistaken compensation was paid and that section 176.179 did not apply. View "Block v. Exterior Remodelers, Inc." on Justia Law
Correia v. Jones
After plaintiff was terminated, she filed suit against the President of Henderson State University for employment discrimination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, holding that plaintiff was an at-will employee at the time of her termination. In this case, passing a proposed budget including plaintiff's name, title, and salary, did not create an employment contract. Therefore, plaintiff had no property right in continued employment.In regard to plaintiff's claim that she has a protected liberty interest in her reputation, which entitled her to a name-clearing hearing, the court held that plaintiff presented no evidence of defendant directly accusing her of stealing or mismanagement. Furthermore, any claims that plaintiff was stigmatized by innuendo or defendant's commenting on any part of the audit report failed. Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish that she was deprived of a protected liberty interest in her reputation. View "Correia v. Jones" on Justia Law