Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

by
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's disability discrimination and failure to accommodate claims on summary judgment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in partially striking Plaintiff's affidavit submitted in support of his opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment and that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination or a claim for failure to accommodate.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in striking Plaintiff's inconsistent statements in his affidavit; and (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and that Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claims failed on the merits. View "Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Ninth Circuit filed an order withdrawing its opinion and substituting this opinion in its place, denied a petition for panel rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc. The panel also amended the opinion affirming the district court's holding that the State of Nevada waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as to plaintiffs' Fair Labor Standards Act claims when the State removed the case from state court to federal court.The panel extended the holding of Embury v. King, 361 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 2004), and held that a State that removes a case to federal court waives its immunity from suit on all federal-law claims in the case, including those federal-law claims that Congress failed to apply to the states through unequivocal and valid abrogation of their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Therefore, Nevada waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. View "Walden v. Nevada" on Justia Law

by
Francisca Gomez died as the result of a horrific industrial accident while she was cleaning a seed sorting machine as part of her employment with the Crookham Company (“Crookham”). Her family (the Gomezes) received worker’s compensation benefits and also brought a wrongful death action. The Gomezes appealed the district court's decision to grant Crookham’s motion for summary judgment on all claims relating to Mrs. Gomez’s death. The district court held that Mrs. Gomez was working within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, that all of the Gomezes’ claims were barred by the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho worker’s compensation law, that the exception to the exclusive remedy rule provided by Idaho Code section 72-209(3) did not apply, and that the Gomezes’ product liability claims failed as a matter of law because Crookham was not a “manufacturer.” In affirming in part and reversing in part, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the trial court erred when it failed to consider whether Crookham committed an act of unprovoked physical aggression upon Mrs. Gomez by consciously disregarding knowledge that an injury would result. As such, the matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. Crookham" on Justia Law

by
William DeVos, M.D., and Donald Simmons, M.D. (collectively, "the doctors"), appealed a preliminary injunction entered in an action filed against them by The Cunningham Group, LLC, and Cunningham Pathology, LLC. The doctors separately appealed the trial court's order denying their request to increase the amount of the surety bond for the imposition of the injunction. According to the complaint, the doctors had been employed by The Cunningham Group from April 30, 2007, until August 31, 2018, when the doctors terminated their employment without prior notice. The Cunningham Group, also identified in the complaint, other pleadings, and documents in the record as "Services LLC," provided pathology and cytology services through an agreement with Cunningham Pathology. The doctors entered into employment agreements with Services LLC in 2007, in which they agreed that, if they provided Services LLC less than 12 months' notice of their termination of their employment, they would pay Services LLC an amount equal to one year's annual salary. The doctors also agreed that, for a period of two years after the termination of employment, they would not directly or indirectly solicit any of Cunningham/Services' clients or referral sources without prior consent of Cunningham/Services. Cunningham asserted that Cunningham Pathology was an express third-party beneficiary of the doctors' employment agreements with Services LLC, and asserted claims of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and sought to enforce the restrictive covenants contained in the employment agreements. Cunningham also filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit the doctors from violating the nonsolicitation provisions of the employment agreements. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the doctors would still be required to prove their actual damages should it later be determined that they were wrongfully enjoined. "[A]t this stage the trial court should be concerned only with setting an injunction bond amount that would adequately cover the doctors' prospective costs, damages, and attorney fees if it is later determined that the doctors were wrongfully enjoined." The Supreme Court found that based on the evidence presented to the trial court, a $25,000 injunction bond was "simply inadequate to compensate two physicians for damages and attorney fees in the event it is determined that they were wrongfully enjoined from soliciting and continuing to serve Brookwood through their new pathology business." The trial court's order denying the doctors' request to increase the amount of the injunction bond was reversed, and the case remanded for the trial court to increase the injunction-bond amount. View "DeVos v. Cunningham Group, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The DC Circuit denied Affinity's petition for review of the Board's finding of labor practices violations. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Affinity committed unfair labor practices by disciplining firing, and reporting to the state nursing board a pro-union nurse; excluding a union organizer from the hospital; and threatening nurses who filled out union complaint forms. The court was without jurisdiction to review Affinity's only defense to the refusal-to-bargain charge. View "DHSC, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

by
Beau Gordon, a professional roofer, fell 35 feet through a "camouflaged hole" in a warehouse roof he was inspecting. For the resulting head injury, a jury awarded Gordon approximately $875,000 against the building's owner, ARC Manufacturing, Inc. (ARC) and Joseph Meyers. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly refused to instruct on primary assumption of risk where, as here, defendants did not hire or engage Gordon. The Court of Appeal concluded that primary assumption of risk did not apply, rejected appellants' other contentions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Gordon v. ARC Manufacturing, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Former psychologist at Ironwood State Prison (Ironwood), John Doe, sued his former employer, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) alleging discrimination, retaliation, and harassment based on disability. Doe also alleged CDCR violated FEHA by failing to accommodate his two disabilities, asthma and dyslexia, by relocating him to a cleaner and quieter office and providing him with requested computer equipment. Finding no triable issues of material fact, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CDCR. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Doe v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

by
Former managers of Safeway supermarket stores filed suit seeking unpaid overtime wages, claiming they had been misclassified as exempt executives under regulations applicable to the mercantile industry. A jury found that Safeway had proven that William Cunningham had been an exempt employee and was therefore not entitled to overtime pay. Cunningham challenged the trial court's instruction based on the language in Batze v. Safeway, Inc. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 440, and Heyen v. Safeway Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 795.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and clarified that a task does not become exempt merely because the manager undertakes it in order to contribute to the smooth functioning of the store. The court held that an instruction on the consideration of the manager’s purpose, where appropriate, must inform the jury of relevant limiting principles outlined in the applicable regulations and recognized by the court's prior decisions. Therefore, the court held that the trial court's instruction did not affect the jury's verdict. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contested expert testimony under the circumstances of this case. View "Safeway Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

by
Ammons and Riley sued Wisconsin Central under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, for injuries they sustained when the train they were operating struck another train. Both alleged Wisconsin Central was negligent in violating various rules and regulations, which resulted in their injuries. Wisconsin Central alleged that plaintiffs failed to exercise ordinary care and that multiple locomotives, railroad cars, track, and track structures sustained significant damage, which caused it to spend significant amounts of money to repair, perform environmental cleanup and remediation, and incur other incidental and consequential damages. Wisconsin Central sought damages in excess of $1 million.Section 55 of the FELA prohibits “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from liability.” Section 60 prohibits “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, intent, or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the injury or death of any employee.” Plaintiffs argued that Wisconsin Central’s counterclaims constituted a “device” designed to exempt itself from liability to pay damages to injured employees, to deter railroad employees from providing information regarding injury or death of an employee, or both.The Illinois Supreme Court held that the counterclaim was not prohibited, citing the employer’s long-standing right to sue its employees for negligence, the statute's plain language, and federal court decisions. Unlike a contractual agreement or a release, a counterclaim does not extinguish a plaintiff’s FELA cause of action or exempt the railroad employer from liability. View "Ammons v. Canadian National Railway Co." on Justia Law

by
The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District entered into a contract with the Joint Venture, for the “Primary Settling Tanks and Grit Removal Facilities” project to be carried out at the Calumet water reclamation plant. Under the contract, the Joint Venture was responsible to determine the procedures and methods for the work and furnish all temporary structures and safety equipment and was responsible for the safety of all personnel on the worksite. The contract required the Joint Venture to submit plans for the work to the District’s engineer but state that the engineer’s acceptance of the plans did not relieve the Joint Venture of its responsibility for safety, maintenance, and repairs on the project. Andrews, a Joint Venture employee, suffered severe, career-ending head injuries while working on the project.In a suit alleging construction negligence, willful and wanton construction negligence, and loss of consortium, the District alleged immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201). The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the District was not entitled to summary judgment of immunity. The Act immunizes a local governmental entity from liability for injuries arising out of its employee’s acts or omissions while determining policy and exercising discretion. The District did not provide evidence that its employees made discretionary or policy decisions with respect to the two-ladder configuration that resulted in Andrews’s injuries. Seven witnesses testified that no District employees weighed in on worksite safety decisions. View "Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago" on Justia Law