Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

by
When a district court concludes that a proposed settlement in a Fair Labor Standards Act case is unreasonable in whole or in part, it cannot simply rewrite the agreement, but it must instead reject the agreement or provide the parties an opportunity to revise.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's approval of a settlement agreement in an FLSA case where the district court modified the agreement by increasing the portion of the settlement funds to be paid to plaintiff while reducing attorneysʹ fees and costs to be paid to his counsel. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in rewriting the settlement agreement by modifying the allotment of the settlement funds. Furthermore, the district court erred in concluding that the maximum fee percentage that plaintiff's counsel may retain in an FLSA suit is generally limited to 33% of the total settlement amount. Therefore, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Fisher v. SD Protection Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) does not prevent employers from requesting reasonable documentation to assure themselves that employees' absences are legitimate. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of MTA's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff's claims for failure to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FRSA. Plaintiff, a locomotive engineer, alleged that MTA was liable for disciplinary action against him when he failed to report to work while under the influence of a prescribed narcotic.The court held that there was no reason to conclude that the FRSA precludes employers from implementing standard policies reasonably designed to verify employees' appropriate use of medical leave. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his absences, when unaccompanied by SLA-28 forms, were protected activity, as directly required by element (i), and indirectly by (ii) and (iv). View "Lockhart v. MTA Long Island Railroad" on Justia Law

by
A group of 122 detention officers who work or worked at Otero County Prison near Chaparral, New Mexico, alleged that their employer, Management & Training Corporation (MTC), failed to pay them for certain activities that they engaged in before they arrived at, when they arrived at, and after they left their posts within the prison. According to the officers, these activities constituted compensable work, so MTC’s failure to pay violated both the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act. The Tenth Circuit concurred that in the context presented, the officers' activities constituted compensable work. The Court rejected MTC's arguments that : (1) the time the officers devoted to these activities was de minimis; and (2) it need not pay the officers for these activities because it did not know the officers were engaging in them. Additionally, the Court concluded that the officers’ rounding claim survived summary judgment. As such, the district court's order awarding summary judgment to MTC, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aguilar v. Management & Training" on Justia Law

by
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of UPS, holding that plaintiff's action alleging that he was fired because of his race in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 was preempted under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). In this case, plaintiff's claim depended on interpreting the collective bargaining agreement provisions, and thus was completely preempted under the LMRA. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's motion to remand to state court or in granting judgment for UPS. View "Johnson v. Humphreys" on Justia Law

by
Primera Beef, LLC appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Allan Ward. Primera Beef alleged Ward breached the confidentiality provision of a settlement agreement between him and Primera Beef when Ward’s attorney disclosed the terms of the agreement to a prosecutor in a related criminal action. Ward moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was not liable for his attorney’s actions because his attorney was not acting within the scope of his authority when he disclosed the terms. The district court agreed. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the district court. View "Primera Beef v. Ward" on Justia Law

by
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's claims of sex discrimination and retaliation on summary judgment and declining Plaintiff's request to alter or amend that ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.This complaint stemmed from Plaintiff's unsuccessful pursuit of tenure within Harvard University's Anthropology Department. Plaintiff alleged that Harvard denied her tenure on the basis of sex discrimination and retaliation for engaging in protected conduct in violation of several state and federal antidiscrimination laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's claims on summary judgment and then denied Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding that Plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing Harvard's stated reason for denying tenure was merely pretext for discrimination; (2) because Plaintiff could not establish a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employment decision, her retaliation claims failed; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion. View "Theidon v. Harvard University" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court considered two questions of Texas law certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concerning whether changes made by the Texas Legislature in 2017 to Deferred Retirement Option Plans (DROP) violate a Texas Constitution provision that prohibits the reduction or impairment of certain accrued retirement benefits, concluding that the 2017 legislative reforms do not violate the Constitution.Certain retirees challenged the 2017 statutory amendments, which eliminated their ability to request lump-sum distributions from their respective DROP accounts. The retirees argued that the funds in DROP are accrued service retirement benefits and that the change to how the funds may be withdrawn reduces or impaired the accrued benefit in violation of Tex. Const. art. XVI, 66(d). The Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court, concluding that section 66's application in this case was unsettled under Texas law. The Supreme Court answered that the 2017 amendment does not violate section 66. View "Degan v. Board of Trustees of the Dallas Police" on Justia Law

by
Claimant Elizabeth Doody worked for the Laconia School District as an elementary school speech assistant for over a decade. Her job required her to accompany students from their location to a special services room as well as to supervise a locked side entrance door at the beginning of the school day when students arrive and at the end of the school day when they depart. Of the school’s 300 students, approximately 125 students typically used the side entrance, which consisted of an outside concrete area, an exterior door that accessed a small atrium with a floor mat, and an interior door that accessed the corridor. In winter weather, the outside concrete area was treated with sand and ice melt product. On April 18, 2017, Claimant fell twice while walking down the corridor toward the side entrance, once at approximately 8:30 a.m. and again at approximately 3:00 p.m. Both falls occurred in the same location. The morning fall did not injure Claimant, but the afternoon fall fractured her right arm, which had to be repaired surgically. Claimant was taken out of work by one of her doctors the day after the injury and was released to part-time work with modifications. Because the District was unable to accommodate the restrictions, Claimant remained out of work until school resumed in the fall. Despite the surgery and a subsequent course of physical therapy, Claimant remained unable to lift her right hand over her head and continued to experience pain. Claimant appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision to deny her claim for indemnity benefits and payment of medical bills. The parties disputed whether Claimant’s injury arose out of her employment. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the CAB misapplied the applicable law with respect to on-the-job injuries, and because applying that test required further fact-finding, it vacated the CAB’s decision and remanded for further factual findings and for the correct application of the “increased-risk test” to those facts. View "Appeal of Elizabeth Doody" on Justia Law

by
By calling a teacher’s instructional work in a specialized and separate school district educational program, provided outside of regular school instructional hours, an “extracurricular assignment,” the school district claimed the teacher had no tenure protection to that position and had no recourse when she was replaced by a non-tenured teacher and suffered a loss in compensation. The district wrapped the label “extracurricular” around the assignment even though the after-hours instructional program was provided by the school district in order to fulfill core curriculum requirements for certain students unable to fulfill those requirements through the school district’s day program. The teaching position in which petitioner served in the alternative education program was tenure eligible. Indeed, the Board of Education and the Commissioner both conceded that a person serving in that “BookBinders” position exclusively for the requisite period of time would have been entitled to tenure. But petitioner was denied tenure because she already held tenure in a teaching position in the district’s regular-education day-instruction program. After review, of the Commissioner of Education’s decision regarding the teacher’s tenure, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded petitioner met the statutory criteria for tenure, and that she was entitled to a remedy for the violation of her right not to be removed or reduced in salary while protected by tenure for her work in the BookBinders program. View "Melnyk v. Board of Education of the Delsea Regional High School District" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against the county, alleging that the reasons for his termination were racial discrimination and unlawful retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court must reevaluate plaintiff's comparators evidence under the new standard that the court announced in Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc), which was decided after the district court ruled this case. Therefore, the court vacated in part and remanded for reconsideration.The court affirmed the district court's judgment that, in the absence of valid comparators, plaintiff failed to establish a retaliation claim regarding (1) the actions of Lieutenant Ricelli in 2013, (2) the discipline he suffered from Captain White in 2015, and (3) Director Patterson's decision to terminate him in 2015. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that barred plaintiff from deposing the Miami-Dade County mayor regarding plaintiff's section 1983 claim. View "Johnson v. Miami Dade County" on Justia Law