Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Coen v. Aptean, Inc. et al.
The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review centered on a claim of abusive litigation that Timothy Coen filed based on a previous contract lawsuit against his former employer that was resolved in his favor. In his abusive litigation case, Coen sought punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that punitive damages were not available for a statutory abusive litigation claim, relying on its prior decisions that in turn relied on dicta in footnote 3 of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Yost v. Torok, 344 SE2d 414 (1986), which was decided three years before the current abusive litigation statutes, OCGA sections 51-7-80 to 51-7-85, were enacted in 1989. The Supreme Court granted Coen’s petition for certiorari to decide whether that statute authorized the recovery of punitive damages. The Court concluded punitive damages generally may be recovered in an abusive litigation lawsuit (as long as the lawsuit is not solely to recover damages for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings), because the text of OCGA 51-7-83 (a) indicated that punitive damages were included, the statute did not change the common law generally allowing punitive damages in abusive litigation cases, and punitive damages in abusive litigation cases did not always constitute an impermissible double recovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coen v. Aptean, Inc. et al." on Justia Law
International Union of Operating Engineer Local 501 v. National Labor Relations Board
Casino slot technicians are not "guards" under section 9(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. Under the Act the NLRB, cannot certify a union to represent "guards," as the term is used in the statute, if that union also represents non-guard employees.The Ninth Circuit held that the slot technicians' duties differed in fundamental respects from those of the surveillance technicians in Bellagio, LLC v. NLRB, 863 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Therefore, the panel denied Station GVR's petition for review of the NLRB's decision certifying the union as the slot technicians' bargaining representative, based on the NLRB's determination that the slot technicians are not guards. The panel granted the NLRB's cross-application to enforce its order requiring GVR to bargain with the union.The panel denied the union's petition for review of the NLRB's decision not to order an affirmative remedy requiring GVR to provide the union with certain information that it had requested in a letter to the company. The panel held that the union was not a "person aggrieved" and thus did not have standing to bring its petition. In this case, the Board granted it all of the relief that it had specifically sought in the charge form and complaint. View "International Union of Operating Engineer Local 501 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
Robertson v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services
Robertson brought claims against DHS and two DHS employees, Mattke and Evan, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging retaliation for complaining of discrimination in the workplace. The district court dismissed the claims against Evans and Mattke because Title VII authorizes suit only against an employer as an entity, not against individuals, then granted summary judgment, holding that Robertson’s retaliation claim against DHS for failing to promote her to a director position failed because she could not prove a “but-for” causal link between her protected activity (reporting discrimination) and DHS’s decision not to promote her. With respect to her second retaliation claim, alleging that DHS continued the retaliation against her through Evans, the court held that Robertson failed to establish that she suffered an adverse action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. With respect to her failure-to-promote claim, DHS provided a nonretaliatory reason for choosing another candidate. Robertson failed to submit evidence that DHS’s reason was pretextual. Robertson failed to “identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in DHS’s stated reason for hiring Evans over her “that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy of credence.” With respect to her claim that DHS continued the retaliation through Evans, Robertson has failed to show that she suffered a materially adverse action. View "Robertson v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services" on Justia Law
Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center
Temporary staffing agency FlexCare, LLC assigned Lynn Grande to work as a nurse at Eisenhower Medical Center (Eisenhower). According to Grande, during her employment at Eisenhower, FlexCare and Eisenhower failed to ensure she received her required meal and rest breaks, wages for certain periods she worked, and overtime wages. Grande was a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against FlexCare brought on behalf of FlexCare employees assigned to hospitals throughout California. Her own claims were based solely on her work on assignment at Eisenhower. FlexCare settled with the class, including Grande, and Grande received $162.13 for her injuries, plus a class representative incentive bonus of $20,000. Grande executed a release of claims, and the trial court entered a judgment incorporating the settlement agreement. About a year later, Grande brought a second class action alleging the same labor law violations, this time against Eisenhower, who was not a party to the previous lawsuit. FlexCare intervened in the action asserting Grande could not bring the separate lawsuit against Eisenhower because she had settled her claims against them in the prior class action. The trial court held a trial narrowed to questions as to the propriety of the lawsuit, and ruled Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement and could not avail itself of the doctrine of res judicata because the hospital was neither a party to the prior litigation nor in privity with FlexCare. Eisenhower petitioned for a petition for a writ of mandate and FlexCare appealed the trial court’s interlocutory order. The Court of appeal concurred with the trial court on grounds that Eisenhower and FlexCare were not in privity, preventing Eisenhower from blocking Grande’s claims under the doctrine of res judicata, and Eisenhower was not a released party under the settlement agreement. Therefore the appellate court denied mandamus relief. View "Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center" on Justia Law
Kolchinsky v. Western Dairy Transport, LLC
Bentley, the owner of Trucking, rear-ended the Kolchinskys’ car while driving a tractor-trailer through Illinois. The Kolchinskys were severely injured. Bentley's deliveries had been arranged by WD, which instructed Bentley to transport milk from Indiana to its destination. His route was up to him. Trucking’s agreement with WD provided that Bentley was an independent contractor. When Trucking accepted a job from WD, it agreed to call the broker daily with a status update, protect the freight, notify the broker of any damage, and inform the broker of delivery. Tucking was responsible for determining delivery times; WD reserved the right to withhold any resulting damages. The agreement required Trucking to pay its employees and provide and maintain its own tractor, fuel, insurance, licenses, and permits. The Kolchinskys sued Bentley; citing theories of respondeat superior and vicarious liability, the Kolchinskys also sued Trucking and WDThe judge granted the defendants judgment, concluding that the driver was an independent contractor so the Kolchinskys could not hold the companies responsible for his alleged negligence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Courts applying Illinois law consistently have declined to find an agency relationship when a company hires an independent driver to deliver a load to designated persons at designated hours but does not reserve the right to control the manner of delivery. WD had no part in the transaction leading to Bentley’s fateful trip View "Kolchinsky v. Western Dairy Transport, LLC" on Justia Law
Quel v. Board of Trustees, Employees’ Retirement System of Hawai’i
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) and the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of Hawai'i (ERS Board) denying Plaintiff's application for service-connected disability retirement benefits, holding that the ERS Board clearly erred in finding that Plaintiff's permanent capacity resulted from an "occupational hazard."Specifically, the ERS Board found that Plaintiff's permanent incapacity did not result from "a danger or risk which is inherent in, and concomitant to," her "particular occupation or particular job," which was "not a risk common to employment in general." The circuit court and ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case to the ERS Board for further proceedings, holding that the ERS Board added a requirement to the definition of "occupational hazard" that does not exist in the law. View "Quel v. Board of Trustees, Employees’ Retirement System of Hawai'i" on Justia Law
Greater Philadelphia Chamber Commerce v. City of Philadelphia
Philadelphia enacted an ordinance to address the disparity in the pay of women and minorities: the “Inquiry Provision” prohibits an employer from asking about a prospective employee’s wage history and the “Reliance Provision” prohibits an employer from relying on wage history in setting or negotiating a prospective employee’s wage. The Chamber of Commerce filed suit, alleging that both provisions infringed on the freedom of speech of the Chamber and its members. The Chamber concedes that the pay gap exists and that the city has a substantial governmental interest in addressing it but argues that the city passed the Ordinance “with only the barest of legislative records” and did not present sufficient evidence to establish that the Ordinance would satisfy the city’s objective.. The district court agreed that the Inquiry Provision violated the First Amendment speech rights of employers and invalidated it but concluded that the Reliance Provision did not impact speech.The Third Circuit reversed in part. The district court’s analysis applied a much higher standard than required. The Supreme Court has not demanded legislative certainty or empirical proof that legislation would achieve the stated interest even when applying strict scrutiny. Courts need only determine whether the legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” The Supreme Court has even “permitted litigants to justify [analogous] speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’” View "Greater Philadelphia Chamber Commerce v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law
Woolf v. Strada
Plaintiff appealed the district court's summary judgment award in favor of his former employer in an action alleging claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), impairment and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At issue on appeal was plaintiff's ADA claim.The Second Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 did not alter or erode its well‐settled understanding that the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. In this case, because plaintiff did not attempt to show that his work-induced impairment substantially limited his ability to work in a class or broad range of jobs, the court held that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff has a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA. View "Woolf v. Strada" on Justia Law
Alaniz v. Sun Pacific Shippers, L.P.
Sun Pacific appealed the trial court's judgment after a jury awarded damages against it for injuries sustained by an employee of one of its independent contractors.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court prejudicially erred because it did not instruct the jury on the Privette/Hooker doctrine as it applies to either negligence or premises liability. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that Sun Pacific was liable if its failure to use reasonable care was a substantial factor in harming the employee, but did not say that that principle only applied to the hirer of an independent contractor if its negligent exercise of retained control over safety conditions affirmatively contributed to the harm. Furthermore, the trial court told the jury that Sun Pacific was liable if its negligent use or maintenance of the property was a substantial factor in harming the employee, but did not say that these principles would only apply to Sun Pacific if the hazard were concealed. Therefore, the court held that each instruction was an incorrect statement of law and Sun Pacific has not forfeited its contention. The court also held that the trial court's error was prejudicial. The court held that Sun Pacific was entitled to a mitigation of damages of instruction; the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the negligence cause of action; and the court directed the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Sun Pacific on the premises liability cause of action. View "Alaniz v. Sun Pacific Shippers, L.P." on Justia Law
City of Cleveland v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
In this dispute over which court has jurisdiction over an employer's claim against the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC) for the reimbursement of alleged excessive premiums paid by the employer the Supreme Court held that the claim was a legal claim, not an equitable one, and therefore, the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.The City of Cleveland filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas alleging that the BWC charged the City inflated premiums for workers' compensation insurance in order to make up for discounts the BWC provided other employers. The BWC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the common pleas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit and that the court of claims had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and granted partial summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's claim sounded in law and must proceed through the court of claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over legal claims against the BWC. View "City of Cleveland v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation" on Justia Law
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Labor & Employment Law, Supreme Court of Ohio