Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Frlekin v. Apple Inc.
The Supreme Court granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to decide a question of California law regarding Industrial Welfare Commission wage order No. 7-2001 (Wage Order 7), which requires employers to pay their employees a minimum wage for all "hours worked," concluding that time spent on the employer's premises waiting for, and undergoing, mandatory exit searches of bags, packages, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees is compensable as "hours worked" within the meaning of Wage Order 7.Employees filed a class action complaint against Employer, Apple Inc., alleging that Employer failed to pay them minimum and overtime wages for time spent waiting for and undergoing Employer's exit searches in violation of California law. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Employer. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked the Supreme Court to address the state law issue. The Supreme Court concluded that, in the instant case, Employees' time spent on Employer's premises waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices, such as iPhones, brought to work purely for personal convenience, is compensable as "hours worked" within the meaning of Wage Order 7. View "Frlekin v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law
Dolgencorp, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board
Dolgencorp's Auxvasse, Missouri store employed six people. Price, a sales associate, contacted the Union. Myers, an organizing director, obtained authorization cards and filed an election petition. The Union and Dolgencorp agreed to the terms of an election to be held on December 8, 2017. On November 17, 2017, Myers created a group text message conversation between himself, Price, and employees Miles and Durlin. Through the election date, Miles and Durlin actively participated in group conversations and never expressed opposition to Union representation. The six eligible employees voted, 4-2, to unionize. After the election, Miles and Durlin told Dolgencorp’s vice president they voted in favor of the Union but that Price and Myers pressured them using threats and bribes. Dolgencorp filed objections, alleging Price acted as an agent of the Union and engaged in misconduct that materially affected the election result. The NLRB certified the Union as the exclusive representative. Dolgencorp refused to recognize the Union.The Eighth Circuit upheld the Board’s finding that Dolgencorp engaged in an unfair labor practice (National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5)). Conclusions that Price's comments were not meant to be intimidating or to influence witness testimony and that Price was not acting as a union agent or with apparent authority were supported by substantial evidence. An alleged tire-slashing threat occurred outside the critical period; the offer of an unconditional $100 loan did not substantially impair an employee's free choice in the election. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
Paskert v. Burns
Paskert, an Auto$mart sales associate, was supervised by Burns. Bjorkland was also a sales associate. Paskert alleges she was prevented from completing her training. Burns frequently lost his temper with everyone, he ridiculed and screamed at his employees, he referred to female customers using derogatory names, and threw objects. Bjorkland and Paskert heard Burns remark that he “never should have hired a woman” and wonder whether he could make Paskert cry. Burns openly bragged at work about his purported sexual conquests. Bjorkland witnessed Burns attempt to rub Paskert’s shoulders. Burns stated, “Oh, if you weren’t married ... I could have you.” Paskert and Bjorkland reported these incidents to the Director. After a few months on the job, Paskert was demoted. Three days later, she was discharged for insubordination, a poor sales record and use of profanity. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission issued a right-to-sue letter. Paskert’s federal complaint cited sex discrimination based on a hostile work environment and retaliation.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Burns’s alleged behavior, while reprehensible and improper, was not so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of Paskert’s employment. Paskert failed to exhaust her retaliation claim. Because hostile work environment claims are separate from sex discrimination claims, and because Paskert failed to make any separate arguments regarding sex discrimination in her briefs, the claim was not before the court. View "Paskert v. Burns" on Justia Law
Potter v. Department of Veterans Affairs
In 2014, the Phoenix VA Health Care System where Potter worked was in the midst of a patient care crisis that had resulted in an investigation by the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (OIG). Potter alleges she engaged in five whistleblowing activities by making four protected disclosures and by cooperating with OIG. In December 2014, during a reorganization of the Phoenix DVA, Potter’s title was changed, which she claimed amounts to a demotion; a position for which Potter had applied was withdrawn in November 2015; and Potter was assigned to “unclassified duties.” Potter alleges that in early 2017, conditions at the Phoenix DVA forced her “involuntary resignation.” constituting the agency’s fourth and final reprisal. Potter accepted an offer for a Staff Nurse position at the VA Northern California Health Care System in 2017, and filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint at the Office of Special Counsel. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge found that Potter had shown only one prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal but denied corrective action because the government established that the DVA would have taken the same action even if Potter had not made the protected disclosures. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to three alleged reprisals. The court vacated as to the November 2015 failure to hire. View "Potter v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law
Bohlen v. DiNapoli
The Court of Appeals upheld a determination of the Comptroller's Office that a Port Authority compensation adjustment program artificially enhanced certain employees' final average salaries so as to increase their retirement benefits, holding that substantial evidence supported the Comptroller's determination.The Comptroller concluded that the payments made pursuant to the compensation adjustment program were not pensionable compensation under N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law 431(3), which provides that "any additional compensation paid in anticipation of retirement" must be excluded from final average salary calculations. Petitioner employees commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding challenging the determination of the Comptroller's Office. The Appellate Division annulled the Comptroller's determination and granted the petition, concluding that the payments did not artificially inflate Petitioners' final average salary in anticipation of retirement. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the Comptroller's determination that the Port Authority's compensation adjustment program constituted "additional compensation paid in anticipation of retirement." View "Bohlen v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law, New York Court of Appeals
Parker v. EnerNOC, Inc.
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the jury's verdict awarding Plaintiff damages after finding that Defendants violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, 148A & 150 (the Wage Act) but vacated portions of the trial judge's final judgment, holding that the judge erred in his determination of the portion of the award subject to trebling under the Wage Act.Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendants, argued that Defendants failed to pay her the full amount of a commission that she had earned and by terminating her when she complained about it, resulting in her losing an additional commission. The jury found that Defendants violated the Wage Act and awarded Plaintiff damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence, and therefore, the trial court properly denied Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; but (2) the full amount of the commission that would have been due to Plaintiff had she not been terminated is a "lost wage" that must be trebled pursuant to the Wage Act. View "Parker v. EnerNOC, Inc." on Justia Law
House v. Iacovelli
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim, holding that Plaintiff's dismissal did not jeopardize the public policy identified by the trial court and that Plaintiff did not satisfy the jeopardy element of her wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim.Plaintiff alleged that her employer wrongfully terminated her employment because she had challenged the employer for failing accurately to report her earnings to the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that dismissing employees under such circumstances would not jeopardize the stated public policy manifested in the provisions of Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4141 and that section 4141.27 sets forth an adequate remedy for violating the public policy embodied in the statute. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by determining that Plaintiff could not satisfy the jeopardy element and that the statutory remedies contained in Chapter 4141 was insufficient to protect Plaintiff's interests. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the remedies in Chapter 4141 are sufficient to protect society's interest in the public policy that employers accurately report employees' pay and tips and the lack of a personal remedy for the dismissed employee does not jeopardize the stated public policy. View "House v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law
Lin v. Shanghai City Corp.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in a wage-and-hour practices and policies action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, the New York Business General Business Law, and 26 U.S.C. 7434. The district court treated defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for conditional collective certification as a cross‐motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs, and as a motion to dismiss without prejudice as to putative opt-in plaintiffs.The court held that plaintiffs had reason to recognize the motion could be converted into one for summary judgment and that the district court appropriately applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B), dismissing the complaint based on plaintiffs' two prior voluntary dismissals in New York State court and in the Eastern District of New York. The court considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Lin v. Shanghai City Corp." on Justia Law
Gomez v. Crookham
Francisca Gomez died as the result of a horrific industrial accident that occurred while she was cleaning a seed sorting machine as part of her employment with the Crookham Company (“Crookham”). Her family (the Gomezes) received worker’s compensation benefits and also brought a wrongful death action. The Gomezes appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment to Crookham on all claims relating to Mrs. Gomez’s death. The district court held that Mrs. Gomez was working within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, that all of the Gomezes’ claims were barred by the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho worker’s compensation law, that the exception to the exclusive remedy rule provided by Idaho Code section 72-209(3) did not apply, and that the Gomezes’ product liability claims fail as a matter of law because Crookham is not a “manufacturer.” The Idaho Supreme Court determined that given the totality of the evidence in this case, which included prior OSHA violations for similar safety issues, the district court erred by failing to consider whether Crookham consciously disregarded information suggesting a significant risk to its employees working at or under the picking tables, which were neither locked nor tagged out, as they existed on the date of the accident. On this basis, the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Crookham was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to apply the proper standard for proving an act of unprovoked physical aggression, and to determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge of a serious risk to Mrs. Gomez. View "Gomez v. Crookham" on Justia Law
Sanchez v. Department of Veterans Affairs
In 1999, while working at the San Juan VA Medical Center, Dr. Sanchez, a urologist, reported to his superiors what he believed to be improper practices. In 2000, Sánchez received a proficiency report prepared by his supervisor, indicating that his performance “ha[d] shown a significant [negative] change since his last evaluation.” Sánchez was reassigned to the Ambulatory Care Service Line, where he believed that he would not perform surgery, care for patients, or supervise other staff members. He concluded that these actions were retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Sánchez and the VA entered into a settlement agreement under which Sanchez was to be reassigned to the Ponce Outpatient Clinic with a compressed work schedule of 10 hours per day for four days per week, to include three hours of travel per day. The parties adhered to the Agreement for 16 years. In 2017, Sánchez received a letter, informing him that he was required to be at the Ponce clinic from “7:30 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. from Monday through Friday.” An AJ rejected his petition for enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The background of the Agreement supports the conclusion that 16 years was a reasonable duration. As the party claiming a breach, Sánchez had the burden of proof but did not offer evidence that the claimed animosity persisted after that 16-year time period. View "Sanchez v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law