Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Viet bought used copiers for Le and Le’s corporation and shipped the copiers to Vietnam for resale. After the relationship dissolved, Le sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), alleging that he had typically worked 60 hours each week and that Le failed to pay overtime and that Le had not reimbursed him for expenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Viet’s claim on summary judgment. Even assuming that Viet was an employee covered by the Act, he offered few details and no corroboration to support his estimate of his work hours. It is not clear that Viet was an employee. Le treated Viet as an independent contractor, using a 1099 tax form; Le did not set a work schedule or keep track of Viet’s hours. Le paid a fixed rate for each copier. View "Viet v. Le" on Justia Law

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Current and former Whole Foods employees initiated this diversity action seeking to recover purportedly lost wages, alleging that Whole Foods manipulated its incentive-based bonus program, resulting in employees losing wages otherwise owed to them. In the not yet certified class action, Whole Foods moved to dismiss all nonresident putative class members for lack of personal jurisdiction.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Whole Foods' motion to dismiss, on alternative grounds, holding that putative class members -- absent class certification -- are not parties before a court and thus Whole Foods' motion was premature. The court wrote that, only after the putative class members are added to the action, should the district court entertain Whole Foods' motion to dismiss the non-named class members. Finally, the court held that Whole Foods' remaining arguments were without merit. View "Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's action against the Town, alleging that she was terminated from her employment based on age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The district court granted summary judgment on the sole ground that plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of any adverse employment action, because she chose to retire rather than attend a scheduled disciplinary hearing.The court held that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to present genuine issues of fact as to whether a reasonable person in plaintiff's shoes would have felt compelled to retire. In this case, the district court failed to view evidence that the retirement was not voluntary because it was coerced by the threat of likely termination, and therefore plaintiff suffered a constructive-discharge adverse employment action. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Green v. Town of East Haven" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the city and the chief of police, alleging unlawful retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to participate in a media interview, deprivation of his right to pretermination process, and violation of his rights under the North Dakota Constitution.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the First Amendment claim where plaintiff failed to prove his speech as a public employee was protected by the First Amendment. In this case, the district court found that plaintiff was not speaking as a citizen in a local news interview; plaintiff's speech during the interview was not on a matter of public concern because his asserted desire was to clear the name of his Facebook alias, which was a purely private interest; and even assuming plaintiff was a citizen commenting on a matter of public concern, his speech at the interview was not First Amendment protected, because it created great disharmony in the workplace, interfered with plaintiff's ability to perform his duties, and impaired his working relationships with other employees. The court also held that plaintiff was not deprived of his right to due process, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Nagel v. City of Jamestown" on Justia Law

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Tchankpa suffered a serious shoulder injury while employed by Ascena Retail Group. Tchankpa contends that Ascena violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by not accommodating his injury and constructively discharging him. Tchankpa’s claim centers on his request for a work-from-home accommodation. He argues that Ascena failed to accommodate his disability by not allowing him to work from home three days per week. Tchankpa did not provide documentation outlining his medical restrictions for several months and no documentation explained why Tchankpa needed to work from home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Tchankpa’s claims. Employees cannot mandate a particular accommodation and an employer may request medical records supporting the employee’s requested accommodation. After finally providing a doctor’s note, Tchankpa resigned before Ascena fully responded. “The ADA is not a weapon that employees can wield to pressure employers into granting unnecessary accommodations or reconfiguring their business operations." View "Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Group, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging a discriminatory hostile work environment and retaliation for complaining about discrimination. In this case, defendant alleged that employees retaliated against him for reporting possible overcharging at his job and that employees made inflammatory remarks regarding his Egyptian heritage and his Coptic Christian religion. Plaintiff was terminated by Marriott shortly after a physical altercation with another employee.The court held that a hostile work environment claim does not require a plaintiff to show that he or she had been physically threatened by the defendant or that his or her work performance has suffered as a result of the claimed hostile work environment; discriminatory conduct not directly targeted at the plaintiff can contribute to an actionable hostile work environment; and dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim by summary judgment was improper because plaintiff's submission in opposition to the motion presented disputed issues of material fact that should be resolved by a jury. View "Rasmy v. Marriott International, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner denying benefits to Plaintiff pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c(a), holding that the Board incorrectly determined that Plaintiff's heart disease claim was untimely.The Commissioner found that Plaintiff was neither diagnosed with heart disease nor filed a claim for that disease under section 7-433c until after he had retired. Therefore, the Commissioner concluded that Plaintiff's disease and resulting disability were not suffered while Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and that even if Plaintiff was developing heart disease while he was employed by Defendant that was not sufficient to make the claim compensable. The Board reversed, concluding that it was reasonable to infer that Plaintiff's heart disease was the sequela of his accepted claim under section 7-433c for hypertension. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's initial claim for hypertension met the requirements of section 7-433c, was timely, and was compensable; and (2) the Board reasonably concluded that Plaintiff's heart disease was the sequela of his hypertension, which was the injury at issue in his primary claim. View "Coughlin v. Stamford Fire Department" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which vacated the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner dismissing Plaintiff's claim for benefits brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c(a), holding that Plaintiff met the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 7-433c and that, on remand, the Commissioner shall determine whether Plaintiff's hypertension was a substantial factor in his subsequent development of heart disease.The Commissioner found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits for heart disease because he failed to file a notice of new claim within one year of his diagnosis. In making this finding, the Commissioner rejected Plaintiff's argument that his heart disease diagnosis was the sequela of his compensable claim for hypertension. The Board vacated the Commissioner's dismissal because the Commissioner did not present findings as to whether Plaintiff's heart disease was caused by his hypertension or constituted a new injury. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case, holding (1) when a plaintiff has a compensable claim for hypertension under section 7-433c, the plaintiff may also be eligible for benefits for subsequent heart disease if his heart disease is causally related to his hypertension; and (2) Plaintiff was not required to file a notice of new claim in order to pursue benefits for his heart disease. View "Dickerson v. Stamford" on Justia Law

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Ogle works for the Ohio Department of Taxation. He is not a member of the union that represents the Department’s employees in collective bargaining. Under state law, the union may require non-members to pay “fair share” fees to defray the cost of collective-bargaining activities, Ohio Rev. Code 4117.09(C). In 2016-2018, the state deducted these fees from his pay without consent. In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in “Janus,” that compulsory “fair share” fees violate the free-speech rights of public employees, overruling its 1977 “Abood” decision authorizing such fees. Ogle filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the union, seeking a refund of the fair share fees he and others paid. In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit joined two other circuits in holding that public-sector unions that collected “fair share” fees in reliance on Abood may assert a good-faith defense to section 1983 lawsuits that seek the return of those fees. The Sixth Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of Ogle’s suit. Despite section 1983’s silence about defenses or immunities, the historical context from which the statute emerged indicates that a narrow good-faith defense protects those who unwittingly cross a line in reliance on presumptively-valid state law. View "Ogle v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Association" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court upholding the decision oft he Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) denying workers' compensation benefits to Appellant, holding that a previous order by the OAH was not a final, appealable order and that collateral estoppel was not applicable.Appellant filed for workers' compensation benefits after his leg was amputated below the knee. The Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division (the Division) denied the claim. Appellant appealed, but while the contested case hearing was pending the Division withdrew its denial of benefits. In response, the OAH issued an order vacating the hearing and directing the Division to award workers' compensation benefits. The Division issued a redetermination in favor of Appellant. Appellant's employer objected, and after a contested case hearing, OAH denied workers' compensation benefits. The district court upheld the OAH decision denying benefits. On appeal, Appellant claimed that the first OAH order was a final appealable order awarding benefits and that his employer was collaterally estopped from objecting to the Division's redetermination awarding benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the first OAH order was not a "prior adjudication" of workers' compensation benefits and provided no basis to implicate the principle of collateral estoppel. View "Lower v. Peabody Powder River Services, LLC" on Justia Law