Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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Castetter underwent cancer treatment during his employment. After returning from medical leave, he became a District Manager, reporting to Dollar General's regional managers Chupp and Hubbs. Chupp identified deficiencies in Castetter’s stores and implemented a performance plan. Castetter wrote to Hubbs describing Chupp’s improper characterization of his performance and Chupp’s unprofessional conduct. The letter did not refer to cancer, medical leave, or discrimination. Hubbs claims he did not receive the letter. Castetter testified that Hubbs mocked him. Human resources issued a Final Counseling detailing Castetter’s unprofessional conduct and violations of Dollar General’s policies, including employees who had not completed the hiring process and were working without pay, insufficiently trained employees, understaffed stores, high turnover, and a cash discrepancy. Dollar General placed Castetter on another improvement plan. Human resources subsequently discovered numerous violations, including a non-employee attending an employee meeting and failure to process employment documents. Another unpaid non-employee whose paperwork was incomplete was given security access without passing background and drug tests and was stealing from the store. Dollar General terminated Castetter. The district court rejected his disability discrimination on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Castetter failed to show discriminatory intent by establishing a causal nexus between unprofessional remarks and the decision to terminate him. Castetter’s termination was based on his failure to adhere to his responsibilities. View "Castetter v. Dolgencorp, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Arizona Supreme Court: Has Arizona consented to damages liability for a State agency's violation of the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act? View "Redgrave v. Ducey" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Central Montana Medical Center (CCMC) and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint alleging wrongful termination and violation of Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-904(1)(b) and (c) of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, holding that the district court did not err.In granting summary judgment in favor of CCMC and denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the district court determined that CMMC terminated Plaintiff's employment for good cause and that CMMC did not violate its express written policies when it terminated Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact in this case, and CMMC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Putnam v. Central Montana Medical Center" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their negligence cause of action against Technicolor. The jury found that Technicolor had been negligent and that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to plaintiffs, assigning 95 percent responsibility to Technicolor. After the trial court reduced the jury's damages awards, judgment was entered in the amount of $803,838.30 for economic damages and $2,083,920 for noneconomic damages, for a total award of $2,887,758.30.The court held that substantial evidence supported the verdict where there was substantial evidence that Technicolor could have satisfied the labor verification requirement, and that Technicolor's negligence left plaintiffs in a worse position. The court also held that workers' compensation exclusivity was inapplicable and rejected Technicolor's remaining claims. View "Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the City of Somerville, Massachusetts and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that the City unlawfully forced him to retire as a police officer when it discovered that he had basically no vision in one eye, holding that Plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact precluding summary judgment.Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Massachusetts discrimination law. In granting summary judgment to the City, the district court ruled in part that no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff could perform high-speed pursuit driving, which the court concluded was an essential function of his job. The First Circuit vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether his monocular vision rendered him unqualified to perform the essential job functions of an incumbent officer in the City's police department. View "Melo v. City of Somerville" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor dismissing Plaintiff's petition seeking workers' compensation benefits for lack of prosecution, holding that Plaintiff engaged in activity within a year before the motion to dismiss was filed.Plaintiff filed a petition with the Department seeking disability benefits and medical expenses arising from her workplace injury. Eventually, Employer/Insurer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution under ARSD 47:03:01:09, asserting that there had been no activity for at least one year and that Plaintiff had failed to show good cause for the delay. The Department granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal because its decision was based upon its erroneous conclusion that Plaintiff's participation in a vocational rehabilitation program was not "activity" under ARSD 47:03:01:09. View "Laplante v. GGNSC Madison, S.D." on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit held that the Board did not have substantial evidence to gainsay DISH's impasse determination and penalize the employer for refusing still more years of negotiation. In this case, the Board's decision rested on an unsound factual foundation from the ALJ. Furthermore, the court held that the Board lacked substantial evidence merely because it failed to grapple with countervailing portions of the record. Finally, the court held that some of the Board's counterarguments were not properly before the court and rejected all of the counterarguments. View "Dish Network Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

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Joll, an accomplished runner and an experienced running coach, had been a middle school teacher for more than 25 years. She applied for a job as the assistant coach of a high school girls’ cross-country team. The school hired a younger man for the job but invited Joll to apply for the same position on the boys’ team. She did so but the school hired a younger man again. She filed suit for sex and age discrimination. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the school district, concluding that Joll had not offered enough evidence of either form of discrimination to present to a jury.The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the district court apparently asked “whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself,” rather than aggregating the evidence “to find an overall likelihood of discrimination.” Joll offered evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the school district used hiring procedures tilted in favor of the male applicants, applied sex-role stereotypes during the interview process, and manipulated the criteria for hiring in ways that were inconsistent except that they always favored the male applicants. View "Joll v. Valparaiso Community Schools" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court reversing a decision of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board that had dismissed, as untimely filed, a grievance filed by Respondent, holding that there was no basis in the record for the circuit court to find that the Board improperly dismissed Respondent's grievance as untimely filed.Respondent filed a grievance alleging that he should have been appointed for a position in the Highway Engineer classification with the West Virginia Division of Highways (DOH). The Board granted DOH's motion to dismiss the grievance as untimely filed. The circuit court reversed, finding that the grievance was timely filed under the discovery rule. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the time period for filing an employment selection grievance under W. Va. Code 6C-2-4(a)(1) begins when the grievance is unequivocally notified of the selection decision by the employer, not when the grievance discovers facts about the person selected for the position. View "West Virginia Division of Highways v. Powell" on Justia Law

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Michael Richardson was injured while working, and attempted to recover personal injury damages outside of the worker’s compensation system. Hayden Homes subcontracted with Z&H Construction, LLC, Plumbing Unlimited, LLC, and Alignment Construction, LLC for various aspects of a new construction project. Richardson was employed by Alignment, and worked on Hayden’s construction project. He was injured when he fell through a crawl space cover at the construction site. He received a worker’s compensation award from the worker’s compensation insurer for his direct employer, Alignment. After Richardson received his worker’s compensation award, he sued Z&H, Hernandez Framing, LLC (a subcontractor of Z&H), and Plumbing Unlimited (collectively, “Respondent LLCs”), alleging negligence in the construction of the crawl space cover. The district court granted the Respondent LLCs’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the Respondent LLCs were Richardson’s statutory co-employees and immune from suit pursuant to Idaho Code section 72- 209(3). Finding no reversible error in that reasoning, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment. View "Richardson v. Z&H Construction, LLC" on Justia Law