Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

The Oakland Education Association (OEA) represents certain employees of the Oakland Unified School District (District). Following a dispute over school closures approved by the District, OEA members conducted a one-day strike. OEA filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), claiming the District committed unfair practices under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). The District filed a competing charge, claiming OEA’s strike was an unfair practice under EERA.PERB issued separate complaints for the competing charges and bifurcated the hearings. In its first decision, PERB found the District violated EERA. In its second decision, PERB held that OEA’s strike was legal because it was provoked by the District’s unfair practices and OEA had negotiated in good faith. The District did not challenge the first decision but contested the second, arguing that OEA’s strike was illegal and violated constitutional rights.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that public school employees may engage in unfair practice strikes under EERA. It concluded that PERB did not clearly err in finding that such strikes are allowed and that OEA’s one-day strike did not violate the rights to education, due process, or equal protection. The court also found that neither EERA nor the due process clause prohibits pre-impasse unfair practice strikes conducted before PERB determines an unfair practice has occurred. However, the court noted that PERB erred by excluding evidence of educational harm but deemed this error harmless. The court affirmed PERB’s decision. View "Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

Marissa Darlingh, a guidance counselor at an elementary school in the Milwaukee Public School District, attended a rally in April 2022 where she delivered a profanity-laden speech denouncing gender ideology and transgenderism. She identified herself as a school counselor and vowed that no student at her school would transition under her watch. After a video of her speech was posted on YouTube, school officials investigated and eventually fired her for violating employment policies, including using abusive language and undermining the district's mission to provide an equitable learning environment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, with a magistrate judge presiding, applied the Pickering balancing test and concluded that the school district's interests as a public employer outweighed Darlingh's speech rights. The judge denied her request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed her First Amendment claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that while Darlingh spoke on a matter of public concern, her speech was incompatible with her role as a school counselor. The court emphasized that her extreme vulgarity and belligerent tone diminished her First Amendment interests. Additionally, her role required a high degree of public trust, and her speech conflicted with the school district's obligation to provide a supportive educational environment. The court concluded that the school district's interests outweighed Darlingh's free-speech rights, and her speech fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection in the public-employment context. View "Darlingh v Maddaleni" on Justia Law

Jeffery Johnson, a Black employee at Accenture LLP, reported racial discrimination while working on a client project. Accenture's internal investigation found his complaint was made in good faith but lacked merit. Subsequently, Johnson had difficulty securing new projects and was eventually terminated. He sued Accenture, claiming illegal retaliation for reporting discrimination.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Accenture, dismissing Johnson's case. The court found that Johnson's difficulty in finding projects and his termination occurred after his complaint but concluded that the record did not support Johnson's argument that his complaint caused these issues. The court also determined that Johnson's filings violated local rules by presenting unsupported assertions and irrelevant facts, leading to the admission of many of Accenture's facts as uncontroverted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Johnson failed to show a causal link between his complaint and the adverse employment actions he experienced. The court noted that Johnson's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that his complaint was the "but for" cause of his difficulties and termination. The court also found that Johnson's arguments relied on speculation rather than concrete evidence. Consequently, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Accenture, concluding that Johnson's retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could not proceed. View "Johnson v Accenture LLP" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York implemented a policy requiring all employees to be vaccinated against Covid-19, with exemptions for religious or medical reasons. Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz, employees of the Federal Reserve, applied for religious exemptions, claiming that the vaccine conflicted with their religious beliefs. The Federal Reserve denied their requests and subsequently terminated their employment for non-compliance with the vaccination policy. Gardner-Alfred and Diaz filed a lawsuit, alleging that the Federal Reserve's actions violated their religious liberties under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and various federal statutes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the Federal Reserve on all federal claims. The court found no genuine dispute of fact regarding the sincerity of Gardner-Alfred's religious objections and concluded that the vaccination policy did not conflict with Diaz's professed religious beliefs. Additionally, the district court imposed discovery sanctions on Gardner-Alfred and Diaz for repeatedly neglecting their discovery obligations, withholding relevant documents, and violating court orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on Gardner-Alfred's claims, agreeing that she failed to provide sufficient evidence of sincerely held religious beliefs. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on Diaz's claims, finding that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding the sincerity of her religious beliefs and whether the vaccination policy burdened those beliefs. The court also upheld the district court's imposition of discovery sanctions, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Katie Wood, a transgender woman teaching at a public high school in Florida, challenged the enforcement of Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3), which prohibits her from using the honorific “Ms.” and the gendered pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with students during class time. Wood argued that this statute violated her First Amendment right to free speech and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted Wood a preliminary injunction, finding that she had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. The district court reasoned that Wood’s use of her preferred honorific and pronouns constituted speech as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and that her interest in expressing her gender identity outweighed the state’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court held that Wood had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3) infringed her free speech rights. The court concluded that when Wood used her preferred honorific and pronouns in the classroom, she was speaking as a government employee, not as a private citizen. Consequently, her speech was not protected under the First Amendment in this context. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wood v. Florida Department of Education" on Justia Law

An insurer, Arrowood Indemnity Company, entered run-off in 2003, ceasing to issue new policies but continuing to manage existing claims, including workers' compensation for a Scully Signal Company employee who sustained a second work-related injury in 2001. Arrowood sought second-injury reimbursements from the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, which reimburses insurers for a portion of workers' compensation benefits paid to employees with exacerbated injuries. Arrowood and the Trust Fund settled in 2009, with Arrowood receiving reimbursements until 2013.The Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) began denying Arrowood's reimbursement requests in 2015, citing a precedent that insurers in run-off, who no longer collect and transmit employer assessments to the Trust Fund, are ineligible for reimbursements. Arrowood's subsequent complaint in Superior Court was dismissed, and the Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal, directing Arrowood to seek administrative review. The DIA administrative judge and the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board upheld the denial, leading Arrowood to appeal to the Appeals Court.The Appeals Court reversed the Board's decision, ruling that the statutory language of the Massachusetts workers' compensation act does not preclude insurers in run-off from receiving second-injury reimbursements. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted further appellate review and agreed with the Appeals Court. The Court held that the plain language of the act does not exclude insurers in run-off from reimbursement eligibility and that the statutory scheme supports this interpretation. The Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arrowood Indemnity Company v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Melissa Myers, an instructional aide at an elementary school in the Sunman-Dearborn Community Schools, took FMLA leave at the end of the 2017-2018 school year due to grief from her husband's death. Upon returning for the 2018-2019 school year, she exceeded her paid leave days within the first two months. The school principal, Kelly Roth, warned her about her attendance, leading Myers to resign and subsequently sue the school district and Roth for violations of the FMLA, ADA, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that Myers was neither eligible for FMLA leave nor had a qualifying condition in the weeks before her resignation. Additionally, she did not notify the school district of her intent to take statutory leave. The court also rejected her "anticipatory retaliation" theory due to insufficient evidence. The ADA claim failed because Myers did not experience an adverse employment action, and her working conditions were not objectively intolerable to constitute constructive discharge. The equal-protection claim was dismissed for lack of proof of differential treatment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Myers did not meet the eligibility requirements for FMLA leave, lacked evidence of a serious health condition, and failed to provide sufficient notice of intent to take FMLA leave. The court also found no evidence of constructive discharge under the ADA, as her working conditions were not intolerable, and there was no imminent threat of termination. Lastly, the equal-protection claim was dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. View "Myers v. Sunman-Dearborn Community Schools" on Justia Law

John Ledford, an employee of Jenway Contracting, Inc., died from a fall while working. He was survived by his adult, non-dependent daughter, Summer Ledford. Unable to receive death benefits under Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act, Summer filed a wrongful death claim against Jenway under Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County dismissed Summer’s complaint, agreeing with Jenway that the Workers’ Compensation Act limits employer liability to injured workers and their dependents, barring Summer’s claim. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision bars non-dependent adult children from pursuing wrongful death claims against a deceased employee’s employer. The court found that the Act’s exclusivity provision, which limits employer liability to the Act’s specified compensation, applies broadly and does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, maintaining that compliant employers are immune from such wrongful death suits. View "Ledford v. Jenway Contracting" on Justia Law

Two hospitals in Tennessee, Saint Francis Hospital and Saint Francis Hospital-Bartlett, sued Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company, claiming that Cigna routinely underpaid them for emergency services provided to Cigna members. The hospitals, which are out-of-network providers for Cigna, argued that Cigna had a quasi-contractual obligation to pay the reasonable value of their services based on federal and state laws requiring hospitals to treat emergency patients and insurers to cover emergency care.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee dismissed the hospitals' claims. The court found that the hospitals' complaint did not meet the pleading standards of Rule 8, that Tennessee common law did not support their claims, and that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Sixth Circuit held that neither federal law (specifically the Affordable Care Act) nor Tennessee law imposed a duty on Cigna to pay the full value of out-of-network emergency services. The court noted that the ACA's requirement for insurers to provide "coverage" for emergency services did not mean that insurers had to pay the full cost. The court also found that Tennessee common law did not support the hospitals' claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, as there was no contractual or statutory duty for Cigna to pay the full value of the services.The Sixth Circuit concluded that the hospitals' claims failed because they could not establish that Cigna had a legal obligation to pay more than what was stipulated in its contracts with its members. The court did not address the ERISA preemption issue, as the dismissal was affirmed on other grounds. View "AMISUB (SFH), Inc. v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A group of current and former employees of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. alleged that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding wages for tipped workers. They sought preliminary certification for a collective action to include all servers in states where Cracker Barrel attempts to take a tip credit over the last three years. Cracker Barrel objected, arguing that notice should not be sent to employees who are subject to arbitration agreements or to out-of-state employees with no ties to Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary certification and approved notice to the proposed group, including employees who might have entered into arbitration agreements and out-of-state employees. The court decided to reserve judgment on the arbitration issue until the second stage of proceedings and concluded that nationwide notice was permissible based on the participation of one Arizona-based plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in following the two-step procedure for preliminary certification. It also held that where the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement are in dispute, the district court is not required to determine the arbitrability of absent employees' claims before authorizing notice. However, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuits in holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California applies to FLSA collective actions in federal court. This means that for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court must assess whether each opt-in plaintiff's claim is sufficiently connected to the defendant's activities in the forum state. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing nationwide notice and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC." on Justia Law