Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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An insurance adjuster was injured while performing the specific task he was hired to do: identify and distinguish preexisting roof damage from storm damage. While the adjuster recovered workers’ compensation benefits, he also filed suit against the homeowner for failing to make the premises safe and for not warning him about the roof’s condition. The homeowner filed two summary judgment motions, arguing the "intimately connected" doctrine barred the adjuster’s suit as a matter of law. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court erred by denying summary judgment. "The homeowner exercised no control over the adjuster. And absent some exercise of control over a contractor, Mississippi law does not impose liability on property owners for injuries suffered by independent contractors arising from or intimately connected to the work they were contracted to perform." The Court therefore reversed the trial court's denial fo summary judgment and rendered judgment I the homeowner's favor. View "Peak v. Cohee" on Justia Law

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Brett Woolley appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) decision that found him ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Commission determined that Woolley was ineligible for benefits because he was a corporate officer whose claim for benefits was based on wages from a corporation in which he had an ownership interest. The Commission also determined Woolley willfully made a false statement by saying he had not received wages or performed services as a corporate officer. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Woolley was ineligible for benefits due to his status as a corporate officer because it was supported by substantial and competent evidence. However, the Court found Woolley did not willfully misrepresent his status as a corporate officer, "The statute makes no mention of a claimant’s performance of services as a corporate officer. To compound the confusion, IDOL provides no information in the unemployment handbook or on its website to explain why it is necessary for claimants to report their corporate officer status when filing a claim for benefits. To serve as the basis for a willful failure to report a material fact, the question to be answered by a claimant must be accurately grounded in the legal requirements of the statute." View "Woolley v. Idaho Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

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The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on whether Sky Down Skydiving, LLC, improperly designated its tandem skydiving instructors and parachute packers as independent contractors, rather than as employees, thereby eliminating the need for worker’s compensation insurance. After notifying the company that it was in violation of Idaho Code section 72-301, the Industrial Commission filed a civil law suit against Sky Down for penalties and injunctive relief. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court concluded that the instructors and parachute packers were independent contractors. The magistrate court then dismissed the Commission’s complaint with prejudice. After the case was dismissed, a witness contacted the Industrial Commission’s counsel to recant his earlier testimony. The Commission then filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the magistrate court. The Commission filed an intermediate appeal with the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. The Commission then timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded because both lower courts erred by failing to apply the proper test, and the district court erred in concluding there was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings. View "Idaho ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Sky Down Sky Diving" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Dr. Pepper retaliated against him for complaining about racial discrimination at the company. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Dr. Pepper, holding that, even if plaintiff made a prima facie case of retaliation, Dr. Pepper provided legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions based on plaintiff's performance under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. In this case, Dr. Pepper alleged that plaintiff had an inability to adjust to new management expectations, an unwillingness to be coached, and a refusal to sit through his interim performance review. The court also held that plaintiff failed to create a jury issue on pretext. View "Couch v. American Bottling Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the vacated the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission affirming and adopting the findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ) awarding an additional-benefits claim to Bruce Menser, holding that Menser's additional-benefits claim was time barred by the statute of limitations.At the time Menser requested a hearing before the Commission, he was receiving workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ found that Menser sustained compensable brain and neuropathy injuries during the course and scope of his employment and that the statute of limitations did not bar Menser's claim for additional medical benefits because it had been tolled. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission erred in determining that Menser's claim for additional medical benefits sufficiently tolled the statute of limitations, and to the extent that Arkansas case law does not comport with this holding, those cases are overruled. View "White County Judge v. Menser" on Justia Law

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The School Code provides that school districts must grant full-time teachers paid sick leave of at least 10 days in each school year. Unused sick days accumulate. Sick leave means "personal illness, quarantine at home, serious illness or death in the immediate family or household, or birth, adoption, or placement for adoption. The school board may require a certificate from a physician ... as a basis for pay during leave after an absence of 3 days for personal illness or 30 days for birth,” 105 ILCS 5/24-6.Dynak, a full-time teacher, gave birth by scheduled caesarian section on June 6, 2016. The District approved her use of accumulated paid sick leave on June 6 and 7, the last day of the school year. The District approved her request for 12 weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, (FMLA) 29 U.S.C. 2601, beginning on August 18, the first day of the next school year. The District denied her request to use paid sick leave for the first 28.5 days of her FMLA leave. Dynak did not submit a physician’s certificate to substantiate a medical need for additional paid sick leave.The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Dynak’s suit; "there is no evidence ... that the legislature intended to create a vested right in an employee to take paid sick leave on any days the employee chooses.“ Sick leave for birth must be interpreted in the same manner as sick leave for other events listed in section 24-6. If a teacher gives birth during the school year, she must use her accumulated sick leave to take paid time off for the birth. If a teacher gives birth just before or during a summer break, however, the teacher has no need to use her accumulated sick days. View "Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that American Marine was liable for most of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff was working as a seaman for American Marine when he was injured on board a vessel owned by the employer.The court held that American Marine has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s finding of unseaworthiness was clear error; American Marine failed to establish that plaintiff's accident was mostly his own fault where the district court clearly evaluated the evidence and made no inconsistent findings about causation, finding plaintiff 20 percent at fault; American Marine failed to carry its burden of demonstrating clear error in the district court's choice between competing experts; the district court's finding of diminished earning capacity was not clearly erroneous; in regard to the district court's award of past medical expenses because of American Marine's negligence, plaintiff's failure to prove that he was obliged to reimburse his attorneys for his medical expenses is irrelevant; and the district court did not clearly err in crediting plaintiff's testimony about his current condition. View "Luwisch v. American Marine Corp." on Justia Law

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A party who complied with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent in collecting fair-share fees cannot be held liable for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 to obtain repayment of fair-share union fees. The court held that, because defendants collected fair share fees in reliance on directly controlling Supreme Court precedent and then-valid state statutes, their reliance was objectively reasonable, and they are entitled to a good-faith defense as a matter of law. The court reviewed plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Christina Neitzelt's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its order disallowing an L4-L5 disc herniation as an allowed condition in Appellant's workers' compensation claim, holding that under the some evidence standard, the Commission did not abuse its discretion.After Neitzelt had back surgery the Commission granted her employer's request to disallow the L4-L5 disc herniation from Neitzelt's claim based on evidence arising from the surgery. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission's exercise of its continuing jurisdiction was untimely and therefore improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that some evidence before the Commission supported its conclusion that Neitzelt's employer established both new or changed circumstances and a mistake in fact. View "State ex rel. Neitzelt v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying Employee's workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that she failed to prove her work injury was the prevailing or primary factor causing any permanent disability and denying Employee's claim against the Second Injury Fund as moot, holding that the Commission did not err.Employee was exposed to cypermethrin, an insecticide, while working for Employer. When Employee was at the doctor's office for testing, another patient's dog got loose and tripped Employee. Employee fell and allegedly sustained permanent injuries to her knees, lower back, hip and neck. Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation asserting that, in addition to cypermethrin exposure, she sustained injuries from being tripped while walking out of the doctor's office. An ALJ awarded Employee benefits. The Commission reversed, concluding that Employee failed to meet her burden of proving her exposure to cypermethrin was the prevailing or primary factor in causing any alleged injury from being tripped accidentally. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee was not entitled to workers' compensation for any injury sustained from her accidental tripping; and (2) because Employee's accidental tripping did not arise out of and in the course of her employment, the Fund was not implicated. View "Schoen v. Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center" on Justia Law