Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Linn County v. Brown
The original plaintiffs in this action were nine Oregon counties that sought declaratory relief, alleging that the Oregon paid sick leave law required them to spend money on a program without sufficient state reimbursement, as required by Article XI, section 15 of the state Constitution, and that they consequently were not required to comply with that statute. Defendants, the governor and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, responded that the constitutional provision did not apply to the paid sick leave law because that law was not a “program” within the meaning of Article XI, section 15(1), and, additionally, that not all nine plaintiff counties met the cost threshold required to make Article XI, section 15(3), applicable to them. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the paid sick leave law did not require local governments to implement a “program” under that provision and, therefore, that the counties were not exempt from that statute. View "Linn County v. Brown" on Justia Law
Williams v. Baptist Health
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's action against Baptist Health appellees and John Hearnsberger, M.D., holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motions to compel production of two types of disputed discovery.Appellant, a surgeon, was on the medical staff of Baptist Health from 2003 until 2011, when his appointment and clinic privileges at Baptist Health Medical Center-Little Rock were terminated, effective immediately. Baptist Health also reported the suspension of Appellant's clinical privileges to the Arkansas State Medical Board, which, in 2014, revoked Appellant's license. Appellant appealed the revocation, and his license was reinstated. In 2011, Appellant filed a lawsuit against Baptist Health and several individuals, asserting several claims. The circuit court entered a consent order dismissing the Medical Board and Dr. Hearnsberger in his official capacity. The circuit court then granted summary judgment on Appellant's remaining claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motions to compel production of two types of discovery, and the discovery error was not harmless as to Appellant's discrimination and tortious-interference claims. View "Williams v. Baptist Health" on Justia Law
Fuqua v. United States Postal Service
Fuqua, a mail handler, was forced to transfer to a new location when his Chicago center was downsized. He did not receive placement within 30 miles of his home. He refused to appear for work in Kansas City and was fired. Fuqua alleged his termination caused him emotional distress and made an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671. The Postal Service denied his claim, ruling that his exclusive remedy was through the Department of Labor (DOL) under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8101. Fuqua filed suit for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA. During a stay in the proceedings, Fuqua corresponded with the DOL alleging he was injured because of defendants’ “extreme and outrageous conduct refusing to allow [him] to become assigned a station closer to [his] residence.” The DOL denied his FECA claim, explaining “[e]motional conditions that arise out of administrative and personnel matters, such as termination of employment are usually covered only if the weight of the evidence supports that the employer acted in an abusive manner or erred.” The district court dismissed Fuqua’s case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. FECA applied to Fuqua’s claim, its administrative scheme ran its course, and his claim was denied for lack of evidence. The district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over his FTCA claims. Fuqua’s allegation falls within the “transfer, or reassignment” definition of “personnel action.” View "Fuqua v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law
Brandt v. Fitzpatrick
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Appellant and dismissing his race discrimination and retaliation claims against the Maine Department of Corrections (MDOC), holding that Appellant lacked the proof needed to reach trial.Appellant left his job with MDOC as a state corrections officer to apply for a position in the federal prison system. Appellant met the minimum qualification and interviewed for each open spot but was turned down each time. Appellant subsequently reapplied for his former job, but MDOC refused to rehire him. Appellant sued MDOC in federal court for race discrimination and retaliation. The district court judge granted summary judgment for MDOC. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a reasonable jury could not find that MDOC's rejection of Appellant's application for reinstatement was a product of unlawful discrimination or made in retaliation for his complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission. View "Brandt v. Fitzpatrick" on Justia Law
Wilfong v. Randolph County Board of Education
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the order of the Public Grievance Board denying as untimely the grievance brought by Melissa Wilfong challenging the alleged failure to the Board of Education of Randolph County to place her in a full-time administrative position, holding that Wilfong's grievance was untimely.Wilfong was employed as a half-time principal and half-time teacher at Valley Head Elementary School, which closed at the end of the 2016-2017 school year. In April 2017 the Board notified Wilfong that she had been approved for transfer to another position but informed her that she did not yet have an assignment for the following school year. In August 2017, Wilfong accepted a full-time teaching position. That same day, Wilfong filed her grievance complaining that the Board failed to place her in an administrative position. The Grievance Board denied the grievance as untimely. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Wilfong filed her grievance outside the fifteen-day window provided by W. Va. Code 6C-2-4(a)(1), the grievance was not timely filed. View "Wilfong v. Randolph County Board of Education" on Justia Law
Queen v. City of Bowling Green
Queen, a Bowling Green firefighter, 2011-2016, was subject to harassment because he is an atheist. According to Queen, he was forced to participate in Bible studies; his co-workers and supervisors badgered him regarding his sexuality and regularly disparaged minorities. In 2012, Queen complained to his supervisor, Rockrohr, who “responded in hostility.” Rockrohr later told Queen that he had discussed the matter with the fire chief and they both believed that Queen “needed to get employment somewhere else.” Queen apologized. Queen’s employment conditions did not improve. Queen was intentionally tripped while retrieving his gear and was regularly subject to disparaging remarks. Stress and anxiety caused Queen to take a leave of absence. While on leave, Queen received many phone calls from his supervisors asking why he was absent.Queen resigned and filed suit under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging hostile work environment based on religion and gender, constructive discharge, retaliation, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on hostile work environment based on religion and gender and the FMLA claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to the city on the claims for hostile work environment based on religion and for retaliation and denial of qualified immunity to Rockrohr for the retaliation claim. View "Queen v. City of Bowling Green" on Justia Law
Ali v. Woodbridge Township School District
Ali, a non-practicing Muslim of Egyptian descent, was a non-tenured high school teacher. His supervisor received complaints about Ali’s instruction on the Holocaust. One English teacher reported that her students were questioning historical accounts of the Holocaust, opining that Hitler didn’t hate the Jews and that the death counts were exaggerated. Students’ written assignments confirmed those accounts. Ali also presented a lesson on the September 11 terrorist attacks, requiring students to read online articles translated by the Middle Eastern Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Ali posted links to the articles on a school-sponsored website: “U.S. Planned, Carried Out 9/11 Attacks—But Blames Others” and “U.S. Planning 9/11 Style Attack Using ISIS in Early 2015.” The MEMRI articles also contained links to other articles, such as “The Jews are Like a Cancer, Woe to the World if they Become Strong.” A reporter questioned Principal Lottman and Superintendent Zega. Lottman directed Ali to remove the MEMRI links from the school’s website. The following morning, Ali met with Zega and Lottman; his employment was terminated.Ali sued under New Jersey law and 42 U.S.C. 1981, claiming that Lottman referred to him as “Mufasa,” asked Ali if “they had computers in Egypt,” and remarked on his ethnicity during the meetings that resulted in Ali’s termination. He alleged discrimination, hostile work environment, free speech and academic freedom violations, and defamation. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Ali cannot show that his termination for teaching anti-Semitic views was a pretext for discrimination. View "Ali v. Woodbridge Township School District" on Justia Law
A Special Touch v. UC Tax Services
A Special Touch (Salon) was a sole proprietorship owned by Colleen Dorsey (Owner) offering nail, skin, massage, and permanent cosmetic services. After a 2014 audit, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (Department), Office of Unemployment Compensation Tax Services (OUCTS) issued a Notice of Assessment to the Salon indicating that it owed unemployment compensation (UC) contributions and interest in the amount of $10,647.93 for the period of 2010 through the second quarter of 2014. This assessment was based on OUCTS’s determination that ten individuals providing work for the Salon had been misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees of the Salon, thus subjecting it to the UC taxes. This discretionary appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required a determination of what “customarily engaged” meant, as that term was used in Subsection 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), 43 P.S. section 753(l)(2)(B). In particular, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the phrase required an individual to be involved in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business in actuality, as opposed to having the mere ability to be so involved. The Court concluded the phrase “customarily engaged” as used in Subsection 4(l)(2)(B) mandated that an individual actually be involved in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business. Because the Commonwealth Court reached a contrary conclusion, the Court reversed. View "A Special Touch v. UC Tax Services" on Justia Law
Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO
The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the circuit court finding that the Workplace Freedom Act (the Act) infringes upon the rights to associate, as well as the liberty and property rights, of labor unions that are member organizations of the AFL-CIO (Labor Unions), holding that the Act does not violate constitutional rights at issue.In 2016, the Legislature enacted the Act, which prohibits collective bargaining agreements that require an employee to pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other similar charges as a condition of employment, or as a condition for the continuation of employment, when the employee has chosen not to join a union. On remand, the circuit court ruled that the Act unconstitutionally fringes on the rights of the Labor Unions, who represent both private and government workers in West Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act does not violate the West Virginia Constitution's protections of association, property, and liberty rights. View "Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-CIO" on Justia Law
Coffey v. New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan
The First Circuit held that the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan (Plan) does not allow a former judge who resigned with sufficient years of creditable service, but before reaching the minimum retirement age, to receive a Service Retirement Allowance (SRA) upon later reaching the retirement age.Plaintiff was fifty-four years old when she resigned from her position as a superior court justice for the state of New Hampshire. Plaintiff served in that position for sixteen-and-a-half years. At the age of sixty-one, Plaintiff applied for an SRA. The Board of Trustees of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Plan denied her application. Plaintiff filed suit against the Plan seeking a declaratory judgment that she was eligible for an SRA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plan as to Plaintiff's claim for violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. 100-C, 5, concluding that the plain language of the statute requires a judge to be in active service when she elects to retire and claim a service retirement allowance. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff was not eligible to receive an SRA on her application. View "Coffey v. New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan" on Justia Law