Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Lagerman v. Arizona State Retirement System
In this case concerning the administration of the Arizona State Retirement System (ASRS) the Supreme Court held that the requirement to submit a retirement application for receipt of retirement benefits pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-757(A) does not violate Ariz. Const. art. XXIX, 1(D) and that all conditions listed in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-764(A) must be satisfied in order to elect a retirement date under the ASRS Plan.Plaintiff began her Plan-qualified employment in 1978 and became eligible for a normal retirement in 2005. In 2016, Plaintiff submitted an application for retirement, listing 2005 as her date for commencing retirement. The ASRS Agency rejected that date and instead used the 2016 date as Plaintiff's retirement date. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies, Plaintiff sought judicial review in superior court. The court affirmed the Agency's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Plan processed Plaintiff's retirement date as provided for in statute and calculated her chosen monthly life annuity benefit as required; and (2) therefore, the Plan complied with section 38-757(A), and no forfeiture, impairment, or diminishment of Plaintiff's normal retirement benefits occurred in violation of article 29, section 1(D) of the Arizona Constitution. View "Lagerman v. Arizona State Retirement System" on Justia Law
Martin v. Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc.
Plaintiff filed suit against her employer and its CEO for interference and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer on the FMLA claim, holding that plaintiff's visit to her counselor did not count as treatment by a health care provider under the statute. In regard to the Title VII claim against the employer, the court held that plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that the CEO knew she had complained about race or sex discrimination, and thus she cannot show a relationship between her firing and that protected activity. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to impeach the CEO's testimony or present circumstantial evidence of his knowledge beyond temporal proximity. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate on this claim because a jury could find discrimination only based on speculation, rather than on evidence. Finally, plaintiff's section 1981 claims were abandoned on appeal. View "Martin v. Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc." on Justia Law
Fessler v. IBM Corp.
Fessler sued, alleging that his former employer, IBM. unlawfully “capped” his sale commissions despite representing to him that his commissions would be uncapped. The district court dismissed his claims on the basis that the Incentive Plan Letters (IPLs) that IBM presents to its employees foreclosed any reasonable expectation that Fessler would receive additional commissions.The Fourth Circuit vacated, finding that Fessler adequately stated claims for fraud, constructive fraud, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and punitive damages. Although the IPLs stated that they did not constitute a promise and IBM reserved the right to adjust the plan’s terms,.Fessler can plausibly allege that he reasonably relied on PowerPoint presentations that repeatedly informed him that his commissions would be uncapped, and his past experience that IBM never capped a commission before 2016. A jury could find that since the representations that his commission would be uncapped were presented subsequent to Fessler receiving IPLs, it was reasonable for Fessler to understand them as adjustments to the plan’s terms. Fessler can plausibly allege the requisite intent to deceive, based on IBM’s motivation to recruit good salespeople who would not work for IBM if they knew that their commissions would be capped. Fessler’s quantum meruit claim is sufficient because of the lack of a meeting of the minds with regard to the exact payment he would receive for his work. View "Fessler v. IBM Corp." on Justia Law
Viers v. Baker
In this action in which Plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against the Commonwealth's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the conduct alleged was insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress but reversed the circuit court's ruling that Defendant was absolutely immune from Plaintiff's defamation claim.After she was fired, Plaintiff, a former administrative assistant in the Commonwealth's attorney's office, filed this complaint against Chadwick Seth Baker, the Commonwealth's attorney for Dickenson County, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Baker filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss. The circuit court sustained Baker's demurrer, ruling that termination of at-will employment did not give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that Baker enjoyed absolute immunity regarding the defamation claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) absolute immunity does not apply to a Commonwealth's attorney's allegedly defamatory statements about why he made the decision to fire an employee; and (2) Plaintiff did not adequately plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Viers v. Baker" on Justia Law
Geoffroy v. Town of Winchendon
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's age discrimination and Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) claims, holding that Plaintiff's OWBPA-compliant waiver and release were knowing and voluntary under federal common law.Plaintiff, a former Winchendon police officer, decided to resign with a pension after the Defendants determined that he had made several threats against his former girlfriend. Plaintiff resigned instead of facing termination and the possibility of losing his pension and being criminally charged. Plaintiff signed a separation agreement agreeing to waive and release any claims he had against Defendants up and through signing the agreement. Plaintiff later brought a complaint alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and defamation, alleging that the waiver and release in his separation agreement violated the OWBPA and were thus invalid. The district court granted summary judgment on the age discrimination and OWBPA claims for Defendants, and a jury found for Defendants on the retaliation and defamation claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding (1) the waiver and release did not violate the OWBPA and were knowing and voluntary; and (2) Defendant's argument that the district court abused its discretion in withdrawing an exhibit at trial was meritless. View "Geoffroy v. Town of Winchendon" on Justia Law
Zabala-de Jesus v. Sanofi Aventis PR, Inc.
The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's claim under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, holding that Defendant put forward a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.Plaintiff was let go from his position after a new, consolidated position went to another employee and because Plaintiff's performance ratings had declined over time. Plaintiff brought an age discrimination claim under the ADEA and under analogous Puerto Rico law. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the Puerto Rico law claims and granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ADEA claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not put forth evidence that sufficed to create a genuine issue of disputed material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for selecting the other employee over him for the new, consolidated position was a pretext for age discrimination. View "Zabala-de Jesus v. Sanofi Aventis PR, Inc." on Justia Law
Sysco Minnesota, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 120
Sysco Minnesota filed suit against Local 120 under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for violating their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Eighth Circuit held that Local 120 waived its right to the CBA's prescribed non-judicial grievance procedures, including arbitration. In this case, Local 120's failure to seek relief under the CBA’s prescribed grievance procedures in a timely manner caused the parties to complete all discovery and litigate the merits of Sysco Minnesota's breach claim. Furthermore, the district court did not err in finding that Local 120 violated the picket line clause in the CBA; Local 120 waived the right to engage in sympathy strikes; and the court was not persuaded that Local 120 did not authorize, participate in, or ratify the picket line. View "Sysco Minnesota, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 120" on Justia Law
Sullivan v. Nassau County Interim Finance Authority
Unions representing Nassau County employees filed suit against NIFA after it instituted a year-long wage freeze for all county employees. The unions alleged that the wage freeze, because it was a legislative act that was not reasonable and necessary to achieve NIFA's purported goal of fiscal soundness, violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court held that NIFA's implementation of the wage freeze was administrative, rather than legislative, and granted summary judgment for defendants.The Second Circuit held that NIFA's wage freeze did not violate the Contracts Clause and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court assumed without deciding that NIFA's imposition of the wage freeze was legislative in nature, and held that the wage freeze was a reasonable and necessary means to achieve NIFA's asserted end of ensuring the continued fiscal health of the county. View "Sullivan v. Nassau County Interim Finance Authority" on Justia Law
Wilson v. City of Kansas City
In this disability discrimination action, the Supreme Court reversed the award of litigation expenses but affirmed in all other respects the circuit court's judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding that no statute allows a circuit court to award as litigation expenses the expenses incurred by counsel for the prevailing party in a Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) case.Plaintiff sued the City of Kansas City for disability discrimination and retaliation under the MHRA. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor, awarding him actual and punitive damages. The circuit court entered judgment in conformity with the verdict. Upon Plaintiff's motion, the circuit court amended the judgment to award attorney fees and litigation expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the City's argument that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence and argument of Plaintiff's workers' compensation permanent partial disability rating was not preserved for appellate review; and (2) the circuit court erred in awarding Plaintiff litigation expenses because no statute authorizes an award of litigation expenses in an MHRA case. View "Wilson v. City of Kansas City" on Justia Law
Robinson v. Langenbach
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on a jury verdict for Plaintiff on her claim that, as directors of the closely held Perma-Jack Company, Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff as a shareholder, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) with respect to Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary claim, because Plaintiff did not sue Perma-Jack itself for lost wages or reinstatement, Plaintiff's claim was not actually one for wrongful termination, as Defendants argued; (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendants engaged in shareholder oppression and ordering Defendants to buy Plaintiff's Perma-Jack shares; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining the fair value of Plaintiff's shares and in denying Plaintiff prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. View "Robinson v. Langenbach" on Justia Law