Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Dr. Johnathan Slone began working as a general surgeon at El Centro Regional Medical Center (Center) on a locum tenens basis. Despite not being board-certified, he was granted full staff privileges in January 2015. In April 2016, Slone became an employee of the Imperial Valley MultiSpecialty Medical Group (IVMSMG) and later entered into a contract with Community Care IPA (IPA) to provide healthcare administrative services. In July 2017, Slone was informed by the Center that he had until July 2020 to become board-certified. Subsequently, he resigned from IVMSMG and began working full-time for IPA. In September 2017, the Center suspended his privileges for failing to complete medical records, and by March 2018, his suspension was deemed a voluntary resignation.Slone filed a fourth amended complaint in February 2021, alleging that the Center retaliated against him in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 after he reported concerns about patient care. The case proceeded to a bench trial solely on this cause of action. The Superior Court of Imperial County found in favor of the Center, concluding that Slone did not suffer retaliation and had not proven any economic or noneconomic damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that Slone did not carry his burden on appeal. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings that the Center did not retaliate against Slone for his complaints about patient care. The court also upheld the trial court's findings that Slone voluntarily resigned from his surgical practice to pursue a career as a medical administrator and did not suffer any economic or noneconomic damages as a result of the alleged retaliation. View "Slone v. El Centro Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Cristin Dent filed a Title VII racial discrimination claim against her former employer, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Dent received a notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 5, 2023, giving her until July 5, 2023, to file her complaint. Her attorney attempted to file the complaint on July 4, 2023, but failed to complete the online submission process. The complaint was ultimately filed on July 10, 2023, five days late. Dent requested that the district court deem her complaint timely by equitably tolling the statutory period for filing.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted Charles Schwab’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Dent’s complaint was time-barred. The court denied Dent’s request for equitable tolling, concluding that her attorney’s failure to follow the court’s instructions and local rules on submitting complaints did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting such relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, agreeing that equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy and that Dent’s attorney’s mistake was merely “garden variety” neglect, not an extraordinary circumstance. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for equitable tolling and in granting the motion to dismiss. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Dent v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Johnson sued the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) and its members in federal district court, alleging he was fired for reporting inefficiency and incompetence to the state auditor. His initial complaint asserted retaliation under the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), later amended to include First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, holding that Johnson failed to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) notice requirements and that the MWPA claim was barred by the MTCA’s one-year statute of limitations. The court also found Johnson’s First Amendment and breach-of-contract claims time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims. The defendants argued that the MTCA’s broad application and limited immunity waiver necessitate compliance with its procedural requirements for MWPA claims. Johnson countered that the MWPA provides a separate right to monetary relief and should not be subject to the MTCA’s requirements.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the certified question from the Fifth Circuit. The court concluded that the MWPA is a remedial statute separate from the MTCA. The MWPA does not prescribe a statute of limitations or notice requirement, and the reference to the MTCA’s damages cap does not incorporate its procedural requirements. Therefore, the court held that MWPA claims are not subject to the MTCA’s statute of limitations and notice requirements. The certified question was answered accordingly. View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

Amanda Jackson, a healthcare worker, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Methodist Health Services, after being placed on unpaid leave and subsequently discharged for refusing to be vaccinated for Covid-19 or undergo weekly testing. Jackson claimed that Methodist discriminated against her based on her religion, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by not accommodating her religious objections to the vaccine.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Jackson's complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Methodist had granted Jackson a religious exemption from the vaccine requirement, conditioned on her compliance with weekly Covid-19 testing, as mandated by an executive order from Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker. Jackson refused to comply with the testing requirement, leading to her unpaid leave and discharge. The court concluded that Methodist had reasonably accommodated Jackson's religious beliefs by granting the exemption and that the testing requirement did not burden her religious practices.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Methodist had reasonably accommodated Jackson's religious beliefs by exempting her from the vaccine mandate and requiring weekly testing, which was consistent with the governor's executive order. The court also rejected Jackson's claim under the Illinois Department of Public Health Act, finding that Methodist, as a private employer, was not exercising powers granted to the Department and was acting within its authority to set workplace safety rules. The court concluded that Jackson failed to state a claim for relief under both Title VII and the Illinois Department of Public Health Act. View "Jackson v. Methodist Health Services Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) challenging the County of Los Angeles and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) over the implementation of Penal Code sections 13670 and 13510.8. These sections, effective January 1, 2022, mandate law enforcement agencies to prohibit participation in law enforcement gangs and cooperate with investigations into such gangs. The OIG sent letters to 35 deputies, directing them to participate in interviews about their knowledge of and involvement in law enforcement gangs, and to display and provide photographs of gang-associated tattoos.The Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) had previously ruled that the County violated the Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO) by not negotiating the effects of a new ordinance with ALADS. ALADS filed an unfair labor practice claim with ERCOM and sought injunctive relief from the trial court to enjoin the OIG from proceeding with the interviews without first meeting and conferring with ALADS under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and the ERO.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the interview directive triggered the duty to meet and confer with ALADS under the MMBA. The court found that the interviews had significant and adverse effects on working conditions, particularly concerning potential disciplinary actions, and that the County failed to demonstrate a compelling need for immediate investigation without prior negotiation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court agreed that the OIG's decision to conduct interviews was a managerial decision but that the effects of this decision, including potential discipline and the manner of implementation, were subject to bargaining under the MMBA. The court found no error in the trial court's balancing of the interim harm, noting the lack of evidence suggesting that effects bargaining could not be performed expeditiously. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Five current and former employees of Parker-Hannifin Corporation, representing a class of participants in the Parker Retirement Savings Plan, filed a lawsuit against Parker-Hannifin Corporation and related entities. They alleged that Parker-Hannifin violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by imprudently retaining the Northern Trust Focus Funds, providing higher-cost shares, and failing to monitor its agents in their fiduciary duties.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that the plaintiffs did not state a viable claim of breach of fiduciary duty because they failed to identify meaningful benchmarks for comparison, and their evidence of high turnover rates and limited performance history was insufficient. The court also found the plaintiffs' allegations regarding higher-cost shares to be speculative and conclusory. Consequently, the court dismissed the failure-to-monitor claim as it was contingent on the success of the other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded facts to state a claim for imprudent retention of the Focus Funds, noting that the funds' high turnover rates and underperformance could indicate a flawed decision-making process. The court also found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Parker-Hannifin failed to negotiate for lower-cost shares, which could constitute a breach of the duty of prudence. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Johnson v. Parker-Hannifin Corp." on Justia Law

Marlon Quesada, a deputy sheriff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, was not promoted to sergeant despite taking the sergeant's examination in 2017 and 2019, scoring in band two and band one, respectively. Quesada had a mixed employment record, including two suspensions for misconduct and a 2015 investigation that was terminated due to a statute of limitations. Quesada claimed the Department improperly considered this time-barred investigation during the promotion process, which he argued was illegal.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Quesada's petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department to promote him and provide back pay and other damages. The trial court rejected Quesada's argument for a burden-shifting approach, similar to that used in discrimination cases, and found that Quesada did not establish that the Department's decision was illegal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the standard approach to civil litigation applies, where the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the elements of their claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The court declined to adopt a burden-shifting approach, noting that Quesada's case did not involve discrimination based on race or membership in a historically oppressed group. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Department's decision, including Quesada's mediocre performance evaluations and past misconduct. The court concluded that Quesada's policy arguments did not justify a departure from the standard legal approach. View "Quesada v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Ngozi Iweha, a Black woman born and educated in Nigeria, was hired as a staff pharmacist at Larned State Hospital (LSH) in Kansas. She alleged that she faced a hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Incidents included exclusion from projects, insensitive comments about Nigeria, and a confrontation with a coworker involving "slave trade beads." She was eventually placed on administrative leave and terminated following an investigation into her workplace conduct.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the incidents described by Iweha did not amount to a hostile work environment as they were not sufficiently severe or pervasive. The court also determined that Iweha failed to show that her termination was pretextual. The court noted that the employer's progressive discipline policy was discretionary and that the investigation into Iweha's conduct was independent and thorough. Additionally, the court found that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, as her complaints did not specifically allege discrimination based on race or national origin.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the incidents described by Iweha were not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. The court also found that Iweha failed to demonstrate that the reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court noted that the investigation into her conduct was independent and that the decision to terminate her was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. The court also upheld the finding that Iweha did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Iweha v. State of Kansas" on Justia Law

Gloria Cocuzzo, a long-term employee of Trader Joe's East Inc., claimed she was terminated due to age discrimination. Cocuzzo, who began working at Trader Joe's in 2003 and was promoted to Merchant in 2012, received positive performance reviews and regular pay increases. In February 2021, she purchased beer for her underage grandson, also an employee at the store. This incident was reported to her supervisor, Jennifer Gillum, who, after consulting with a regional vice president, decided to terminate Cocuzzo. Cocuzzo was given the option to retire but was ultimately terminated when she refused to sign a termination notice.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Trader Joe's and Gillum, finding no evidence of age discrimination. The court held that Trader Joe's had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Cocuzzo, namely her violation of the store's alcohol policy by purchasing alcohol for an underage individual. The court also found that Cocuzzo failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Trader Joe's had a legitimate reason for terminating Cocuzzo and that she did not provide adequate evidence to prove that this reason was a pretext for age discrimination. The court also found that the evidence presented by Cocuzzo, including her positive performance reviews and the treatment of other employees, did not support her claims of disparate treatment or discriminatory animus. Consequently, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Trader Joe's and Gillum. View "Cocuzzo v. Trader Joe's East Inc." on Justia Law

A Transportation Security Officer (TSO) claimed she was terminated due to her disability, gender, and parental status, and alleged retaliation for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Her employer, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), attributed her termination to her erratic attendance, including numerous tardies and unscheduled absences, despite multiple warnings.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of TSA on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination and retaliation. Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff's attendance issues persisted even when she was on a modified work schedule and that TSA had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation. However, it found that TSA had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, including the plaintiff's chronic absenteeism and failure to follow leave procedures. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that these reasons were pretextual or that TSA's actions were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for TSA on all counts, holding that the plaintiff did not meet her burden to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext and discriminatory or retaliatory intent. View "Serrano-Colon v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law