Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Apple Studios LLC offered Brent Sexton a film role on the condition that he get vaccinated. Sexton refused vaccination and sued Apple when it withdrew its offer and cast a different actor. Apple filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that its casting decision was protected activity in furtherance of free speech on public issues, including the vaccination controversy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The trial court denied Apple’s motion, finding that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had shown a probability of prevailing on his claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Apple’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that while Apple’s casting decision was protected activity, Sexton had demonstrated minimal merit in his claims. The court found that Apple’s interest in mandatory vaccination was not compelling and that Sexton had provided sufficient evidence to show he was qualified for the role with daily COVID-19 testing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that Apple’s casting decision was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute because it contributed to public discourse on vaccination policy and the portrayal of a historical figure. The court found that Sexton’s privacy claim failed because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and his discrimination claims failed because he was unqualified for the job due to his refusal to get vaccinated. The court granted Apple’s request for judicial notice and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Apple and for a determination of the fees and costs owed by Sexton to Apple. View "Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (the "Fund") seeking to collect withdrawal liability payments from several companies (the "Related Employers") that were commonly controlled with Borden Dairy Company of Ohio, LLC and Borden Transport Company of Ohio, LLC (the "Borden Ohio entities"). The Borden Ohio entities had previously withdrawn from the Fund and entered into a settlement agreement with the Fund during an arbitration process, which revised their withdrawal liability payments. The Borden Ohio entities later went bankrupt and ceased making payments, prompting the Fund to seek payment from the Related Employers.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed the Fund's suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ruling that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA) does not provide a statutory cause of action to enforce a private settlement agreement. The District Court also concluded that the Fund failed to meet the procedural requirements for notice and demand outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the settlement agreement is properly understood as a revision to the withdrawal liability assessment under the MPPAA. Since no employer began an arbitration with respect to the revised assessment, the Fund has a cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(1). The Court also determined that the Fund met the procedural requirements for notice and demand under 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1). Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's order dismissing the Fund's suit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension v. Laguna Dairy S.de R.L. de C.V." on Justia Law

Sycamore Cross Solar LLC applied for certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to construct and operate a solar facility in Isle of Wight County and Surry County, Virginia. The project aimed to generate up to 240 megawatts of power and included transmission lines and associated facilities. The West Virginia & Appalachian Laborers’ District Council (WVALDC) participated in the case, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (Commission) failed to consider the benefits to specific groups as required by the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA) and did not impose a local hiring condition.The Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing where Sycamore, WVALDC, and Commission staff presented their cases. Sycamore's witness testified about the project's economic benefits and commitment to local hiring, though no firm commitment was made. The Hearing Examiner recommended issuing the CPCNs without a local hiring condition but suggested notifying WVALDC about hiring timelines. The Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's findings but declined the notification requirement, leading WVALDC to seek reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the VCEA only required the Commission to consider the benefits to specified groups, not make specific findings. The Commission's consideration of the evidence and its decision not to impose a hiring-related condition were within its discretion. The Court found no abuse of discretion, as the Commission reasonably concluded that the statutory requirements were met without the need for additional hiring conditions. View "WVALDC v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

Susan Kinder, a white woman, was employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) and alleged racial discrimination when she was reassigned to a new role. She claimed violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Kinder had conflicts with a black colleague, Lydia Richardson, who accused her of making racially insensitive remarks. An investigation found the animosity was mutual. The prosecutor decided to reassign both employees, but Kinder viewed her new role as a demotion.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a right-to-sue letter on April 28, 2022, but Kinder’s counsel could not access it until July 6, 2022. Kinder filed her complaint on October 4, 2022, alleging Title VII and Equal Protection Clause violations. The MCPO moved for summary judgment, arguing the Title VII claim was untimely and that the office was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment to the MCPO, finding the Title VII claim was filed outside the 90-day window and that the MCPO was an arm of the state, immune from § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 90-day period for filing the Title VII claim began when Kinder’s counsel was notified on June 15, 2022, that the right-to-sue letter was available, making the October 4 filing untimely. The court also held that the MCPO is an arm of the state and not a suable “person” under § 1983, as the office is financially interdependent with the state and enjoys state indemnification for employment-related actions. View "Kinder v Marion County Prosecutor's Office" on Justia Law

Firefighter Robert Vande Krol filed a workers' compensation claim in January 2021, identifying his injury as brain cancer with an injury date of October 28, 2020. Vande Krol argued that the 2021 statute, which eased the burden on firefighters to establish a statutory presumption for certain diseases, should apply to his claim. This statute became effective nearly a year after his injury and eight months after he filed his claim.The Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) initially reviewed the case, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ determined that the 2017 statute applied, as it was in effect when Vande Krol received his diagnosis and filed his claim. The ALJ concluded that Vande Krol did not meet the requirements of the 2017 statute, specifically failing to link his cancer to a known carcinogen related to his work. Consequently, the ALJ denied his claim for compensation.The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed with the ALJ, ruling that the 2021 statute should apply because it became effective before the evidentiary hearing. The court set aside the ALJ's decision, concluding that the statutory presumption was procedural and did not result in an impermissible retroactive application.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and concluded that the 2021 statute does not apply to Vande Krol’s claim. The court held that the 2021 statute is substantive in nature and does not contain an express declaration of retroactivity. Therefore, the substantive right of the employer and insurer vested at the time Vande Krol filed his claim, making the 2017 statute applicable. The court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "VANDE KROL v SUPERSTITION/BENCHMARK" on Justia Law

The Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor filed a lawsuit against Levering Regional Health Care Center and Reliant Care Management Company for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The suit alleged that Levering deducted 30 minutes of pay for employees' meal breaks, despite knowing that employees routinely worked through these breaks. An investigation revealed that many employees did not receive lunch breaks or had them interrupted, and some were unaware of the policy to report missed breaks for compensation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Levering's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Levering did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the unpaid overtime work due to the employees' failure to use the established reporting policy. Additionally, the court found that the Secretary did not adequately establish the amount of overtime owed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that Levering may have failed to effectively communicate its policy to employees, as evidenced by the lack of time sheets submitted during the audit period compared to a later period. The court also found that the Secretary provided enough evidence to estimate the amount of unpaid overtime work, meeting the burden of showing the extent of the work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Micone v. Levering Regional HCC, L.LC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an at-will employee, was terminated by her employer, a private organization, after she sent emails to members of the Tennessee General Assembly expressing grievances about the employer's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The employer claimed the emails violated its policies. The plaintiff sued for retaliatory discharge, asserting her termination violated her right to petition under Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Hamilton County dismissed the complaint, holding that the right to petition did not apply to private employers. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the right to petition could serve as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, thus allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution is enforceable only against governmental entities, not private parties. The court emphasized that the historical context of the right to petition, dating back to early England, was intended to protect against government oppression, not to constrain private parties. The court noted that no state has held that the right to petition limits the ability of private employers to terminate at-will employees. Consequently, the court concluded that private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, holding that at-will employees cannot base claims of retaliatory discharge against private employers on the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution. View "Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee" on Justia Law

AFSCME Council 93 filed a petition to certify a bargaining unit consisting of thirteen employees from the Town of Barnstead’s police and fire departments. The Town objected, arguing that the employees' duties were too dissimilar to share a community of interest. The case was submitted to the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) for a decision on the written record.A PELRB hearing officer approved the proposed bargaining unit, concluding that the employees shared a sufficient community of interest to negotiate jointly. The officer noted that all employees worked in public safety, were subject to the Town’s employment terms, and interacted with each other at work. The Town requested a review, challenging the community of interest determination. The PELRB denied the request and certified AFSCME as the bargaining unit’s exclusive representative. The Town then appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the PELRB’s decision, focusing on whether the police and fire department employees shared a community of interest under RSA 273-A:8, I. The Court found that the PELRB’s decision was primarily based on the fact that all employees followed the Town’s personnel policies, which was insufficient to establish a community of interest. The Court noted differences in work schedules, duties, responsibilities, and organizational structures between the police and fire departments. The Court concluded that the record did not support the PELRB’s finding of a community of interest and reversed the PELRB’s decision approving the proposed bargaining unit. View "Appeal of Town of Barnstead" on Justia Law

Nicholas Guthneck was hired by Qlarant Integrity Solutions, LLC, a Maryland company working on federally funded contracts, as a health fraud investigator in September 2020. He worked remotely from Montana. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, President Biden issued Executive Order 14042 in September 2021, mandating that federal contractors ensure their employees were vaccinated against COVID-19. Qlarant implemented a vaccination policy in October 2021, requiring employees to submit proof of vaccination by November 24, 2021. Guthneck refused to disclose his vaccination status, citing Montana law (House Bill 702, codified as § 49-2-312, MCA), which prohibits employment discrimination based on vaccination status. Consequently, Qlarant terminated his employment on November 4, 2021.Guthneck filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB), which found reasonable cause to support his claim. The case was set for a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Qlarant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law. The OAH hearing officer agreed and dismissed the complaint. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Human Rights Commission (HRC), which vacated the dismissal, stating that the hearing officer lacked authority to determine preemption.Qlarant sought judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. The District Court reversed the HRC's decision, ruling that the hearing officer had the authority to determine preemption and correctly found that Executive Order 14042 preempted § 49-2-312, MCA. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the OAH hearing officer had the authority to determine whether Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law, as it involved statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional question. The Court also held that Executive Order 14042 expressly preempted § 49-2-312, MCA, for federal contractors like Qlarant during the relevant period. Thus, Qlarant was required to comply with the federal mandate, and Guthneck's termination for refusing to disclose his vaccination status was lawful. View "Qlarant v Guthneck" on Justia Law

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC transitioned a petroleum refinery into a renewable diesel production facility in 2021. During this transition, HollyFrontier reassigned work from hourly workers to salaried employees with higher education and technical expertise. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union Local 11-574 filed a grievance, alleging that this reassignment violated their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator ruled in favor of HollyFrontier on the reassignment issue but also decided that salaried employees should be included in the bargaining unit, an issue not submitted for arbitration.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and granted HollyFrontier's petition to vacate the arbitrator's decision regarding the inclusion of salaried employees in the bargaining unit. The court reasoned that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding an issue that was not submitted for arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur of the arbitration award. The court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by addressing an issue not submitted for arbitration. The parties had only submitted the issue of whether HollyFrontier's reassignment of work violated the CBA, and the arbitrator's decision to include salaried employees in the bargaining unit was beyond the scope of the submitted issue. The court emphasized that arbitration is limited to the issues the parties agree to submit, and the arbitrator must stay within those bounds. View "HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. United Steel Paper" on Justia Law