Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

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The DC Circuit granted a petition for review of the NLRB's determination that Circus committed three unfair labor practices related to a temporary employee. The court held that the Board engaged in unreasoned decisionmaking by finding unfair labor practices without substantial evidence on the record as a whole and by departing from announced standards in an arbitrary and capricious manner.   The court held that NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), requires an employee to affirmatively request union representation in a manner reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice. In this case, the employee's statement of fact standing alone was insufficient to trigger the protections of the National Labor Relations Act. The court also held that the Board misapplied the Wright Line mixed-motive test by failing to consider the employer's rebuttal case. Consequently, this error is fatal to the Board's finding that Circus violated section Section 8(a)(1) by suspending and terminating the employee because of a protected activity. Finally, the court held that the ALJ witness credibility determinations supporting the conclusion that the employee was threatened is patently insupportable. In regard to the unlawful termination finding, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Circus Circus Casinos, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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The DC Circuit denied a petition for review of the Authority's order finding that the Union committed unfair labor practices by attempting to dismantle the pool of arbitrators selected by a predecessor union and thereby impeding access to the grievance process.The court held that the Authority's conclusion that the Union committed unfair labor practices was not arbitrary and capricious. Rather, the Authority followed its own precedent when it determined that the Union's outreach to the two arbitrators amounted to unfair labor practices. The court also held that the Authority did not act contrary to law when it determined that the Union acted outside of the statutory protection for the expression of personal views; the Union has not demonstrated that its First Amendment rights were violated, seeing as it failed to identify a public concern implicated by its speech; the Authority's nontraditional remedy did not exceed its statutory authority because it was an appropriate exercise of its power to carry out the purposes of the Civil Service Reform Act by restoring the status quo ante; and the Union's application for leave to adduce additional evidence is denied because the Union has not established that the evidence is material or that there were reasonable grounds for the Union's failure to adduce it earlier. View "Independent Union of Pension Employees for Democracy and Justice v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the Texas Farm Animal Activity Act (the Act), Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 87.001-87.005, does not apply to ranchers and ranch hands, holding that the court of appeals did not err.The Act limits liability for injury to "a participant in a farm animal activity or livestock show" that results from an "inherent risk" of those activities. Raul Zuniga worked full-time for Conway and Marlene Waak to work cattle on a ranch, landscape, and cut hay. Zuniga died after being trampled. Plaintiffs, Zuniga's family, sued the Waaks, on wrongful death and survival claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Waaks, concluding that the Act barred Plaintiffs' claims. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Zuniga was not "a participant in a farm animal activity" for whose injuries and death the Act limits liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act does not cover ranchers and ranch hands and, therefore, did not shield the Waaks from liability for their negligence resulting in Zuniga's death. View "Waak v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on Plaintiff's survival action and rendered judgment for Defendant, holding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act because her evidence did not raise a fact issue under the intentional-injury exception to the Act's exclusive remedy.Plaintiff's husband, an employee of Defendant, a trucking and warehousing company, died when his rig ran off the highway and rolled over. Plaintiff filed suit, arguing that her husband fell asleep at the wheel due to the fatigue of being overworked. At issue was whether there was any evidence that Defendant believed the accident was substantially certain to result from Plaintiff's being overworked. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to raise a fact issue on the applicability of the intentional-injury exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act. View "Mo-Vac Service Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that a state agency violated the Texas Whistleblower Act, Tex. Gov't Code 554.002, when it fired one of its employees, holding that, under City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. 2000), no evidence demonstrated that the employee's report of a violation of state law more than one year earlier caused the agency to terminate the employee's employment.Laura Rodriguez, a regional manager for child-support services with the Office of the Attorney General, was fired fifteen months after reporting a violation of state law. Rodriguez sued the agency, claiming that it violated the Act because it fired her in retaliation for her protected activity. The trial court concluded that Rodriguez had made a good-faith report of a violation of law that caused the agency to terminate her employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record evidence demonstrated that Rodriguez was fired based on conduct unrelated to her protected activity and that no evidence established that activity was a but-for cause of her termination. View "Office of Attorney General of Texas v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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Young was serving a one-year probationary period working for the IRS when the agency removed her for misconduct. Young appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, challenging her removal as an unlawful adverse action and filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging that she had been terminated because of discrimination based on her national origin, disability, and prior protected EEO activity. An administrative judge (AJ) dismissed Young’s action, reasoning that Young was a probationary employee, not entitled to full appellate rights. Young filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, alleging whistleblower retaliation. The Office did not take action.Young then filed an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal, claiming that she had disclosed attendance violations and a hostile work environment, including refusal to accommodate her disabilities, and that she had been removed from her position in retaliation for those disclosures. The AJ ordered Young to make a nonfrivolous showing that she had made protected disclosures that led to her removal with detailed factual support. Young did not respond. The AJ dismissed her IRA appeal. Young contends that she was unable to file a timely response because of health issues, but she never sought an extension and she submitted other filings during the period she was given for filing a response. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Young failed to make nonfrivolous allegations that she made disclosures that the Board has jurisdiction to address in an IRA appeal, View "Young v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Plaintiff's request for attorney fees under S.D. Codified Laws 60-11-24 after Plaintiff prevailed in an action seeking unpaid wages, holding that because this case was removed for a bench trial section 60-11-24 did not apply and Plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorney fees.After Defendant fired Plaintiff, Plaintiff brought an action in small claims court for unpaid wages. Defendant removed the action to circuit court, which ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff requested attorney fees under section 60-11-24. The circuit court denied the request because the removal statute referenced in section 60-11-24 had been repealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that it could not award reasonable attorney fees under section 60-11-24 because of the repeal of S.D. Codified Laws 15-39-59; and (2) while attorney fees remain recoverable under section 60-11-24 for small claims cases removed to circuit court for a jury trial, this case was removed for a bench trial. View "Goin v. Houdashelt" on Justia Law

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Ehnert was placed at WPP by Staffmark as a temporary general laborer. It was understood that Ehnert would be considered for hire as a WPP employee. Ehnert suffered from various medical conditions but never requested accommodations. On May 23, 2012—the last day of his work placement—Ehnert was informed that he would not be hired by WPP. Ehnert completed applied for social security disability insurance (SSDI) benefits, representing that he had been unable to work due to a “disabling condition” since May 21, 2012. An ALJ granted Ehnert benefits. Ehnert then sued WPP and Staffmark, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and age, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Ehnert was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because a necessary element was lacking for his ADA and PHRA claims--that he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job as of the date WPP informed him that he would not be hired. Ehnert’s statements regarding his disability for SSDI purposes preclude his subsequent claim that, for the purposes of the ADA and the PHRA, he was “qualified” for the position; Ehnert failed to advance a reasonable explanation that reconciles those positions. View "Ehnert v. Washington Penn Plastic Co Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that Falcon Jet violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act when it failed to pay team leaders and production liaisons not less than one and one-half times their regular rates for hours worked in excess of forty per week after June 6, 2014. Sixteen other team leaders and production liaisons joined the action. Falcon Jet claimed exemptions for executive or administrative employees and highly-compensated employees. The district court held that the exemptions do not apply and awarded plaintiffs liquidated damages.The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred in granting plaintiffs summary judgment on the limited record, because the record did not establish that every plaintiff was not an exempt employee for the entire period at issue. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Coates v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp." on Justia Law

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In this labor dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), holding that Defendant did not carry its burden to establish that Plaintiff was its borrowed employee.Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence after he was injured while working on an offshore drilling rig owned by Defendant. Although Plaintiff was not Defendant's employee, Defendant claimed that workers' compensation benefits were Plaintiff's sole remedy because Plaintiff was acting as its "borrowed employee" under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The jury found that Plaintiff was not Defendant's borrowed employee and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The trial court granted Defendant's JNOV motion, finding that the submission of the borrowed-employee question to the jury was improper and that the evidence supported Defendant's borrowed-employee defense. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the borrowed-employee inquiry can be a fact question for the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that the borrowed-employee inquiry was a legal question for the court, not a fact question for the jury; but (2) Defendant did not establish that Plaintiff was its borrowed employee. View "W&T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu" on Justia Law