Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Montana Department of Labor & Industry v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court
The Supreme Court held that service is not required when the Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Employment Relations Division (DLI) files an application for enforcement of judgment when it seeks enforcement of a final agency decision in a wage claim action.DLI applied to the district court for enforcement of judgment against a Billings restaurant on behalf of Jordan Carillo for unpaid wages pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-3-212(1). DLI did not serve the restaurant under Mont. R. Civ. P. 4. The district court concluded that the filing of an application for enforcement of judgment initiates as lawsuit that that due process requires service of process. DLI petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. After considering DLI's petition as one of a declaratory judgment, the Supreme Court held (1) DLI need not follow Mont. R. Civ. P. 4 service of process requirements when applying for enforcement of judgment in Montana's district courts in wage claim matters pursuant to section 39-3-212(1); but (2) the statutes do not exempt DLI from compliance with Mont. R. Civ. P. 5. View "Montana Department of Labor & Industry v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law
City of Cranston v. International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendants, including a Union and an Employee, and ordering the City of Cranston to arbitrate the Union's grievance filed on behalf of Employee after the trial justice found that Employee, a police officer, remained a member of the bargaining unit, holding that the trial justice did not err.After ending Employee's injured-on-duty benefits, the City terminated his employment. The Union filed a grievance alleging that the City's actions violated the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City. The City denied the grievance, and the Union filed a demand for arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. When a dispute arose about whether an arbitrator should make the determination of whether the dispute was arbitrable the trial justice decided that he should decide that issue because, if a determination was made that Employee was retired, then the Union's grievance would not be arbitrable. The trial justice ruled that Employee had not retired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee did not retire, and therefore, the Union had standing to pursue a grievance on his behalf and its grievance was substantively arbitrable; and (2) therefore, the trial justice did not err in granting the Union's motion to compel arbitration. View "City of Cranston v. International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law, Rhode Island Supreme Court
Warren Technology, Inc. v. UL LLC
Warren, a manufacturer of unitary electric (UE) heaters for HVAC systems, filed suit against its competitor, Tutco and against a Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL), UL. Warren's claims are based on its allegations that, UL certified Tutco's UE heaters as compliant, even though the heaters are not actually compliant. Warren sought damages and injunctive relief under the Lanham Act for false advertising and contributory false advertising, damages under the common law of unfair competition, and declaratory and injunctive relief under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Tutco's and UL's joint motion to dismiss. In this case, Warren calls UL's authorization to Tutco to use UL's mark, and Tutco's advertisements to that effect, "misrepresentations," but it really means nothing more than (by its lights) a "misinterpretation" of UL 1995. However, it does not follow, that even a misinterpretation of UL 1995 is a falsity -- or a "deceptive act" within the meaning of the Lanham Act -- rather than a matter of opinion, provided it was made in good faith and in accordance with OSHA's criteria for independence, procedural regularity, etc. The court held that, because all of Warren's claims against UL and Tutco are based upon the same allegation of falsity, they fail for want of a misrepresentation or a deceptive act. View "Warren Technology, Inc. v. UL LLC" on Justia Law
Olabi v. Neutron Holdings, Inc.
The Private Attorney General Act (Labor Code 2698) allows an employee, as a proxy for state enforcement agencies, to sue an employer on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees for Labor Code violations. When the parties have an arbitration agreement, California law blocks the employer from enforcing that agreement with respect to representative PAGA claims for civil penalties; the agreement may be enforceable with respect to other claims, including claims for victim-specific relief (like unpaid wages). Lime rents electric scooters. Olabi entered into an agreement to locate, recharge, and redeploy Lime's scooters. The agreement required the parties to arbitrate “any and all disputes,” including Olabi’s classification as an independent contractor but contained an exception for PAGA representative actions.Olabi sued, alleging Lime intentionally misclassified him and others as independent contractors, resulting in Labor Code violations; he included claims under the Unfair Competition Law and PAGA. Lime petitioned to compel arbitration, arguing Olabi was required to arbitrate independent contractor classification disputes and that the PAGA exception did not cover the unfair competition claim or the PAGA claim to the extent that Olabi sought victim-specific relief. Olabi voluntarily dismissed his unfair competition claim and disavowed any claim for victim-specific relief. The trial court denied Lime’s petition and granted Olabi leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed. The language of the arbitration agreement broadly excludes PAGA actions View "Olabi v. Neutron Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law
Rosas v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
At issue in this case was the correct interpretation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-750(E)(5), which provides that income earned by any individual who performed certain services while employed by an entity that provides such services to or on behalf of an "educational institution" cannot be used to qualify for unemployment during breaks between academic terms if that person is guaranteed reemployment.Plaintiffs were employees of Chicanos For La Cause (CPLC), a nonprofit corporation that administered federally funded Early Head Start and Migrant Seasonal Head Start programs and provided services to help school districts comply with their obligations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. When the summer break began, Plaintiffs applied for unemployment insurance benefits from Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), which granted benefits. The ADES Appeals Board reversed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to ADES to award unemployment benefits to two plaintiffs and for further proceedings to resolve the claims of the remaining plaintiffs, holding that section 23-750(E)(5) applies to plaintiffs only if they performed services for CPLC that CPLC supplied to the school districts. View "Rosas v. Arizona Department of Economic Security" on Justia Law
Cavitt v. D&D Services, LLC d/b/a Novus Auto Glass
In August 2015, Kiel Cavitt was working for D&D Services, repairing a motor home’s windshield, when he fell from a scaffold onto concrete and fractured his right elbow. He suffered what was known as a “terrible triad” fracture, which had three components: dislocation of the elbow (which can result in ligament injury), fracture of the radial head, and fracture of the ulnar coronoid process. Cavitt had surgery which included an implanted prosthesis for the radial head. The surgeon testified that "typical" complications following terrible triad fracture surgery include pain, decreased range of motion, infection and the "need for further surgery." Cavitt appeared to recover from the surgery, but several months later, he began to experience "shooting electrical pain" in his elbow. Doctors could not determine specifically what was causing the pain, and attempted to manage the pain with medication. Cavitt was unable to return to his former work as a glazier because of restrictions on his use of the arm, and he started a new job delivering pizza. Cavitt sought an order from the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board requiring his employer to pay for medical care for the ongoing elbow issues for the rest of his life. The Board ordered only that the employer “pay future medical costs in accordance with the [Alaska Workers’ Compensation] Act,” and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. The Alaska Supreme Court construed the Commission’s decision as requiring the employer to provide periodic surveillance examinations until another cause displaces the work injury as the substantial cause of the need for this continuing treatment, and with that construction - consistent with the medical testimony - the Court affirmed. View "Cavitt v. D&D Services, LLC d/b/a Novus Auto Glass" on Justia Law
Rogers v. Burch Corporation
Joshua Rogers appealed a preliminary injunction preventing Rogers from soliciting any employees or clients of Burch Corporation, his former employer, as contractually agreed to under restrictive covenants in an employment agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court determined there was nothing justiciable concerning the preliminary injunction because the nonsolicitation clause in the employment agreement expired, at the latest, on December 6, 2019. Therefore, the case was moot and the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Rogers v. Burch Corporation" on Justia Law
Ramirez v. Brown
In this personal injury action brought pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of one of Plaintiff's co-employee supervisors, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed.Plaintiff was injured when his hand and arm became entangled in a pipe-straightening machine at his place of employment. Plaintiff sued his co-employee supervisors - Elvin Brown, Bill Wartenbee, and Bryce Mitchell - claiming they were not entitled to immunity from liability under the Act because they intentionally acted to cause physical harm or injury to Plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Brown and Wartenbee were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and were immune from liability for Plaintiff's injury; and (2) Plaintiff established genuine issues of material fact against Mitchell precluding summary judgment. The Court remanded the claim against Mitchell for trial. View "Ramirez v. Brown" on Justia Law
McIntyre v. Nissan North America, Inc.
The Fifth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion.The court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that he was wrongfully discharged for having a firearm in his vehicle parked in the employee lot. Plaintiff argued that his discharge was wrongful under Miss. Code. Ann. 45-9-55(1).The court held that the section 45-9-55(2) exception applies because the general public's access to Lot 1B was restricted or limited. Therefore, the statutory exception to the right of an employee to have a firearm in his vehicle applies in this case. The court declined to consider Nissan's remaining arguments. View "McIntyre v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law
Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hospital
In 2015, Cartwright sued his former employer, alleging discrimination based on his race and sex under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; discrimination based on race, 42 U.S.C. 1981; and age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. 623. The judge appointed counsel for the limited purpose of settlement negotiations. The parties did not reach an agreement. The attorney was relieved of the limited representation. Cartwright failed to respond to discovery requests and filed many motions. The judge recruited a lawyer to represent him pro bono but later permitted the attorney to withdraw. The judge recruited another pro bono lawyer. After 14 months and more than 530 hours of work, the third attorney moved to withdraw citing substantial, irreconcilable disagreements with Cartwright. The judge granted the defendants partial summary judgment. Cartwright responded with multiple motions, accusing the judge of bias. The defendants moved to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The judge recruited another pro bono attorney, then denied the motion as moot. Counsel later was allowed to withdraw. After four years and repeated warnings, the judge dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reminding "judges that they need not and should not recruit volunteer lawyers for civil claimants who won’t cooperate ... Pro bono representation of indigent civil litigants is a venerable tradition ... courts must be careful stewards of this limited resource.” View "Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hospital" on Justia Law