Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries

by
The Sheriff's Office appealed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on First Amendment wrongful-discharge claims brought by former Deputy Sheriffs Timothy Bruce and Robert Curtis. Bruce and Curtis's complaints alleged that Cole, the newly elected sheriff, discharged them for political reasons in violation of their First Amendment rights.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity, holding that political loyalty is an appropriate requirement for the job of deputy sheriff under Missouri law because of the closeness and cooperation required between sheriffs and their deputies in fulfilling overlapping duties. In this case, Cole did not violate Bruce and Curtis's constitutional rights. Consequently, the county is also entitled to summary judgment on the claims against it. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Curtis v. Christian County" on Justia Law

by
Purtue, a Dodge Correctional Institution officer, reported that inmate Reddick had thrown an empty box from his cell, hitting her. Reddick was taken to segregation. A video recording showed the box flying out of Reddick’s cell but the box didn’t fly toward Purtue nor strike her. Work Rule 6 prohibits correctional officers from falsifying records or knowingly giving false information to prison authorities. Reddick stated that he and Purtue had quarreled earlier and that he threw the box out of frustration but purposefully directed it away from Purtue. Purtue reiterated that the box had hit her. After watching the video, Purtue agreed that the box had not hit her but maintained that something else hit her. The investigators doubted that story because on the video Purtue did not react. The warden decided to skip progressive discipline and immediately terminate Purtue’s employment. Executive Directive #2 classifies “[l]ying or providing false information” as “Serious Acts of Misconduct” that may result in termination. Other officials agreed with that recommendation. A memorandum identified comparators for Purtue—one man and two women—all of whom were fired for lying or falsifying records.Purtue filed suit, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The investigation accurately summarized Purtue’s conduct. Purtue’s expert testimony was speculative and offered nothing more than his opinion that termination was unwise but not necessarily pretextual. Although there were gender disparities in a statistical report, those disparities revealed little about Purtue's dismissal. View "Purtue v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

by
In 2009, Avalos was confirmed as the Under Secretary of Agriculture for Marketing and Regulatory Programs at the USDA. Avalos met Trevino, also a USDA political appointee. Trevino later moved to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and was involved in developing a vacancy announcement and reviewing candidates for the Field Office Director position in HUD’s Albuquerque office. Avalos applied, but the certificate of eligible candidates from which selection would be made listed only a preference-eligible veteran. Treviño sought to consider additional candidates; she did not complete a pass-over request but let the certificate expire and began revising the vacancy announcement. HUD again announced the vacancy. Avalos applied and was the only candidate listed on the certificate. Avalos got the position.During a regular review of appointments, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) noted that HUD had appointed Avalos without OPM approval and advised HUD that it would not have approved the appointment. OPM instructed HUD to “regularize” the appointment. HUD reconstructed the hiring record and found no intent to grant an unauthorized preference but determined that it could not certify that the appointment met merit and fitness requirements because of Treviño’s involvement. Avalos received a Notice of Proposed Termination. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board correctly found that it had jurisdiction to review Avalos’s appointment and substantial evidence supports the decision to remove Avalos to correct his illegal appointment. View "Avalos v. Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

by
In this dispute over the amount that air ambulance providers may recover from workers' compensation insurers, the Supreme Court held that Texas law requiring that private insurance companies reimburse the fair and reasonable medical expenses of injured workers is not preempted by a federal law deregulating aviation and that federal law does not require Texas to mandate reimbursement of more than a fair and reasonable amount for air ambulance services.PHI Air Medical, LLC, an air ambulance provider, argued that the federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempted the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's (TWCA) fee schedules and reimbursement standards. An administrative law judge held that PHI was entitled to reimbursement under the TWCA's standards. On judicial review, the trial court declared that the ADA did not preempt the TWCA's reimbursement provisions. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the price of PHI's service to injured workers is not significantly affected by a reasonableness standard for third-party reimbursement of those services, the ADA does not preempt that standard; and (2) the ADA does not require that Texas compel private insurers to reimburse the full charges billed for those services. View "Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. PHI Air Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) dismissing Plaintiff's workers' compensation claim against Ismael Huerta and LFA Inc. because Plaintiff failed to prove he was an employee of Huerta, holding that the WCC did not clearly err in its determination that Plaintiff was not an employee of Huerta.Plaintiff was working on a roofing job with Huerta when he slipped and fell from the roof. Plaintiff brought a claim against Huerta and LFA, claiming that Huerta was his employer and that Huerta and LFA conducted a scheme to avoid liability under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The WCC dismissed the action, finding that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he was Huerta's employee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that Plaintiff failed to prove his employee status. View "Aboytes-Mosqueda v. LFA Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) granted University Professional and Technical Employees' (UPTE's) petition for unit modification to add a new classification, systems administrators, into a preexisting bargaining unit. The University of California refused to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment for systems administrators. PERB granted UPTE's unfair practice charge against the University. The University appealed, arguing that the systems administrator classification did not share a community of interest with the existing bargaining unit as required under the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Gov. Code 3560) and that PERB erred in not requiring proof of majority support by the unrepresented systems administrators subject to the unit modification petition.The court of appeal denied the petition. PERB’s finding that a community of interest exists is supported by substantial evidence. The job descriptions reflect a similarity in “common skills” and “job duties” between systems administrators and employees in the unit. The University fails to cite any evidence suggesting a disparity between the job descriptions and the employees’ actual skill sets. PERB properly counted the number of systems administrators at the time the petition was filed; PERB’s holding that it lacked the discretion to require proof of majority support from UPTE was not clearly erroneous. View "Regents of the University of California v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

by
Some public-sector employees join their local unions; others do not. If a collective-bargaining agreement contains an “agency-fee” provision, both union members and nonmembers must pay a portion of union dues. A Pennsylvania statute authorizes such a “fair share fee” arrangement, 71 Pa. Stat. 575(b). Nonmembers pay only the amount spent on the union’s collective-bargaining activities and do not subsidize political activity. In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME, holding that forcing nonmembers to pay agency fees violates the First Amendment, striking down an Illinois statute. Janus said nothing about Pennsylvania law but its holding was clear.Public-school teachers who had to pay agency fees under Pennsylvania law sued, seeking a declaration that the agency-fee provisions in their collective-bargaining agreements, and the Pennsylvania statutes authorizing them, were unconstitutional. When the Supreme Court issued its Janus decision, the Pennsylvania State Education Association instructed public schools to stop deducting agency fees from teachers’ paychecks and set up refund procedures. Pennsylvania’s Department of Labor and its Attorney General notified public-sector employers that they could no longer collect agency fees. The district court dismissed, noting the change in the law and the unions’ compliance with it. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding the case moot. The teachers no longer face any harm. Just because a statute may be unconstitutional does not mean that a federal court may declare it so; without any real dispute over the statute’s scope or enforceability. View "Hartnett v. Pennsylvania State Education Association" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's award of employee benefits to Plaintiff, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to employee benefits under the City of Edgemont's Personnel Manual.Plaintiff sued the City of Edgemont alleging that he was owed employee benefits under the Manual. The circuit court found that Plaintiff was a City employee as of December 3, 2012 but only awarded employee benefits under the Manual after Plaintiff was appointed City Engineer/Code Officer on May 6, 2014. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Plaintiff any additional employee benefits under the Manual from December 3, 2012 to May 6, 2014; (2) the circuit court erred in granting benefits under the Manual from May 6, 2014 through May 5, 2015 because, as a temporary or seasonal employee, Plaintiff did not qualify for the benefits afforded to regular full-time or part-time employees; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees because he did not prevail on his wage claim. View "Koopman v. City Of Edgemont" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Appellee in this workers' compensation case, holding that an error led to the exclusion of relevant evidence and incorrect jury instructions that impacted the jury's verdict, which prejudiced Appellants.Fern Johnson sued her former employer and its workers' compensation carrier (collectively, Appellants) alleging bad faith and conversion based on their denial of previously ordered workers' compensation medical benefits. A jury returned a verdict for Johnson. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it concluded that Appellants' legal obligation to pay Johnson's benefits was not fairly debatable; but (2) the circuit court erred when it determined that the lack of a reasonable basis to deny benefits necessarily impacted the jury's consideration of the separate bad faith element concerning Appellants' knowledge. View "Johnson v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, Konica service technicians, were required to drive their personal vehicles, containing Konica’s tools and parts, to customer sites. Technicians did not report to an office but usually drove from home to the first customer of the day and, at the end of the day, from the last customer to home. Plaintiffs sought wages for time spent commuting to and from the first and last work locations and reimbursement for mileage incurred during those commutes. The court determined that the commute time was not compensable, citing wage order 4-2001 and Labor Code 2802. The court of appeal reversed. If carrying tools and parts in a technician’s personal vehicle during the commute was optional, then the technician was not “subject to the control of [defendant]” for purposes of determining “hours worked.” Even if a technician was required “as a practical matter” to carry tools and parts during the commute, the technician would not be “subject to the control of [defendant]” during the commute if the technician was able to use the time effectively for the technician’s own purposes. However, if a technician was required during the commute to carry a volume of tools and parts that did not allow the technician to use ‘the time effectively for his own purposes, the technician would be “subject to the control of [defendant]” for purposes of determining “hours worked” and entitlement to wages. There are triable issues of material fact regarding those issues. View "Oliver v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law