Justia Labor & Employment Law Opinion Summaries
Andrews v. Lombardi
In this action challenging an ordinance passed in 2011 requiring retirees from the City's police and fire departments to enroll in the federal Medicare program upon reaching the age of eligibility instead of continuing to have the City pay for their private health insurance for life the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the final judgment of the superior court in favor of the City, holding that the trial judge misconceived the evidence with respect to the health care benefits that Plaintiffs were receiving from the City.Most police or firefighter retirees filed suit challenging the ordinance, and many settled. Some retirees opted out of the settlement and pursued their claims through a bench trial. The trial justice found in favor of the City. The Supreme Court held (1) with respect to Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, violation of the Takings Clause, and promissory estoppel, the superior court's judgment was proper; and (2) as to Plaintiffs' Contract Clause claims, the trial justice overlooked or misconceived evidence in several crucial respects. The Court remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with the provisions pertaining to the Medicare Ordinance as set forth in the final and consent judgment in the lawsuit from which Plaintiffs opted out. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law
Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley
The DC Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination against Cushman & Wakefield's Chief Executive Officer of the Americas for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the fiduciary shield doctrine.The court held that the fiduciary shield doctrine lacks any basis in either the Due Process Clause or the transacting-business prong of the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, D.C.CODE 13-423(a)(1). The court also held that the district court's dismissal erroneously denied plaintiff's request in the alternative for limited jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, on remand, the district court may either (i) determine on the current record that defendant's suit-related contacts (made in his capacity as CEO of the Americas and otherwise) satisfy the minimum-contacts standard, or (ii) grant jurisdictional discovery to permit development of the record on defendant's contacts with the District of Columbia. View "Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley" on Justia Law
Button v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp.
Plaintiff filed suit against the railroad under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging that the railroad discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and her use of FMLA leave when it terminated her. The railroad maintains that plaintiff was terminated as part of a reduction in force (RIF) without discriminatory intent.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the railroad, holding that the affidavits that the district court relied on were not sham affidavits; plaintiff failed to present any evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that her gender was a contributing factor in her termination; the RIF was legitimate and plaintiff failed to demonstrate evidence showing that her gender was a contributing factor in her termination; and thus the district court properly granted the railroad summary judgment on plaintiff's MHRA gender-discrimination claim. Because plaintiff does not offer any direct evidence that the railroad terminated her in the RIF for exercising her FMLA rights, the court analyzed her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. In this case, the railroad proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff and she failed to show that the stated reason was a pretext for FMLA discrimination. View "Button v. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp." on Justia Law
Lyons v. Katy Independent School District
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination and retaliation.Regardless of whether the "transitory and minor" nature of the impairment was part of plaintiff's prima facie case or an affirmative defense to her claim of "regarded as" disability discrimination, the court held that the school district is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's "regarded as" disability-based discrimination claim. In this case, there are no facts in dispute regarding the transitory and minor nature of the perceived impairment from plaintiff's lap band surgery. Although the court held that the district court erred in its determination that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she failed to present sufficient evidence of a causal connection, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the school district on the retaliation claim because plaintiff failed to meet her summary judgment burden of pointing to evidence demonstrating that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the school district for its actions were pretextual. The school district proffered that plaintiff was removed from coaching basketball because it was the school district's understanding that she did not like coaching basketball and did not want to do so. View "Lyons v. Katy Independent School District" on Justia Law
Jeffords v. BP Corporation North America, Inc.
Jeffords, a crane operator on a construction project at an oil refinery, fell seven feet from the catwalk on the body of a crane and injured his feet and back. He sued the project owner and several of its contractors for negligence. While this lawsuit was pending, Jeffords died, apparently of unrelated causes.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. None of the defendants whom Jeffords sued owed him a duty of care. BP owns and operates the Whiting, Indiana oil refinery and contracted with Fluor to provide engineering, procurement, and construction management services. BP and Fluor each entered into separate contracts with MCI to provide construction services. BP also contracted with Central Rent‐a‐Crane, Jeffords’s employer. Central had no contractual relationship with Fluor or MCI; Central is not a defendant because the workers’ compensation system would apply to Jeffords’s injuries on the job. Each of the plaintiff’s arguments that the defendants assumed a duty of care is defeated by the undisputed material facts and contractual provisions in the record, and by the limits of the relevant Indiana Supreme Court cases. View "Jeffords v. BP Corporation North America, Inc." on Justia Law
Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
In this case concerning the application of various California wage and hour laws to flight attendants who work primarily outside California's territorial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that California's wage statement laws apply only to flight attendants who have their base of work operations in California.Plaintiffs, flight attendants for Delta Air Lines, Inc., filed a putative class action in federal court alleging that Delta violates California labor law by failing to pay its flight attendants minimum wage. The federal district court ruled in favor of Delta. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked that the Supreme Court resolve unsettled questions of California law underlying Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court held (1) California's wage statement laws apply only to flight attendants who have their base of work operations in California, and the same is true of California laws governing the timing of wage payments; and (2) whether or not California's minimum wage laws apply to work performed on the ground during Plaintiffs' brief and episodic stops in California, the challenged pay scheme complies with the state requirement that employers pay their employees at least the minimum wage for all hours worked. View "Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law, Supreme Court of California
Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.
The Supreme Court held that the question of whether Plaintiffs, pilots and flight attendants who resided in California but performed most of their work in airspace outside California's jurisdiction, were entitled to California-compliant wage statements depended on whether Plaintiffs' principal place of work was in California.Plaintiffs worked for a global airline based outside California. Plaintiffs were not paid according to California wage law but according to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement entered under federal law. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the airline-employer was required to provide Plaintiffs with wage statements that met the requirements of California law. The Supreme Court held (1) workers are entitled to California-complaint wage statements if they are based for work purposes in California; and (2) for interstate transportation workers who do not perform a majority of their work in any one state, this test is satisfied when California serves as the workers' base of work operations, regardless of their place of residence or whether a collective bargaining agreement governs their pay. View "Ward v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law, Supreme Court of California
Williams v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to UPS in an action brought by plaintiff for retaliation and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The court held that plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because he cannot link protected conduct with his demotion. In this case, plaintiff concedes that his supervisor and his supervisor's supervisor did not know about the statements plaintiff made on two different occasions. The court also held that plaintiff's race discrimination claim failed at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework because UPS provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the action: plaintiff was failing to perform his duties. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS's explanation for his demotion was pretext for discrimination. View "Williams v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law
County of Fresno v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff’s Assoc.
The county petitioned for a writ of mandate to reverse an administrative hearing decision in favor of plaintiffs, two sheriff's deputies, who alleged that their reassignments violated both the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the county and the employee organization, and an established past practice that deputies would not be involuntarily reassigned in the absence of disciplinary issues, documented performance issues, layoffs, or pending disability retirement.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision granting the petition, holding that the arbitrator who heard the matter abused his discretion because his findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, plaintiffs failed to establish a violation by the county of the express terms of the MOU; the association failed to establish that the MOU was ambiguous or silent regarding reassignment of employees, and therefore there was no need to consider the past practices of the parties to determine whether the county violated its obligation to negotiate a change in practice; substantial evidence did not establish an unequivocal and clearly enunciated past practice that the department would not make involuntary transfers in the absence of a disciplinary action, documented performance issue, layoff, or pending disability retirement; the arbitrators finding that a binding past practice existed is unsupported by the record; and substantial evidence does not support a finding that the department made a unilateral change in its own established past practice when it reassigned plaintiffs out of their specialty assignments and back to patrol against their wishes. View "County of Fresno v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Assoc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Labor & Employment Law
Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC
Plaintiff Sofia Barriga filed this lawsuit against 99 Cents Only Stores LLC, (99 Cents) individually, and on behalf of similarly situated current and former nonexempt employees of 99 Cents hired before October 1, 1999, pleading various Labor Code violations and violation of the unfair competition law. Plaintiff alleged 99 Cents had a zero-tolerance policy that required its stores to lock their doors at closing time, therefore, forcing nonexempt, nonmanagerial employees, who worked the graveyard shift and clock out for their meal break or at the end of their shift, to wait for as long as 15 minutes for a manager with a key to let them out of the store. According to plaintiff, 99 Cents did not pay its employees for the time they had to wait be let out, and the policy denied employees their full half-hour meal break. Plaintiff moved the trial court to certify two classes: (1) “Off the Clock Class,” and (2) “Meal Period Class.” 99 Cents opposed the certification motion, contending there was no community of interests among putative class members, and the lack of common issues among putative class members would render a class action unmanageable. Plaintiff moved to strike 174 declarations of employee declarants who were members of the proposed classes on the grounds the process by which they had been obtained was improper, and because they were substantively inconsistent with the subsequent deposition testimony of 12 of declarants. Concluding it lacked the statutory authority to strike the declarations, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to strike. And, based on all 174 declarations, the court concluded plaintiff had not demonstrated a community of interests or a commonality of issues among putative class members. Plaintiff appealed those orders. The Court of Appeal found the record demonstrated the trial court in this case was unaware of the need to scrutinize 99 Cents’ declarations carefully, and was either unaware of or misunderstood the
scope of its discretion to either strike or discount the weight to be given the 174 declarations, including the declarations of employees who were not members of the putative classes, if it concluded they were obtained under coercive or abusive circumstances. The orders denying plaintiff’s motion to strike 99 Cents’ declarations and class certification motion were reversed, and the matter remanded for reconsideration. View "Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC" on Justia Law